KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is a 57-year-old senior systems analyst for a defense contractor. A native of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), he came to the U.S. in November 1989 at the behest of the
Chinese university where he had been employed as an instructor since 1982. He took advantage of
the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 and acquired U.S. permanent residency in 1993, and
naturalized U.S. citizenship in 2003. Foreign influence concerns are raised by the PRC residency and
citizenship of his three sisters, one of whom works for the local people’s congress, and by the PRC
citizenship of a niece who lived with him for several months in 2006. Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 06-09980.h1
DATE: 04/06/2007
DATE:  April 6, 2007
In re:
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SSN:  -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-09980
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ELIZABETH M. MATCHINSKI
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Francisco Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
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Applicant is a 57-year-old senior systems analyst for a defense contractor. A native of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC), he came to the U.S. in November 1989 at the behest of the
Chinese university where he had been employed as an instructor since 1982. He took advantage of
the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 and acquired U.S. permanent residency in 1993, and
naturalized U.S. citizenship in 2003. Foreign influence concerns are raised by the PRC residency and
citizenship of his three sisters, one of whom works for the local people’s congress, and by the PRC
citizenship of a niece who lived with him for several months in 2006. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant. As required by Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 ¶ E3.1.2
(Jan. 2, 1992), as amended, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on June 22, 2006, detailing
the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (foreign influence). Applicant
filed an initial response to the SOR on July 7, 2006, in which he responded to the allegations and
requested a hearing. In a supplemental response dated December 14, 2006, Applicant amended his
responses to SOR ¶¶ 1.d and 1.g, and indicated he now wanted a decision based on the written record
without a hearing.
The government submitted a File of Relevant Material (FORM) on January 24, 2007,
consisting of 13 Items (1-13). On January 26, 2007, DOHA forwarded a copy of the FORM to
Applicant and instructed him to respond within 30 days of receipt. Applicant filed a timely rebuttal
to the FORM on February 21, 2007. On review, Department Counsel had no objections to
Applicant's submission. The case was assigned to me on February 28, 2007, to determine whether
it was clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE
The government requested administrative notice be taken of several facts concerning the
PRC, including that it is an economically powerful country with an authoritarian government
dominated by the Chinese Communist Party; has a poor human rights record; possesses large and
increasingly sophisticated military forces and weapons; is a foreign rival of the U.S.; targets U.S.
intelligence; may place travelers to the PRC under surveillance; and was known to be an active
collector of U.S. economic intelligence as of 2000. Source documents were included in the FORM
as Items 7 through 12 for administrative notice.
Authority to consider the government’s request is set forth in ¶ E3.1.10 of Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6 (The Administrative Judge may rule on questions of procedure, discovery,
and evidence and shall conduct all proceedings in a fair, timely, and orderly manner.).  The DOHA
Appeal Board has ruled that administrative or official notice in administrative proceedings is broader
than judicial notice under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In ISCR Case No. 02-24875 (decided Oct.
12, 2006), the Appeal Board found no error in a DOHA administrative judge taking administrative
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notice of a U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human Rights 2000: Laos, as the document
was an official U.S. government report relevant to the issues in the case before him, and it was
provided in advance to the applicant who had an opportunity to rebut its contents or to present
alternative information for the judge to notice.
In this case, Applicant had the opportunity to review the source documents and he filed no
objections. The State Department publications (Background Note: China; Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices-2005 for China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau); and Consular
Information Sheet) (Items 7, 8 and 12, respectively), and the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive’s Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and
Industrial Espionage-2005 (Item 11) may properly be considered as official U.S. government
reports. The unclassified excerpts from a bipartisan Select Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives, U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s
Republic of China (Item 9) is also accepted, but primarily as a historical reference given its dated
nature (May 1999). The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies’ Intelligence Threat
Handbook (Item 10) is distinguishable as a product of a private contractor at the behest of  the
Interagency/OPSEC Support Staff. Administrative notice may be taken of non-governmental
issuances, and will be accepted of this document given the absence of any objections from Applicant.
