KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is U.S. citizen by virtue of his father’s citizenship and his birth in the U.S.  He
graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, served on active duty for five years, and has been
recalled to active duty for service in Iraq.  His mother has resided in the U.S. for 34 years but
remains a citizen of the Republic of Korea (ROK).  His wife is a citizen of the ROK residing with
him in the U.S.  His grandmother, mother-in-law, father-in-law, and brother-in-law are all citizens
and residents of the ROK.  He has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence.
Clearance is granted. 
CASENO: 06-12223.h1
DATE: 05/31/2007
DATE:  May 31, 2007
In re:
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SSN:  ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-12223
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
LEROY F. FOREMAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Daniel F. Crowley, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Philip D. Cave, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
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Applicant is U.S. citizen by virtue of his father’s citizenship and his birth in the U.S.  He
graduated from the U.S. Military Academy, served on active duty for five years, and has been
recalled to active duty for service in Iraq.  His mother has resided in the U.S. for 34 years but
remains a citizen of the Republic of Korea (ROK).  His wife is a citizen of the ROK residing with
him in the U.S.  His grandmother, mother-in-law, father-in-law, and brother-in-law are all citizens
and residents of the ROK.  He has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence.
Clearance is granted.  
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 6, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny Applicant a security
clearance.  This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified, and Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Jan. 2, 1992), as
amended and modified (Directive).  The SOR alleged security concerns raised under Guideline B
(Foreign Influence) of the Directive. 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on July 20, 2006.  He initially elected to have the
case decided on the record in lieu of a hearing before an administrative judge.  Department Counsel
sent the File of Relevant Material to Applicant on August 23, 2006.  On November 1, 2006,
Applicant changed his election and requested a hearing.  Scheduling the hearing was delayed because
Applicant had been ordered to active duty in the U.S. Army Reserve and deployed to Iraq. The case
was assigned to an administrative judge on January 25, 2007.  The case was scheduled for April 27,
2007, and the hearing convened on that date; but the administrative judge granted a continuance until
April 30, 2007, because of the unavailability of Applicant’s counsel.  The case was reassigned to me
on April 27, 2007, and heard on April 30, 2007, as rescheduled.  DOHA received the hearing
transcript (Tr.) of the April 27 hearing on May 4, 2007, and the transcript of the April 30 hearing on
May 9, 2007.  All citations to the transcript in the decision below refer to the transcript of the April
30 hearing.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant's admissions in his answer to the SOR and at the hearing are incorporated into my
findings of fact.  I make the following findings:
Applicant is a 29-year-old analyst employed by a federal contractor since May 2004.  He is
a U.S. citizen by virtue of his father’s citizenship and his birth in the U.S.  His mother is a citizen
of the ROK residing permanently in the U.S.  He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in May
1999 and served for five years on active duty, including tours of duty in Afghanistan and the ROK.
He transferred to the U.S. Army Reserve upon his release from active duty, and he was recalled to
active duty in April 2006 and deployed to Iraq in September 2006 (Tr. 51).  He has held a security
clearance continuously since 1997 (Tr. 57).
While on active duty and assigned to the ROK, he met his future wife, a citizen of the ROK.
They were married in the ROK on September 3, 2002.  They have two children, a two-year-old and
a three-month-old (Tr. 68).  They chose to be married in the ROK to make it easier for Applicant’s
extended Korean family and his wife’s family to attend the ceremony (Tr. 56). Applicant’s
immediate family came to the ROK from the U.S. to attend the ceremony.  His wife accompanied
him when he was reassigned to the U.S. in March 2003, and now resides with him in the U.S.  They
do not have any assets, sources of income, or business connections in the ROK (Tr. 68-69).
Morale, welfare, and recreation activities are U.S. instrumentalities, but they are self-supporting and do not1
receive appropriated funds.
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Applicant’s wife was working for a morale, welfare, and recreation activity for the U.S.
Forces in Korea when Applicant met her.   She graduated from college in the ROK with a major in1
English education (Tr. 54).  Her employment by a U.S. agency required that she undergo a
background  investigation.  When Applicant requested and obtained permission to marry a foreign
national, his intended wife was required to undergo another background investigation (Tr. 55).  His
wife is not employed outside the home (Tr. 73).
Applicant’s mother married a U.S. soldier and came to the U.S. in 1974.  Her first husband,
Applicant’s father, died when Applicant was three years old (Tr. 48, 50).  She has since married
another U.S. citizen. She is a housewife (Tr. 50).  According to Applicant, she never applied for U.S.
citizenship because she was busy raising her children, but she considers herself “more American than
not” (Tr. 85).  She visits the ROK every two or three years (Tr. 83).
