KEYWORD: Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is a 56-year-old naturalized U. S. Citizen, who has resided in the United States
since 1975.  He became a naturalized citizen in 1991.  His children were born in the United States.
He has worked as a computer engineer for federal contractors since 1998.  His elderly parents, three
siblings, father-in-law, and brother-in-law are residents and citizens of Taiwan.  In 2001, he used his
Taiwanese passport to visit Taiwan.  The passport expired in 2003 and he has not renewed it.  He
mitigated the security concerns raised by foreign influence and foreign preference.  Clearance is
granted.  
CASENO: 06-02910.h1
DATE: 04/20/2007
DATE:  April 20, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-02910
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
SHARI DAM
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Branden M. Murphy, Esq.
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Item 4 at 1.1
2
Applicant is a 56-year-old naturalized U. S. citizen, who has resided in the United States
since 1975.  He became a naturalized citizen in 1991.  His children were born in the United States.
He has worked as a computer engineer for federal contractors since 1998.  His elderly parents, three
siblings, father-in-law, and brother-in-law are residents and citizens of Taiwan.  In 2001, he used his
Taiwanese passport to visit Taiwan.  The passport expired in 2003 and he has not renewed it.  He
mitigated the security concerns raised by foreign influence and foreign preference.  Clearance is
granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 19, 2005, Applicant submitted a security clearance application (SCA). On March
21, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, as amended, and Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January
2, 1992, as amended, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant.  The SOR detailed reasons
under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference) why DOHA could not
make a preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant a security clearance to Applicant.  DOHA recommended the case be
referred to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted.
On April 3, 2006, Applicant filed a response to the SOR, admitting all of the allegations, and
elected to have the case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing.  On February 20, 2007,
Department Counsel prepared a File of Relevant Material (FORM), containing five Items, and
mailed Applicant a complete copy on February 21, 2007.  The FORM also contained 12 documents
for which Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice.  Applicant had 30 days
from receipt of the FORM to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation or
mitigation.  Applicant received the FORM on February 28, 2007, and submitted additional
information on March 12, 2007, and objected to the relevance of some documents offered for
administrative notice.  Department Counsel did not object to Applicant’s additional submission.  The
case was assigned to me on March 15, 2007.  After reviewing the 12 documents submitted for
administrative notice, I take notice of the information contained therein.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the entire record, including Applicant’s admissions in his response to the SOR, I
make the following findings of fact:
Applicant is a 56-year-old married man.  He was born in Taiwan.  He came to the United
States in 1975 on a student visa and never returned to Taiwan to live.  He subsequently attended a
prestigious university in the United States and graduated with a Ph.D. in computer sciences.  He
became a naturalized citizen in October 1991.  Since 1998, he has worked as an engineer for federal1
Id. at 8.2
Id. at 3.3
Item 5 at 2.4
Item 3 at 3.5
Response to Form, dated March 12, 2007, at 2.6
Id.7
Id.8
Id.9
Item 3 at 2.10
3
contractors.  He was granted a security clearance in 2002 by the U.S. Treasury Department.  2
Applicant‘s wife was born in Taiwan in 1957.  She became a U.S. citizen in October 1991.
