KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is 50 years old and has worked as a senior engineer for a defense contractor
since 2003. He was born in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and immigrated to the U.S. on an
educational scholarship. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1996. His mother and father are
citizens and residents of PRC. His in-laws are citizens and residents of PRC and live there half of
the year and  live in the U.S. as legal residents for half of the year. Even though his relationship to
his foreign family is close and their contact is frequent, Applicant established he has more substantial
ties to the U.S. In the process, he demonstrated that his relatives do not pose an unacceptable risk.
Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-24575.h1
DATE: 05/31/2007
DATE:  May 31, 2007
In re:
----------------
SSN:  -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ISCR Case No. 06-24575
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
JACQUELINE T. WILLIAMS
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Caroline H. Jeffreys, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
2
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is 50 years old and has worked as a senior engineer for a defense contractor since
2003. He was born in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and immigrated to the U.S. on an
educational scholarship. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1996. His mother and father are
citizens and residents of PRC. His in-laws are citizens and residents of PRC and live there half of
the year and  live in the U.S. as legal residents for half of the year. Even though his relationship to
his foreign family is close and their contact is frequent, Applicant established he has more substantial
ties to the U.S. In the process, he demonstrated that his relatives do not pose an unacceptable risk.
Clearance is granted.
Ex. 1 (Security Clearance Application, dated April 9, 2004).1
Pursuant to Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as2
amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program  (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended (Directive).
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 9, 2004, Applicant executed Security Clearance Application (SF 86).  On January1
16, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons
(SOR)  to Applicant, detailing the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline2
B (Foreign Influence) of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on December 29, 2005,
and implemented by the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. The
revised AG  was provided to Applicant when the SOR was issued. 
In a sworn, written statement, dated February 8, 2007, Applicant responded to the SOR
allegations and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on March 7, 2007. A Notice of
Hearing was issued on March 12, 2007, scheduling the hearing for April 10, 2007. The hearing was
conducted as scheduled. At the hearing, the Government offered one exhibit, Ex. 1. Applicant
offered six exhibits, Exs. A-F. All exhibits were admitted into the record without objections. Prior
to the hearing, the Government submitted seven documents for administrative notice. At the hearing,
these documents were not objected to and they were all admitted into the record, marked as Exs. I-
VII. The transcript (Tr.) was received on April 19, 2007.
MOTION TO AMEND STATEMENT OF REASONS
At the hearing, the Government moved to amend the SOR by adding a sentence to
subparagraph 1.b and adding a new allegation, subparagraph 1.c. Applicant admitted the amended
allegations as be true. In the absence of objection, the Government’s request was granted. The SOR
is amended as follows:
Tr. 53.3
Tr. 57-58.4
Tr. 34.5
Tr. 36.6
Tr. 35.7
Tr. 45.8
Tr. 71-72.9
Tr. 15.10
Ex. C (Lab test results for Applicant’s Mother).11
4
1.b.  Applicant also traveled to China in 2005 and 2006.3
1.c.  Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law are citizens and residents of China. They
also are legal residents of the United States. They spend half of their time living and residing
in the United States, and half of their time living and residing in China.4
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the factual allegations pertaining to foreign influence under Guideline
B, subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c. Those admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After
a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due consideration of same,
I make the following findings of fact:
Applicant is 50 years old and has worked as a senior engineer for a defense contractor since
2003.  He was born in PRC and he graduated from a PRC university with a bachelor’s degree in5
1982.  He immigrated to the U.S. in 1982 on an educational scholarship at a well-known university6
and graduated with a master’s degree in 1988.7
Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1996. He married in the U.S. 17 years ago,
and his two children, aged 16 and 10, were born in the U.S.  He has a strong attachment to the U.S.8
as well as roots in his community. He owns real property in the U.S. and has lived in his current
house for the past seven or eight years.  He has bank accounts in the U.S., including retirement9
accounts. His children go to the local public schools.
Applicant’s mother and father are both citizens and residents of PRC. His parents are both
in their 80s. His mother is a retired teacher and his father is a retired engineer.  On October 21,10
1992, at the age of 63, his mother was diagnosed with thyroid cancer, stage 1.  He testified that his11
Tr. 15.12
Tr. 38-39.13
Tr. 47.14
Tr. 16, 47.15
Tr. 51, 67.16
Tr. 50.17
Ex. D (Character letters for Applicant).18
The school’s primary objectives are teaching students to comprehend and exercise basic Chinese conversation,19
reading, writing, and understanding of the Chinese culture. 
Ex. D, supra, note 13 at 4.20
5
father is also in very poor heath.  He talks to his parents about once a week, for five to ten minutes.12 13
Although his parents get a small pension, they sold their house to a developer and received enough
money to live comfortably.  If necessary, he and his brother supplement  their income.  He and his14 15
brother purchased an apartment for his parents and upon their demise, his brother will live in the
residence. His brother lives in Australia. The apartment is in the name of his parents, and is not in
Applicant’s name. Applicant has no assets in PRC.
Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in law are citizens and residents of PRC. His in-laws
are in their 70s. They also are legal residents of the U.S. They spend half of their time living and
residing in the U.S., and half of their time living and residing in PRC. They are both retired
university professors.  He speaks to his in-laws by telephone about once a month.16 17
From 1986 when he began his educational studies in the U.S. through 1998, a period of 13
years, Applicant did not visit PRC. Applicant traveled to PRC in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, and
2006 to visit his ailing and sick parents. He visited and stayed with his parents for two-weeks during
each of the trips. Since his in-laws live in the same city, he sees them as well.