Applicant’s grandmother is a citizen and resident of the ROK, but she spends about half the
time in the U.S. with her family (Tr. 81).  She is more than 80 years old.  She is a housewife and
lives on her own assets.  She does not depend on any benefits from the ROK government  and has
never had any ties to the ROK government or military.  Applicant visited her often when he was
stationed in the ROK.  Now he calls her twice a year.  Applicant’s wife calls her about every ten days
(Applicant’s Exhibit A).
Applicant’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, and brother-in-law are citizens and residents of the
ROK.  None of his in-laws are politically active, connected with the ROK government or military,
or dependent on the ROK government for any benefits (AX A-D).  
Applicant’s mother-in-law was a homemaker for most of her life, but she is now working in
real estate (Tr. 78).  Applicant writes to her twice a year and calls about four times a year.  His wife
writes about four times a year and calls her every week (AX B).
Applicant’s father-in-law worked as an architect until he was injured in a car accident about
ten years ago.  After he was injured, he stopped working (Tr. 78).  Applicant calls him about once
a month, and Applicant’s wife calls him once a week (AX C).
Applicant’s brother-in-law works as a commercial truck driver (Tr. 79).  He performed his
mandatory military service in the ROK armed forces, but he has no other connection with the ROK
government or military. Applicant calls him once or twice a year and Applicant’s wife calls four or
five times a year.  (AX D.)
The ROK is a highly developed, stable, democratic republic, with a generally good human
rights record.  While some human rights violations have occurred, they have not included
mistreatment of suspects, police abuse of persons in custody, or torture and coercion of citizens by
government officials.  The United States maintains a strong military presence in the ROK, especially
along the demilitarized zone between the ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(DPRK).  While military tension continues between the ROK and DPRK, they have moved forward
At Department Counsel’s request, I took administrative notice of adjudicative facts concerning the ROK, based2
on Hearing Exhibit (HX) III (U.S. Dept. of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Republic of Korea (Mar.
8, 2006) and HX IV (U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: South Korea (Apr. 2006).  I declined to take administrative
notice based on HX I (National Counterintelligence Center, Report to Congress, 2000) based on the age of the
publication and its dubious relevance in light of its reference only to “Korea” without specifying either the ROK or the
DPRK.  I also declined to take administrative notice based on HX II (Larry A. Niksch, Congressional Research Service,
Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations -- Issues for Congress (Jun. 16, 2005), because Department Counsel was unable to
demonstrate that the opinions expressed by the author were accepted by the U.S. government as facts not subject to
reasonable dispute.  However, I admitted HX II as a learned treatise and redesignated it as GX 2.
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on a number of economic cooperative projects, which are sometimes at odds with U.S. policy.  The
ROK is the seventh largest U.S. trading partner and the 11th largest economy in the world.2
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.”  Id. at
527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.  Eligibility for a security clearance is
predicated upon the applicant meeting the security guidelines contained in the Directive.
The Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to
classified information, and it lists the disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC)
for each guideline.  Each clearance decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision
based on the relevant and material facts and circumstances, the whole person concept, and the factors
listed in the Directive ¶¶ 6.3.1 through 6.3.6.
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special relationship with the
government.  The government must be able to have a high degree of trust and confidence in persons
with access to classified information.  However, the decision to deny an individual a security
clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  See Exec. Or. 10865
§ 7.  It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the
Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal
or professional history of the applicant which disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  “Substantial evidence” is
“more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  “[T]he Directive presumes there is a nexus or rational connection
between proven conduct under any of the Criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security
suitability.”  ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996) (quoting DISCR Case No. 92-
1106 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 1993)).  
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Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the
burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  ISCR Case No. 01-
20700 at 3; see Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”  ISCR Case
No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they
must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see Directive ¶ E2.2.2. 
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The concern under this guideline is that a security risk may exist when an applicant’s
immediate family, or other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or
obligation, are not citizens of the U.S. or may be subject to duress.  “These situations could create
the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information.”
Directive ¶ E2.A2.1.1.  A disqualifying condition (DC 1) may arise when “[a]n immediate family
member [spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters], or a person to whom the
individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign
country.”  Directive ¶ E2.A2.1.2.1.   “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of
affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family members of the person’s spouse.”  ISCR Case
No. 01-03120, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 94 at * 8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002).  The totality of an applicant’s
family ties to a foreign country as well as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case
No. 01-22693 at 7 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). 