They have two children, both born in the United States.   He does not have any financial interests3
in Taiwan.   In his response he stated, “After graduation from [the university] with Ph.D. degree, I4
have been working, paying taxes, and later after naturalization, fulfilling civic duties entirely in
America.  I never held any job or position in Taiwan or any other countries. In essence, my whole-
life career is in the United States.  I am of unquestioned allegiance to the United States.”5
Applicant’s elderly parents are citizens and residents of Taiwan.  Applicant calls his parents
about once a week and visits them in Taiwan every three or four years.  He sends them about $500
a year out of a sense of familial obligation and not financial need.  6
Applicant is one of five children, all born in Taiwan.  One of his sisters is a naturalized
citizen and resident of the United States.  His other two sisters are retired and are citizen residents
of Taiwan.  His brother is a dentist and a citizen resident of Taiwan.  He talks to his two sisters and
brother about once a year and visits them when he sees his parents.  None of his relatives have held7
positions in the Taiwan government.8
Applicant’s father-in-law and brother-in-law are citizens and residents of Taiwan, who
operate a small grocery store.  Applicant’s wife calls them twice a month and visits them when she
visits Taiwan every three or four years.  Her mother died in 1982.  Her other brother is a naturalized
U. S. citizen, who resides in the United States.  She sends her family about $100-200 every year at
the Chinese New Year.  She does not own property or have any financial interests in Taiwan.9
Over the course of the last several years, Applicant returned to Taiwan in July 2001 to
celebrate his father’s 80  birthday.  In February 2004, he attended his grandmother’s funeral.  In Juneth
2005, he visited his parents en route to Japan for a family vacation.  10
In 1997, Applicant renewed his Taiwanese passport that was previously issued in June
Response to Form: Republic of China Passport.11
Item 5 at 2.12
Id. at 1.13
U.S. Dept. of State Background Note: Taiwan, October 2006.14
National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC),Annual Report to Congress 15 (2000), included in the FORM15
as Administrative Notice Exhibit VII.
4
1991.  He used it to enter Taiwan in July 2001 for purpose of convenience.  That passport expired11
in June 2003 and he has no intention of renewing it.  Applicant has a current U.S. passport that he
renewed in May 2001.  He has used it for all of his travel, except the July 2001 trip, including his
other trips to Taiwan in 2004 and 2005.  Although he listed himself as having dual citizenship on12
his SCA, he is uncertain of his citizen’s status with Taiwan because he did not renew his passport.
However, he is willing to relinquish his expired Taiwan passport as his loyalties are with the U.S.13
Taiwan is a stable multiparty democracy, a U.S. ally, and a major U.S. trading partner.  It has
a good human rights record. Taiwan maintains a large military establishment, and its primary
mission is the defense of Taiwan against the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).  With the
encouragement of the United States, contact between Taiwan and the PRC has grown significantly
over the last decade, with increases in direct trade, travel, and postal links.  The Taiwan Relations
Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316, is the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the United
States. and Taiwan and the U.S. commitment to ensuring Taiwan’s defensive capability.  Taiwan14
is an active collector of U.S. defense information and technology.15
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive, Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access
to Classified Information, sets forth criteria which must be evaluated when determining security
clearance eligibility.  Within those adjudicative guidelines are factors to consider in denying or
revoking an individual’s request for access to classified information (Disqualifying Conditions), and
factors to consider in granting an individual’s request for access to classified information (Mitigating
Conditions).  By recognizing that individual circumstances of each case are different, the guidelines
provide substantive standards to assist an administrative judge in weighing the evidence in order to
reach a fair, impartial and common sense decision.
Granting an applicant’s clearance for access to classified information is based on a high
degree of trust and confidence in the individual.  Accordingly, decisions under the Directive must
include consideration of not only the actual risk of disclosure of classified information, but also
consideration of any possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently compromise
classified information.  Any doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to classified
information must be resolved in favor of protecting classified information. Directive, Enclosure 2,
¶ E2.2.2.  The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a judgment about
an applicant’s loyalty. Executive Order 10865, § 7.  Instead, it is a determination that an applicant
has not met the strict guidelines established by the Department of Defense for issuing a clearance.
5
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal
or professional history of the applicant that disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information.  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531
(1988).  The Directive presumes a rational connection between past proven conduct under any of the
disqualifying conditions listed in the guidelines and an applicant’s security suitability.  ISCR Case
No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the
corresponding burden of rebuttal shifts to the applicant to present evidence in refutation, extenuation,
or mitigation sufficient to overcome the position of the government.  ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at
3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002); Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate
burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his
clearance.” Id. 
Based upon the allegations contained in the SOR and a consideration of the evidence as a
whole, the following adjudicative guidelines are pertinent to an evaluation of the facts of this case:
Guideline B (Foreign Influence): The Concern -A security concern may exist when an
individual’s immediate family, including co-habitants, and other persons to whom he or she maybe
bound by affection, influence, or obligations are not citizens of the United States or may be subject
to duress.  These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the
compromise of classified information.  Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests
in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially
vulnerable to coercions, exploitation, or pressure.
