KEYWORD: Financial; Personal Conduct
DIGEST: Applicant accrued $12,402 in delinquent debts through nine unpaid consumer accounts.
She also failed to disclose her debts more than 180 days past due as required by question 20 of a
Public Trust Position Application (SF 85P) she submitted in December 2004. Her omission of her
debts from the SF 85P was not intended to be a false answer or to mislead the government. Her debts
resulted from her divorce in 2001, and she has not experienced any delinquencies since. Available
information is sufficient to mitigate the security concerns about her personal conduct and her
finances. Eligibility for an ADP I/II/III position is granted.
CASENO: 06-09176.h1
DATE: 04/24/2007
DATE:  April 24, 2007
In re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for ADP I/II/III Position
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ADP Case No. 06-09176
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MATTHEW E. MALONE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Jennifer Goldstein, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
2
Applicant accrued $12,402 in delinquent debts through nine unpaid consumer accounts. She
also failed to disclose her debts more than 180 days past due as required by question 20 of a Public
Trust Position Application (SF 85P) she submitted in December 2004. Her omission of her debts
from the SF 85P was not intended to be a false answer or to mislead the government. Her debts
resulted from her divorce in 2001, and she has not experienced any delinquencies since. Available
information is sufficient to mitigate the security concerns about her personal conduct and her
finances. Eligibility for an ADP I/II/III position is granted.
 Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
 I sustained Department Counsel’s objection to Ax. H on grounds of relevance. (Tr., 34 - 39) For possible use2
on appeal, it is included in the case file along with Ax. A - G and I - R.
 On its face, her response to SOR ¶ 2.a is an admission, but the accompanying explanation with respect to3
intent, the gravamen of the allegation, is a denial.
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 6, 2004, Applicant submitted a Public Trust Position Application (SF 85P).
After reviewing the results of the ensuing background investigation, adjudicators for the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) were unable to make a preliminary affirmative finding  that1
it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant a position of trust. On August 23,
2006, DOHA issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise security
concerns addressed in the Directive under Guideline E (personal conduct) and Guideline F (financial
considerations).
Applicant timely responded to the SOR, and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to
me on November 16, 2006. I convened a hearing on January 10, 2007, at which the parties appeared
as scheduled. The parties stipulated to the admission of all eleven exhibits proffered by the
government (Gx. 1- 11). Applicant testified and introduced 18 exhibits (Ax. A - R), of which 17
were admitted.  DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on January 18, 2007.2
FINDINGS OF FACT
The government alleged in the SOR that Applicant is delinquent on nine unpaid accounts
totaling $12,402 as follows: an AT&T account in collection status for $298 (SOR ¶ 1.a); a Direct
Digital satellite TV account in collection status for $133 (SOR  ¶ 1.b); an unpaid bill to a pizza
restaurant in collection status for $121 (SOR ¶ 1.c); an account in collection status for an unspecified
original creditor for $298 (SOR ¶ 1.d); an AT&T Broadband account in collection status for $213
(SOR ¶ 1.e); a charged off credit union account for $8,371 (SOR ¶ 1.f); a charged off account to
Finger Hut for $980 (SOR 1.g); a charged off RCA account for $1,786 (SOR ¶ 1.h); and a past due
collection account to an unspecified original creditor for $202 (SOR ¶ 1.i). The government also
alleged that Applicant deliberately falsified her response to question 20 of her SF 85P (debts
currently more than 180 days past) by answering “no,” thereby omitting the debts alleged in SOR
¶¶ 1.a through 1.i (SOR ¶ 2.a).
Applicant admitted with explanations the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.d - 1.g, and 1.i.  In3
addition to her admissions, after a thorough review of the transcript and exhibits, I make the
following findings of relevant fact:
Applicant is 33 years old and has worked since November 2004 for a health care and medical
insurance company contracted to manage medical insurance claims and information for TriCare, the
Department of Defense (DoD) medical insurance system for military personnel and their families.
After working as a claims processor for a vision care provider from May 1999 until May 2004, she
was laid off with a three month severance package. She relied on state unemployment benefits for
 Gx. 1.4
 Ax. G; Ax. I.5
 Ax. I; Ax. J.6
 Ax. C; Ax D; Ax G; Gx. 3; Gx. 4; Gx. 5; Gx. 9.7
4
about one month before obtaining her current job. Applicant was previously employed by a temp
agency from December 1996 until May 1999.4
Applicant is a single mother of two children, ages 8 and 14. She was married until December
31, 2001. In June 2001, Applicant left her husband, taking their children with her, because of her ex-
husband’s physical abuse of Applicant and his use of drugs. During the six months between their
separation and the official end of the marriage, Applicant obtained a protective order against her ex-
husband, but he violated that order and was jailed for it. Additionally, after they separated, her ex-
husband and his girlfriend lived in the marital home, tried to forge checks against Applicant’s bank
account, ran up long distance phone bills (SOR ¶ 1.a), added premium services to their digital cable
television account, took the cable box with him when he left the marital home as their divorce
became final (SOR ¶ 1.b), and generated other debts (SOR ¶ 1.c), for which both Applicant and her
ex-husband were liable, but without Applicant’s knowledge or consent.
