KEYWORD: Foreign preference
DIGEST: Applicant is 55 years old and works as an instructor for a defense contractor. He was born
in the U.S. He lived in Israel from 1975 until 1981 and became a citizen. He was conscripted into
the Israeli army.  He returned to the U.S. and retired from the U.S. military after 20 years of
honorable service. He returned to Israel in 2002 and lived there until 2003.While there he voted in
an election. He failed to mitigate security concerns arising from foreign preference. Clearance is
denied.
CASENO: 06-05903.h1
DATE: 05/07/2007
DATE:  May 7, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-05903
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
NOREEN A. LYNCH
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Nichole Noel, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
2
Applicant is 55 years old and works as an instructor for a defense contractor. He was born
in the U.S. He lived in Israel from 1975 until 1981 and became a citizen. He was conscripted into
the Israeli army.  He returned to the U.S. and retired from the U.S. military after 20 years of
honorable service. He returned to Israel in 2002 and lived there until 2003.While there he voted in
an election. He failed to mitigate security concerns arising from foreign preference. Clearance is
denied.
This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, dated February 20, 1960, as amended, and DoD Directive1
5220.6, dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified (Directive).
GE 1 (Standard Form 86 (SF 86), Security Clearance Application , dated April 10, 2005) at 1-11. 2
Tr. 64.3
Tr. 65. 4
Tr. 83-84.5
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 16, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued to
Applicant a Statements of Reasons (SOR) stating it was unable to find it was clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance.  The SOR, which is in essence the1
administrative complaint, alleged security concerns under Guideline C (Foreign Preference), of the
revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on December 29, 2005, and implemented by the
Department of Defense effective September 1, 2006. The revised guidelines were provided to
Applicant when the SOR was issued.
In a sworn statement, dated June 19, 2006, Applicant responded to the SOR allegations and
elected to have his case decided at a hearing. On February 27, 2007, the case was assigned to me.
On March 14, 2007, the notice of hearing was issued. On March 27, 2007, the hearing was held.
Applicant waived his right to the 15 day notice requirement. At the hearing, the government
submitted three exhibits which were marked and entered into the record without objection as GE 1-3.
Applicant submitted six exhibits which were marked and entered into the record as Applicant
Exhibit (AE) A through F. At the close of the hearing, Applicant requested the record remain open
for a post-hearing submission. On March 27, 2007, Applicant sent  a receipt of registered mail, dated
March 27, 2007. This was marked as AE G and entered into the record without objection.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the factual allegations pertaining to foreign preference under Guideline
C (subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c). Those admissions are incorporated as findings of fact. In addition,
after a thorough and careful review of the pleadings and exhibits, I make the following findings of
fact.
Applicant, who is 55-years-old, has worked as an instructor for a defense contractor since
2004.  He was born in the U.S. but left the country with his parents when he was 13 years old to live2
in Europe.  His father worked for the military as a civilian. Applicant graduated from high school3
in 1970. He joined the U.S. Air Force in 1972 for three years. In August 1975, he decided to move
to Israel to attend college.  He traveled on his U.S. passport. He took courses but did not receive a4
degree. While he lived in Israel he was conscripted into the Israeli army from 1977 until May 1978.
During that time he married a woman he met in Taiwan. He left Israel in 1981 to return to the U.S.
He has since divorced his first wife who is now deceased.5
AE A (Certificate of release or Discharge from Active Duty, dated 1998) at 1.6
AE B (Meritorious Service Medal, dated April 23, 1998) at 1.7
Id.8
Tr. 72. 9
Tr. 73.10
Tr. 74-76.11
GE, supra n. 1 at 1-11.12
AE C (Letters of Reference, dated March 2007) at 1-6.13
4
Under the Israeli Law of Return, Applicant acquired Israeli citizenship. He has maintained
his dual citizenship throughout the years. When he returned to the U.S., he joined the U.S. Army and
served for 20 years. He retired in 1998.   He also received a Meritorious Service Medal.  He held a6 7
security clearance (at one point in time a top secret) while in the U.S. military. He completed his
undergraduate degree in 1985. 
After his military retirement, Applicant worked in the private sector doing security work from
1998 until 2002.  He decided to return to Israel in November 2002 due to his spiritual connection8
with Israel based on his Jewish faith. He applied for a one-year temporary passport. He describes the
time as a "chilling out" or vacation and sightseeing time. He rented a room from a family and was
not working for the U.S. government at the time.  In 2003, he voted in an Israeli election for a9
parliament seat. He did not think anything of this, and acknowledged he did it because others were
doing it. He believed he was promoting U.S. policies in the region.10
Applicant proclaims he would not bear arms for Israel and has no financial ties to the country.
