KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is a 33-year-old employee of a government contractor seeking a position of
public trust. She was born in China and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2004. Her mother,
father, brother and sister-in-law are citizens and residents of China. She submitted no evidence in
extenuation or mitigation of foreign influence security concerns raised by these family connections.
It is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue access to sensitive
information, in an automated data processing (ADP) position designated ADP-I/II/III, to Applicant.
Eligibility to occupy such a public trust position is denied.
CASENO: 06-22581.h1
DATE: 05/22/2007
DATE:  May 22, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Public Trust Position
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ADP Case No. 06-22581
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
DAVID M. WHITE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Candace L. Le’i, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is a 33-year-old employee of a government contractor seeking a position of public
trust. She was born in China and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2004. Her mother, father,
brother and sister-in-law are citizens and residents of China. She submitted no evidence in
Undersecretary of Defense Memorandum, Implementation of Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining
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Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (December 29, 2005), Aug. 30, 2006, directed implementation and use
of the revised adjudicative guidelines for all security clearance adjudications and other determinations made under the
Directive in which an SOR had not been issued by Sept. 1, 2006. Para. 6.1 of DoD 5200.2-R, Personnel Security
Program , Jan. 1987, as amended, and Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security)
Memorandum, Adjudication of Trustworthiness Cases, Nov. 19, 2004, direct that trustworthiness determinations be
adjudicated utilizing the provisions of the Directive.
Gov X 3 (Applicant’s response copy of  SOR dated Jan. 26, 2007).
2
The government submitted four items in support of the allegations, and seven source documents in support of
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a request to take administrative notice of material facts concerning China.
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extenuation or mitigation of foreign influence security concerns raised by these family connections.
It is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue access to sensitive
information, in an automated data processing (ADP) position designated ADP-I/II/III, to Applicant.
Eligibility to occupy such a public trust position is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Applicant applied for a public trust position on September 28, 2004, in conjunction with her
employment by a defense contractor in an automated data processing (ADP) position designated
ADP-I/II/III. On December 14, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, pursuant to Department of Defense Directive 5220.6,
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2,
1992, as amended. The SOR detailed reasons, under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), why DOHA
could not make the preliminary affirmative finding, under the Directive and the revised adjudicative
guidelines,  that it would be clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility1
for an ADP-I/II/III-designated position, and recommended referral to an administrative judge to
determine whether eligibility for a public trust position should be granted, continued, denied, or
revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR allegations by returning an annotated and notarized copy,
dated January 26, 2007, admitting the truth of all of the allegations, and electing to have her case
decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing.  Applicant did not submit any matters for2
consideration in extenuation or mitigation of her admissions. 
Department Counsel submitted the government’s written case on February 27, 2007. A
complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM)  was provided to Applicant, and she was3
afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or
mitigation. Applicant signed the document acknowledging receipt of her copy of the FORM on
March 9, 2007, and returned it to DOHA. She did not submit any further response to the FORM by
the April 9, 2007 due date, nor did she request an extension of time to respond. The case was
assigned to me on May 2, 2007.
Gov X 4 (Public Trust Position Application (SF-85P), dated Sep. 28, 2004) at 1, 4.
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Id. at 1, 2, 3.
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Id. at 3, 8.
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Id. at 4; Gov X 3, supra n. 2, at 2.
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Gov X 4, supra n. 4, at 1.
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The information concerning the dates of her travel to China, provided by Applicant in Gov X 4, may be in
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error.  It appears inconsistent that she could have become a naturalized U.S. citizen in June 2004 if she was traveling in
China from August 2003 through September 2004. However, she provided no clarifying or corrective information in
response to the SOR or FORM. 
Department Counsel listed and identified the seven source documents on pages 6 and 7 of the FORM. They
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are attached behind Gov X 4.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the truth of every factual allegation set forth in the SOR pertaining to
foreign influence under Guideline B (subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c). Those admissions are
incorporated herein as findings of fact. After complete and thorough review of the evidence in the
record, and upon due consideration of same, I make the following additional findings of fact:
Applicant is a 33-year-old employee of a defense contractor seeking to obtain eligibility for
a public trust position for the first time.  She was born in China, has lived in the United States since4
at least 1995, and became a naturalized citizen of the United States on June 16, 2004.  Applicant5
reported on her public trust position application, and admitted in response to the SOR, that her
father, her mother, her brother and her sister-in-law are citizens and residents of China.  Her husband
was also born in China, and is a naturalized U.S. citizen.  Applicant further reported and admitted6
that she traveled to China for pleasure from August 16, 2003 to September 7, 2004.  She stated that7
she has never held a U.S. passport and denied that she was ever a dual citizen of the U.S. and another
country.  Her lack of a U.S. passport and the length of her stay in China indicate that she must have8
traveled on a Chinese passport, especially since she did not become a U.S. citizen until June 2004.9
Department Counsel sought administrative notice of the material facts concerning China set
forth in part III of the FORM, and provided seven official U.S. Government source documents
supporting the truth of those facts.  Applicant did not object to this request, and I did take10
administrative notice of those facts in reaching my decision in this case. Among the most pertinent
of these facts are that China has an authoritarian communist government with a poor human rights
record that, despite improving economic relations, remains a rival military and political power to the
United States. China has targeted the U.S. with active intelligence gathering programs, and is one
of the most aggressive countries in targeting sensitive and protected U.S. technologies. The large
number of Americans of Chinese ancestry are considered prime intelligence targets by the People’s
Republic of China. Those traveling to, and living in China are subject to surveillance, monitoring
and search by Chinese authorities without their consent or knowledge.
