KEYWORD: Foreign Influence; Foreign Preference
DIGEST: Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a defense contractor. She was born in Taiwan,
came to the U.S. to further her education in 1979, and became a U.S. citizen in 1993. Applicant has
applied to formally renounce her Taiwanese citizenship. Applicant has mitigated the foreign
influence concerns raised by her elderly mother in Taiwan. Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-14322h1
DATE: 04/30/2007
DATE: April 30, 2007
In re:
--------------------
SSN: ---------
Applicant for Security Clearance
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ISCR Case No. 06-14322
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EDWARD W. LOUGHRAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esq., Department Counsel
Francisco Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Sheldon I. Cohen, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
2
Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a defense contractor. She was born in Taiwan, came
to the U.S. to further her education in 1979, and became a U.S. citizen in 1993. Applicant has
applied to formally renounce her Taiwanese citizenship. Applicant has mitigated the foreign
influence concerns raised by her elderly mother in Taiwan. Clearance is granted.
Pursuant to Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as1
amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program  (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended (Directive).
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant. On August 24, 2006, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons  (SOR)1
detailing the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
and Guideline C (Foreign Preference) of the Directive. Applicant answered the SOR in writing on
September 23, 2006, and elected to have a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was
assigned to me on January 18, 2007. A notice of hearing was issued on February 22, 2007,
scheduling the hearing for March 28, 2007. The hearing was conducted as scheduled to consider
whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on April 11, 2007.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
Applicant submitted a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, requesting notice of the facts that
support SOR ¶ 2.a, which alleges Applicant “exercise[s] dual citizenship with Taiwan and the United
States.” The Motion was marked as HE XIV. The Government responded with a Motion to Amend
the Statement of Reasons, marked as HE XV, moving to delete SOR ¶ 2.b, and modify SOR ¶ 2.a,
as follows:
After becoming a naturalized United States citizen in about October 1993, you
exercised dual citizenship with Taiwan and the United States by applying for a
Taiwanese passport in about May 1996, and then used it to travel to Taiwan.
Applicant did not object to the Motion to Amend the Statement of Reasons, and was satisfied that
it answered their Motion for a Bill of Particulars. The Motion to Amend the Statement of Reasons
was granted. SOR ¶ 2.a is now as stated above. SOR ¶ 2.b is deleted.
Department Counsel submitted a Motion for Appropriate Relief requesting that Applicant
be ordered to disclose her witness list, to include contact numbers, and a summary of their expected
testimony. The Motion was marked as HE XVI. Applicant’s response was marked as HE XVII. The
motion was denied. Applicant’s Hearing Memorandum was marked as HE XVIII.
The Government offered one exhibit that was marked as Government Exhibit (GE) 1, and
admitted without objection. 
Department Counsel requested administrative notice be taken of the facts contained in
Hearing Exhibit (HE) XIII. The source documents for the facts are U.S. Department of State,
Background Note: Taiwan, dated October 2006 (HE I); Congressional Research Service, CRS Report
for Congress, Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, updated October 9, 2006 (HE
II);  Interagency OPSEC Support Staff, Intelligence Threat Handbook, select pages (HE III); Press
release, U.S. Department of Justice, dated April 18, 2006 (HE IV);  Press release, U.S. Department
Tr. at 142-143, 179; GE 1.2
Tr. at 148-150, 167-168; Applicant’s response to SOR; GE 1 at 16-22.3
4
of Justice, dated January 22, 2007 (HE V); Statement of Facts, United States v. Keyser (HE VI);
National Counterintelligence Center, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection
and Industrial Espionage - 2000 (HE VII); U.S. Department of State, Background Note: China, dated
January 2007 (HE VIII); U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices -
2006: China, dated March 6, 2007 (HE IX); U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee
Report, U.S. National Strategy and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of
China, dated January 3, 1999, select pages (HE X); Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage -
2005 (HE XI); U.S. Department of State, Consular Information Sheet: China, dated September 22,
2006 (HE XII). 
I took administrative notice of the facts contained in HE I, II, VI, and VIII though XII, as
substantially stated in HE XIII. I did not take administrative notice of the facts contained in HE III,
IV, V, and VII. In accordance with ISCR Case No. 03-21434 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2007), those
exhibits were remarked as Government Exhibits (GE) 2 through 5, and admitted.
Applicant testified and offered 23 exhibits that were marked Applicant Exhibits (AE) A
through W. AE I and T were duplicates of HE I and XI, and were withdrawn by Applicant. The
remaining 21 exhibits were admitted. GE 6 was offered and admitted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant’s admissions to the allegations in the SOR are incorporated herein. In addition,
after a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following
findings of fact.
Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a defense contractor. She is single with no children.
Applicant was born in Taiwan. She received her bachelor’s degree in Taiwan in 1978. She came to
the United States in 1979, to further her education. She received a Ph.D. from an American
university in 1987. Applicant became a U.S. citizen in about October 1993.2
Applicant’s father passed away a long time ago. Her mother is 76 years old. She is a citizen
and resident of Taiwan. She has an elementary school education, and does not work. Applicant’s
mother visited Applicant and Applicant’s brother in the United States on three occasions, in 1980,
when Applicant’s niece was born, 1990 or 1991, and 2004 or 2005. Applicant has not seen her
mother since that trip. She talks to her mother about twice a month. Applicant would like her mother
to immigrate to the U.S., but her mother has decided to remain in Taiwan.3
Applicant’s only sibling is a citizen and resident of the United States. He received a Master
of Science degree in engineering from a U.S. university. He came to the U.S. before Applicant, and
Tr. at 148-149; GE 1 at 16-22.4
Tr. at 166-167; AE B.5
Tr. at 152-156; AE D, E.6
Tr. at 156-163; AE V, W.7
Tr. at 151, 178-179; AE B.8
Tr. at 63-70.9
5
became a U.S. citizen before her, in 1990. He is married with two adult children. His wife is a U.S.
citizen. Both of his children were born in the United States.4
Applicant’s brother inherited the family house in Taiwan from his grandparents more than
30 years ago. At that time only male children could inherit property. An old house was on the
property. The house was torn down and a four apartment building was constructed. Two apartments
were sold to finance the construction. Applicant’s mother lives in one of the remaining apartments.
She lives off the rent from the fourth apartment. She does not earn a pension from the government
of Taiwan. Applicant’s brother sends their mother about $3,000 per year to supplement her income.
Applicant sends her about $500 per year.5
Applicant obtained a Taiwanese passport in about May 1996. She obtained the passport so
that she could travel to Taiwan for more than two weeks if her mother became ill. Her mother was
frequently ill and had an operation, but did not inform Applicant or her brother. Applicant later
discovered that she could also travel for longer than two weeks with her U.S. passport. She never
used the Taiwanese passport, and did not renew it after it expired in 2002. She traveled to Taiwan
in 2000 and 2002. She used her U.S. passport when she traveled to Taiwan on both occasions. She
obtained a visa from Taiwan for the 2002 trip. The visa authorized her to stay in Taiwan for 60 days,
with multiple entries.6
Applicant has applied to renounce her Taiwanese citizenship. Additional forms and
documents are being obtained from Applicant’s mother in order to process the application. Applicant
attempted to return her expired Taiwanese passport to the Taiwan government, but they refused to
take it until all the documents are received. Once she receives all the documents, Applicant will
submit the documents and her expired passport to Taiwanese authorities.7
Applicant does not own any foreign property or assets. She owns her house in the United
States, and her net worth is approximately $500,000.8
Applicant has worked as an engineer for several employers. A former supervisor, who
testified on Applicant’s behalf, described her as honest, hard-working, and reliable.  Applicant and9
the Government both introduced copies of the report of Applicant’s background investigation. There
was nothing derogatory in the report. Friends, associates and co-workers all spoke very highly of
GE 6; AE F.10
Tr. at 85-102.11
Tr. at 109-110, 122-124, 137-138.12
HE I at 3, 6.13
Id. at 1, 7.14
Id. at 8-9.15
Id. at 9.16
6
her.  Appellant is very active in her religious community. One of the members of Applicant’s10
religious community has a child with a learning disability. Applicant volunteered to assist in teaching
the child. The mother testified that Applicant is honest, enthusiastic, reliable, and a good person.11
Other witnesses stated Applicant was a person of integrity, a mentor, a role model, dedicated, and
a good friend who treats people with kindness and honesty.12
In 1949, Taiwan was populated by refugees fleeing a civil war in China. That same year,
Communists in mainland China established the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and a separate,
independent government was established in Taiwan. The PRC does not recognize Taiwan, and insists
there is only “one China.”13
Taiwan is a multi-part democracy. Through nearly five decades of hard work and sound
economic management, Taiwan has transformed itself from an underdeveloped, agricultural island
to an economic power that is a leading producer of high-technology goods.14
On January 1, 1979, the United States formally recognized the PRC as the sole legal
government of China. The U.S. also announced that it would maintain cultural, commercial, and
other unofficial relations with the people on Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) signed into
law on April 10, 1979, created the legal authority for the conduct of unofficial relations with Taiwan.
The American Institute in Taiwan, a private nonprofit corporation with offices in Taiwan, is
authorized to issue visas, accept passport applications, and provide assistance to U.S. citizens in
Taiwan. A counterpart organization was established by Taiwan. It has multiple offices in the U.S.15
Maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal. The U.S. does not
support Taiwan independence, but it does support Taiwan’s membership in appropriate international
organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it accessed in 2002, Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the Asian Development Bank. In addition, the U.S.
supports appropriate opportunities for Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations where its
membership is not possible.16
The TRA enshrines the U.S. commitment to assisting Taiwan maintain its defensive
capability. The U.S. continues to sell appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan, in
accordance with the TRA. President Bush publicly stated in 2001 that the United States would do
“whatever it takes” to help Taiwan’s defense and approved a substantial sale of U.S. weapons to
Taiwan, including destroyers, anti-submarine aircraft, and diesel submarines. The White House also
HE II at 2.17
Id.18
Id.19
HE VIII, IX, X, XII.20
HE IV, XI, GE 2-5.21
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).22
Id. at 527.23
7
was more accommodating to visits from Taiwan’s officials than previous U.S. Administrations, and
permitted visits from Taiwan’s president in 2001 and 2003, and Taiwan’s vice president and defense
minister in 2002.  17
Since then, there have been changes in U.S.-Taiwan relations. Taiwan’s new president
disavowed key concepts long embraced by the opposing party - the “status quo” that there is only
one China and Taiwan is part of it - and instead has adopted the more provocative position that
Taiwan already “is an independent, sovereign country,” a “status quo” he promises to maintain.
There was also a series of recent corruption scandals.  18
In response to Taiwan’s political developments, the Administration appears to have dialed
back its earlier enthusiasm for supporting Taiwan’s initiatives. While still pursuing a close
relationship with Taiwan, U.S. officials now appear to be balancing criticisms of the PRC military
buildup opposite Taiwan with periodic cautions and warnings to the effect that U.S. support for
Taiwan is not unconditional, but has limits.  19
China is a large and economically powerful country, with a population of over a billion
people and an economy growing at about 10% per year. China has an authoritarian government,
dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. China has a poor record with respect to human rights,
suppresses political dissent, and its practices include arbitrary arrest and detention, forced
confessions, torture, and mistreatment of prisoners.20
Both China and Taiwan are known to be active collectors of U.S. economic intelligence. The
PRC also maintains intelligence operations in Taiwan.21
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  As Commander in Chief, the President has22
“the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national security and to determine
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to23
grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly
Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960). 24
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).25
Id.; Directive, ¶ E2.2.2.26
Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.27
8
consistent with the national interest to do so.”  An applicant has the ultimate burden of24
demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his or her
security clearance. The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations
should err, if they must, on the side of denials.  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant25
should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such
sensitive information.  The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a26
determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the applicant has not
met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a
clearance.  27
The Directive sets forth potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions
(MC) under each guideline. Additionally, each security clearance decision must be a fair and
impartial commonsense decision based on the relevant and material facts and circumstances, the
whole-person concept, along with the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3 and ¶ E2.2.1 of the
Directive.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those
which would mitigate security concerns, pertaining to the adjudicative guidelines are set forth and
discussed in the conclusions section below.
CONCLUSIONS
I have carefully considered all the facts in evidence and the legal standards discussed above.
I reach the following conclusions regarding the allegations in the SOR.
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
A security risk may exist when an individual’s immediate family, including cohabitants, and
other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens
of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for
foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with
citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security
determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or
pressure. 
Foreign Influence Disqualifying Condition (FI DC) E2.A2.1.2.1 (An immediate family
member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of,
Directive ¶ E3.1.15; ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005). 28
ISCR Case No. 02-14995 (App. Bd. Jul. 26, 2004).29
9
or resident or present in, a foreign country) applies. Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of
Taiwan.
Since the government produced substantial evidence to establish FI DC E2.A2.1.2.1, the
burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate security
concerns raised by these facts. Applicant has the burden of proving mitigation, and the burden of
disproving it is never shifted to the government.  28
I considered all the Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC), and especially FI MC
E2.A2.1.3.1 (A determination that the immediate family member(s), (spouse, mother, sons,
daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign
power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual
to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States) and FI MC E2.A2.1.3.3
(Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent).
Notwithstanding the facially disjunctive language of FI MC E2.A2.1.3.1 (“agents of a foreign
power or in a position to be exploited”), it requires proof that an applicant’s family member(s),
cohabitant(s), or associate(s) in question are (a) not agents of a foreign power, and (b) not in a
position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the applicant to choose between
the person(s) involved and the United States.  29
Applicant’s mother has no association with the government of Taiwan, and is not an agent
of a foreign power. In determining the second prong of FI MC E2.A2.1.3.1, I specifically considered
the nature of the government of Taiwan, as discussed above, and the risk of espionage. Because of
Taiwan’s intelligence operations, I am unable to totally apply FI MC E2.A2.1.3.1.
