KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is a 37-year-old former refugee from Iraq, working as a contract translator in
support of U.S. forces in Iraq. His mother and six of his nine siblings are citizens and residents of
Iraq, whom he has not informed of his presence or work in Iraq in an effort to look out for his and
their safety. Their ignorance of his work does not lessen the security risks raised by their presence
in an area of active anti-U.S. forces should those forces identify the relationship. Applicant did not
meet his burden to overcome foreign influence security concerns. Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 06-05228.h1
DATE: 05/21/2007
DATE:  May 21, 2007
In re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-05228
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
DAVID M. WHITE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Francisco Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Item 3 (Applicant’s letter response (AR) to SOR dated Jul. 10, 2006).
1
The government submitted seven items in support of the allegations, and seven source documents in support
2
of a request to take administrative notice of material facts concerning Iraq.
2
Applicant is a 37-year-old former refugee from Iraq, working as a contract translator in
support of U.S. forces in Iraq. His mother and six of his nine siblings are citizens and residents of
Iraq, whom he has not informed of his presence or work in Iraq in an effort to look out for his and
their safety. Their ignorance of his work does not lessen the security risks raised by their presence
in an area of active anti-U.S. forces should those forces identify the relationship. Applicant did not
meet his burden to overcome foreign influence security concerns. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Applicant applied for a security clearance on May 3, 2005, in conjunction with his
employment by a defense contractor. On June 14, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, pursuant to Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended, and
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended. The SOR detailed reasons, under Guideline
B (Foreign Influence), why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the
Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant a security clearance for
Applicant, and recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance
should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR allegations in a notarized letter dated July 10, 2006,
admitting the truth of all of the factual allegations but denying that any of them made him vulnerable
to coercion, exploitation or pressure, and elected to have his case decided on the written record in
lieu of a hearing.  Department Counsel submitted the government's written case on January 18, 2007.1
A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM)  was provided to Applicant, and he was2
afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or
mitigation. Applicant responded to the FORM on February 23, 2007, providing additional
explanation about his situation and a copy of a letter of recommendation, from a military intelligence
staff sergeant, dated November 1, 2005. The case was assigned to me on March 22, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT             
Applicant admitted the truth of every factual allegation set forth in the SOR pertaining to
foreign influence under Guideline B (subparagraphs 1.a through 1.e), but denied that any of them
made him vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or pressure. Those admissions are incorporated herein
as findings of fact. After complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due
consideration of same, I make the following additional findings of fact:
Applicant is a 37-year-old employee of a defense contractor, hired to work as a translator
Item 4 (Security Clearance Application (SF-86), dated May  3, 2005) at 1, 9. (Note: Item 4 was dated “03-05-
3
05" by Applicant. Department Counsel stated that the application was signed on March 5, 2005 in section III of the
FORM. However, it is apparent from the remaining documents, and the facts that he was visiting family in Iraq during
the entire month of March and started employment in May, that he signed the application on May 3, 2005.) 
Id. at 1, 2; Item 6 (Counterintelligence (CI) Screening Questionnaire dated May 9, 2005) at 1, 10.
4
Item 4 (SF-86) at 4-6, 11-20; Item 6 (CISQ) at 10-11; Item 3 (AR to SOR) at 1.
5
Item 4 at 6; Item 3 at 1-2.
6
Item 4 at 7; Item 6 at 11.
7
Item 6 at 10-11.
8
Id.; Item 3 at 1.
9
3
with U.S. forces in Iraq, who is seeking to obtain a security clearance for the first time.  He was born3
and educated in Iraq, lived as a refugee in Jordan from 1995 until he immigrated in 1998, and
became a naturalized citizen of the United States in 2004.  Applicant reported on his SF-86 and his4
Counterintelligence Screening Questionnaire (CISQ), and admitted in response to the SOR, that his
mother, one brother, three sisters, one half-brother and half-sister are citizens and residents of Iraq;
that his other brother is an Iraqi citizen living in the United States; and that his other sister and other
half-brother are naturalized U.S. citizens and residents.   Applicant also reported and admitted that5
his roommate in the U.S., at the time he was hired to work in Iraq, was an Iraqi citizen.  Applicant6
worked as a crew leader for a public relations/advertising company for the seven years preceding his
current employment. He visited his family in Iraq from February to April 2005, and obtained his
current job in May 2005.7
While living in the U.S., Applicant reported contact with his family members in Iraq twice
per month, and with family members in the U.S. four times per month.  None of Applicant’s family8
members has any employment or other official connection with the government of Iraq.  Since he9
was hired to work with U.S. forces as a translator in Iraq, he says he has severed all contact with his
family in Iraq, and requested that his relatives in the U.S. not tell his family in Iraq that he is there.