While the source documents may properly be considered, the government has requested
notice of certain facts that may or may not be supported by the documentation. After review of Items
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, I agree to take administrative notice of the facts concerning the PRC and
activities therein as requested by Department Counsel with the following caveats:
In foreign relations, China and the United States have been rivals since the cold
war, with particular disagreement on the status of Taiwan, and China has
continued to resist what it considers to be superpower dominance by the United
States, despite improving economic relations. The U.S. House’s Select Committee
on U.S. National Security reported in 1999 that the U.S. assisted the PRC in avionics
modernization of its jet fighters during the Cold War. In its Background Note: China,
the U.S. State Department reports that in the 1970s and 1980s, China maintained its
consistent opposition to “superpower hegemony” but China’s focus was almost
exclusively on the expansionist actions of the Soviet Union and Soviet proxies, such
as Vietnam and Cuba. While U.S. China relations are sometimes complicated by
events in Taiwan and Hong Kong, since the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué
in February 1972, the U.S. has supported the Chinese position that all Chinese on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is only one China and that Taiwan
is part of China. Tensions between the countries raised by the Chinese crackdown of
dissident students in Tiananmen Square and other incidents have not led to a
permanent disruption in U.S-China relations. Moreover, the U.S. wants China to be
a “global partner,” a responsible stakeholder in the international community, and
China has been an “important partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts” since
September 2001.
Industrial espionage is intelligence-gathering “conducted by a foreign
government or by a foreign company with direct assistance of a foreign
government against a private U.S. company for the purpose of obtaining
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commercial secrets. The source document on which Department Counsel relies,
Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage, 2005, defines industrial espionage as “the acquisition of sensitive
information that has independent economic value and that the owner has taken
reasonable measures to protect, regardless of the perpetrator’s country of origin or
whether a foreign government agent can be linked to the theft.” Nothing in this
definition suggests that industrial espionage must be conducted directly by or with
the direct assistance of a foreign government.
Known to be active collectors of U.S. economic intelligence as of 2000, the
National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC)’s 2000 Annual Report to
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage lists
Taiwan and China among the active collectors of U.S. economic and proprietary
information.  Department Counsel did not request administrative notice of the
annual report for 2000. In the annual report for 2005 (Item 11), China and Russia are
specifically cited as two of the most aggressive collectors for 2005. Taiwan is listed
as one of the countries sending the most foreign visitors to DOE and DoD facilities
during fiscal year 2005, but it is not identified specifically as one of the most active
collectors.
FINDINGS OF FACT
DOHA alleged under Guideline B, foreign influence, that Applicant’s brother (¶ 1.a), three
sisters (¶ 1.b), and mother-in-law (¶ 1.e) are resident citizens of the PRC; one of his sisters worked
as a local government representative in the PRC (¶ 1.c); a niece who is a citizen of the PRC lived
with him in the U.S. (¶ 1.d); Applicant was an instructor at a university in the PRC from about
November 1982 to November 1989 (¶ 1.f), and his first year of graduate study in the U.S. was
financed by the Chinese university (¶ 1.g), and Applicant and his spouse visited family members in
the PRC from June 21, 1998 until July 27, 1998 (¶ 1.h).
In his initial answer, Applicant denied the PRC citizenship and residency of his brother, as
his brother had retired to Canada where he was a permanent resident. He admitted his three sisters
and mother-in-law are resident citizens of the PRC, but denied that a sister’s staff position with the
local people’s congress made her a local government employee. As for his niece, he indicated his
niece’s stay with him was only transitional, that she was relocating and would be moved out very
soon. Applicant admitted he had been employed as a computer languages and systems and signals
instructor at the Chinese university before he came to the U.S.; that while his living expenses during
his first year in the U.S. were sponsored by the Chinese university, the U.S. institution covered the
remaining expenses. Applicant acknowledged his and his spouse’s travel to the PRC in 1998 to visit
his ill father.
 In his supplemental answer of December 2006, Applicant provided the lease showing that
his niece had moved out of his home in July 2006, and of the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992
under which he adjusted his status to U.S. permanent resident. In rebuttal to the FORM, Applicant
indicated that the systems and signals course which he taught at the Chinese university was a
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beginner course for biomedical engineering majors that “mainly included the mathematical analyses
for general signals, such as biomedical signals.”
Applicant’s admissions are incorporated as findings of fact. After a review of the documents
of record, I make the following additional findings.
An unsigned report of personal subject interview, included as Item 13, gives the date of Applicant’s spouse’s1
entry as November or December 1990. Under ¶ E3.1.20 of the Directive, official records or evidence complied or created
in the regular course of business, other an DoD personnel background reports of investigation (ROI), may be received
and considered without authenticating witnesses, provided the information has been furnished by an investigative agency
pursuant to its responsibilities in connection with assisting the Secretary of Defense or Agency head concerned, to
safeguard classified information within industry under Executive Order 10865. A report of investigation may be received
with an authenticating witness. The DOHA Appeal Board has held that the right to object to an ROI may be waived, just
as a party can waive a hearing. (ISCR 01-23356 App. Bd., Nov. 24, 2003). Applicant did not object to its inclusion in
the record. While Item 13 was reviewed and considered, it was afforded less weight than Applicant’s SF 86 and his
various answers in resolving factual discrepancies.
