KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is 46 years old and works as a system administrator for a defense contractor. He
was born in Libya, and his immediate family remains in that country as citizens and residents.
Because he presented no facts about his family, he failed to mitigate security concerns arising from
foreign influence.
CASENO: 06-18072.h1
DATE: 03/29/2007
DATE:  March 29, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-18072
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
NOREEN A. LYNCH
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Melvin A. Howry, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is 46 years old and works as a system administrator for a defense contractor. He
was born in Libya, and his immediate family remains in that country as citizens and residents.
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Because he presented no facts about his family, he failed to mitigate security concerns arising from
foreign influence. Clearance is denied.
This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, dated February 20, 1960, as amended, and DoD Directive1
5220.6, dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified (Directive).
The government submitted seven items in support of its contention.2
Item 1 (Applicant's Security Clearance Application (SF 86), dated May 25, 2005) at 1-34.3
Id.4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 11, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued to
Applicant Statements of Reasons (SOR) stating it was unable to find that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance.  The SOR, which is in essence the1
administrative complaint, alleged security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), of the
revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on December 29, 2005, and implemented by the
Department of Defense effective September 1, 2006. The revised guidelines were provided to
Applicant when the SOR was issued.
In a sworn statement, dated October 23, 2006, Applicant responded to the SOR allegations
and elected to have his case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel
submitted the government's written case on January 23, 2007, and provided a complete copy of the
file of relevant material (FORM)  to Applicant, along with notice of his opportunity to file objections2
and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the disqualifying conditions. Applicant received
the FORM on February 1, 2007. Applicant did not submit any additional information. The case was
assigned to me on March 14, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the factual allegations pertaining to foreign influence under Guideline
B (subparagraphs 1.a through 1.f). Those admissions are incorporated as findings of fact. In addition,
after a thorough and careful review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the following findings of
fact:
Since 1991, Applicant who is  46-years-old, has worked as a system administrator for a
defense contractor. He was born in Libya in 1960, and was raised and educated in that country.
However, he came to the United States to study for his undergraduate degree. He received a degree
in computer sciences in 1997. He submitted a security clearance application on May 25, 2005.3
While in Libya, Applicant married a Tunisian woman. He was divorced in 1995 in the United
States. He remarried an American woman, but they are now divorced. He and his wife have four
children who are United States citizens by birth. He became a naturalized citizen on October 6, 1988,
and was issued a U.S. passport in 2002. 4
Over the years, Applicant has traveled extensively. Between 1995 and 2005, he took several
international trips for business (United Kingdom), and returned to Tunisia for pleasure many times
to visit his family.  His mother is deceased. However, his father and step-mother are citizens and
Item 7 (Interrogatories, dated September 28, 2006).5
Consular Information Sheet - Libya, united States Department of State, dated July 27, 2006 at 2.6
Country reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 - Libya, United States Department of State, dated march 8,7
2006.
Background Note: Tunisia, United States Department of State, dated October 2006 at 6.8
Id. at 3-6.9
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residents of Libya. He has seven brothers who are citizens and residents of Libya. His father-in-law
and mother-in-law live in Tunisia. Applicant maintains weekly contact with his in-laws. Other than
addresses and dates of birth of his family members, as noted on his security clearance application
(SF 86), Applicant has provided no information regarding his family. Other than admitting to their
existence, Applicant failed to provide any pertinent facts in response to the SOR.5
The government submitted information regarding Libya and Tunisia. It notes that the U.S.
withdrew from diplomatic relations with Libya in 1973 to protest its support for revolutionary and
terror groups. Although the Libyan Government's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism was
rescinded on June 30, 2006, recent worldwide terrorist alerts have stated that extremists groups
continue to plan terrorists attacks against U.S. interests in that region.6
The country maintains an extensive security apparatus that includes police and military units,
multiple intelligence services, local Revolutionary committees and "Purification" committees.
Security forces have the authority to impose sentences without trial, and the various Security forces
committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.  7
Tunisia  has sought to maintain good relations with the West, while playing an active role
in Arab and African regional bodies.  Tunisian-U.S. relations suffered briefly in 1985 after the Israeli8
raid on the Tunis PLO headquarters, in 1988 after the Tunisian assassination of a PLO terrorist , and
again in 1990 during the Gulf War. Tunisia has an active schedule of joint military exercises with
the U.S. The Department of State, however, warns that in late 2002 and early 2003 tourists were
kidnapped in the Sahara desert areas of southeastern Algeria, and although American citizens have
not bee n attacked, Al-Queda terrorists attacked a synagogue and many Western tourists were killed.9
In assessing the vulnerability to exploitation of Applicant's family, it is helpful to consider
several factors. Even friendly nations can have profound disagreement with the U.S. over matters
they view as important to their vital interests or national security. We know friendly nations have
engaged in espionage against the U.S., especially in the economic, scientific, and technical field. See
ISCR Case No. 00-0317 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002). The nature of a nation's  government, its
relationship with the U.S., and its human rights records are all relevant in assessing the likelihood
that an applicant's family members are vulnerable to government coercion. 
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in
the evaluation of security suitability. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline,
The Directive, as amended by Change 4, dated April 20, 1999, uses 'clearly consistent with the national10
interest" (Sec. 2.3; Sec.2.5.3; Sec 3.2.; and Sec. 4.2.; Enclosure 3, Sec. E3.1.1.; Sec. E3.1.2.; Sec. E3.1.2.5.; Sec.
E3.1.2.6.; and Sec. E3.1.2.7.), "clearly consistent with the interests of national security" (Enclosure 2, Sec. E2.2.3.); and
"clearly consistent with national security" (Enclosure 2, Sec. E2.2.2.).
