KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant, a 58 year old employee of a defense contractor, born in Taiwan, emigrated to
the U.S. from Canada in 1980 and became a citizen in 1994. She has been an employee of the same
corporation since 1984 holding a security clearance since she became a U.S. citizen. She mitigated
security concerns based on her 80-year-old mother and three siblings who live in Taiwan by
demonstrating her strong ties in the U.S. including her two children who are professionals with U.S.
education and her long and outstanding record with her company. Clearance is granted. 
CASENO: 06-20226.h1
DATE: 05/24/2007
DATE:  May 24, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-20226
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CHARLES D. ABLARD
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
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Applicant, a 58 year old employee of a defense contractor, born in Taiwan, emigrated to the
U.S. from Canada in 1980 and became a citizen in 1994. She has been an employee of the same
corporation since 1984 holding a security clearance since she became a U.S. citizen. She mitigated
security concerns based on her 80-year-old mother and three siblings who live in Taiwan by
demonstrating her strong ties in the U.S. including her two children who are professionals with U.S.
education and her long and outstanding record with her company. Clearance is granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 23, 2006, the Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) pursuant to Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry as amended and modified, and
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified, issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary
affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue a security clearance for Applicant. DOHA recommended the case be referred to an
administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or
revoked.
In a sworn written statement, dated November 16, 2006, Applicant responded to the
allegations set forth in the SOR, and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on January
8, 2007. A Notice of Hearing was issued March 2, 2007 for a hearing held on March 21, 2007. At
the hearing, the Government introduced three exhibits, and Applicant introduced four. All were
admitted into evidence. The Government offered eleven documents for administrative notice. The
Applicant testified on her own behalf. The transcript was received on March 30, 2007. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted all of the specific security concerns under Foreign Influence Guideline
B regarding her mother and three siblings who are citizens of and live in Taiwan. The admissions
are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete review of the evidence in the record and
upon due consideration of the record, the following additional findings of fact are made:
Applicant is a 58-year-old employee of a major defense contractor who works as a senior
computer systems analyst on a naval electronics system (Exh. B). She was born in Taiwan and
received a college degree in literature and philosophy. She was married in Taiwan in 1972 and
emigrated to Canada with her husband in 1973. Their two children were born in Canada. They
emigrated to the U.S. in 1980 and were divorced in 1984. Since she had no work related skills and
needed to support a family as a single parent, she took computer courses at a local college and
obtained the employment she continues to perform for her company. She has steadily advanced in
positions with her company (Exh. A). She became a U.S. citizen in 1994 and renounced her
Canadian citizenship in 2006 (Exh. 3). She visited Taiwan in 2006, the first time in 19 years since
she attended her father’s funeral in 1987.
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Applicant has worked in the same installation for the same company and its predecessor
owners for 22 years. She has held a security clearance for 13 years just five months after becoming
a citizen. She is highly regarded by her company and her supervisor who submitted a statement for
her in which he notes her excellent work ethic and solid performance that led to receipt of an award
for outstanding performance and contributions to Navy programs (Exh. A).
Her need for a clearance is based primarily on a job requirement for access to databases for
parts to determine delivery dates, and for access to military facilities where she may be assigned. She
has never had a security violation or negative security comment in regard to security policies or
practices in her 22 years with her company (Exh. A).
Applicant has two adult children. Her daughter has an MBA from a major east coast
university and works for a prominent U.S. film producer. Her son is a medical doctor. Because her
children were born in Canada, they have dual citizenship with the U.S. and Canada. Both children
visited Taiwan when very young but only her daughter has visited as an adult when she went with
Applicant in 2006.
Applicant’s mother is 80 years old. She telephones her approximately every two weeks. Her
mother came to the U.S. on two occasions over ten years ago when she went on two tours on the
West Coast. Since Applicant lives on the East Coast they did not visit. She saw her mother in Taiwan
in 2006 and 1987. 
Applicant’s siblings consist of a sister who now writes children’s books and was a nurse’s
aide. Their mother lives with her in Taiwan. She also does web sites for books (Exh. C). One brother
is with a private company living near their mother. A second brother is an interior designer for
private homes for the past five years. He travels to the PRC frequently in his work since there are
more homes and apartments being built there than in Taiwan. He is allowed to enter the PRC to
work, but must have a permit to do so. He came to the U.S. in 2003. That was the last time she saw
him as she did not see him on her trip to Taiwan in 2006. 
Applicant regards herself and her family as completely American and considers her ancestry
as only Taiwanese. She has no interest in returning to Taiwan and as all her ties are in the U.S. She
has lived in the same apartment for 20 years since 1987. She enjoys U.S. cultural life and spends
most of her time outside of work reading and traveling in the U.S. to visit her children (Tr. 47). She
has voted in all three presidential elections since becoming a U.S. citizen. 