As part of the divorce decree,  of the debts listed in the SOR, Applicant was assigned5
responsibility for the AT&T debt in SOR ¶ 1.a. However, she was only required to pay $72. The
remainder of the listed balance stemmed from her ex-husband’s long distance calls. Consistent with
the somewhat unique state laws on marital property in Applicant’s state, the court retained
jurisdiction over the debts listed at SOR ¶¶ 1.d (a collection account for an unpaid gas credit card),
1.f (a car loan for their minivan), 1.g (a catalogue account the couple used to buy Christmas gifts
during their marriage), and 1.h (a past due medical bill from the birth of her younger child that
should have been covered by her ex-husband’s insurance). Thus, if a creditor wished to be paid, the
court would decide how much the Applicant and/or her ex-husband would pay. There is no
indication any of the creditors has tried to collect since the divorce became final.
The divorce decree resolved the division of financial obligations by allowing Applicant to
pay her ex-husband $1,200 as an “Equalizing Payment.”She liquidated her 401K savings to make
this payment.  Also, as part of the divorce decree, and to completely separate her interests from those6
of her ex-husband, Applicant turned back to the finance company the aforementioned minivan, the
loan for which her ex-husband’s mother had co-signed. The resulting deficiency after re-sale was
$9,098.65; however, even though Applicant made no further payments on this loan, the balance was
reduced to $8,371 before it was charged off in October 2001.  Applicant thinks her ex-mother-in-law7
made payments on the debt after the repossession.
Applicant’s ex-husband was also ordered to pay Applicant $499 each month in child support,
but he has not done so. Nor has he paid for half of his children’s day care, medical, dental or other
expenses as ordered. A personal financial statement (PFS) Applicant submitted when interviewed
in April 2005 by a government investigator showed she earned $2,560 after deductions each month.
Expenses, such as rent, insurance, food, utilities, and other miscellaneous costs totaled about $1,775
each month. Applicant was also paying $262 in monthly car payments. A student loan with a balance
 Tr., 56, 59.8
 Tr. 55, 57 - 58.9
 Gx. 1.10
 Answer to SOR; Tr., 49 - 50.11
 Ax. R.12
5
of $5,128 is in deferral. The PFS reflected about $522 in net cash available each month after
expenses. At hearing, Applicant testified that she has paid off the aforementioned car loan. She also
stated she lives with her boyfriend, who earns about $700 every two weeks.8
Applicant has no knowledge of the broadband internet account referred to in SOR ¶ 1.e. Also,
the collection account listed in SOR ¶ 1.i is for an unpaid medical or dental account attributable to
care her ex-husband received. The balance is now over $560. The digital television account (SOR
¶ 1.b) remains unpaid because Applicant has been unable to determine if the cable box her ex-
husband took had been credited back to the account.