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the adjudicative guidelines are divided into those that may be considered in deciding whether to deny
or revoke an individual's eligibility for access to classified information (Disqualifying Conditions)
and those that may be considered in deciding whether to grant an individual's eligibility for access
to classified information (Mitigating Conditions).
An administrative judge need not view the adjudicative guidelines as inflexible ironclad rules
of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines, when applied
in conjunction with the factors set forth in the Adjudicative Process provision set forth in Section
E2.2., Enclosure 2, of the Directive are intended to assist the administrative judge in reaching fair
and impartial commonsense decisions.
Because the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the
"whole person concept," all available, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. The Adjudicative
Process factors which an administrative judge should consider are: (1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individuals's  age and maturity
at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the
potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Based upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, I find the following adjudicative
guidelines most pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case:
Guideline B - Foreign Influence: Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced
to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S.
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under
this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign
contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited, to such considerations as
whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected
information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
Since the protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, the final decision
in each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance is "clearly
consistent with the interests of national security" or "clearly consistent with the national interest."10
For the purposes herein, despite the different wording in each, I have concluded all of the standards
are the same. In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable,
logical and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing
inferences that are grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
ISCR Case No. 96-0277 (July 11, 1997) at 2.11
ISCR Case No. 94-1075 (August 10, 1995) at 3-4; Directive, Enclosure 3, Para E3.1.15.12
Directive, Enclosure 2, Para. E2.2.213
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In the decision-making process, the burden of producing evidence initially falls on the
government to establish a case which demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, that it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s access to classified
information.  If the government meets its burden, the heavy burden of persuasion then falls upon the11
applicant to present evidence in refutation, explanation, extenuation or mitigation sufficient to
overcome the doubts raised by the government’s case, and to ultimately demonstrate it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the applicant’s clearance.12
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with
the government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship that transcends normal duty
hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. Because of this special relationship, the
government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom
it grants access to classified information. Decisions under this Directive include, by necessity,
consideration of the possible risk that an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect
or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Any
doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to classified information must be resolved
in favor of national security.13
One additional comment is worthy of note. Applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are
not at issue in these proceedings. Section 7 of the Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that
industrial security clearance decisions shall be, “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Security clearance decisions cover
many characteristics of an applicant other than allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism. Nothing in this
decision should be construed to suggest I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express
or implied decision as to Applicant’s allegiance, loyalty or patriotism.
CONCLUSIONS
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors, and conditions, I conclude the following with respect to each allegation set forth in
the SOR. 
Foreign Influence
The government established its case under Guideline B. Applicant admits that his father, step-
mother, seven brothers, and in-laws are residents and citizens of Libya and Tunisia. The foreign
citizenship and residency of these individuals raise a security concern, under Foreign Influence
Disqualifying Condition (FI DC) AG ¶ 7 (a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or
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professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or
coercion).
Applicant admits traveling on many short trips for business and for family pleasure. He did
not elaborate on the extent or nature of the visits. This raises FI DC AG ¶ 7 (i) (conduct, especially
while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure,
or coercion by a foreign person, group, government or country).
When the Government's initial burden has been met and a disqualifying condition raised, the
burden shifts to the Applicant to go forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation, or mitigation,
which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the Government's case. Here Applicant offered no such
information. Furthermore, the FORM does not include any facts that might provide an argument for
Applicant; it only contains references to these individuals in the Applicant's SF-86, the SOR, and the
reply to the SOR. Without more, a determination cannot be made under Foreign Influence Mitigating
Condition (FI MC) AG ¶ 8 (a) (the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which the persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such
that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests
of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.) .
Consequently, that mitigating condition cannot be applied. 
Applicant is a naturalized U.S. citizen and his children are U.S. citizens. However, he is in
a position of vulnerability - he could be placed in the vulnerable position of having to choose between
his loyalty to the U.S. and his loyalty to members of his family in Libya. Applicant insists he will
report any foreign contacts and that he is not vulnerable to foreign coercion or influence, but there is
insufficient evidence to support the application of FI MC AG ¶ 8 (b) (there is no conflict of interest,
either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group or
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor
of the U.S. interest).
Applicant admitted that he has taken many short trips for business out of the country to the
United Kingdom. He visited his family from 1995 until the recent present many times. He also
acknowledged his weekly contacts with family members, demonstrating familial ties. Thus, FI MC
AG ¶ 8 (c) ( contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is
little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation) does not apply.
There is nothing in the record to support the other mitigating conditions such as authorized
contact by the U.S. government,  reporting any contacts with persons or organizations from a foreign
country, or financial or property interests that are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used
effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual. 
Whole Person 
In all adjudications, the protection of our national security is the paramount concern. The
objective of the security clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment of a person's
life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for assignment to sensitive
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duties. As noted above, the adjudicative process is a careful weighing of a number of variables in
considering the whole person concept. It recognizes a person be viewed by the totality of his or her
acts, omissions, motivations and other variables. Each case must be adjudged on its own merits,
taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and applying sound judgment, mature thinking,
and careful analysis.
I considered both the record evidence and Applicant in light of the whole-person concept.
I have also considered the countries at issue, Libya and Tunisia. Applicant is a mature and well-
educated professional who has worked for a defense contractor for many years. A naturalized U.S.
citizen, his immediately family remains citizens and residents of Libya and Tunisia. Such facts are
not necessarily dispositive. Applicant failed, however to provide any facts upon which an assessment
can be made as to whether they might be used as instruments or victims of state coercion. Because
any doubts must be resolved in favor or national security, I find the allegations regarding foreign
influence in the government's favor. Clearance is denied.
FORMAL FINDINGS
              Formal Findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a:            AgainstApplicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Noreen A. Lynch
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Administrative Judge