POLICIES            
See supra, n. 1.
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Directive, Enclosure 2, Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
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Information, dated August 2006 ¶ 2.
Id., at ¶¶ 2(b), 2(c).
13
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Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in
the evaluation of security suitability and trustworthiness determinations, including those involving
ADP I, II, and III positions.  In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the11
adjudicative guidelines are divided into disqualifying conditions (DC) that may raise security
concerns, and mitigating conditions (MC) that may reduce or negate security concerns. Applicable
DCs and MCs must be considered in deciding whether to grant, continue, deny or revoke an
individual's eligibility for a position of public trust. The adjudicative guideline relevant to
Applicant’s case is Guideline B: Foreign Influence. Potentially applicable DCs and MCs under this
guideline are discussed in detail below, in connection with my conclusions. 
An administrative judge need not view the adjudicative guidelines as inflexible, ironclad
rules of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are
intended to be applied in conjunction with the factors set forth in the Adjudicative Process provision
of the Directive,  to assist the administrative judge in reaching fair and impartial, common sense12
decisions. The entire decision-making process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole person concept.” 
All available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. The Adjudicative Process
factors which an administrative judge should consider, in addition to the applicable guidelines, are:
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct,
to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is
voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7)
the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and
(9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, so the final decision in
each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that issuance of a trustworthiness
determination must be clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Any doubt as to
whether access to sensitive information is clearly consistent with national security must be resolved
in favor of the national security.   13
In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and
based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
“Substantial evidence [is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might  accept as adequate to support
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a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.”  ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006)
(citing Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1).  “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.”  Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).  “Substantial evidence” is “more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4  Cir. 1994).th
Directive ¶ E3.1.14.
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Directive ¶ E3.1.15.
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ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005); ?The Administrative Judge [considers] the record17
evidence as a whole, both favorable and unfavorable, evaluate[s] Applicant’s past and current circumstances in light of
pertinent provisions of the Directive, and decide[s] whether Applicant ha[s] met his burden of persuasion under Directive
¶ E3.1.15.”  ISCR Case No. 04-10340 at 2 (App. Bd. July 6, 2006). 
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In the decision-making process, facts must be established by substantial evidence.  The14
burden of producing evidence initially falls on the government to establish a case which
demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue an applicant's access to sensitive ADP-I/II/III information. “Department Counsel
is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to establish facts alleged in the SOR that
have been controverted.”   “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence15
to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department
Counsel, and [Applicant] has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable
[clearance] decision.”  Once the government has met its initial burden of production, the burden of16
persuasion (including any burden to disprove a mitigating condition) never shifts to the government,
but remains with Applicant.  17
A person who seeks access to sensitive information in a position of public trust seeks to enter
a fiduciary relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship
that transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. It is because of this
special relationship that the government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence
in those individuals to whom it grants access to sensitive information. Decisions under this Directive
include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard sensitive information or ADP systems. Such decisions entail
a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of
compromise of sensitive information.
CONCLUSIONS          
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors, and conditions, including those described above, I conclude the following with
respect to each allegation set forth in the SOR:
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)            
“Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person,
group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure
or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this guideline can and should consider the
Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 6.
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identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including,
but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.”18
Applicant’s mother, father, brother and sister-in-law are all citizens and residents of China,
and she reported that she traveled there to visit them from August 2003 to September 2004. These
circumstances raise security concerns under foreign influence disqualifying condition (FI DC) 7(a)
(“contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend or other person
who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion”). China is active in the collection of
protected information, including from U.S. citizens, so her temporary and their permanent presence
there creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or
coercion. FI DC 7(b) (“connections to a foreign person, group, government or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group or country by providing this
information”) also potentially applies to Applicant’s Chinese connections. There need not be
evidence of an actual conflict of interest to raise security concerns, the potential conflict, arising from
Applicant’s numerous and close ties to Chinese citizens and residents, is sufficient to shift the burden
to her to disprove its existence or otherwise mitigate the concerns. Finally, her extended visit to
China raises security concerns under FI DC 7(i) (“conduct, especially when traveling outside the
U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign
person, group, government, or country”) based on China’s documented practice of surveillance and
monitoring of visitors.
Applicant has neither asserted that any foreign influence mitigating condition (FI MC)
applies to her circumstances, nor is there any evidence in the record that would support the
application of any FI MC.  I have reviewed each potential FI MC and conclude that, on this record,
none apply. 
Whole Person Analysis           
Except for her husband, Applicant’s entire immediate family are citizens and residents of
China. Applicant submitted neither evidence nor other information from which any mitigating
condition or circumstance might be applied to lessen the security concerns raised by the potential
for conflict of interest, coercion, pressure, duress or manipulation created by her foreign connections.
These foreign connections will continue into the foreseeable future. Applicant is a mature and
educated individual who failed to alleviate security concerns in the face of her burden to do so.
Given China’s reportedly active collection of protected information, this burden is significant, and
Applicant failed to overcome it. For the reasons stated, I conclude Applicant has not demonstrated
that it is clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant her access to sensitive
information or eligibility for a public trust position.
FORMAL FINDINGS           
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Formal Findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
DECISION            
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue access to sensitive information, in an automated data
processing (ADP) position designated ADP-I/II/III, to Applicant. Eligibility to occupy such a public
trust position is denied.
David M. White             
Administrative Judge