He does not plan to vote again in Israel. He signed a notarized document on March 11, 2007
renouncing his Israeli citizenship. On the day of the hearing, he again affirmed his renunciation. He
surrendered his Israeli passport to the Embassy by mailing it on the day of the hearing. He wants to
go on with his work and believes this one-time occurrence should not have any bearing on his
retaining a security clearance.11
He submitted a security clearance application on April 10, 2005.  During his two years as12
an instructor for the defense contractor he has garnered praise from his supervisors.  He has the13
recommendation of his Chief Operating Officer.
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in
the evaluation of security suitability. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline,
the adjudicative guidelines are divided into those that may be considered in deciding whether to deny
ISCR Case No. 96-0277 (July 11, 1997) at 2.14
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or revoke an individual's eligibility for access to classified information (Disqualifying Conditions)
and those that may be considered in deciding whether to grant an individual's eligibility for access
to classified information (Mitigating Conditions).
An administrative judge need not view the adjudicative guidelines as inflexible ironclad rules
of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines, when applied
in conjunction with the factors set forth in the Adjudicative Process provision set forth in Section
E2.2, Enclosure 2, of the Directive are intended to assist the administrative judge in reaching fair and
impartial commonsense decisions.
Because the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the
"whole person concept," all available, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. The Adjudicative
Process factors which an administrative judge should consider are: (1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's  age and maturity at
the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the
potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.
Based upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, I find the following adjudicative
guideline most pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case:
Guideline C - Foreign Preference: When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a
preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
Since the protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, the final decision
in each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance is "clearly
consistent with the interests of national security" or "clearly consistent with the national interest." For
the purposes herein, despite the different wording in each, I have concluded all of the standards are
the same. In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical
and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences that
are grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
In the decision-making process, the burden of producing evidence initially falls on the
government to establish a case which demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, that it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s access to classified
information.  If the government meets its burden, the heavy burden of persuasion then falls upon the14
applicant to present evidence in refutation, explanation, extenuation or mitigation sufficient to
ISCR Case No. 94-1075 (August 10, 1995) at 3-4; Directive, Enclosure 3, Para E3.1.15.15
Directive, Enclosure 2, Para. E2.2.216
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overcome the doubts raised by the government’s case, and to ultimately demonstrate it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the applicant’s clearance.15
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with
the government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship that transcends normal duty
hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. Because of this special relationship, the
government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom
it grants access to classified information. Decisions under this Directive include, by necessity,
consideration of the possible risk that an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect
or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Any
doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to classified information must be resolved
in favor of national security.16
One additional comment is worthy of note. Applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are
not at issue in these proceedings. Section 7 of the Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that
industrial security clearance decisions shall be, “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense
be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Security clearance decisions cover
many characteristics of an applicant other than allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism. Nothing in this
decision should be construed to suggest I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express
or implied decision as to Applicant’s allegiance, loyalty or patriotism.
CONCLUSIONS
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors, and conditions, I conclude the following with respect to each allegation set forth in
the SOR. 
Foreign Preference
The government established its case under Guideline C. Applicant admits that he voted in a
2003 election in Israel. He cites no reason for doing so. He served in the Israeli Army for a year. He
resided in Israel and obtained citizenship under the Law of Return. These raise a security concern,
under Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition (FI DC) AG ¶ 10 (a) (exercise of any right,
privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign
citizenship of a family member) and (b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign
citizenship by an American citizen.
When the Government's initial burden has been met and a disqualifying condition raised, the
burden shifts to the Applicant to go forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation, or mitigation,
which is sufficient to overcome or outweigh the Government's case.
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Applicant has renounced his Israeli citizenship and has surrendered his passport to his
Embassy. Thus, Foreign Preference Mitigating Conditions (FP MI) AG ¶ 11 (b) the individual has
expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship  and FP MI AG ¶ 11 (e) the passport has been
destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated apply. 
I have considered the other mitigating conditions and find that none apply.
Whole Person 
In all adjudications, the protection of our national security is the paramount concern. The
objective of the security clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment of a person's
life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for assignment to sensitive
duties. As noted above, the adjudicative process is a careful weighing of a number of variables in
considering the whole person concept. It recognizes a person be viewed by the totality of his or her
acts, omissions, motivations and other variables. Each case must be adjudged on its own merits,
taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and applying sound judgment, mature thinking,
and careful analysis.
I considered both the record evidence and Applicant in light of the whole-person concept.
I have also considered the fact that Applicant is a mature individual with a 20 year military service
record. He successfully held a security clearance for many years. However, his long term attachment
to Israel and his recent outreach to live there for a period of time and vote in an election are clear
exercises of Israeli citizenship. Granted he now renounces the citizenship and has surrendered his
passport, but that does not outweigh his reaching out to Israel in 2003. Applicant failed to meet his
burden of persuasion. Under the current guideline, Applicant's conduct represents an unacceptable
security risk. I find the allegations regarding foreign preference against Applicant. Clearance is
denied.
FORMAL FINDINGS
              Formal Findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as
required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a:            AgainstApplicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
8
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge