KEYWORD: Drugs; Personal Conduct
DIGEST:  Applicant used marijuana, cocaine, psilocybin, psilocyn, methamphetamine, lysergic acid
diethylamide, and/or phencyclidine on diverse occasions for more than 20 years.  He also sold small
amounts of marijuana and cocaine.  He falsified his 2003 security clearance application to conceal
his cocaine use from his employer and the government. He failed to mitigate security concerns
pertaining to his drug involvement and personal conduct. Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 05-11090.h1
DATE: 05/23/2007
DATE:  May 23, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 05-11090
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARK W. HARVEY
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Item 5 (Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) for Security Clearance Application1
is dated October 20, 2003, on the signature page).  For convenience, the security clearance application in this decision
will be called an SF 86.  There is an allegation of falsification of the 2003 SF 86. 
On August 30, 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) published a memorandum directing2
application of revised Adjudicative Guideline to all adjudications and other determinations made under the Directive
and Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5200.2-R, Personnel Security Program  (Regulation), dated January 1987,
as amended, in which the SOR was issued on or after September 1, 2006.  Even if the revised Adjudicative Guidelines
were in effect, my ultimate decision would be the same.
Item 1 (Statement of Reasons (SOR), dated August 30, 2006) at 1-2.  Item 1 is the source for the remainder3
of this paragraph. 
Item 4 (Applicant’s response to SOR, dated September 22, 2006).  4
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) transmittal letter, dated January 29, 2007.  Applicant signed5
the receipt on February 4, 2007. 
2
Applicant used marijuana, cocaine, psilocybin, psilocyn, methamphetamine,
lysergic acid diethylamide, and/or phencyclidine on diverse occasions for more than 20
years.  He also sold small amounts of marijuana and cocaine.  He falsified his 2003
security clearance application to conceal his cocaine use from his employer and the
government. He failed to mitigate security concerns pertaining to his drug involvement
and personal conduct. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 20, 2003, Applicant applied for a security clearance and submitted
a Security Clearance Application (SF 86).   On August 30, 2006,  the Defense Office of1 2
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to him, under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, dated
February 20, 1960, as amended and modified, and Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive),
dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified.  The SOR alleges security concerns3
under Guideline H (Drug Involvement) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct). The SOR
detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under
the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue
a security clearance for him, and recommended referral to an administrative judge to
determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked.
In an answer notarized on September 22, 2006, Applicant responded to the SOR
allegations, and elected to have his case decided on the written record in lieu of a
hearing.  A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM), dated January 19,4
2006, was provided to him on February 4, 2007, and he was afforded an opportunity to
file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation.  His5
Id. The DOHA transmittal letter informed Applicant that he had 30 days after receipt to submit information.6
Speed, LSD, PCP and mushrooms are essentially street names for methamphetamine, lysergic acid7
diethylamide, phencyclidine, and psilocybin or psilocyn respectively. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (PCP and LSD); Neal
v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 286 (1996)(LSD); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 492 (1976) (Speed); United
States v. Hussein, 351 F.3d 9, 16 (1  Cir. 2003) (mushrooms are a plant which may contain the Schedule I controlledst
substance psilocybin or psilocyn).
Item 4, supra note 4, is the source for all factual assertions in this paragraph. 8
Item 5, supra note 1, at Sections 1 (date of birth), 5 (education), 6 (employment), 8 (spouse), 9 (relatives), and9
11 (military service) is the source for the facts in this paragraph, unless otherwise stated. 
Unless stated otherwise, the source for the facts in this section is Applicant’s affidavit to a Special Investigator10
of the Office of Personnel Management on April 19, 2006.  Applicant noted that details concerning the numbers of times
he used drugs and the dates of use may vary from previous statements, and such details were difficult for him to recall.3
submissions were due by March 6, 2007, but he did not submit any additional
information.  The case was assigned to me on April 9, 2007.6
Procedural Issue
A National Security Agency (NSA) clearance decision statement, dated October
7, 2004, is included in the file as Item 7.  This statement describes an NSA interview on
July 20, 2004, wherein Applicant evidently admitted more extensive and recent illegal
drug use than is contained in the other exhibits I received.  This July 20, 2004, NSA
interview is not in my file. I have decided not to give any evidentiary weight to Item 7.
  
FINDINGS OF FACT
As to the factual allegations, Applicant admitted use of marijuana, cocaine, PCP,
LSD, Speed, as well as sale of marijuana and cocaine.  He also admitted that he failed7
to provide complete information about his drug involvement on his 2003 SF 86.   His8
admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete and thorough
review of the evidence of record, and upon due consideration of same, I make the
following findings of fact:
Applicant is a 48-year-old employee of a defense contractor.  From 1983 to 1986,9
he attended a university, and he was awarded a bachelor of science degree. He has no
prior military service. Applicant is married, however, he is separated from his spouse.