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Applicant’s background and foreign ties
Applicant was born in the PRC in May 1949. The youngest of six children, he is predeceased
by his parents as well as by the elder of his two brothers. His other brother (age 66) is a PRC citizen
but a legal permanent resident of Canada since December 1, 2003. Applicant’s three sisters (ages
72, 68, and 61) are resident citizens of the PRC.
Applicant and his spouse, also a native of the PRC, married in March 1977. They had a son
in November 1981. After three years of graduate study at a scientific and technological university
(hereafter “Chinese university”) in the PRC, Applicant was awarded his master of science degree in
March 1982. For the next seven years, Applicant was a lecturer/instructor at the Chinese university
where he taught courses in computer languages and a beginner level course for biomedical
engineering majors that focused on mathematical analyses for general, biomedical signals.
In about November 1989, Applicant came to the U.S. to pursue technical research in
biomedical engineering at a renowned medical school.  The Chinese university financed  much of1
the cost of his first year with the remainder covered by the U.S. medical school. Under the terms of
the sponsorship, Applicant was to return to the Chinese university after one year.
On April 11, 1990, the President of the United States issued Executive Order 12711. It
directed the Attorney General to take any steps necessary to defer until January 1, 1994, the enforced
departure of all PRC nationals and their dependents who were in the U. S. on or after June 5, 1989,
up to an including the date of the order. These PRC nationals were allowed to maintain lawful status
in the U.S. without a valid passport through January 1, 1994. Applicant continued his research at the
U.S. medical school and cut his financial ties to the Chinese university. In mid-August 1992, he
began working as a software programmer at an institute affiliated with the medical school. On
October 1, 1992, the U.S. Congress passed the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992. It provided
for the acquisition of U.S. permanent residency status for those PRC nationals who had resided
continuously in the U.S. since April 11, 1990, and were not physically present in the PRC for longer
than 90 days between April 11, 1990 and October 1, 1992, unless conditions permitted their safe
return to the PRC as certified by the President. Applicant took advantage of that statute and acquired
lawful permanent residence in the U.S. in 1993.
From January 1997 to November 1998, Applicant was employed as a software engineer for
the medical institute. On April 15, 1998, he was issued his PRC passport, which was valid until April
14, 2003. On June 21, 1998, Applicant, his spouse, and their son traveled to the PRC to see his 93-
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year-old father, who was very ill. They visited with other family members as well during their five-
week stay. Applicant did not return to the PRC when his father died in 2001.
In late November 1998, Applicant went to work as a senior systems analyst for his current
employer. On February 6, 2003, he became a naturalized U.S. citizen, taking an oath to renounce all
foreign allegiances, to support and defend the U.S. Constitution and its laws, and to bear arms or
perform noncombatant service or civilian service on behalf of the U.S. if required. His spouse
became a U.S. citizen in March 2003 and his son in August 2003.
Needing a clearance for his duties with the defense contractor, Applicant executed a security
clearance application (SF 86) on January 25, 2005. He disclosed the PRC births of his parents and
eldest brother who were all deceased, and the PRC citizenship and residency of the sister closest to
him in age. He indicated that his other siblings (two sisters and one brother) and mother-in-law were
PRC citizens but indicated  “Unknown” as to their addresses. Applicant also disclosed his foreign
employment for the Chinese university as a lecturer from January 1982 to November 1989, his
possession of a valid PRC passport from April 15, 1998 to April 14, 2003, and his trip to the PRC
in June/July 1998. He also disclosed a pleasure trip to Canada for two days in February 2004.