 As to her efforts to pay or otherwise resolve the debts listed in the SOR, Applicant testified
that after the divorce she offered to make minimal payments to the catalogue company debt (SOR
¶ 1.g), but the creditor wanted more than she could afford at the time. Her debts were thereafter
charged off and she did not address them further until the SOR was issued. She also looked into
filing for bankruptcy protection, but was told the accounts were so old that bankruptcy would be an
ineffective way to resolve her credit. Instead, she has focused on rebuilding her credit through buying
and paying off her car and by avoiding additional delinquencies. She further testified that none of
the listed creditors in the SOR have tried to collect on the debts.9
On November 30, 2004, Applicant submitted an SF 85P. In response to question 20 (“Your
Financial Record - 180-Day Delinquencies. Are you now over 180 days delinquent on any loan or
financial obligation? (Include loans or obligations funded or guaranteed by the Federal
Government.)”), Applicant answered “no.”  She received advice and assistance in filling out her10
questionnaire from a company “trainer,” a human resources employee who was helping several
employees complete their applications. The trainer interpreted question 20 for Applicant to mean she
only needed to declare delinquent federal loans. This understanding was based on the language of
the question when compared to question 19 (“Your Financial Record - Bankruptcy, Liens,
Judgements. In the last 7 years have you, or a company over which you exercised some control, filed
for bankruptcy, been declared bankrupt, been subject to a tax lien, or had a legal judgement rendered
against you for a debt?”), which she and the trainer understood was aimed at accounts such as those
listed in the SOR, but only if they were the subject of a lien or judgment.11
Applicant is well-regarded at work. Associates who have know her since 2004 speak highly
of her work ethic, honesty, reliability, and her character as a single mother.12
POLICIES AND BURDEN OF PROOF
 Directive, Enclosure 2.13
 A memorandum from Carol A. Haave, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and14
Security to DOHA Director, Adjudication of Trustworthiness Cases (Nov. 19, 2004), directed that adjudication of
trustworthiness cases for ADP I, II, and III positions be resolved using the provisions of the Directive rather than, as
originally drafted, DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, DoD Personnel Security Program , as amended (Regulation). Positions
designated as ADP I or ADP II are classified as sensitive positions in section AP10.2.1 of the Regulation. ADP III
positions are nonsensitive positions. (Regulation, AP102.3.1) By virtue of the aforementioned memorandum, however,
even though they are nonsensitive positions, ADP III cases are treated in the same way and adjudicated under the same
guidelines and procedures as ADP I and II cases.
 Also, Appendix 8 of the Regulation sets forth the adjudicative policy, as well as the disqualifying conditions15
and mitigating conditions associated with each guideline. DoD contractor personnel are afforded the adjudication
procedures contained in the Directive. (Regulation, C8.2.1)
 Directive, 6.3.16
 “The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person17
concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be
considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should
consider the following factors:
 E2.2.1.1. The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
 E2.2.1.2. The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;
 E2.2.1.3. The frequency and recency of the conduct;
 E2.2.1.4. The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
 E2.2.1.5. The voluntariness of participation;
 E2.2.1.6. The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes;
 E2.2.1.7. The motivation for the conduct;
 E2.2.1.8. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
 E2.2.1.9. The likelihood of continuation or recurrence;”
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). See also, Regulation, C6.1.1.1 (“The standard18
that must be met for...assignment to sensitive duties is that, based on all available information, the person’s loyalty,
reliability, and trustworthiness are such that...assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the
interests of national security.”)  
6
The Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines  to be considered in evaluating an13
applicant’s suitability for access to sensitive information.  Each trustworthiness determination must14
reflect consideration of both disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC) under
each adjudicative issue applicable to the facts and circumstances of each case.  Each determination15
must also reflect a fair and impartial common sense consideration of all available relevant and
material information,  and it must reflect the adjudication process outlined in the Directive at16
Section E2.2.1.  The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not17
determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable guidelines
should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they represent policy guidance
governing the grant or denial of access to sensitive information.
Trustworthiness determinations are intended solely to resolve whether it is clearly consistent
with the national interest  for an applicant to receive or continue to have access to sensitive18
information. The government bears the initial burden of producing admissible information on which
it based the preliminary decision against the applicant. Additionally, the government must be able
to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the government meets its burden, the burden then
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.19
 See Egan; Directive, E2.2.2.20
 Directive, E2.A5.1.1.21
 Directive, E2.A5.1.2.2. The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts22
from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations,
determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness,
or award fiduciary responsibilities;
7
shifts to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the government’s case. As with security
clearances, no one has a “right” to such access.  Thus, an applicant bears a heavy burden of19
persuasion. Access to sensitive information is a fiduciary relationship with the government based
on trust and confidence. The government, therefore, has a compelling interest in ensuring each
applicant possesses the requisite judgement, reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect
sensitive information pertaining to the national interests as his or her own. The “clearly consistent
with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s
suitability for access in favor of the government.20
CONCLUSIONS
Personal Conduct. Under Guideline E, a security concern may arise if it is shown an
applicant has exhibited  questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations. Such conduct may indicate the
person may not properly safeguard classified information.  Here, the government questioned21
Applicant’s trustworthiness by alleging she deliberately “falsified material facts on a Security
Clearance Application, Standard Form 85P, executed by [her] under date December 6, 2004" by
answering “no” to question 20, as discussed above (SOR ¶ 2.a). 
Applicant is seeking an ADP I/II/III position of trust, not a security clearance. Further, the
SF 85P produced by the government in support of this allegation was signed and submitted by
Applicant on November 30, 2004. Nonetheless, Applicant did not contest the allegation based on
these errors. While she  admitted the fact of her omission, she denied the gravamen of the allegation;
that is, that she intended by her omission to deceive or mislead the government about her financial
problems. I conclude that the date listed in SOR ¶ 2.a is a typographical error, and that Department
Counsel submitted sufficient information to show that these omissions and inaccuracies exist. 