He says he does this for his safety and that of his family. In his response to the SOR, he explained:
I deny that I am vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or pressure due to these [Iraq-
resident] family contacts. They do not know that I am working in Iraq as linguist. I
didn’t tell them because I am looking out for their safety, my safety and the countries
[sic] safety. I always warn my brothers and my sister back in the states [sic] not to say
anything about my current job to my family in Iraq. . . . I have not contacted my
family members in Iraq since I’ve been working here. . . . my brother in the United
States knows that I am working in Iraq, but does not know what I do. . . . I told my
brothers and my sister in United States that if any one asked about me, even my
mother, my brother or my sisters in Iraq, just tell them that I am very busy and have
no time to call any one. . . . My former roommate does know that I am in Iraq, but
does not know what I do here. . . . My family in Iraq is not vulnerable to coercion,
exploitation or pressure, due to my living and working arrangement because they do
Item 3 at 1-2.
10
Item 7 at 1.
11
Items 8 through 14.
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not know I am here.  10
In his February 23, 2007, response to the FORM, Applicant restated that he had not had any
communication with his family at all since he began his employment there.
Applicant has been working in Iraq since May 2005.  In his FORM response, he states that
he has “been working along side many other US Citizens as well as military personnel. These
individuals have found me to be very trusting and have placed a great deal of confidence in me.” A
military intelligence staff sergeant with whom he worked wrote him a letter of recommendation in
November 2005, describing him as an extremely talented team player, with vast knowledge,
exceptional communication skills, dedication and a positive “can-do” attitude. The senior
investigator who conducted Applicant’s counterintelligence screening in May 2005 stated that no
evidence indicated Applicant was a potential security risk, and that he did not appear to present a
CI/FP risk.  11
Department Counsel sought administrative notice of the material facts concerning Iraq set
forth in part IV of the FORM, and provided seven official U.S. Government source documents
supporting the truth of those facts.  Applicant made no objection, and I did take administrative12
notice of those facts in reaching my decision in this case. Among the most pertinent of these facts
are that Iraq’s newly and freely elected government has been unable to quell violence that has
engulfed parts of Iraq, fueled and perpetrated by Al Qaeda terrorists, Sunni insurgents and Shiite
militias and death squads. Numerous attacks and kidnappings by these groups have targeted
contractors and other non-combatants, and various human rights abuses have been substantiated.
Anti-western terrorist activity in Iaq is a continuing threat to Americans, and others. 
POLICIES            
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in
the evaluation of security suitability. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline,
the adjudicative guidelines are divided into disqualifying conditions (DC) that may raise security
concerns, and mitigating conditions (MC) that may reduce or negate security concerns. Applicable
DCs and MCs must be considered in deciding whether to grant, continue, deny or revoke an
individual's eligibility for access to classified information.
An administrative judge need not view the adjudicative guidelines as inflexible, ironclad
rules of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are
intended to be applied in conjunction with the factors set forth in the Adjudicative Process provision
of the Directive (Enclosure 2, Section E2.2), to assist the administrative judge in reaching fair and
impartial, common sense decisions.
The entire decision-making process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the "whole person concept." All available, reliable information about the person, past and
Directive ¶¶ E2.2.2, E2.2.3.
13
“Substantial evidence [is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might  accept as adequate to support
14
a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.”  ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006)
(citing Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1).  “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.”  Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).  “Substantial evidence” is “more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4  Cir. 1994).th
Directive ¶ E3.1.14.
15
Directive ¶ E3.1.15.
16
ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005); ?The Administrative Judge [considers] the record17
evidence as a whole, both favorable and unfavorable, evaluate[s] Applicant’s past and current circumstances in light of
pertinent provisions of the Directive, and decide[s] whether Applicant ha[s] met his burden of persuasion under Directive
¶ E3.1.15.”  ISCR Case No. 04-10340 at 2 (App. Bd. July 6, 2006). 
5
present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. The
Adjudicative Process factors which an administrative judge should consider, in addition to the
applicable guidelines, are: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, so the final decision in
each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that issuance of a clearance must be clearly
consistent with the interests of national security. Any doubt as to whether access to classified
information is clearly consistent with national security must be resolved in favor of the national
security.   In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical13
and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
In the decision-making process, facts must be established by “substantial evidence.”  The14
burden of producing evidence initially falls on the government to establish a case which
demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue an applicant's access to classified information. “Department Counsel is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to establish facts alleged in the SOR that
have been controverted.”   “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence15
to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department
Counsel, and [Applicant] has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance
decision.”  Once it has met its initial burden of production, the burden of persuasion (including any16
burden to disprove a mitigating condition) never shifts to the government.  17
A person who seeks access to classified information seeks to enter a fiduciary relationship
with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship that transcends normal
duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. It is because of this special relationship
that the government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals
Directive ¶ E2.A2.1.1.
18
See ISCR Case No. 05-03250 at 4 (App. Bd. Apr 6, 2007).
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to whom it grants access to classified information. 
Decisions under this Directive include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk an
applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than
actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically
provides that any adverse industrial security clearance decision shall be "in terms of the national
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned."
Nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest I have based this decision, in whole or in
part, on any express or implied judgment as to Applicant's loyalty or patriotism.
CONCLUSIONS           
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors, and conditions, including those described briefly above, I conclude the following
with respect to each allegation set forth in the SOR:
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)            
“A security risk may exist when and individual’s immediate family, including cohabitants,
and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not
citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential
for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with
citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security
determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or
pressure.”18
Seven of Applicant’s ten immediate family members are both citizens and residents of Iraq,
and an eighth is an Iraqi citizen residing in the U.S. These circumstances could raise security
concerns under foreign influence disqualifying condition (FI DC) E2.A2.1.2.1 (“An immediate
family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a
citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country”). The risk of coercion, exploitation or pressure
from the government of Iraq itself may be insignificant, since Applicant and the U.S. forces to whom
he provides support are in Iraq in alliance with, and to further the interests of that government.
Accordingly, the Iraqi citizenship, in and of itself, of his brother who resides in the U.S. does not
raise any security concerns under this (or any) FI DC. However, there are many violent, warring,
organized groups operating contrary to the interests of U.S. forces in Iraq that present a heightened
risk to act against Applicant’s family members in Iraq if his activities and their relationship becomes
known. Applicant recognizes and addresses this risk through his decision to have no contact with
his family in Iraq, and his attempts to prevent them from knowing where he is and what he is doing.
The issue is whether Applicant’s family are in a position to be exploited by anti-U.S. forces in Iraq
in a way that could force Applicant to choose between loyalty to them and loyalty to the United
States,  not whether the family members realize such risk exists. Accordingly, Applicant’s close19
family members in Iraq raise security concerns under FI DC E2.A2.1.2.1. 
7
Applicant no longer lives with his former roommate, who remains in the U.S., so no security
concerns are raised under FI DC E2.A2.1.2.2 (“Sharing living quarters with a person or persons,
regardless of citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists”).
Department Counsel did not assert that any other FI DC applied, nor are any supported by the
evidence.
Applicant essentially asserted that foreign influence mitigating condition (FI MC)
E2.A2.1.3.1 (“A determination that the immediate family member(s) . . . in question are not agents
of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the
individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States”) applies to his
circumstances. However, this FI MC requires Applicant to prove both that his family members are
not agents of a foreign power, which he has done, and that his family members are not in a position
to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force him to choose between loyalty to family
or country. His assertion that this second condition applies because he did not tell them he is in Iraq
is not persuasive. Deceiving his family members in no way reduces their vulnerability to exploitation
by anti-U.S. forces active in Iraq, who may be expected to actively seek to identify Applicant as an
Iraqi with close family in the country. As noted, Applicant himself identifies this danger as his
reason for deceiving his mother and siblings. 
Applicant’s assertion that he has not had contact with his family members in Iraq since he
began working there in 2005 is also insufficient to mitigate security concerns by application of FI
MC E2.A2.1.3.3 (“Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent”).
Applicant has regular contact with Iraqi citizens in his daily work as a translator for U.S. forces. His
non-contact with his family, with whom he previously had frequent contact, was motivated by his
ongoing and natural concern for the threat to their well-being arising from his work on behalf of U.S.
forces in Iraq. This is not an indication that his susceptibility to pressure, coercion or duress through
threats or harm to his family is reduced, but in fact shows the opposite.
There is no evidence in the record that would support the application of any other FI MC.
I have reviewed each potential FI MC and conclude that none apply. 
Whole Person Analysis           
Applicant’s mother and six of his nine siblings are both citizens and residents of Iraq. He
cares for them and their welfare. He even cut off his previously frequent contact with them, to
prevent their knowing of his work on behalf of U.S. forces in Iraq because of the danger to which
this work exposes them. The security concern is not whether his family knows what he is doing, but
the risk to them, and through them to Applicant, if anti-U.S. factions find out that he has family in
Iraq who are in a position to be exploited. Applicant left Iraq as a refugee persecuted by the former
regime, and became a U.S. citizen who has risked his personal safety by serving with U.S. forces as
a contract translator in Iraq since May 2005. His work in this regard has been excellent. However,
on balance, he has not met his burden to show that security concerns raised by the presence of his
close family members in an area of active and violent anti-U.S. hostilities is mitigated, or that the
potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress is lessened simply because he deceived those
family members about his activities. This deception, in fact, demonstrates that Applicant recognizes
this danger to his family, and his real risk of having to choose between their interests and those of
the United States should hostile forces identify them. The risk is a continuing one, inherent in the
ongoing family relationship and the nature of the conflict in Iraq.
8
As noted above, any doubt as to whether access to classified information is clearly consistent
with national security must be resolved in favor of the national security. For the reasons stated, I
conclude Applicant has not demonstrated that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national
security to grant him access to classified information.
FORMAL FINDINGS           
Formal Findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
DECISION            
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
David M. White             
Administrative Judge