KEYWORD: Alcohol; Financial; Personal Conduct; Criminal Conduct
DIGEST: Applicant failed to mitigate security concerns about her use of alcohol, two alcohol-related
arrests, her financial problems, and her deliberate falsification of her Application for a Position of
Trust (SF 85P). Eligibility for an ADP I/II/III position is denied.
CASENO: 06-08068.h1
DATE: 04/30/2007
DATE:  April 30, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for ADP I/II/III Position
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ADP Case No. 06-08068
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MATTHEW E. MALONE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Jennifer Goldstein, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant failed to mitigate security concerns about her use of alcohol, two alcohol-related
arrests, her financial problems, and her deliberate falsification of her Application for a Position of
Trust (SF 85P). Eligibility for an ADP I/II/III position is denied.
 Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 17, 2004, Applicant submitted a Public Trust Position Application (SF 85P).
After reviewing the results of the ensuing background investigation, adjudicators for the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) were unable to make a preliminary affirmative finding  that1
it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a position of trust. On May 2,
2006, DOHA issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security
concerns addressed in the Directive under Guideline G (alcohol), Guideline E (personal conduct),
Guideline F (financial considerations), and Guideline J (criminal conduct).
Applicant timely responded to the SOR, and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to
a DOHA administrative judge on October 13, 2006. A hearing scheduled for November 21, 2006,
was cancelled because Applicant took a leave of absence from her employment. The case was
transferred to me on November 17, 2006, due to caseload considerations, and I rescheduled the
hearing for January 8, 2007, at which the parties appeared as scheduled. The government submitted
ten exhibits (Gx. 1- 10) that were admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant testified and
introduced three exhibits (Ax. A - C), which were admitted without objection. I left the record open
after the hearing to allow Applicant time to submit additional relevant information. Her 13-page
post-hearing submission was timely received and admitted without objection as Ax. D. DOHA
received the transcript (Tr.) on January 16, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The government alleged in SOR 1 that Applicant drank alcohol at times to excess between
June 2003 and September 2004 (SOR ¶ 1.a); that in June 2003 she was charged with and convicted
of DUI (SOR ¶ 1.b); that in March 2004 she was again charged with and convicted of DUI (SOR ¶
1.c); and that in September 2004 she was charged with and convicted of DUI, and that the charge
was still pending trial as of the SOR issuance (SOR ¶ 1.d). In response, Applicant admitted the
allegations in SOR 1.a, 1.b, and 1.d. She denied being arrested in March 2004, and claimed she was
arrested for an unsubstantiated violation of the terms of her sentence from her June 2003 conviction.
Under SOR 2, the government alleged Applicant deliberately falsified her response to
question 16 of her SF 85P (arrests, charges, and/or convictions for any offense in the past seven
years) by omitting the two arrests alleged in SOR ¶¶ 1.c and 1.d (SOR ¶ 2.a); and that she
deliberately falsified her answer to question 22 (debts currently more than 180 days past) by omitting
from her answer several delinquent debts listed in SOR 3. (SOR ¶ 2.b). Applicant denied
intentionally falsifying her answers to the SF 85P.
Under SOR 3, the government alleged Applicant owed approximately $19,900 for 16 unpaid
debts that have either been charged off as business losses or referred for collection (SOR ¶¶ 3.a -
3.p).  Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 3.b, 3.f, 3.g, 3.j, 3.l, 3.m, and 3.o.
 This account is the same as that listed in ¶ 3.j. Accordingly, I find for the Applicant as to SOR ¶ 3.j.2
 Tr., 46;3
 Tr., 79.4
 Tr., 81 - 82.5
 Gx. 2 - 4; Gx. 7; Gx. 8.6
 Gx. 7.7
3
Under SOR 4, the government alleged as criminal conduct, Applicant’s falsifications listed
in SOR ¶¶ 2.a and 2.b, insofar as her answers may violate 18 U.S.C. 1001 (SOR ¶ 4.a); and
Applicant’s three DUI arrests and convictions listed in SOR ¶¶ 1.a - 1.c (SOR ¶ 4.b).
Her admissions are incorporated herein as facts. After a thorough review of the transcript and
exhibits, I make the following additional findings of relevant fact:
Applicant is 25 years old and has worked since January 2001 for a health care and medical
insurance company contracted to manage medical insurance claims and information for TriCare, the
Department of Defense (DoD) medical insurance system for military personnel and their families.
