KEYWORD: Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is a 26-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He holds dual U.S. and Israeli
citizenship, as do his fiancé and all members of both of their immediate families. His sister, and his
fiance’s father and sisters reside in Israel. During his four visits to Israel in the eight years since he
turned 18 years old, Applicant traveled using the active Israeli passport which he intends to maintain.
Applicant submitted no mitigating evidence for consideration, and did not meet his burden to
overcome foreign preference and foreign influence security concerns. Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 06-22954.h1
DATE: 05/07/2007
DATE: May 7, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-22954
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
DAVID M. WHITE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Jeff A. Nagel, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Gov X 3 (Applicant’s letter response to SOR dated Dec. 14, 2006).
1
The government submitted four items in support of the allegations, and seven source documents in support of
2
a request to take administrative notice of material facts concerning Israel.
2
Applicant is a 26-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He holds dual U.S. and Israeli
citizenship, as do his fiancé and all members of both of their immediate families. His sister, and his
fiance’s father and sisters reside in Israel. During his four visits to Israel in the eight years since he
turned 18 years old, Applicant traveled using the active Israeli passport which he intends to maintain.
Applicant submitted no mitigating evidence for consideration, and did not meet his burden to
overcome foreign preference and foreign influence security concerns. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Applicant applied for a security clearance on March 13, 2006, in conjunction with his
employment by a defense contractor. On December 5, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, pursuant to Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended,
and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance
Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended. The SOR detailed reasons, under
Guideline C (Foreign Preference), Guideline B (Foreign Influence), why DOHA could not make the
preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant a security clearance for Applicant, and recommended referral to an administrative
judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR allegations in a notarized letter dated December 14, 2006,
admitting the truth of all of the allegations, and elected to have his case decided on the written record
in lieu of a hearing.  Applicant did not submit any matters for consideration in extenuation or1
mitigation of his admissions. Department Counsel submitted the government's written case on
January 31, 2007. A complete copy of the file of relevant material (FORM)  was provided to2
Applicant, and he was afforded an opportunity to file objections and submit material in refutation,
extenuation, or mitigation. Applicant signed the document acknowledging receipt of his copy of the
FORM on February 12, 2007, and returned it to DOHA. He did not submit any further response to
the FORM by the March 12, 2007 due date, nor did he request an extension of time to respond. The
case was assigned to me on March 28, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the truth of every factual allegation set forth in the SOR pertaining to
foreign preference under Guideline C (subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c), and foreign influence under
Guideline B (subparagraphs 2.a through 2.c). Those admissions are incorporated herein as findings
of fact. After complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due
consideration of same, I make the following additional findings of fact:
Gov X 4 (e-QIP security clearance questionnaire, dated Mar.13, 2006) at 6, 15, 31-32. (Note: Gov X 4 contains
3
pages 6 of 34 through 34 of 34 of Applicant’s e-QIP, but does not include pages 1to 5 of 34. Citations are to the numbers
on each page, starting with 6.) 
Id. at 1, 7, 8, 13-14.
4
Id. at 20-25.
5
Id. at 9, 24.
6
Id. at 25-26.
7
Id. at 26.
8
Although Department Counsel lists eight source documents on pages 4 and 5 of the FORM, document II, the
9
Consular Information Sheet dated February 8, 2006, was not actually provided in the file.  Department Counsel only
attempted to cite this document once (at FORM footnote 1), from what I can tell. The subsequent “Id.” citations appear
to refer to document I (the first source cited in footnote 1), since the information matches. Accordingly, the omission of
source document II does not affect the validity of taking administrative notice of the facts supported by the other seven
source documents. The FORM also incorrectly cites the date of source document IV as “January 17, 2006,” when the
correct date is “January 17, 2007.”
3
Applicant is a 26-year-old employee of a defense contractor seeking to obtain a security
clearance for the first time.  He was born and educated, through graduate school, in the United3
States, and is a dual citizen of the United States and Israel.  Applicant reported on his security4
questionnaire, and admitted in response to the SOR, that his father, his mother, and his fiancé are
dual citizens of Israel and the U.S., currently residing in the U.S. He further reported and admitted
that his sister, and his fiance’s father and sisters are dual citizens of the U.S. and Israel who currently
reside in Israel.  His father was born in Israel and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1985. His
sister was born in Israel and was registered as a U.S. citizen born abroad, based on their mother’s
U.S. citizenship.  Both his mother and his fiancé were born in the U.S.   Applicant and his fiancé live5
in an apartment together.6
Applicant possesses a valid Israeli passport, and stated he has no specific plans regarding it.7
He used this Israeli passport instead of his U.S. passport during trips to Israel from July to August
1999, July to August 2002, June to July 2004, and December 2005 to January 2006.  He was over8
age 18 during each of these trips. Applicant neither asserted that any mitigating conditions applied
to his circumstances, nor provided any evidence on which such a finding could be made.