He has twin sons who were born in 1992. 
Drug Involvement
When Applicant was 16 or 17, he was arrested for possessing or using
marijuana.   He attended a court-ordered drug education class. He has not received any10
other drug counseling.
During Applicant’s high school years from 1973 to 1977, he used marijuana once
or twice a week with friends at parties.   He also used LSD and mushrooms five to six
4
times each, and Speed once or twice with friends.  He did not recall using LSD or
mushrooms after high school.
During his college years from 1977 to 1982, Applicant used marijuana on the
weekends.  He also used PCP and cocaine three times per year.  From 1983 to 1986,
Applicant attended a university away from home.  He used marijuana and cocaine on the
weekends and during summer breaks when he returned home. He did not remember how
often or how much of these drugs he used.  He did not remember using PCP, LSD or
Speed during those years. 
From 1986 to 1992, Applicant’s marijuana use was two or three times per year,
and his cocaine use was six times per year.  He was employed and could afford more
cocaine. Thereafter, he continued to use cocaine sporadically, with his last cocaine use
occurring in the Summer of 2002. 
From 2000 to 2003, Applicant had a medical problem and received a prescription
for percocet. He used percocet when the pain was not severe “to feel the high that it
gives.” Id. at 4.  
When he was using drugs, generally he purchased a quantity and then would use
half and sell the other half.  Sometimes he would share drugs with friends without
selling it to them. 
In both his April and September 2006 statements, Applicant said he did not intend to use
drugs in the future because he had too much to lose, and now “leads a faith based life.”  He noted
a dramatic change in his life and his reliance on religion for support.  However, his response to the
SOR included the comment, “I have not abused [drugs] since approximately 2000-2001 time frame,”
which was inconsistent with April 2006 statement about ending his cocaine use in the summer of
2002. 
     
Personal Conduct
Question 27 of Applicant’s October 20, 2003, security clearance application asks,
“Since the age of 16 or in the last seven years, whichever is shorter, have you illegally
used a controlled substance, for example, marijuana, cocaine, crack cocaine, hashish,
narcotics (opium, morphine, codeine, heroin, etc.), amphetamines, depressants
(barbiturates, methaqualone, tranquilizers, etc.), hallucinogenics (LSD, PCP, etc.), or
prescription drugs?” Applicant answered, “No.”
He did not include any cocaine use that occurred from October 1996 until
Summer 2002, even though his use of a controlled substance was in the last seven years
before signing his SF 86. 
In his statement to a Special Investigator of the Office of Personnel Management
(Item 6 at 6), Applicant said:
I did not list my drug use on my SF 86 because I felt rushed filling it out and I was
afraid that my current employer would find out.  In addition, I feared that I would not
5
get hired or not get a clearance. I was not purposely trying to be deceitful, and am
remorseful. I do not feel that this information could be used to blackmail or coerce
me.
 In his response to the SOR (Item 4 at 1-2), Applicant provided an explanation for his
incorrect answer:
I deny–I did not deliberately and intentionally falsify material facts when I filled out
the application.  At the time the application was submitted I had one day to fill it out
and get it back to my prospective employer so I rushed through the application.  So
I did not give my drug history much thought nor did I feel that I had ample time to
ponder it. However, I did clarify the fact that there was an abuse within the last seven
years after the application was submitted.
POLICIES
In an evaluation of an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance, an administrative judge
must consider Enclosure 2 of the Directive, which sets forth adjudicative guidelines. In addition to
brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines are divided into
Disqualifying Conditions and Mitigating Conditions, which are used to determine an applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.
These adjudicative guidelines are not inflexible ironclad rules of law. Instead, recognizing
the complexities of human behavior, an administrative judge should apply these guidelines in
conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative process provision in Section E2.2, Enclosure
2, of the Directive. An administrative judge’s overarching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and
common sense decision. Because the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of
variables known as the “whole person concept,” an administrative judge should consider all
available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
Specifically, an administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors
listed at Directive ¶ E2.2.1: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Since the protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, the final decision
in each case is arrived at by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance is “clearly
consistent with the interests of national security.” In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those
conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise,
I have avoided drawing inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
“Substantial evidence [is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might  accept as adequate to support11
a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.” ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006)
(citing Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1). “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.”  Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance.” See v.Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4  Cir. 1994).th
“The Administrative Judge [considers] the record evidence as a whole, both favorable and unfavorable,12
evaluate[s] Applicant’s past and current circumstances in light of pertinent provisions of the Directive, and decide[s]
whether Applicant ha[s] met his burden of persuasion under Directive ¶ E3.1.15.”  ISCR Case No. 04-10340 at 2 (App.