On February 21, 2006, Applicant was interviewed by an Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) investigator about his foreign ties. Applicant discussed his employment at the Chinese
university before he came to the U.S. in 1989, but averred he had not maintained any contact with
anyone from the university. Supposed to return to the PRC after one year of research, he  remained
in the U.S. as Congress passed a law that allowed Chinese students to stay without having to return
to China to complete their two years of residency. Applicant denied dual citizenship with the U.S.
and China as he understood China does not recognize dual citizenship. His PRC passport was no
longer valid, although he was not certain whether it became invalid automatically on him acquiring
U.S. citizenship or on its expiration in November 2003. Applicant told the OPM investigator he had
telephone contact with his family members in China: with his  brother  two or three times per year,
with the youngest of his sisters five times per year, and with his other sisters two or three times per
year. He also indicated he had in-person contact with his brother in Canada in 2004, and with his
sisters when he went to China in 1998. The interviewer reported that  Applicant further indicated his
brother worked as an engineer for a Chinese television station in China, that his youngest sister was
employed by the local government as a representative, and that his other sisters had been university
professors until their retirements. Applicant denied that his spouse had a close relationship with her
mother, who is also a resident citizen of the PRC, and described her contact with her mother as
limited to once every year or two. Applicant, his spouse, and their son, visited her mother when they
went to the PRC in 1998. Applicant also described monthly contact with a nephew (son of his eldest
sister), who is a naturalized U.S. citizen living in the U.S. and working for the federal government.
A niece (daughter of his youngest sister) had been in the U.S. for three or four years. She had moved
the week before to Applicant’s area for a job and was residing with Applicant temporarily while
looking for an apartment. Applicant denied any preference, sympathy, or alliance with any foreign
interests and that he could be placed under duress because of his contacts with family members in
the PRC.
When he filed his initial response to the SOR in July 2006, Applicant indicated that his
brother retired “years ago,” and was living in Canada as a lawful permanent resident; that the
youngest of his three sisters was a part-time staff member of an office in the local people’s congress,
The National People’s Congress is the PRC’s legislative body and the highest organ of state power in the PRC.2
See U.S. State Department’s Background Note: China  (Item 7). Under the election law, citizens have the opportunity
to vote for local people’s congress representatives at the county level and below, although in most cases the nomination
of candidates in those elections was strictly controlled in 2005. See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005
for China (Item 8 p.25). While local subgovernmental village committees are not considered government bodies, the
local people’s congress is regarded as a legislative body. The State Department reports that beginning in late 2002, a
practice began of naming local Chinese Communist Party secretaries to serve concurrently as head of the local people’s
congress, a move that dramatically strengthened party control over these legislatures. (Id.).
8
which he maintained was not a government office. He provided proof showing his brother acquired
Canadian permanent residency in December 2003, which in light of his brother’s age, leads me to
conclude that Applicant was likely talking about his brother’s past employment during the subject
interview. It is less clear whether Applicant’s brother was in the PRC as of February 2006. There is
no evidence to contradict Applicant’s representation that his brother was living in Canada as of July
2006. Applicant’s claim of his sister being on staff of the local people’s congress is considered a
further clarification of her employment in the PRC. It is not clear whether Applicant told the OPM
investigator that his sister worked as a “representative” for the local government without naming the
people’s congress, which is a local legislative entity.  2
As of July 2006, Applicant’s spouse had contacted her mother in the PRC “several times”
to check on her health. Applicant did not speak with his mother-in-law. Applicant’s niece was
employed in the U.S. by the same university where Applicant had conducted his research in the early
1990s. She resided in Applicant’s home from about February 2006 to mid-July 2006 when she found
her own apartment.
The PRC’s political and economic state
China is a large and economically powerful country, with a population of more than a billion
people and an economy growing at about 10% per year. China has an authoritarian government
dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. The National People’s Congress, the PRC’s legislative
body, is the highest organ of state power. In 2002, a practice began of naming local Chinese
Community Party secretaries to serve concurrently as head of the local people’s congresses. This
move has strengthened Communist Party control over these legislatures. During 2005, the PRC
government’s human rights record remained poor, with a trend toward increased harassment,
detention, and imprisonment by government and security authorities of those perceived as
threatening to government authority. Foreign visitors in the PRC may be placed under surveillance
by security personnel, their hotel rooms, telephones, and facsimile machines monitored, and their
personal possessions, including computers, searched without their knowledge or consent.
The PRC possesses large military forces (strategic nuclear forces, army, navy and air force),
which are in the process of transformation into a smaller, more mobile, high tech military. The PRC
acquired some advanced weapon systems from Russia but much of its air and naval forces continue
to be based on 1960s era technology. The U.S. has made significant, tangible progress with the PRC
on nuclear nonproliferation. The PRC was the first state to pledge “no first use” of nuclear weapons.
While Taiwan has complicated the relationship and been a source of discord between the
U.S. and PRC at times, the U.S. formally recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal
government of China. Since Tiananmen, the PRC has sought a higher international profile through
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its seat as a permanent member of the United Nations, and through diplomatic relations with other
countries. The U.S. and PRC have a history of cooperation on scientific, environmental and more
recently counterterrorism. China is an important trading partner of the U.S. Its trade surplus with the
U.S. was $201.6 billion in 2005.