She is also a single mother of a four-year-old child. 
Applicant attended college for one year in 1999. While in school, she received several
unsolicited credit cards, which she used to supplement funding her parents gave her occasionally.
She soon became overextended in her use of personal credit and was unable to repay those accounts
(SOR ¶¶ 3.a, 3.e, 3.g, 3.m, and 3.o) because she could only afford rent, groceries, and other
necessities. After she left school and was supporting herself, she continued to accumulate unpaid
debt through other sources, such as retail stores (SOR ¶¶ 3.b and 3.f), and through unpaid cable
television, internet service, residential telephone and cell phone accounts (SOR ¶¶ 3.d, 3.h,  3.i, 3.k,2
and 3.p).  Of these, Applicant claimed she paid the delinquent phone bill listed in SOR ¶ 3.d,  and3 4
that the phone bill listed in SOR 3.i was resolved when the phone company kept her deposit after
she moved.  Applicant also failed to repay a cash advance company in 2003 (SOR ¶ 3.l), and became5
delinquent on her car insurance payments (SOR ¶ 3.m).6
The aforementioned debts total approximately $10,000. The largest accounts past due are for
credit cards in the amounts of $1,738 (SOR ¶ 3.a), $1,222 (SOR ¶ 3.g), and $2,685 (SOR ¶ 3.m).
Applicant has not paid or taken any verifiable actions to resolve any of her delinquent accounts. In
a written statement given to a government investigator in April 2005, Applicant represented she had
plans to pay her debts off through a credit counseling service, but she failed to follow through on her
plans.7
Sometime in 2000, Applicant was involved in a serious car accident. Her insurance company
determined her car to be a total loss. However, by the time a determination of liabilities was
 Applicant testified she was held partially responsible for the accident.8
 Tr., 37 - 39, 77. Ax. D. 9
 Gx. 5; Tr., 84 - 86.10
 Gx. 9; Answer to SOR. 11
 Tr., 62 - 66, 89 - 90.12
4
completed,  the garage where her car was taken after the accident had obtained a mechanic’s lien8
against the title to the car. The insurance company has relied on the presence of the mechanic’s lien
as justification for not paying on Applicant’s claim. The result has been that the credit union that
financed the car loan has, since 2001, been looking to Applicant for the $9,712 due on the loan (SOR
¶ 3.c). Applicant has disputed this debt, but does not have the resources to resolve it.9
On February 2, 2005, Applicant submitted a personal financial statement (PFS) that showed
a positive net cash flow each month of about $1,879; however, at hearing she claimed she does not
have much money left over each month, and does not know why. She has a negative balance in her
checking account and nothing in her savings account.10
On June 27, 2003, Applicant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence
(DUI) of alcohol (SOR ¶ 1.b). She and some friends had been at a club in another city and Applicant
had several mixed drinks. This was not the first time Applicant had driven after drinking alcohol.
She recalls her blood alcohol content (BAC) was between .12% and .14% when she was arrested.
The legal limit in her state at the time was .08%. She was found guilty, sentenced to four days in jail,
fined nearly $1,500, and her driver’s license was restricted. She was also ordered to attend a driver
alcohol safety class and undergo 90 days of alcohol counseling. 
In March 2004, Applicant was arrested for failing to attend her driver safety class; however,
this was quickly resolved because the paperwork that transferred supervision of her sentence from
the jurisdiction where she was arrested to where she lived and would attend the class was a day late.