Bd. July 6, 2006).
6
In the decision-making process, the Government has the initial burden of establishing facts
by “substantial evidence,”  demonstrating, in accordance with the Directive, that it is not clearly11
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s access to classified
information. Once the Government has produced substantial evidence of a disqualifying condition,
the burden shifts to Applicant to produce evidence “to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts
admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and [applicant] has the ultimate burden of
persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The burden of
disproving a mitigating condition  never shifts to the government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at
5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).12
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with
the government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship that transcends normal duty
hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. It is because of this special relationship the
government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to
whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions under this Directive include, by necessity,
consideration of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
The scope of an administrative judge’s decision is limited. Nothing in this decision should
be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied
determination as to Applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism. Executive Order 10865, § 7.
CONCLUSIONS
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors, and conditions, including those described briefly above, I conclude the following
with respect to the allegations set forth in the SOR:
Drug Involvement
Under Guideline H, “[i]mproper or illegal involvement with drugs raises questions regarding
an individual’s willingness or ability to protect classified information.  Drug abuse or dependence
may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of
classified information.”  Directive ¶ E2.A8.1.1.  
“Drugs are defined as mood and behavior-altering substances, and include: Drugs, materials, and other13
chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or
cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens); and Inhalants and other similar substances.” Directive
¶¶ E2.A8.1.1.2.1 and E2.A8.1.1.2.2. 
 “Recent drug involvement” also is addressed as a disqualifying condition (DI DC 5) in the Directive ¶14
E2.A8.1.2.5.  This disqualifying condition applies only in the context of failure to successfully complete a drug treatment
program.  ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 3 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004).
In ISCR Case No. 05-11392 at 1-3 (App. Bd. Dec. 11, 2006) the Appeal Board, considered the recency15
analysis of an Administrative Judge, who held a hearing on July 31, 2006, stating:
The Administrative Judge made sustainable findings as to a  lengthy and serious history of improper
or illegal drug use by a 57-year-old Applicant who was familiar with the security clearance process.
That history included illegal marijuana use two to three times a year from 1974 to 2002.  It also
included the illegal purchase of marijuana and the use of marijuana while holding a security clearance.
Although Applicant did not abuse drugs while holding a security clearance, Applicant’s illegal drug use was much more
extensive than the Applicant in ISCR Case No. 05-11392. 
7
Three drug involvement disqualifying conditions (DI DC) are pertinent to security concerns:
DI DC 1: Any drug abuse. 
DI DC 2: Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture,
purchase, sale, or distribution.  13
DI DC 3: Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner
that deviates from approved medical direction.
Directive ¶¶ E2.A8.1.2.1 to E2.A8.1.2.3. 
DI DC 1 applies because Applicant used marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, lysergic acid
diethylamide, phencyclidine, and/or psilocybin or psilocyn.  DIDC 2 applies because he possessed
and sold illegal drugs.  
In regard to SOR  ¶ 1.h, DI DC 3 does not apply because there is insufficient evidence that
Applicant’s percocet use deviated from approved medical direction.  There is no evidence that a
medical professional told Applicant not to take percocet unless he was suffering severe pain. 
Security concerns based on DI DCs 1 and 2 can be mitigated by showing that the drug
offenses were not recent (DI MC 1).   Directive ¶ E2.A8.1.3.1.  There are no “bright line” rules for14
determining when conduct is “recent.” The determination must be based “on a careful evaluation of
the totality of the record within the parameters set by the directive.”  ISCR Case No. 02-24452 at 6
(App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2004).  If the evidence shows “a significant period of time has passed without any
evidence of misconduct,” then an administrative judge must determine whether that period of time
demonstrates “changed circumstances or conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of reform or
rehabilitation.”  Id.  DI MC 1 does not apply because Applicant’s last cocaine use was in the Summer
of 2002.   He receives some credit for not using drugs for almost five years, however, his overall15
drug abuse was so significant and long lasting, that the recency mitigating condition is not fully
Administrative judges “must look at the record for corroboration of Applicant’s testimony.” ISCR Case 02-16
03186 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 16, 2006). Moreover, a judge may consider “Applicant’s failure to present documentary
evidence in corroboration of his denials and explanations.” ISCR Case 01-20579 at 5 (App. Bd. Apr. 14, 2004) (holding
Applicant’s failure to provide reasonably available corroborative evidence may be used in common sense evaluation to
determine whether Applicant’s claims are established). In ISCR Case 01-02677 at 7 (App. Bd. Oct. 17, 2002), the Appeal
Board explained:
While lack of corroboration can be a factor in evaluating the reliability or weight of evidence, lack of
corroboration does not automatically render a piece of evidence suspect, unreliable, or incredible. .