In an effort to acquire advanced technology, the PRC has aggressively targeted sensitive and
protected U.S. economic and militarily critical information. The PRC blends intelligence and non-
intelligence assets, relying on covert espionage activity by personnel from government ministries,
commissions, institutes, and military industries independent of the PRC intelligence services, and
by  targeting ethnic Chinese who have access to sensitive information.
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at
527. The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility
for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb.
20, 1960). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3
(App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).
The adjudicative guidelines set forth potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and
mitigating conditions (MC) under each guideline. In evaluating the security worthiness of an
applicant, the administrative judge must also assess the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3
of the Directive. The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. It is merely an indication
the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance. 
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline B—foreign influence
Applicant’s sisters are resident citizens of the PRC. His brother is also a citizen of the PRC,
although he also has permanent residency in Canada and was living in Canada as of July 2006.
Applicant has two to three times yearly telephone contact with his two older sisters and his brother,
and about five times yearly contact with the youngest sister. He visited his siblings when he was
in the PRC in 1998 and with his brother in Canada in 2004. Applicant also provided a home for his
niece from late January/early February 2006 to mid-July 2006. She is a PRC citizen as well.
Disqualifying condition ¶ E2.A2.1.2.1. An immediate family member, or a person to whom the
individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign
country, applies.
See MC E2.A2.1.3.1. A determination that the immediate family members(s), (spouse, father, mother, sons,3
daughters, brothers, sisters) cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position
to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s)
involved and the United States. The mitigating condition is bifurcated in nature [“A determination that the immediate
family member(s). . . are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power. . . .”]. To
construe the conjunction “or” as “and” would be against the plain language. While MC E2.A2.1.3.1. can be applied if
an applicant satisfies only one of the two parts, a given adjudicative condition (either disqualifying or mitigating) cannot
be read in such a way to be inconsistent with other adjudicative conditions. Under Guideline B, if foreign relations, who
are not government agents or employees, are in a position to be exploited then MC E2.A2.1.3.1. does not mitigate the
foreign influence concerns. 
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The DOHA Appeal Board has held it reasonable for the administrative judge to consider the
significance not only of an applicant’s ties, but also of his spouse’s ties to a foreign country and the
possible effect they may have on Applicant’s contacts under Guideline B (see ISCR Case No. 01-
02452, App. Bd. Nov. 21, 2002). Applicant’s spouse is also a native of the PRC. Applicant told an
OPM investigator in February 2006 that his spouse did not have a close relationship with her
mother, and that she had rare telephone contact with her, once every year or two. However, he
indicated more recently in July 2006 that while he does not have contact with his mother-in-law,
his spouse “calls her several times to check her health condition.” Accordingly, DC ¶ E2.A2.1.2.2.
Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the
potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists, also applies.
The government’s case for DC ¶ E2.A2.1.2.3. Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are
connected with any foreign government is based on Applicant’s sister’s staff position with the local
people’s congress, which Department Counsel submits is “connected with the Communist regime
that controls the PRC.” (FORM at 7). The supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party over all
other government, military, and civilian entities is well documented (see Item 8 at 25, “Beginning
in late 2002, a practice began of naming local CCP secretaries to serve concurrently as the head of
the local people’s congress, a move that dramatically strengthened party control over these
legislatures.”). However, it is his sister’ employment with the local people’s congress, a legislative
body, which triggers DC ¶ E2.A2.1.2.3., rather than any connection or influence with a political
party, although clearly there is an increased risk because of the pervasive influence of the Chinese
Communist Party even at the local level. DC ¶ E2.A2.1.2.6. Conduct which may make the
individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government, must also be
considered, given Applicant’s trip to the PRC in 1998 to visit his relatives and U.S. State
Department reports of PRC security personnel targeting foreign visitors without their knowledge
or consent (see Item 12).
In light of the existing foreign connections, Applicant has a heavy burden of persuasion as
to whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him a security clearance. The
Directive provides for mitigation where the family members and/or close associates are not agents
of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the
Applicant to choose between loyalty to them and the United States (see ¶ E2.A2.1.3.1.).  As3
affirmed by the DOHA Appeal Board in ISCR 02-14995 (App. Bd. Jul. 26, 2004), both prongs must
be satisfied to meet this mitigating condition. Applicant has failed to satisfy either.
