KEYWORD: Foreign Influence; Security Violations
DIGEST: Applicant, a lead engineer with a major defense contractor born to naturalized U.S.
citizens from Taiwan, mitigated security concerns of foreign influence arising from his parents-in-
law and brother-in-law who are citizens of Taiwan. His parents-in-law have had U.S. green cards for
five years. They have lived in the U.S. half of the year in five of the past six years and all of the past
year to prepare to become U.S. citizens. Applicant is fully integrated into U.S. society and has little
contact or interest in the country of his parents origin. Applying the whole person analysis I conclude
in his favor. Applicant also mitigated allegations regarding security violations in 1994 and 2000 that
were minor in nature and did not result in divulging of information or documents. Clearance is
granted. 
CASENO: 03-02313.h1
DATE: 06/30/2007
DATE: June 30, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 03-02313
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CHARLES D. ABLARD
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq. , Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
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SYNOPSIS
Applicant, a lead engineer with a major defense contractor born to naturalized U.S. citizens
from Taiwan, mitigated security concerns of foreign influence arising from his parents-in-law and
brother-in-law who are citizens of Taiwan. His parents-in-law have had U.S. green cards for five
years. They have lived in the U.S. half of the year in five of the past six years and all of the past year
to prepare to become U.S. citizens. Applicant is fully integrated into U.S. society and has little
contact or interest in the country of his parents origin. Applying the whole person analysis I conclude
in his favor. Applicant also mitigated allegations regarding security violations in 1994 and 2000 that
were minor in nature and did not result in divulging of information or documents. Clearance is
granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 30, 2006, the Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) pursuant to Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry as amended and modified, and
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified, issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary
affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue a security clearance for Applicant. DOHA recommended the case be referred to an
administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or
revoked.
In a sworn written statement, received April 24, 2006, Applicant responded to the allegations
set forth in the SOR, and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on February 13, 2007.
A Notice of Hearing was issued April 11, 2007 for a hearing held on April 25, 2007. Applicant
waived the 15 day notice requirement. The Government introduced three exhibits and Applicant
introduced ten exhibits. All offered exhibits were accepted into evidence. The government requested
that administrative notice be taken of twelve official government documents (Exhs. I - XII). Three
(Exhs. V, VI, and XII) were excluded from consideration upon objection of Applicant. Applicant and
three others testified on his behalf. The transcript was received on May 8, 2007. 
The record was left open at the request of Applicant for 30 days for receipt of additional
evidence. Applicant submitted additional evidence on in the form of three documents which were
admitted without objection into the record. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted all allegations under Foreign Influence-Guideline B and Security
Violations-Guideline K with explanatory information. Those admissions are incorporated herein as
findings of fact. After a complete review of the evidence in the record and upon due consideration
of the record the following additional findings of fact are made:
Applicant is a 38-year-old employee of a major defense contractor working as an engineer.
He was born and educated in the U.S. of parents from Taiwan who were naturalized U.S. citizens.
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He speaks a little Mandarin, the language of his parents, but insufficiently to hold a serious
conversation. He holds bachelor’s (summa cum laude) and master’s degrees in electrical engineering
from two major U.S. universities. He has worked for his employer since his graduation in 1991 and
has held a security clearance for the past 14 years. The current application for security clearance (SF
86) is for a ten year renewal and was filed in 1999 (Exh. 1). He was interviewed by a defense
investigator in 2002 (Exh. 2). 
Applicant was married in 1994 to another student at their undergraduate university and she
is also an engineer with the same defense contractor working for the same program. They work on
one of several subsystems of a weapons system for the Navy. His annual income is $110,000 and
their combined annual income is $190,000. Each has a 401(k) valued at over $100,000. They own
their own home with no mortgage which is valued at approximately $350,000. All of their assets are
in the U.S. They have little or no cultural interest in or contact with Chinese society or history.
Applicant and his fiancé who became his wife traveled to Taiwan on three occasions in 1993,
1997, and 2001 on family matters related to their courtship and birthday events for their parents. He
advised his company of each trip.
Applicant’s parents-in-law and a brother-in-law are citizens of of Taiwan. His father-in-law
retired from an electric power company where he worked as an accountant. He received a lump sum
on retirement and gets nothing further from the company. His mother-in-law was a homemaker. His
parents-in-law visited  in the U.S. with Applicant and his wife for several weeks each year during
the first years of their marriage. Since 2002 they have spent half of each year in the U.S. as they were
applying for citizenship. Each has had a green card for the past five years. They have lived in the
U.S. permanently for the past year as they prepare to take the examination for citizenship (Exhs. I
and J). They own a condo in Taiwan and a house in the U.S. which they purchased to provide income
for their daughter while she was in school. The property is rented.
Applicant’s brother-in-law lives in Taiwan and works as a lineman for a telephone company
which has been privatized. The government still holds a minority interest in the company with most
of the stock held by commercial financial entities (Exh. J 2). He did mandatory two years of military
service in Taiwan. He visited Applicant and his wife in the U.S. once in 2006 for a sight-seeing trip.
He speaks very little English so Applicant and his brother-in-law have no common language. He is
married with a young son. As soon as Applicant’s parents-in-law become citizens they intend to
sponsor the family to come to the U.S. (Tr. 167). 
Applicant had two security violations over the 14 years since he obtained a security clearance.
The first occurred in 1994 and concerned two shrink wrapped documents classified Confidential that
he left on his desk overnight in violation of requirements of the Department of Defense Industrial
Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information. When they were discovered the documents
were still shrink wrapped. The second violation occurred in 2000 concerning two classified
documents that were unaccounted for since Applicant failed to obtain receipts for them when he
turned them in for destruction. This was in violation of the NISPOM, and he was given verbal
counseling and required to attend a refresher security briefing. No disclosure or leaks of information
occurred as a result of either violation. 