This charge is erroneously reflected in Gx. 9 as another DUI charge.11
On September 4, 2004, Applicant was again arrested and charged with DUI. The charge was
pending as of the end of her background investigation. At hearing, Applicant testified she was
convicted of this DUI and received a sentence similar to that from her earlier conviction. She also
testified she is still on probation from the second conviction, that her license was suspended, and she
was ordered to abstain from alcohol. She admitted she still drank despite the court order, and that
she was last intoxicated on Christmas Eve 2006. Applicant admitted that she drank with friends as
often as every weekend, frequently to the point of intoxication, and she disclosed that she has driven
at times since her most recent conviction, despite having a suspended driver’s license.12
On September 17, 2004, Applicant submitted her SF-85P. In response to question 16 (arrests,
charges, and/or convictions in the last seven years), she disclosed her June 2003 DUI arrest and
conviction, but did not disclose her DUI arrest from the week before she completed the
questionnaire. In response to the SOR ¶ 2.a, she denied intentionally falsifying her answer to this
question. At hearing she testified that she knew the charge was pending, but thought she only had
 Answer to SOR; Gx. 1; Tr., 49 - 51.13
 SOR 2.b alleged she deliberately falsified question “22. Your Financial Record.” In the SF 85P submitted14
as Gx. 1 in support of this allegation, this question is number 20. Neither party has addressed this discrepancy, and I
conclude from all of the available information about this allegation that the reference in SOR 2.b is a typographical error.
 Answer to SOR; Gx. 1; Tr., 51.15
 Directive, Enclosure 2.16
 Department Counsel moved to amend the SOR to show that a memorandum from Carol A. Haave, Deputy17
Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and Security to DOHA Director, Adjudication of Trustworthiness
Cases (Nov. 19, 2004), directed that adjudication of trustworthiness cases for ADP I, II, and III positions be resolved
using the provisions of the Directive rather than, as originally drafted, DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, DoD Personnel
Security Program , as amended (Regulation). Applicant did not object and I granted the motion. (Tr., 11) Positions
designated as ADP I or ADP II are classified as sensitive positions in section AP10.2.1 of the Regulation. ADP III
positions are nonsensitive positions. (Regulation, AP102.3.1) By virtue of the aforementioned memorandum, however,
even though they are nonsensitive positions, ADP III cases are treated in the same way and adjudicated under the same
guidelines and procedures as ADP I and II cases.
 Also, Appendix 8 of the Regulation sets forth the adjudicative policy, as well as the disqualifying conditions18
and mitigating conditions associated with each guideline. DoD contractor personnel are afforded the adjudication
procedures contained in the Directive. (Regulation, C8.2.1)
 Directive, 6.3.19
5
to disclose convictions.  In response to question 20 (debts currently more than 180 days13
delinquent),  she disclosed only her $9,000 debt to the credit union stemming from her car accident14
in 2000, discussed above. She did not disclose any of her other credit card or other personal debts,
discussed above, which she knew to be more than 180 days past due. In response to SOR ¶ 2.b,
Applicant denied intentionally falsifying her answer to this question, and at hearing testified that she
knew by listing the largest of her debts the government would find out about the others.15
Applicant’s friends and co-workers speak highly of her willingness to work hard and help
others. She has volunteered for projects to help the homeless and has been active in community
efforts to stop violence in her hometown. Applicant enjoys a good reputation at work as an affable
and professional worker who is good at her job.
POLICIES AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines  to be considered in evaluating an16
applicant’s suitability for access to sensitive information.  Each trustworthiness determination must17
reflect consideration of both disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC) under
each adjudicative issue applicable to the facts and circumstances of each case.  Each determination18
must also reflect a fair and impartial common sense consideration of all available relevant and
material information,  and it must reflect the adjudication process outlined in the Directive at19
 “The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person20
concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be
considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should
consider the following factors:
 E2.2.1.1. The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
 E2.2.1.2. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
 E2.2.1.3. The frequency and recency of the conduct;
 E2.2.1.4. The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
 E2.2.1.5. The voluntariness of participation;
 E2.2.1.6. The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes;
 E2.2.1.7. The motivation for the conduct;
 E2.2.1.8. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
 E2.2.1.9. The likelihood of continuation or recurrence;”
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). See also, Regulation, C6.1.1.1 (“The standard21
that must be met for...assignment to sensitive duties is that, based on all available information, the person’s loyalty,
reliability, and trustworthiness are such that...assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the
interests of national security.”)  
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.22
 See Egan; Directive, E2.2.2.23
6
Section E2.2.1.  The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not20
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable guidelines
should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they represent policy guidance
governing the grant or denial of access to sensitive information.