Applicant submitted four affidavits attesting to his character. Two affidavits are from
colleagues at work who support his application for a security clearance.  A third affidavit is from18
the principal of a local Chinese School. He indicates that Applicant has volunteered as the director
and treasurer of the school board since 2005.  The fourth affidavit is from the president of the19
Applicant’s home owners’ association, who states “[Applicant] has been elected twice and is serving
as a board member of our home owner association for past the four years. He actively participates
in the planning of neighborhood improvement measures, addressing safety issues, enforcing
community bylaws, communicating with the neighbors, and encouraging the passage of community
initiatives.”20
The PRC is a repressive, totalitarian government with foreign policy goals antithetical to the
U.S. It has cooperated with the U.S. in the global war on terrorism in recent years. It has an active,
effective intelligence service that targets U.S. intelligence and economic information, and operates
ISCR Case No. 96-0277 (July 11, 1997) at 2.21
ISCR Case No. 97-0016 (December 31, 1997) at 3; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.14.22
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).23
ISCR Case No. 94-1075 (August 10, 1995) at 3-4; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.24
ISCR Case No. 93-1390 (January 27, 1995) at 7-8; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.25
Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.26
Id.27
Id.; Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ E2.2.2.28
6
against its citizens in the U.S. However, under PRC law, citizens who become naturalized citizens
of other countries lose their PRC citizenship.
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines to be considered in evaluating
a person’s eligibility to hold a security clearance. Included in the guidelines are disqualifying
conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC) applicable to each specific guideline. Additionally,
each security clearance decision must be a fair and impartial commonsense decision based on the
relevant and material facts and circumstances, the whole-person concept, along with the factors listed
in the Directive. Specifically these are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding
circumstances; (2) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (3) the age of the applicant; (4) the
motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary,
or undertaken with knowledge of the consequences; (5) the absence or presence of rehabilitation; and
(6) the probability that the circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future. Although
the presence or absence of a particular condition or factor for or against clearance is not outcome
determinative, the adjudicative guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured
against this policy guidance.
The sole purpose of a security clearance determination is to decide if it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an applicant.  The Government21
has the burden of proving controverted facts.  The burden of proof is something less than a22
preponderance of evidence.  Once the government has met its burden, the burden shifts to an applicant23
to present evidence of refutation, extenuation, or mitigation to overcome the case against him.24
Additionally, an applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance
decision.25
No one has a right to a security clearance  and “the clearly consistent standard indicates that26
security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable27
doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved
in favor of protecting such sensitive information.  The decision to deny an individual a security28
Executive Order 10865 § 7.29
6
clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication29
that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance.
CONCLUSIONS
I have carefully considered all the facts in evidence and the legal standards, and I reach the
following conclusions.
Under Guideline B, a security risk may exist for an individual with divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests. The person may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or a government in a way that is not in the interests of the U.S., or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. His parents are in their 80s and both have bad health. They
recently sold a piece of property and are now well off financially. His parents’ health has always been
his main concern. However, his parents encouraged him to attend the university in PRC and to come
to the U.S. to continue his education. His brother immigrated to Australia. His parents are proud of
their sons and their lifestyles. His in-laws live in both PRC and the U.S. Neither his parents nor in-laws
are likely to be vulnerable to foreign exploitation. Assuming arguendo that they were exploited in
PRC, Applicant’s strong ties to the U.S. would not make him vulnerable to exploitation or coercision
by PRC in the event his parents and in-laws were targeted. Applicant is an American citizen and his
loyalties are only to the U.S. If he had to choose, he would exhibit behavior favorably only to the U.S.,
even if it means that harm would come to those in PRC that he loved. Consequently, Foreign Influence
Disqualifying Conditions ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion)
applies. However, Applicant’s contact with his parents or in-laws in PRC does not create a heightened
risk for him or them.
Various factors can mitigate the foreign influence security concerns. The fact that his parents
are citizens and residents of PRC does not constitute an unacceptable security risk. Applicant visits
his parents to support them with his love and respect during their advancement as senior citizens. For
the past 20 years, Applicant has developed strong ties to the U.S., which include real estate ownership,
bank accounts, his marriage in the U.S. and the birth of his children here. Applicant has a profession
here that he is extremely proud of and that he excels at. Once Applicant became a naturalized U.S.
citizen, he lost his PRC citizenship. Thus, it is unlikely that Applicant would be sought out as a spy
for PRC while he resides in the U.S. or visits PRC. Moreover, in the unlikely event that Applicant is
approached by PRC while he is in the U.S., he is aware of the protocol in place to report such a
transgression. If he had to choose between divulging information about the U.S. in order to protect his
parents and in-laws, he would not jeopardize his U.S. citizenship. It is highly unlikely that Applicant
would jeopardize his relationships and loyalties in the U.S. in any way. Applicant can be trusted to
resolve any conflict of interest with relatives in PRC in favor of the U.S. Thus, Foreign Influence
Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) ¶ 8(a) (the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country
in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are
such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
7
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.) and
FI MC ¶ 8(b) (there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has
such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest) apply. Accordingly, allegations 1.a
through 1.c of the SOR are concluded in favor of Applicant.
I considered carefully all the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in this case in
light of the “whole person” concept, keeping in mind that any doubt as to whether access to classified
information is clearly consistent with national security must be resolved in favor or the national
security. Applicant is a mature individual who has lived in the U.S. for more than 20 years. He has
strong ties to this country, which include his education, real estate, bank and retirement accounts. He
 married in the U.S. and his children are U.S. citizens by birth. Applicant can be trusted to resolve any
conflict of interest with relatives in PRC in favor of the U.S. I conclude Applicant has mitigated the
potential security concerns arising from his personal ties to PRC.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 2. Guideline B (Foreign Influence): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.
Jacqueline T. Williams
 Administrative Judge