Guideline C (Foreign Preference): The Concern -When an individual acts in such a way as
to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
CONCLUSIONS
After considering all facts in evidence and legal standards, including the “whole person”
concept, I conclude the following in regard to the allegations contained in the SOR:
Guideline B: Foreign Influence
The Government’s evidence and Applicant’s admissions established a disqualifying condition
under Foreign Influence Disqualifying Condition (FI DC) E2.A2.1.2.1 (An immediate family
member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen or,
or resident or present in, a foreign country).  Applicant’s parents, brother and two sisters are citizens
and residents of Taiwan.  According to ISCR Case No. 01-03120, DOHA LEXIS 94 at 8 (App. Bd.
Feb. 20, 2002), Applicant’s father-in-law and brother-in-law also fall within the disqualification as
“[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, the
immediate family members of the person’s spouse.”
While family ties with persons in a foreign country are not, as a matter of law, disqualifying
ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 6 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005)(quoting ISCR Case No. 00-0317 at 6 (App. Bd. Mar.16
29, 2002)).
The Appeal Board has not increased an applicant’s burden of persuasion in cases involving contacts with17
family members living in Taiwan.  This situation may be compared to the Appeal Board’s decision to place a “very heavy
burden of persuasion” on applicants to demonstrate that contacts with immediate family members living in Iran do not
pose a security risk. See ISCR Case No. 02-13595 at 3 (App. Bd. May 10, 2005) (stating an applicant has “a very heavy
burden of persuasion to overcome the security concerns” when parents and siblings live in Iran); ISCR Case No. 04-
11463 at 4 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006) (articulating “very heavy burden” standard when applicant’s family members live
in Iran).
6
under Guideline B, such ties do raise a prima facie security concern.  This concern is sufficient to
require an applicant to present evidence of rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation sufficient to meet the
applicant’s burden of persuasion that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or
continue a security clearance.  ISCR Case No. 99-0424, 2001 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).
The Appeal “Board has warned ‘against reliance on overly simplistic distinctions between
‘friendly’ nations and ‘hostile’ nations when adjudicating cases under Guideline B,’”  and Taiwan16
should not be labeled as “hostile” or as “friendly” to the United States.  Taiwan is in competition
with the United States in several areas, and is likely to continue to engage in espionage against the
United States.  Taiwan’s future relationship with the United States may not be as congenial as it is
today.  In any event, Applicant should not be placed into a position where he may be forced to
choose between loyalty to the United States and his relatives living in Taiwan.  17
The Government having established a disqualification, the burden shifted to Applicant to
rebut or mitigate the allegations.  After considering all mitigating conditions under this guideline,
in particular, Foreign Influence Mitigating Condition (FI MC) E2.A2.1.3.1 (A determination that the
immediate family member(s), (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant,
or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a
foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s)
involved and the United States), I conclude it provides some information that makes his situation less
susceptible to foreign influence than if his relatives were agents of a foreign power.  Applicant
supplied evidence that none of his family members, including in-laws, are associated with the
Taiwanese government.
In assessing the vulnerability to exploitation of Applicant’s family, it is helpful to consider
several factors: the nature of the foreign government, its relationship to the United States, its human
rights record, and a careful balancing of the nature and strength of Applicant’s relationship to his
foreign associates.  Taiwan is a stable democracy with close commercial and friendly ties to the
United States.  It has improved its human rights record significantly in the past few years.  Although
friendly countries may have profound disagreements with the United States or may have engaged
in espionage against the United States, especially in economic, scientific, military and technical
fields, it is less likely that such a foreign government would attempt to exploit a United States citizen
through relatives in that foreign country.  Taiwan’s continuing dependence and alliance with the
United States, coupled with its democratic form of government, diminishes the risk of it using
coercion, persuasion, or duress to exploit its citizens to gather classified information from United
States citizens.  Thus, Applicant’s evidence showing his elderly parents, siblings, and in-laws’
absence of governmental connections provides some information that makes his situation less
susceptible to foreign influence than if his relatives were residents and citizens of a foreign country
such as Iran, a country known for its hostility toward the United States.