The phrase "agent of a foreign power" is a statutory term of art defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b). It does not4
include a person who is simply employed by a foreign government, unless they are so employed in the U.S., or they are
engaged in intelligence gathering or terrorism. The federal statute dealing with national security and access to classified
information, 50 U.S.C. § 438(6), adopted the definitions of “foreign power” and “agent of a foreign power” from 50
U.S.C. § 1801.While I am not persuaded that the term “agent of a foreign power” should be more expansively defined
than as set forth in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) and by reference 50 U.S.C. § 438(6), I am required to follow Appeal Baord
precedent.
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The term "agent of a foreign power" is not defined in the Directive.  The DOHA Appeal4
Board has not defined the term, but has issued decisions explaining it. "An employee of a foreign
government need not be employed at a high level or in a position involving intelligence, military,
or other national security duties to be an agent of a foreign power for purposes of Foreign Influence
Mitigating Condition 1."( ISCR Case No. 02-24254, App. Bd. Jun. 29, 2004). In declining to adopt
the definition of “foreign agent” set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
§1801 (b), the Board suggested that  "agent" could include a person whose activities are directly or
indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in part by a foreign
principal. (ISCR Case No. 03-10954, App. Bd. Mar. 8, 2006).
Nothing is known about Applicant’s sister’s specific position and duties for the local people’s
congress.  While the risk associated with her job is likely primarily under the second prong of ¶
E2.A2.1.3.1 (in position to be exploited), I cannot state conclusively that she is not an agent of a
foreign power. Applicant’s other sisters are retired university professors. There is no indication they
are currently agents of a foreign power, although there is a heightened risk of undue coercion
because of their past academic positions where their activities were likely to be noticed by
governmental or Party authorities. Applicant’s mother-in-law did not work outside the home.
Although not specifically stated in the adjudicative guideline, the particular foreign country
of which the close relative or associate is a citizen or resides is relevant in determining the
likelihood of undue influence being brought to bear on its citizens/residents. Countries with strong
democratic institutions and respect for the rule of law are generally regarded as presenting less of
a risk than totalitarian regimes with a record of human rights abuses, support for terrorist activities,
or hostility to the U.S. The PRC has a poor human rights record and a history of targeting the U.S.
to obtain sensitive and protected technologies. Applicant has not lived in the PRC since late 1989,
and while his first year of research in the U.S. was funded in part by the Chinese university where
he served as an instructor in computer languages and biomedical signals and systems before he
came to the U.S., he has not had any tie, financial or otherwise, to the Chinese university since then.
Yet his  present employment with a defense contractor, especially given his past affiliation with the
Chinese university, makes him an attractive target. In the absence of any indication that Applicant
plans to travel to the PRC in the future, the risk of undue foreign influence is primarily through his
sisters in the PRC. The risk is substantially lessened with respect to his brother, who is a legal
resident of Canada. Applicant’s niece is similarly removed from the physical reach of the PRC
military and security authorities, but her visa status in the U.S. is unknown. 
Common sense suggests that the stronger the ties of affection or obligation, the more
vulnerable a person is to being manipulated if the relative is improperly influenced, brought under
control, or even used as a hostage by a foreign intelligence or security service. Even though his
spouse has contacted her mother several times to check on her health, Applicant is not likely to
jeopardize the life he has enjoyed in the U.S. for his  mother-in-law, who is 91 and in ill health. He
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has no personal relationship with her. In contrast, despite his limited contact with his sisters in the
PRC (telephone contact from two to five times yearly depending on the sister), there is sufficient
evidence of a bond with these siblings through his calls, his visit with them in 1998, and his
assistance in providing a temporary home for his youngest sister’s daughter. His niece lived with
him for several months in 2006 until she found her own apartment. While Applicant may well have
seen this niece only twice in person before she came to the U.S., it is reasonable to infer that they
developed a relationship over the months she resided in his home. MC ¶ E2.A2.1.3.3. Contact and
correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent, does not apply.
Whole Person Analysis
“The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance.” ¶ E2.2.1. Applicant
has established significant bonds to the U.S., most notably citizenship in 2003 and continuous
employment since August 1992. He has traveled to the PRC only once in the past ten years, which
was in 1998 to see his ill father. Yet primarily because of his bond to his sisters who are resident
citizens of the PRC—a circumstance clearly beyond his control—there is an unacceptable risk of
undue foreign influence. With so little known about his relatives’ activities and associations in the
PRC, I am unable to conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him
access.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Elizabeth M. Matchinski
Administrative Judge