Trustworthiness determinations are intended solely to resolve whether it is clearly consistent
with the national interest  for an applicant to receive or continue to have access to sensitive21
information. The government bears the initial burden of producing admissible information on which
it based the preliminary decision against the applicant. Additionally, the government must be able
to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the government meets its burden, the burden then
shifts to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the government’s case. As with security
clearances, no one has a “right” to such access.  Thus, an applicant bears a heavy burden of22
persuasion. Access to sensitive information is a fiduciary relationship with the government based
on trust and confidence. The government, therefore, has a compelling interest in ensuring each
applicant possesses the requisite judgement, reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect
sensitive information pertaining to the national interests as his or her own. The “clearly consistent
with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s
suitability for access in favor of the government.23
CONCLUSIONS
Financial Considerations. Under Guideline F, an applicant who is financially overextended
through delinquent debt and poor personal financial management may be at risk of engaging in
 Directive, E2.A6.1.1.24
 Directive, E2.A6.1.2.1. A history of not meeting financial obligations;25
 Directive, E2.A6.1.2.3. Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;26
 Directive, E2.A7.1.1. 27
 Directive, E2.A7.1.2.1. Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence,28
fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
 E2.A7.1.2.5. Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;29
7
illegal acts to generate funds to resolve their fiscal difficulties.  Applicant incurred several debts24
while she was in school and for several years after through her careless use of credit cards. After
leaving school in 2000, she continued to accrue delinquent debts through her credit cards and
through non-payment of accounts at stores and for various utilities. Ironically, her largest debt –
$9,712 to the company that financed the car she totaled in an accident (SOR ¶ 3.c) – did not arise
through her own mismanagement. However, her overall financial problems have kept her from being
able to pay or otherwise resolve that debt. Further, although she has had a good job for the past six
years, she cannot explain why she has no money left over each month. Aside from the debt listed at
SOR ¶ 3.j, the government has presented sufficient information to support the allegations under this
guideline. These facts warrant consideration of Guideline F disqualifying condition (DC) 1  and DC25
3.  26
By contrast, Applicant has failed to show that her financial problems are either not recent or
that they constitute an isolated circumstance in her background. Nor has she demonstrated that the
factors leading to her indebtedness are not likely to recur or that she has sought help through credit
counseling. Indeed, as noted above, she still has trouble managing her money and she lacks the
resources to repay or meaningfully address her delinquencies. Aside from the debt stemming from
the car accident, none of her debts resulted from factors beyond her control, and she has not made
any good-faith effort to repay these debts. Accordingly, none of the Guideline F mitigating
conditions apply to these facts. On balance, I conclude Guideline F against the Applicant.
Alcohol Consumption. The security concern about alcohol consumption, as expressed
through Guideline G, is that excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of
questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control impulses, and increases the risk of
unauthorized disclosure of classified information due to carelessness.  Such consumption may be27
presented as alcohol-related incidents such as fighting, domestic violence, arrests for alcohol-related
crimes, and clinical diagnoses of alcoholism or alcohol dependence. Here, available information
shows Applicant twice was convicted of DUI, that between June 2003 and September 2004, she
drank every weekend with friends, often to the point of intoxication, that she continued to consume
alcohol in violation of her probation requirement that she abstain, and that she was intoxicated as
recently as December 2006. On these facts, Guideline G DC 1  and DC 5  must be considered.28 29
There is not sufficient information in this record to warrant consideration of any of the listed
mitigating conditions under Guideline G. Applicant’s last documented alcohol-related incident
occurred in 2004. Thus, were it not for Applicant’s recent intoxication in violation of a court order,
 E2.A7.1.3.2. The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem;30
 Directive, E2.A5.1.1.31
 See note 14, supra.32
 Directive, E2.A5.1.2.2. The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts33
from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations,
determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness,
or award fiduciary responsibilities;
 E2.A5.1.2.5. A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded34
agreement made between the individual and the agency;
 Directive, E2.A10.1.1.35
8
MC 2  might apply. In short, Applicant failed to produce any information that would indicate her30
alcohol use has or is likely to change. Therefore, it is also likely she will be involved in alcohol-
related adverse conduct in the future, thus perpetuating the government’s doubts about her judgment
and reliability. Accordingly, I conclude Guideline G against the  Applicant.