7
I also considered FI MC E2.A2.1.3.2 (Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are
casual and infrequent).  It provides some mitigation as to the allegations regarding his siblings with
whom he has limited communications (about once per year), but not to his parents with whom he
speaks frequently.  It is not clear from the record how often he interacts with his in-laws. 
Applicant does not have any financial interests in Taiwan.  This fact does not mitigate the
foreign influence concern based on FI DC E2.A2.1.2.1 or FI DC E2.A2.1.2.3.  See ISCR Case No.
04-02233 at 3 (App. Bd. May 9, 2006).
I conclude no Guideline B Mitigating Conditions apply, and I expressly and specifically
indicate that I have not relied “explicitly or implicitly” on any of the Mitigating Conditions listed
under Guideline B of the Directive.  See ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 6 (App. Bd. Jan. 7, 2007).  The
mitigating information will be applied in the “whole person” analysis, infra.
Guideline C: Foreign Preference
Based on Applicant’s previous maintenance and use of a Taiwanese passport after becoming
a U.S. citizen and possessing a U.S. passport, the Government established a disqualification under
Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition (FP DC) E2.A3.1.2.1 (The exercise of dual citizenship),
and FP DC E2.A3.1.2.2 (Possession and/or use of a foreign passport). 
The Government having established a disqualification, the burden shifted to Applicant to
rebut or mitigate the allegation.  After reviewing all of the mitigating conditions, I conclude that
Foreign Preference Mitigating Condition (FP MC) E2.A3.1.3.4 (Individual has expressed a
willingness to renounce dual citizenship) is applicable.  Applicant’s passport expired in June 2003
and he has not renewed it.  He did not indicate what he had done with the expired passport.
However, he expressed his loyalty to the U.S. in his responses to the SOR and FORM, as well as
during his interview. 
Possession of Expired Taiwanese Passport
Applicant renewed his Taiwanese passport in 1997 and used it to enter Taiwan one time in
July 2001.  In June 2003, the passport expired.  Its whereabouts are unknown.
The Memorandum of Assistant Secretary of Defense Arthur L. Money, dated August 16,
2000, hereinafter “ASDC3 memorandum” mandates that “consistent application of the guideline
requires that any clearance be denied or revoked unless the applicant surrenders the foreign passport
or obtains official approval for its use from the appropriate agency of the United States
Government.” 
The Appeal Board indicated in ISCR Case No. 03-10390 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2005) that
the ASDC3 memorandum requirement to surrender a passport also applied to expired passports.
Moreover, the passport cannot be surrendered to a Department of Defense security officer, it must
be surrendered to the issuing authority.  ISCR Case No. 03-06174 at 3-5 (App. Bd. Feb. 28, 2005).
There was no allegation concerning the failure to surrender the Taiwanese passport under
Guideline C (foreign preference) in this case.  “[T]here is no question that Applicant was entitled
to receive reasonable notice of the reasons why DOHA proposed to deny or revoke [her] access to
8
classified information, as well as a reasonable opportunity to respond.”  ISCR Case No. 03-06174
at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 28, 2005) (citations omitted).