Based on available information, Guideline E DC 2  must be considered. However, Applicant22
demonstrated she lacked the intent to falsify or mislead, as required by the plain language of DC 2
when she completed her SF 85P. Her explanation of her understanding of the question, when taken
together with the advice she received and the wording of the question about student or federal loans,
was both plausible and credible. In light of all of the information probative of this issue, DC 2 does
not apply, and I conclude Guideline E for Applicant.
Financial Considerations. Under Guideline F, an applicant who is financially overextended
through delinquent debt and poor personal financial management may be at risk of engaging in
 Directive, E2.A6.1.1.23
 Directive, E2.A6.1.2.1. A history of not meeting financial obligations;24
 Directive, E2.A6.1.2.3. Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;25
 Directive, E2.A6.1.3.3. The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control26
(e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation); 
 Directive, E2.A6.1.3.1. The behavior was not recent;27
8
illegal acts to generate funds to resolve their fiscal difficulties.  Applicant incurred several debts23
during her marriage that have gone unpaid since 2001, when her divorce decree was issued. She was
unable to pay those debts for several years, but her most recent PFS shows she has a positive cash
flow that would enable to her to address at least some of the listed debts. These facts warrant
consideration of Guideline F disqualifying condition (DC) 1  and DC 3.  24 25
By contrast, through Applicant’s divorce decree it appears she may no longer be liable for
some of the listed debts. Specifically, she paid her ex-husband $1,200 from her 401K retirement
savings plan to settle her share of some of the marital debts, and the debts listed at SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.d,
1.g, and 1.h, which total $3,362, were retained by the court in case creditors came looking for their
payments. It appears none of them did. Jurisdiction over the $8,371 deficiency after re-sale of the
minivan which Applicant returned (SOR ¶ 1.f), was also retained by the court through the divorce
decree. As a co-signer on the car note, Applicant’s ex-mother-in-law was also liable for this debt.
Additionally, Applicant has no knowledge of the debts in SOR ¶¶ 1.c and 1.e (totaling $334), and
the $202 debt in SOR ¶ 1.i resulted from her ex-husband’s medical care after they separated. This
leaves only the $131 digital television account (SOR ¶ 1.b) unaccounted for. Applicant avers this,
too, was a result of her ex-husband’s actions after they separated but before he left the marital abode.
Rather than unnecessarily assume full responsibility for the debts she and her husband
generated during their marriage, she has, since 2001, focused on rebuilding her credit and avoiding
further delinquencies. To that end, she has paid off a car loan, has no credit cards, has a job that pays
her well, and she has a positive cash flow. She has done this despite her ex-husband’s failure to pay
support and other expenses as ordered in the divorce. Because of the circumstances surrounding her
divorce, I have considered Guideline F mitigating condition (MC) 3.  In the five years since her26
divorce Applicant has not taken any recent action to resolve the listed debts of which she was aware,
primarily because she understood many of the debts were resolved through her divorce decree.
In light of all of the information probative of this issue, it is unclear for what debts Applicant
is responsible. At worst, she and her ex-husband may be subject to a division of these obligations
by the court that issued their divorce decree. However, there is no indication their creditors have
been trying to collect on the listed debts. Applicant is not now financially overextended, and the
listed debts are not recent, requiring consideration of MC 1.  The mere presence of unpaid debts27
does not automatically disqualify one from holding a sensitive position, and the debts in this case
are not a source of pressure on Applicant to obtain funds through illegal or other inappropriate
measures. I conclude Guideline F for the Applicant.
 See note 17, supra.28
9
Whole Person. In evaluating Applicant’s case, I have also considered the adjudicative
process factors collectively referred to as the “whole person” concept.  Applicant is a mature adult,28
who carries a heavy responsibility in caring for her two children. The circumstances that resulted in
the debts in the first place stemmed from the end of her marriage, and she has taken steps to improve
her financial standing so as to avoid similar problems in the future. As a matter of common sense,
the facts presented in this case do not pose an unacceptable risk to the interests of national security.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings regarding each SOR allegation are as follows:
Paragraph 1, Guideline F (Financial): FOR THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.i: For the Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E (Personal Conduct): FOR THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For the Applicant
10
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant Applicant’s request for eligibility for assignment to a sensitive
position. Eligibility is granted.
Matthew E. Malone
Administrative Judge