Personal Conduct. Under Guideline E, a security concern may arise if it is shown an
applicant has exhibited questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. Such conduct may indicate the
person may not properly safeguard classified information.  Here, the government questioned31
Applicant’s trustworthiness by alleging she deliberately falsified material facts on her SF 85P by
listing only one of her arrests in response to question 16 and only one of her debts in response to
question 20.  Available information is sufficient to support these allegations. Applicant’s32
explanation of her response to question 20 – that she intended to disclose her debts to the
government by listing her largest debt – might seem plausible were that the only such omission.
However, taken together with the fact her response to question 16 omitted an arrest that had occurred
only a week earlier, the most reasonable conclusion to be drawn from all of the information bearing
on this issue is that Applicant intended, through her answers to these questions, to mislead the
government by minimizing the scope of her financial problems and her arrest record.
Accordingly, Guideline E DC 2  must be considered. Additionally, in light of Applicant’s33
continued drinking in violation of the terms of her probation, and her decision to drive despite the
fact her driver’s license has been revoked as part of her most recent DUI conviction, I have also
considered Guideline DC 5.  By contrast, Applicant failed to submit sufficient information in34
response to the government’s case that would support any of the Guideline E mitigating conditions.
I conclude Guideline E against the Applicant.
Criminal Conduct. The facts raised as security concerns about Applicant’s drinking and her
deliberate false statements to the government also raise security concerns addressed in the Directive
under Guideline J. Specifically, a history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's
judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.  A person who is willing to disregard the law and risk35
fines or incarceration may also be willing to disregard rules and regulations governing the protection
of classified information. The criminal activity at issue may consist of a single serious crime or
multiple lesser offenses. Here, available information shows that Applicant has been twice convicted
of DUI, and that she continues to break the law by violating her probation and driving without a
 Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001.36
  Directive, E2.A10.1.2.1. Allegations or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was37
formally charged; and E2.A10.1.2.2. A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
 See note 20, supra.38
 Directive, E2.2.3. 39
9
license. Available information also shows she deliberately made false statements to the government
through her responses in her SF 85P. It is against federal criminal law and punishable by fines and/or
imprisonment to knowing and wilfully make a false statement or representation to any agency of the
U.S. government concerning a matter within its jurisdiction.  Applicant signed her SF 85P directly36
below an advisement to that effect, thereby demonstrating she was aware of the consequences of her
false statements. All of the foregoing requires consideration of Guideline J DC 1 and DC 2.  By37
contrast, there is no information available that would support consideration of any of the Guideline
J mitigating conditions. Her criminal conduct is recent, it is not isolated, and, in view of the fact
Applicant’s conduct includes knowing violation of the terms of her probation, she cannot claim she
is rehabilitated. I conclude Guideline J against the Applicant.
Whole Person. In evaluating Applicant’s case, I have also considered the adjudicative
process factors collectively referred to as the “whole person” concept.  As discussed above,38
Applicant has not demonstrated her criminal conduct, her drinking, and her financial problems will
not recur. The overriding security concern here is the lack of information showing rehabilitation or
changed circumstances that would resolve the government’s concerns based on these facts.
Applicant is a smart, hard-working person, and her friends and associates speak highly of her.
However, their recommendations carry diminished weight in that none of their remarks demonstrated
any firsthand knowledge of the adverse information in Applicant’s background. 
A fair and commonsense assessment  of the entire record before me shows the government39
properly expressed reasonable doubts about Applicant’s suitability to hold a sensitive position. The
SOR was based on sufficient, reliable information about Applicant’s excessive alcohol use, her
alcohol-related criminal conduct, her deliberate false statements to the government, and her financial
problems. Such issues bear directly on an applicant’s ability and willingness to exercise the requisite
good judgment and discretion expected of one in whom the government entrusts its sensitive
information. 
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings regarding each SOR allegation are as follows:
Paragraph 1, Guideline G (Alcohol): AGAINST THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against the Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct): AGAINST THE APPLICANT
10
Subparagraph 2.a: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against the Applicant
Paragraph 1, Guideline F (Financial): AGAINST THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.b: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.c: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.d: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.e: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.f: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.g: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.h: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.i: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.j: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.k: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.l: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.m: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.n: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.o: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 3.p: Against the Applicant
Paragraph 4, Guideline J (Criminal Conduct): AGAINST THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 4.a: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 4.b: Against the Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant’s request for eligibility for assignment to a
sensitive position. Eligibility is denied.
Matthew E. Malone
Administrative Judge