A disqualifying condition (DC 2) also may arise when an applicant is “[s]haring living
quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse
foreign influence or duress exists.”  Directive ¶ E2.A2.1.2.2.  Where the cohabitant is also an
immediate family member under DC 1, both disqualifying conditions may apply.  The evidence in
this case is sufficient to raise both DC 1 and DC 2.
Family ties with persons in a foreign country are not, as a matter of law, automatically
disqualifying under Guideline B. However,  such ties raise a prima facie security concern sufficient
to require an applicant to present evidence of rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation sufficient to meet
the applicant’s burden of persuasion that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or
continue a security clearance for the applicant.  See Directive¶ E3.1.15; ISCR Case No. 99-0424,
2001 DOHA LEXIS 59 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).
Since the government produced substantial evidence to establish DC 1, the burden shifted
to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  Directive ¶
E3.1.15.  An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of
disproving it is never shifted to the government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep.
22, 2005).  
In cases where an applicant has immediate family members who are citizens or residents of
a foreign country, a mitigating condition (MC 1) may apply if “the immediate family members,
cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be
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exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to
the person(s) involved and the United States.”  Directive ¶ E2.A2.1.3.1.  Notwithstanding the facially
disjunctive language of MC 1(“agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited”), it
requires proof “that an applicant’s family members, cohabitant, or associates in question are (a) not
agents of a foreign power, and (b) not in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that
could force the applicant to chose between the person(s) involved and the United States.”  ISCR
Case No. 02-14995 at 5 (App. Bd. Jul. 26, 2004).
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United States has
a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person,
organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person,
organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-
11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004).  Although the ROK historically has been regarded as friendly
to the U.S., the distinctions between friendly and unfriendly governments must be made with
caution.  Relations between nations can shift, sometimes dramatically and unexpectedly. 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over
matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly
nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific,
and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd.
Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S.,
and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is
associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
None of Applicant’s family members are agents of a foreign power, connected to a foreign
government or its military services, politically active, or dependent on the ROK government for any
benefits.  None of them are involved in businesses likely to be involved in economic or industrial
espionage.  While these individual family circumstances are not determinative,  Applicant’s evidence
demonstrating his family’s absence of governmental connections, financial dependence on the
government, or business connections susceptible to industrial espionage is relevant in assessing
whether MC 1 applies. The nature of the ROK’s government, its human rights record, and its
relationship with the U.S. also are not determinative, but they are all relevant factors in determining
whether the ROK would risk damaging its relationship with the U.S. by exploiting or threatening its
private citizens in order to force a U.S. citizen to betray the U.S.  After considering the totality of
Applicant’s family ties to the ROK as well as each individual family tie, I conclude MC 1 is
established.
A mitigating condition (MC 3) may apply if “[c]ontact and correspondence with foreign
citizens are casual and infrequent.”  Directive ¶ E2.A2.1.3.3.  at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2002).
Applicant has no immediate family members in the ROK, but he maintains regular contact with his
grandmother, mother-in-law, father-in-law, and brother-in-law.  I conclude MC 3 is not established.
Whole Person Analysis
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In addition to considering the specific disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each
guideline, I have also considered the general adjudicative guidelines in the Directive ¶ E2.2.1.  I have
considered: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding
the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) the applicant’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation;
(6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the
motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9)
the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  Directive ¶¶ E2.2.1.1 through E2.2.1.9.  Some of these
factors were discussed above, but some merit additional comment.
Applicant is a mature adult who spent five years on active duty as an Army officer, and he
has been recalled for service in Iraq.  His grandmother remains a resident of the ROK, but she spends
half her time in the U.S.  His mother has never bothered to become a U.S. citizen, but she has lived
in the U.S. for 32 years, had two American husbands, raised a loyal soldier-son, and clearly is an
American at heart.  Under the revised adjudicative guidelines implemented by the Department of
Defense for cases where the SOR was issued on or after September 1, 2006 (Guidelines), a
mitigating condition may be established by showing “the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of
interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”  Guidelines ¶ 8(b). While Applicant’s case is not covered by
the revised guidelines, the strength and depth of his commitment to the U.S. and his family ties in
the U.S. are relevant considerations under the whole-person concept.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines B, and
evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated
the security concerns based on foreign influence.  Accordingly, I conclude he has carried his burden
of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to continue his security clearance.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to continue Applicant’s security clearance.  Clearance is granted.
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LeRoy F. Foreman
Administrative Judge