On December 29, 2005, the President approved the revised Adjudicative Guidelines for
Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (Revised Guidelines).  The President’s
approval of the Revised Guidelines was forwarded in a Memorandum from the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs to the Director, Information Security Oversight Office that
same day.  This Memorandum asked the Director to, “[p]lease circulate the revised guidelines to all
affected agencies for immediate implementation.”  Under Guideline C (Foreign Preference) of the
Revised Guidelines, paragraph 10 (a)(1) the first disqualifying condition states, “possession of a
current foreign passport (emphasis added),” effectively overruling the Appeal Board’s expansive
interpretation of the ASDC3 memorandum as applicable to expired passports
The Revised Guidelines were implemented within DoD by an Under Secretary of Defense
Memorandum dated August 30, 2006.  This Memorandum makes the Revised Guidelines applicable
to all adjudications and other determinations in which a SOR is issued after September 1, 2006, and
requires that all SORs issued prior to September 1, 2006, be adjudicated under the previous
Guidelines.  Applicant’s case must be adjudicated under the previous Guidelines because Applicant’s
SOR was issued on March 21, 2006.  ISCR Case No. 03-17839 at 8 (App. Bd. Nov. 24, 2006)
(White, J. separate opinion) (explaining purpose for delayed implementation is to ensure applicants
receive notice of particular guidelines in effect at the time the SOR is issued).  However, assuming
the Revised Guidelines improve and support National Security objectives, and an Applicant is not
prejudiced by the change, an Applicant should be able to urge the DoD to apply the Revised
Guidelines, when they are not inconsistent with the previous Guidelines, or when they clarify
application of the Guidelines.
Based on said change and clarification, I conclude that the ASDC3 memorandum does not
bar Applicant’s clearance because of his possession of an expired Taiwanese passport.
Whole Person Analysis
In addition to evaluating the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under the guideline, the
adjudicative process requires thorough consideration and review of all available, reliable information
about the applicant, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, to arrive at a balanced decision.
Directive ¶ E2.2.1 describes the essence of scrutinizing all appropriate variables in a case as the
“whole person concept.” In evaluating the conduct of an applicant, an administrative judge should
consider: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding
the conduct; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at
the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Because foreign influence does not involve misconduct, voluntariness of participation, rehabilitation,
and behavior changes, etc., the eigth factor in this series is the most relevant. 
The Appeal Board suggests that the whole person analysis address “evidence of an
applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and extent of an applicant’s family’s ties to the U.S. relative
to his ties to a foreign country; his or her ties social ties within the U.S.; and many others raised by
the facts of a given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).  The Appeal Board
9
previously recommended the whole person analysis in ISCR Case No. 03-02878 at 3 (App. Bd. June
7, 2006), which provides:
Applicant has been in the U.S for twenty years and a naturalized citizen for seven.
Her husband is also a naturalized citizen, and her children are U.S. citizens by birth.
Her ties to these family members are stronger than her ties to family members in
Taiwan.  She has significant financial interests in the U.S. , and none in Taiwan.  She
testified credibly that she takes her loyalty to the U.S. very seriously and would
defend the interests of the U.S.  Her supervisors and co-worker assess her as very
loyal and trustworthy.  
In the present case, there are many countervailing positive attributes to Applicant’s life as
a U.S. citizen that weigh in favor of granting him a security clearance.  He has lived in the United
States for 32 years and has been a naturalized U.S. citizen for 16 years.  He has close ties to the
United States.  His wife, two children, sister, and brother-in-law are U.S. citizens and residents.  He
obtained his advanced degree at a U.S. university.  He does not have a criminal background, a history
of financial difficulties or a poor employment record.  He was granted a security clearance from the
Department of the Treasury in 2002.  During the past seven years, he made three trips to Taiwan.
His Taiwanese passport has expired and he will not renew it.  He has no financial ties to Taiwan and
the amount of money he and his wife send to their parents is minimal.  He is patriotic, loves the
United States and has expressed his loyalty to it. 
In addition to the above facts, security worthiness determinations are predictive judgments
and the best predictor of future performance is past performance.  Based on a review of his history
and substantial ties to the United States, I conclude Applicant’s potential for exploitation by Taiwan,
a democratic ally of the United States, appears low and unlikely to occur.  Applicant mitigated the
security concerns raised under foreign preference and foreign influence.  Accordingly, Guideline B
and Guideline C are decided for him. 
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are as follows:
Paragraph 1: Guideline B (Foreign Influence) FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2: Guideline C (Foreign Preference) For Applicant
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1.b: For Applicant
DECISION
10
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.  Clearance is granted.
Shari Dam
Administrative Judge