Department Counsel sought administrative notice of the material facts concerning Israel set
forth in part III of the FORM, and provided seven official U.S. Government source documents
supporting the truth of those facts.  I did take administrative notice of those facts in reaching my9
decision in this case. Among the most pertinent of these facts are that Israel is a close ally of the
United States, and is a parliamentary democracy with close historic and cultural ties and many
mutual interests. Israel has, however, been identified as an active collector of sensitive and
proprietary industrial information, and several individuals have been recently convicted of
conducting espionage through unauthorized disclosure or sale of classified information to Israel.
Anti-western terrorist activity in Israel is a continuing threat to Americans, and others. 
POLICIES            
Directive, Enclosure 2, Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
10
Information, dated August 2006 ¶ 2.
Id., at ¶¶ 2(b), 2(c).
11
“Substantial evidence [is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might  accept as adequate to support
12
a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.”  ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006)
(citing Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1).  “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.”  Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).  “Substantial evidence” is “more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4  Cir. 1994).th
4
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in
the evaluation of security suitability. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline,
the adjudicative guidelines are divided into disqualifying conditions (DC) that may raise security
concerns, and mitigating conditions (MC) that may reduce or negate security concerns. Applicable
DCs and MCs must be considered in deciding whether to grant, continue, deny or revoke an
individual's eligibility for access to classified information.
An administrative judge need not view the adjudicative guidelines as inflexible, ironclad
rules of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are
intended to be applied in conjunction with the factors set forth in the Adjudicative Process provision
of the Directive,  to assist the administrative judge in reaching fair and impartial, common sense10
decisions.
The entire decision-making process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the "whole person concept." All available, reliable information about the person, past and
present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. The
Adjudicative Process factors which an administrative judge should consider, in addition to the
applicable guidelines, are: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, so the final decision in
each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that issuance of a clearance must be clearly
consistent with the interests of national security. Any doubt as to whether access to classified
information is clearly consistent with national security must be resolved in favor of the national
security.   In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical11
and based on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
In the decision-making process, facts must be established by “substantial evidence.”  The12
burden of producing evidence initially falls on the government to establish a case which
demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue an applicant's access to classified information. “Department Counsel is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to establish facts alleged in the SOR that
Directive ¶ E3.1.14.
13
Directive ¶ E3.1.15.
14
ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005); ?The Administrative Judge [considers] the record15
evidence as a whole, both favorable and unfavorable, evaluate[s] Applicant’s past and current circumstances in light of
pertinent provisions of the Directive, and decide[s] whether Applicant ha[s] met his burden of persuasion under Directive
¶ E3.1.15.”  ISCR Case No. 04-10340 at 2 (App. Bd. July 6, 2006). 
Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 9.
16
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have been controverted.”   “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence13
to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department
Counsel, and [Applicant] has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance
decision.”  Once it has met its initial burden of production, the burden of persuasion (including any14
burden to disprove a mitigating condition) never shifts to the government.  15
A person who seeks access to classified information seeks to enter a fiduciary relationship
with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship that transcends normal
duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. It is because of this special relationship
that the government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals
to whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions under this Directive include, by
necessity, consideration of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to
protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified
information. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that any adverse industrial
security clearance decision shall be "in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned." Nothing in this decision should be
construed to suggest I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied
decision as to Applicant's loyalty or patriotism.
CONCLUSIONS          
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors, and conditions, including those described briefly above, I conclude the following
with respect to each allegation set forth in the SOR:
Guideline C (Foreign Preference)          
“When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over
the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are
harmful to the interests of the United States.”  Appellant admitted the truth of three SOR allegations16
that raise security concerns under this guideline.
Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition (FP DC) 10(a) (“exercise of any right, privilege
or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship
of a family member [including but not limited to] possession of a current foreign passport”), and FP
DC 10(b) (“action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen”)
Directive, Enclosure 2 ¶ 6.