. . Evidence that lacks corroboration must be evaluated in terms of its intrinsic believability and in light
of all the other evidence of record, including evidence that tends to support it as well as evidence that
tends to detract from it.  8
applicable. 
Drug involvement security concerns may be mitigated under DI MC 2 when the “drug
involvement was an isolated or aberrational event.” Directive ¶ E2.A8.1.3.2. DI MC 2 does not apply
because applicant used drugs on numerous occasions for  more than 20 years.
For DI MC 3, security concerns pertaining to drug involvement may be mitigated by a
“demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future.”  Directive ¶ E2.A8.1.3.3.  Applicant
stated he made a dramatic change in his lifestyle, and that he has turned to religion for support and
guidance.  He receives some credit under DI MC 3 for these positive changes, however, Applicant
has not shown or demonstrated a sufficient track record of no drug abuse.  Morever, his failure to
present readily available corroboration about his rehabilitation from co-workers, neighbors, family
and friends is an important factor in this decision.  DI MC 3 does not apply.16
In regard to DI MC 4, security concerns may be mitigated when an applicant has satisfactorily
completed “a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements,
without recurrence of abuse, and [after receiving] a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical
professional.” Directive ¶ E2.A8.1.3.4.  DI MC 4 does not apply because Applicant has not
completed a prescribed drug treatment program.  
Although his eventual admission that he used many illegal drugs on numerous occasions
over many years was not prompt, he deserves some credit under the “whole person” concept for
eventually providing accurate information.  See ISCR Case No. 04-07360 at 2, 3 (App. Bd. Sep.
26, 2006) (indicating when a mitigating condition cannot be fully applied, “some credit” is still
available under that same mitigating condition).  
Personal Conduct
Under Guideline E, “[c]onduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness,
unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations
could indicate that applicant may not properly safeguard classified information.”  Directive ¶
E2.A5.l.l.  
 
Two personal conduct disqualifying conditions (PC DC) could raise a security concern and
may be disqualifying in this case.  PC DC 2 applies where there has been “deliberate omission,
concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security
questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine
The Appeal Board has cogently explained the process for analyzing falsification cases, stating:17
(a) when a falsification allegation is controverted, Department Counsel has the burden of proving
falsification; (b) proof of an omission, standing alone, does not establish or prove an applicant’s intent
or state of mind when the omission occurred; and (c) a Judge must consider the record evidence as a
whole to determine whether there is direct or circumstantial evidence concerning the applicant’s intent
or state of mind at the time the omission occurred. [Moreover], it was legally permissible for the Judge
to conclude Department Counsel had established a prima facie case under Guideline E and the burden
of persuasion had shifted to the applicant to present evidence to explain the omission. 
In ISCR Case No. 04-08934 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 17, 2006) the Board stated that an applicant’s statements18
about his or her intent and state of mind when the SF 86 was executed were relevant but not binding information.
Moreover, an applicant’s statements are considered in light of the record evidence of a whole.  Id. “The security concerns
raised by an applicant’s falsification are not necessarily overcome by applicant’s subsequent disclosures to the
government.   See ISCR Case No. 01-19513 at 5 (App. Bd. Jan. 22, 2004).” Id.
 9
employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or
trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities.”  Directive ¶ E2.A5.1.2.2.  A security concern
may result under PC DC 3 when an applicant deliberately provides “false or misleading information
concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security official, competent medical
authority, or other official representative in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness
determination.”  Directive ¶ E2.A5.11.2.3.   
PC DCs 2 and 3 are established by substantial evidence.  He deliberately and intentionally
gave a false answer to Question 27 of his October 20, 2003, SF 86, denying his cocaine use within
the last seven years.  He admitted he did not disclose his illegal drug use because he was worried17
about his employment and security clearance.  In his response to the SOR, he was not candid when
he said the falsification was not deliberate or intentional.  18
 
A security concern based on Guideline E may be mitigated by establishing by substantial
evidence personal conduct mitigating conditions (PC MC).  Under PC MC 1, security concerns may
be mitigated when the “information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of
judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability.”  Directive ¶ E2.A5.1.3.1.  PC MC 1 does not apply
because the falsification was substantiated, deliberate, and it is relevant to a determination of
judgment, trustworthiness and reliability. 