FI MC E2.A2.1.3.3 does not apply because Applicant’s contacts with her mother are not
casual or infrequent.
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over
the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are
harmful to the interests of the United States. 
Based on all the evidence, Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition (FP DC)  E2.A3.1.2.1
(The exercise of dual citizenship) and FP DC E2.A3.1.2.2 (Possession and/or use of a foreign
passport) apply in this case. Applicant obtained and used a Taiwanese passport after becoming a U.S.
citizen. This constitutes an exercise of her Taiwanese citizenship.
I have considered all the Foreign Preference Mitigating Conditions (FP MC), and I especially
considered FP MC E2.A3.1.3.1 (Dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in
a foreign country) and FP MC E2.A3.1.3.4 (The individual has expressed a willingness to renounce
ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004).30
10
dual citizenship). I do not find FP MC E2.A3.1.3.1 totally applicable. Applicant actively exercised
her dual citizenship by using a Taiwanese passport after becoming a U.S. citizen. FP MC
E2.A3.1.3.4 is applicable. Applicant has not only expressed a willingness to renounce dual
citizenship; she has formally begun the process to renounce her Taiwanese citizenship.
Whole Person Analysis
The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in
reaching a determination. In evaluating Applicant’s case, I have considered the adjudicative process
factors listed in the Directive. I have also considered every finding of fact and conclusion discussed
above. 
Applicant was born in Taiwan, but followed her only brother to the United States in 1979,
to further her education. She remained and became a U.S. citizen in 1993. She obtained a Taiwanese
passport in 1996, thinking it would assist if she had to go to Taiwan should her mother become ill.
She realized she did not need a Taiwanese passport, never actually used it, and did not renew it after
it expired in 2002. She has taken steps to formally renounce her Taiwanese citizenship. 
Applicant’s only remaining connection to Taiwan is her elderly mother. Applicant would like
her mother to immigrate to the U.S. Her mother is set in her ways and chooses to remain in Taiwan.
She lives off the rent from the apartment owned by Applicant’s brother, with some assistance from
Applicant and her brother.
Applicant’s brother and his wife are U.S. citizens and their two adult children were born here.
Like Applicant, he is a successful engineer. Applicant has close ties to her community, particularly
through her religious activities. She has substantial assets in the U.S., including her home. She is
highly regarded in her community and the workplace.
Taiwan is an ally of the United States. However, Guideline B is not limited to countries
hostile to the United States. “The United States has a compelling interest in protecting and
safeguarding classified information from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized
to have access to it, regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical
to those of the United States.”  The distinctions between friendly and unfriendly governments must30
be made with caution. Relations between nations can shift, sometimes dramatically and
unexpectedly. 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over
matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly
nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific,
and technical fields. Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S.,
and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is
11
associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
China has an authoritarian government, a bad human rights record, and has a very aggressive
espionage program. The U.S. officially supports the “one China” policy. However, to treat China and
Taiwan the same is to ignore reality. They currently function as separate entities. That is not to say
that China is irrelevant to this case. China conducts intelligence operations in Taiwan. The threat to
Taiwan from China is real. It is this threat that is the impetus to Taiwan’s defense spending. It also
provides motivation for Taiwan’s intelligence gathering. The threat from China also provides
motivation for Taiwan to keep the U.S. as a friend, as it is dependent on the U.S. for its arms and
defense. 
Taiwan is a democracy, does not have a poor human rights record, and is dependent upon the
United States for arms, as well as its defense against China. Taiwan is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the United States, but there is no indication that Taiwan utilizes coercion against
its citizens for espionage purposes. Many of our allies conduct intelligence gathering against the U.S.
Taiwan would be risking a great deal by raising the stakes, and attempting to use duress against one
of its citizens in an attempt to coerce a U.S. citizen to commit espionage. Applicant’s mother is also
not a good candidate for coercion. She is not dependent upon the government of Taiwan. She is
stubborn. She did not inform Applicant or her brother that she had an operation, because she did not
want to bother them. Applicant has established that her mother in Taiwan does not create a
heightened risk of foreign pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress. It is extremely unlikely that
Applicant would ever have to choose between the interests of her mother or Taiwan, and the interests
of the U.S.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions and evaluating all the evidence
in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based
on foreign influence and foreign preference.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1.  Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Paragraph 2.  Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
DECISION
12
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is
granted.
Edward W. Loughran
Administrative Judge