17
6
apply to Applicant’s ongoing possession, and consistent use during overseas travels, of an active
Israeli passport. He was born in the United States, yet acquired Israeli citizenship through his dual
citizen parents, and maintains dual citizenship as an adult. During each of his four visits to Israel
since turning age 18, he has used his Israeli passport to gain entry as a citizen, in lieu of identifying
himself as an American. The elections by his sister and his fiance’s immediate family members to
reside in Israel also demonstrates a strong affinity for that country by those to whom he is bound by
close ties of affection. 
I have considered each potentially applicable Foreign Preference Mitigating Condition (FP
MC), even though none was asserted by Applicant in his response to the SOR or FORM. FP MC
11(a) (“dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country”) does
not apply.  Applicant was born in the United States, and some process was required for him to obtain
and actively maintain his Israeli passport and dual citizenship. There is no evidence from which to
possibly conclude that FP MC 11(b) (“the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual
citizenship”) could apply to Applicant. He has expressed no such willingness, and his actions
indicate an unwillingness to do so. 
FP MC 11(c) (“exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship
occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor”) does not
apply. Applicant was born a U.S. citizen. His alleged and admitted exercise of Israeli citizenship
occurred after he turned age 18, and continues to present – some eight years later. FP MC 10(d) (“use
of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority”) does not apply because no
such authority approved his use of the Israeli passport, nor (possibly excepting the most recent visit
when he was working as an intern for his current employer but had not yet applied for a clearance)
did he hold any position in which he would have had a “cognizant security authority” during his
visits to Israel. Finally, Applicant provided no evidence to indicate that FP MC 10(e) (“the passport
has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority or otherwise invalidated”)
applies. He, in fact, indicated that he has no particular plans for the passport which I interpret to
mean he plans to keep it and use it again in the future.
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)            
“Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person,
group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure
or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this guideline can and should consider the
identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including,
but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.”17
All of Applicant’s immediate family members, as well as his fiancé and her father and sisters,
are dual citizens of the U.S. and Israel. His sister and his fiance’s family also reside in Israel.
Applicant and his fiancé live together in the United States. These circumstances raise security
concerns under foreign influence disqualifying condition (FI DC) 7(a) (“contact with a foreign family
member, business or professional associate, friend or other person who is a citizen of or resident in
7
a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure or coercion”). Israel is active in the collection of protected information,
including from U.S. citizens, and there is heightened risk of anti-Israeli and anti-American  terrorism
by groups active within its borders. FI DC 7(b) (“connections to a foreign person, group, government
or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group or
country by providing this information”) also potentially applies to Applicant’s Israeli connections.
There need not be evidence of an actual conflict of interest to raise security concerns, the potential
conflict, arising from Applicant’s numerous and close ties to Israeli citizens and residents, is
sufficient to shift the burden to him to disprove its existence or otherwise mitigate the concerns. In
addition, Applicant lives with his fiancé, so security concerns are raised under FI DC 7(d) (“sharing
living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates
a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion”), because his fiance’s
father and sisters are dual citizens residing in Israel and subject to the same heightened risk arising
under FI DC 7(a). 
Applicant has neither asserted that any foreign influence mitigating condition (FI MC)
applies to his circumstances, nor is there any evidence in the record that would support the
application of any FI MC.  I have reviewed each potential FI MC and conclude that none apply. 
Whole Person Analysis           
Applicant, his entire known family and his fiance’s entire known family are dual citizens of
the United States and Israel. Applicant’s sister and father were born in Israel. Applicant, his mother
and his fiancé were all born in the United States and actively sought and maintain their Israeli
citizenship. During each of his four documented visits to Israel in the eight years since he turned age
18, Applicant exercised his Israeli citizenship, and traveled using the active Israeli passport which
he apparently plans to maintain for future use. 
Applicant submitted neither evidence nor other information from which any mitigating
condition or circumstance might be applied to lessen the security concerns raised by the potential
for conflict of interest, coercion, pressure or manipulation created by his foreign connections and his
indications of foreign preference. Applicant is a mature and educated individual who is accountable
for his choices, and who demonstrated no effort to alleviate security concerns in the face of his
burden to do so. Given Israel’s reportedly active collection of protected information and heightened
risk of anti-western terrorist activity within its borders, this burden is a heavy one and Applicant
failed to meet it. For the reasons stated, I conclude Applicant has not demonstrated that it is clearly
consistent with the interests of national security to grant him access to classified information.
8
FORMAL FINDINGS           
Formal Findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant
DECISION            
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
David M. White             
Administrative Judge