PC MC 2 applies when the “falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the
individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily.”  Directive ¶ E2.A5.1.3.2.  PC
MC 3 applies when the “individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the falsification before
being confronted with the facts.”  Directive ¶ E2.A5.1.3.3.  Applicant receives some mitigation
under PC MCs 2 and 3 because the only record evidence that Applicant failed to accurately report
his drug use in his 2003 security clearance application was provided by Applicant in subsequent
security interviews.  Moreover, his false statement on his 2003 SF 86 is not particularly recent.
However, his statement in response to the SOR fails to take full responsibility for the falsification,
weighing against greater mitigation. 
PC MC 4 applies  when omission “of material facts was caused or significantly contributed
to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted information
was promptly and fully provided.”  Directive ¶ E2.A5.1.3.4.  There is no evidence that such a
circumstance as described in PC MC 4 occurred.  Security concerns can be mitigated under PC MC
The failure to provide a forthright response to the SOR may be considered as follows: “(a) to assess an19
applicant’s credibility; (b) to evaluate an applicant’s evidence of extenuation, mitigation, or changed circumstances; (c)
to consider whether an applicant has demonstrated successful rehabilitation; (d) to decide whether a particular provision
of the Adjudicative Guidelines is applicable; or (e) to provide evidence for whole person analysis under Directive Section
6.3.”  ISCR Case No. 03-20327 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No. 00-0633 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 24,
2003)). 10
5 when an applicant “has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
coercion, exploitation, or duress.”  Directive ¶ E2.A5.1.3.5. PC MC 5 may not be fully applied
because the steps made toward rehabilitation are insufficient in magnitude and his response to the
SOR fails to take full responsibility for the falsification, and understates the recency of his drug
abuse.  In sum, Applicant’s October 20, 2003, false statement denying drug use during the last
seven years reflects questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, and dishonesty.  
“Whole Person” Analysis 
In addition to the enumerated disqualifying and mitigating conditions as discussed
previously, I have considered the general adjudicative guidelines related to the whole person concept
under Directive provision E2.2.1. As noted above, Applicant’s history of drug abuse, his actions
concerning illegal drug use and drug sales, and the falsification of his 2003 security clearance
application were knowledgeable and voluntary. He is 48 years old, sufficiently mature to be fully
responsible for his conduct. The likelihood of future drug abuse remains substantial because
insufficient time has elapsed since his last cocaine use, and Applicant has not provided sufficient
corroborative evidence of a change in his lifestyle. Applicant’s use of drugs while away from his
work environment mostly at parties makes his conduct less aggravated, but the possibility remains
of compromise of sensitive or classified information. Standing individually the falsification might
be regarded as an isolated offense and somewhat remote in time.  However, the false information
on his 2003 SF 86 cannot be viewed in isolation.  On April 19, 2006, he made a written statement
admitting he did not provide the drug information on his SF 86 because he was concerned about
losing his employment, and denial of his security clearance application. Then in his response to the
SOR on September 22, 2006, he said the falsification was not deliberate and intentional. His failure
to be forthright and to take full responsibility in his 2006 response to the SOR weighs against
mitigating the falsification allegation.   A person who engages in “conduct involving questionable19
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply
with rules and regulations could indicate that [applicant] may not properly safeguard classified
information.”
Applicant presented substantial extenuating and mitigating evidence for his drug abuse. He
stopped using drugs in October 2002 and desires to maintain his drug-free status in the future. He
relies on religion to support his lifestyle change. He disclosed his extensive history of drug abuse in
his 2006 interview. Applicant disclosed the only record evidence showing his drug abuse. The
absence of evidence of any prior violation of her employer’s rules or requirements, and his evident
sincerity about making future progress weigh in his favor. Abstaining from drug abuse for almost
five years shows significant evidence of his efforts to establish his responsibility and rehabilitation.
However, after weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, all the facts and
circumstances, in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the
security concerns pertaining to drug involvement and personal conduct.  His falsification of his 2003
SF 86, and his failure to be more candid in his response to the SOR weighed most heavily in my
See ISCR Case No. 04-06242 at 2 (App. Bd. June 28, 2006).20 11
determination.
The evidence leaves me with grave questions and doubts as to Applicant’s security eligibility
and suitability. I take this position based on the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518 (1988), my “careful consideration of the whole person factors”  and supporting evidence,20
my application of the pertinent factors under the Adjudicative Process, and my interpretation of my
responsibilities under Enclosure 2 of the Directive. Applicant has failed to mitigate or overcome the
government’s case.  I conclude Applicant is not eligible for access to classified information.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:         
Paragraph 1, Guideline H:  AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a to 1.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E:  AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.  Clearance is denied.
Mark W. Harvey
Administrative Judge