KEYWORD: Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is 44 years old and became a U.S. naturalized citizen in 1998. He has lived in
the U.S. since 1987. His parents, brother, and sister are citizens and residents of Taiwan. He
telephones his parents about once or twice a month. He has less frequent contact with his siblings.
Earlier this year, Applicant renounced his Taiwanese citizenship, and submitted his passport toward
accomplishing that goal. Applicant has strong ties to the U.S., including a child born in the U.S. He
obtained his master's education here. He has ties to his community, including investment in real
estate, retirement plans, and bank accounts. Applicant has successfully mitigated the security
concerns related to foreign preference and foreign influence. Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-22781.h1
DATE: 03/30/2007
DATE:  March 30, 2007
In re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-22781
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
JACQUELINE T. WILLIAMS
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Daniel F. Crowley, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
2
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is 44 years old and became a U.S. naturalized citizen in 1998. He has lived in the
U.S. since 1987. His parents, brother, and sister are citizens and residents of Taiwan. He telephones
his parents about once or twice a month. He has less frequent contact with his siblings. Earlier this
year, Applicant renounced his Taiwanese citizenship, and submitted his passport toward
accomplishing that goal. Applicant has strong ties to the U.S., including a child born in the U.S. He
obtained his master’s education here. He has ties to his community, including investment in real
estate, retirement plans, and bank accounts. Applicant has successfully mitigated the security
concerns related to foreign preference and foreign influence. Clearance is granted.
Ex. 1 (Security Clearance Application, dated March 29, 2004, which is unsigned). The SF 86 had a handwritten1
note “0-7-05 re-cert.”The Government stated that Applicant recertified the accuracy of this information as of that date.
See Tr. 28.
Id. at 1.2
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 29, 2004, Applicant applied for a security clearance and completed a Security
Clearance Application (SF 86), which is unsigned.  On December 19, 2006, the Defense Office of1
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, pursuant to
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, dated February 20,
1960, as amended and modified, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and
modified. The SOR detailed reasons under Guideline C (Foreign Preference) and Guideline B
(Foreign Influence) why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the
Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security
clearance for Applicant and recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether
a clearance should be granted or revoked.
In a sworn, written statement, dated January 3, 2007, Applicant responded to the SOR
allegations and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on February 1, 2007. A Notice of
Hearing was issued on February 10, 2007, scheduling the hearing for February 26, 2007. The hearing
was conducted as scheduled. At the hearing, the Government offered three exhibits, Exs. 1-3.
Applicant offered 27 exhibits, Exs. A-Z, and AA. All exhibits were admitted into the record without
objections. Prior to the hearing, the Government submitted 12 documents requesting that I take
administrative notice of them. At the hearing, these documents were not objected to by Applicant
and they were all admitted into the record, marked as Exs. I-XII. The transcript (Tr.) was received
on March 9, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the factual allegations pertaining to foreign preference under Guideline
C, subparagraphs 1.a and 1.b. He also admitted the factual allegations pertaining to foreign influence
under Guideline B, subparagraphs 2.a through 2.c. Those admissions are incorporated herein as
findings of fact. He denied the factual allegation under subparagraph 1.c. After a complete and
thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due consideration of same, I make the
following findings of fact:
Applicant is 44 years old and has been employed as a senior software engineer by a defense
contractor since April 2003.  He was born in Taiwan (Republic of China). While living in Taiwan,2
Tr. 49.3
Tr. 72.4
Tr. 50, 71.5
Ex. C (Master of Science Degree).6
Ex. 1, supra, note 1; Ex. G (Certificate of Naturalization, dated October 24, 1998); Tr. 51.7
Ex. R (Birth Certificate).8
Tr. 51.9
Tr. 61.10
Tr. 76.11
Tr. 76.12
Tr. 61.13
Tr. 61, 73.14
4
he fulfilled mandatory, military service from 1984 to 1986.  After the service, he continued his3
college education in Taiwan and received a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering.4
Applicant immigrated to the U.S. on September 1, 1987, at the age of 27, to continue his
studies.  In 1987, Applicant attended a well-known university in the U.S. and was awarded a5
master’s of science degree in June 1990.  He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in October 1998.6 7
He is married and has one child, who was born in the U.S. in February 1998.8
Applicant exercised dual citizenship with Taiwan and the U.S. On November 6, 1998, he was
issued a valid U.S. passport. On or about December 30, 2002, he was issued a Taiwanese passport,
which expires December 10, 2012. He stated that his 2002 passport is a replacement of a previous
passport, issued in December 1996 and expired December 10, 2012. In 1999, he visited Taiwan. He
used his U.S. passport on that trip.9
Applicant’s mother and father are citizens and residents of Taiwan. His parents are both
retired and spend their time watching television and doing grocery shopping.  His parents did not10
complete their elementary school education. They sold mushrooms in a local market for a living
throughout their life.  His brother, who lives in Taiwan, helps to support them.  They receive no11 12
Taiwan government pension nor do they have connections to the Taiwan government.  Applicant13
testified: “I talk to my mother once or maybe twice a month to check on her health and my father’s
health. My father has high blood pressure. It’s usually a conversation about two minutes.”  He sends14
his parents about $600 per year to assist with their expenses.