A witness for Applicant at the hearing with decades of security experience with the same
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company testified that these violations, on a scale of 1-10 for seriousness, would be categorized as
category 2 or 3 violations (Tr. 115). Neither violation resulted in any heightened attention given to
Applicant by his employer. He receives regular annual briefings on security issues from his company.
He regrets the incidents and is embarrassed about them. However, their occurrence has heightened
his attention to security concerns so these incidents have increased his security awareness and
attention to security requirement. 
Applicant is highly regarded for his diligence, integrity, and excellent engineering work in
his job by his supervisors and colleagues who testified for him (Exhs. A-H). He has excellent work
ethic and top engineering skills. He is regarded as a key member of the engineering staff. He is
regarded as a model citizen with a reputation for honesty and integrity. He follows the rules of the
company in all matters and knows security regulations and requirements. He knows that any possible
breach of security requires immediate reporting to security officers.
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at 527
An evaluation of whether the applicant meets the security guidelines includes consideration
of the following factors: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and
maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence
of rehabilitation and other behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential
for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Directive, ¶ E2.2.1. Security clearances are granted only when “it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to do so.” Executive Order No. 10865 § 2. See Executive Order No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
Initially, the Government must establish, by something less than a preponderance of the
evidence, that conditions exist in the personal or professional history of the applicant which
disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information.
See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. The applicant then bears the burden of demonstrating that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the applicant’s clearance. “Any doubt as to
whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved
in favor of the national security.” Directive, ¶ E2.2.2. “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should
err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. See Executive Order No. 12968 §
3.1(b).
“A security risk may exist when an individual’s immediate family and other persons to whom
he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States
or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that
could result in the compromise of classified information.” Directive, ¶ E2.A2.1.1. Having
immediate family members who are citizens of, and residing in a foreign country, may raise a
disqualifying security concern. Directive, ¶ E2.A2.1.2.1.
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CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors and conditions above, I conclude the following with respect to all allegations set
forth in the SOR: 
Conditions under Foreign Influence Guideline B that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying include having an immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual
has close ties of affection or obligation, who is a citizen of, or resident in a foreign country.
(E2.A2.1.2.1.) Based on the evidence of record, including Applicant’s admissions, the Government
established reasons to raise security concerns because of foreign influence. Having established such
reasons, the Applicant had the burden to establish security suitability through evidence which refutes,
mitigates, or extenuates the disqualification and demonstrates that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant a security clearance. ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).
Mitigating conditions that might be applicable to allegations relating to his family are a
determination that the individuals in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to
be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty
to the persons involved and the U.S.(E2.A2.1.3.1.), and contacts and correspondence with foreign
citizens are casual and infrequent. (E2.A2.1.3.3.) While his relatives are not agents of a foreign
power, by definition parents and siblings are persons with close ties of affection. The same applies
to close family in-laws. Thus, the specific mitigating conditions are not applicable.
Conditions under Security Violations Guideline K that could raise a security concern and be
disqualifying include violations that are multiple or due to negligence (E2.A11.1.2.2.). Possible
mitigating conditions that could mitigate security concerns include actions that were inadvertent
(E2.A11.1.3.1.), were isolated or infrequent (E2.A11.1.3.2.), or demonstrate a positive attitude
towards discharge of security responsibilities (E2.A11.1.3.4.). In view of the time spread between
the two violations and the fact that the second and last one was seven years ago, both were
inadvertent. Applicant has shown in his conduct, as stated at the hearing by himself and his
supervisors and colleagues, a positive attitude towards his security responsibilities and extensive
training in security requirements, I conclude that all mitigating conditions are applicable.
In all adjudications the protection of our national security is of paramount concern. Persons
who have access to classified information have an overriding responsibility for the security of the
nation. The objective of the security clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment
of a person’s trustworthiness and fitness for access to classified information. The “whole person”
concept recognizes that we should view a person by the totality of their acts and omissions. Each
case must be judged on its own merits taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and
applying sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis.
Applicant is a person of substance and veracity who has had a responsible position of trust
and has done an excellent job for his company for 16 years. He provided sincere and credible
testimony as to his relationship with his family, his motivations, and his loyalty to the U.S. He was
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born in the U.S., educated in the U.S., and is totally integrated into U.S. culture. He has no cultural
contact with his parent’s country of origin. The status of his parents-in-law in becoming U.S. citizens
within months certainly lessens any likelihood of coercion or pressure from them adversely affecting
security interests. He has little contact with his brother-in-law and, because of Applicant’s limited
ability to speak any of the Chinese languages, cannot converse with him. 
While there is evidence that Taiwan has engaged in economic and military espionage, and
that the PRC may use it as a source of information as stated in official documents (Exhs. IV, and XI),
efforts of the U.S. are consistent in support of Taiwan for its democratically elected government
(Exh. II). Applicant shows no loyalty to Taiwan or the PRC and is a competent professional who
knows how to deal with any pressures that might be brought against him by an agent of a foreign
government.
After considering all the evidence in its totality and as an integrated whole to focus on the
whole person of Applicant, I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
clearance to Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are hereby
rendered as follows:
Paragraph l Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: For Applicant
Paragraph 2 Guideline K: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b.: For Applicant
DECISION
After full consideration of all the facts and documents presented by the record in this case,
it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance is granted. 
Charles D. Ablard 
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Administrative Judge