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at 527.
An evaluation of whether the applicant meets the security guidelines includes consideration
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of the following factors: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and
maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence
of rehabilitation and other behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential
for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Directive, ¶ E2.2.1. Security clearances are granted only when “it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to do so.” Executive Order No. 10865 § 2. See Executive Order No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
Initially, the Government must establish, by something less than a preponderance of the
evidence, that conditions exist in the personal or professional history of the applicant which
disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information.
See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. The applicant then bears the burden of demonstrating that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the applicant’s clearance. “Any doubt as to
whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved
in favor of the national security.” Directive, ¶ E2.2.2. “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should
err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“A security risk may exist when an individual’s immediate family and other persons to whom
he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States
or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that
could result in the compromise of classified information.” Directive, ¶ E2.A2.1.1. Having
immediate family members who are citizens of, and residing in a foreign country, may raise a
disqualifying security concern. Directive, ¶ E2.A2.1.2.1. 
CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors and conditions above, I conclude the following with respect to all allegations set
forth in the SOR:
Conditions under Guideline B that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include contact with a foreign family member who is a citizen of, or resident in a foreign country if
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or
coercion (AG ¶ 7a). Based on the evidence of record, including Applicant’s acknowledgment of
family members living abroad, the Government established a basis for concern over foreign influence.
The Applicant had the burden to establish security suitability through evidence which refutes,
mitigates, or extenuates the disqualification and demonstrates that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant a security clearance. ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).
By virtue of the relationships of the foreign family members, Applicant’s contacts, though
infrequent, cannot be deemed casual. Mitigating conditions (MC) that might be applicable are a
determination that the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which the
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual group or government and the interests of the U.S. (AG ¶ 8a). The other relevant
MC is that the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the US.,that
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she can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. (AG ¶ 8b). I find that both
are applicable.  
While Applicant’s mother lives in Taiwan, she is a an octogenerian whose only contacts  with
her daughter are by telephone. They have had very little personal interaction over the past 20 years
except for Applicant’s one visit to Taiwan in 2006. Even when visiting the U.S. she came on tours
to the opposite side of the country and did not see Applicant. 
Applicant’s sister and two brothers are in commercial activities totally unrelated to the
government of Taiwan. The department counsel acknowledged that the brother who travels to the
PRC is the most problematic member of her family. But he does interior design work, and is not
employed by either the government of Taiwan or the government of the PRC. He is required to obtain
a permit to enter the PRC but that appears to be a routine practice for persons doing commercial
work. 
The most important mitigating factor is Applicant herself and her total commitment to the
U.S. through her long employment and excellent record with a major defense contractor and the
lengthy period she has held a security clearance without problems. She has lived in the same place
for over 20 years and has children who are well educated in the U.S. and hold professional positions
in their fields. 
While Taiwan, as do other countries, engages in industrial espionage (Exh. XI), none of her
relatives living in Taiwan pose a potential security threat or are in a position likely to be influenced
by the Taiwan or PRC governments. None of them work for the Taiwan government or are involved
in work that might create security issues for the U.S. Any potential security concerns relating to
possible future trips to Taiwan are minimal considering the infrequency of her past travels to Taiwan
and knowledge of security requirements. Applicant can be relied upon to take whatever steps are
necessary to eliminate any possible risk.
In all adjudications the protection of our national security is of paramount concern. Persons
who have access to classified information have an overriding responsibility for the security of the
nation. The objective of the security clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment
of a person’s trustworthiness and fitness for access to classified information. The “whole person”
concept recognizes that we should view a person by the totality of their acts and omissions. Each case
must be judged on its own merits taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and applying
sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis.
Looking at her as a whole person, Applicant presents a highly credible case that she would
not be influenced by anything contrary to the best interests of the U.S. Her strong ties the U.S.
contrast with her minimal ties to Taiwan. Her residence in the U.S. for over a quarter of a century and
career record as a trusted employee of major U.S. corporations for 22 years effectively refute the risk
that she would now take any action that would jeopardize U.S. security interests. She has assimilated
into U.S. customs and culture, and has become a model employee of a major defense contractor
working on an important national defense program.
After considering all the evidence in its totality and as an integrated whole to focus on the
whole person of Applicant, I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
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clearance to Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are hereby
rendered as follows:
Paragraph l Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: For Applicant
DECISION
After full consideration of all the facts and documents presented by the record in this case, it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.
Clearance is granted. 
Charles D. Ablard 
Administrative Judge