Ex. M (Working Certification for Applicant’s sister, dated January 19, 2007).15
Ex. N (Documents pertaining to Applicant’s brother).16
Tr. 62-63.17
Tr. 62-63.18
Ex. I (Letter, dated January 31, 2007).19
Ex. S (Assessment Notice for Residence).20
Ex. T (Brokerage Statement); Ex. U (IRA Statement)21
Ex. V (Donation to Multiple Sclerosis); Ex. W (Miscellaneous donation checks).22
Ex. X (Certification of Jury Duty); Ex. Y (Voter Registration, County Board of Elections).23
Ex. Z (Education Savings Statement); Ex. AA (Prepaid College Trust Statement).24
Ex. Q (Character letter, dated February 4, 2007).25
5
Applicant’s brother and sister are citizens and residents of Taiwan. His sister is a senior
marketing director of a music company since April 2006.  From July 2005 to March 2006, she15
owned her own flower design business. From June1998 to June 2005, she worked for various music
firms in Taiwan. Since November 1998, his brother is chief of a company that makes games.16
Previously, from July 1989 to November 1997, he was a coordinator at a graphics company. Neither
of his siblings has  worked for the Taiwan government.  Applicant talks to his siblings about once17
or twice a year.18
On January 31, 2007, Applicant wrote a letter to the U.S. Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative Office. In that letter, he renounced his Taiwanese citizenship, and submitted his
passport toward accomplishing that goal.19
Applicant has strong ties to the U.S. Not only did he receive his master’s degree from a well-
known U.S. university, he owns real estate in the U.S.  He has bank accounts and retirement funds20
in the U.S.  He also contributes to community organizations.  He is registered to vote and has21 22
served as a juror in his local Circuit Court.  He has opened an education savings account for his23
daughter, as well as a prepaid college trust.  He does not have any financial or business interests in24
Taiwan.
Applicant submitted a character letter from a person who has known him through work since
April 2003. His friend found Applicant to be a very hard-working, respectable, and trustworthy
individual, who is honest and possesses “high integrity.”25
The government of Taiwan is an ally and conducts trade with the U.S. Taiwan is a stable
democracy, and it has a strong and well-developed economy. The threat of economic and industrial
espionage continues to be a matter of concern for the U.S. Foreign countries continue to target the
U.S. to illegally obtain critical technology. Foreign collectors operate against U.S. economic
interests. In 2000, Taiwan was one of the eight most active collectors of foreign economic
Ex. VII (National Counterintelligence Center Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Election and26
Industrial Espionage 2000) at 15.
ISCR Case No. 96-0277 (July 11, 1997) at 2.27
ISCR Case No. 97-0016 (December 31, 1997) at 3; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.14.28
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).29
ISCR Case No. 94-1075 (August 10, 1995) at 3-4; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.30
ISCR Case No. 93-1390 (January 27, 1995) at 7-8; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.31
6
information and industrial espionage in the world. There is no information showing that Taiwan
exploits, harasses or pressures its citizens in an attempt to garner economic or industrial
information.26
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines to be considered in evaluating
a person’s eligibility to hold a security clearance. Included in the guidelines are disqualifying
conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC) applicable to each specific guideline. Additionally,
each security clearance decision must be a fair and impartial commonsense decision based on the
relevant and material facts and circumstances, the whole-person concept, along with the factors listed
in the Directive. Specifically these are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding
circumstances; (2) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (3) the age of the applicant; (4) the
motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary,
or undertaken with knowledge of the consequences; (5) the absence or presence of rehabilitation; and
(6) the probability that the circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future. Although
the presence or absence of a particular condition or factor for or against clearance is not outcome
determinative, the adjudicative guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured
against this policy guidance.
The sole purpose of a security clearance determination is to decide if it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an applicant.  The Government27
has the burden of proving controverted facts.  The burden of proof is something less than a28
preponderance of evidence.  Once the government has met its burden, the burden shifts to an applicant29
to present evidence of refutation, extenuation, or mitigation to overcome the case against him.30
Additionally, an applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance
decision.31
Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.32
Id.33
Id.; Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ E2.2.2.34
Executive Order 10865 § 7.35
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No one has a right to a security clearance  and “the clearly consistent standard indicates that32
security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable33
doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved
in favor of protecting such sensitive information.  The decision to deny an individual a security34
clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication35
that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance.
CONCLUSIONS
I have carefully considered all the facts in evidence and the legal standards, and I reach the
following conclusions.
Foreign Preference
Under Guideline C, a security risk may exist when an individual acts in such a way as to
indicate a preference for a foreign country over the U.S. Such a person may be prone to provide
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the U.S. Applicant became a
naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. He possessed a passport from Taiwan that was to expire in 2012. He
was in the Taiwan military while he lived there before immigrating to the U.S. and becoming a
naturalized citizen. Moreover, his college education was obtained in Taiwan after he fulfilled his
military obligation, and before he became a naturalized U.S. citizen. He attended a university in the
U.S. to obtain his master’s degree. He does not have any financial or business interests in Taiwan.
Thus, Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition (FP DC) 10(a)(1) (possession of a current foreign
passport) applies. Moreover, FP DC 10(a)(2) (military service or a willingness to bear arms for a
foreign country), FP DC 10(a)(3) (accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or other
such benefits from a foreign country), and FP DC 10(a)(5) (using foreign citizenship to protect
financial or business interests in another country) do not apply.
Various conditions can mitigate a security concerning regarding foreign preference. On January
31, 2007, Applicant renounced his Taiwanese citizenship and surrendered his passport to the U.S.
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. He last traveled to Taiwan in 1999 and used his
U.S. passport. Thus, Foreign Preference Mitigating Conditions (FP MC) 11(a) (dual citizenship is
based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country), FP MC 11(b) (the individual has
expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship), and FP MC 11(e) (the passport has been
destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated) apply.
Accordingly, allegations 1.a through 1.c of the SOR are concluded in favor of Applicant.
Foreign Influence
7
Under Guideline B, a security risk may exist if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or a
government in a way that is not in the interests of the U.S., or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Applicant’s parents, sister, and brother are citizens and residents of Taiwan.
Consequently, Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion) applies.
Various factors can mitigate the foreign influence security concern. Even though he possessed
a valid Taiwan passport, when Applicant traveled to Taiwan in 1999, he used his U.S. passport. He
had since renounced his Taiwan citizenship and surrendered his passport. He has monthly telephone
calls with his parents. His parents are retired and do not receive a pension from the Taiwan
government. His sister and brother work for private companies that are not affiliated with the Taiwan
government. He talks to his siblings no more than once or twice a year. Moreover, the fact that his
parents, sister, and brother are citizens and residents of Taiwan does not constitute an unacceptable
security risk. For the past 20 years, Applicant has developed strong ties to the U.S., which include real
estate ownership, bank accounts and retirement plans, and a daughter born here. Applicant has a
profession here that he is extremely proud of. He votes and serves jury duty. It is highly unlikely that
Applicant would jeopardize his relationships and loyalties in the U.S. in any way. Applicant can be
trusted to resolve any conflict of interest with relatives in Taiwan in favor of the U.S. Thus, Foreign
Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) 8(a) (the nature of the relationships with foreign persons,
the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that
country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose
between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.) and FI MC 8(b) (there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the
individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual
can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest) apply. Accordingly,
allegations 2.a through 2.c of the SOR are concluded in favor of Applicant.
I considered carefully all the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in this case in
light of the “whole person” concept, keeping in mind that any doubt as to whether access to classified
information is clearly consistent with national security must be resolved in favor or the national
security. Applicant is a mature individual who has lived in the U.S. for more than 20 years. He has
strong ties to this country, which include his education, real estate, bank and retirement accounts. His
daughter is a U.S. citizen by birth, and he is already saving and planning her higher education in the
U.S. Applicant credibly testified that the U.S. is his home. Applicant can be trusted to resolve any
conflict of interest with relatives in Taiwan in favor of the U.S. I conclude Applicant has mitigated the
potential security concerns arising from his personal ties to Taiwan.
FORMAL FINDINGS
8
Formal Findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1. Guideline C (Foreign Preference): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline B (Foreign Influence): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.
Jacqueline T. Williams
 Administrative Judge