KEYWORD: Security Violations
DIGEST: Applicant mitigated serious security concerns over his having mishandled protected
information  in 1993 to 1994 which led to severe ramifications for him, including being denied
access and being terminated in 1995.  Over ten years later he has demonstrated how he reformed
himself and made positive changes in behavior.  He now takes all security requirements seriously
and persuaded he is willing and able to comply with security rules.  Significantly, all of his managers
from that earlier period and today have confidence in him.  One observe that Applicant’s dismissal
“made permanent the corrective action” to preclude any “errant behavior” in the future.  His
managers uniformly recommend that his security clearance be reinstated.   Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 04-00352.h1
DATE: 06/30/2007
DATE: June 30, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 04-00352
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
KATHRYN MOEN BRAEMAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Candace Le’i, Esquire, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
William F. Savarino, Esquire, Cohen Mohr LLP
       This procedure is required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and Department of Defense Directive1
5220.6, dated January 2, 1992 (Directive), as amended by Change 4, April 20, 1999.   
       Applicant did receive a copy of the DoD Directive 5220.6 which was sent with his Statement of Reasons2
(SOR) on September 29, 2006.  (TR 8; 14)
      While on January 8, 2007, the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) database reflected that3
Applicant was separated from his employment on December 21, 2006, and that he had requested that he no
longer be processed for a security clearance, Department Counsel subsequently learned from his counsel on
January 12, 2007, that Applicant did wish to pursue a security clearance.  The JPAS database then reflected
that Applicant was currently employed and being sponsored for a security clearance by his employer.
2
SYNOPSIS
Applicant mitigated serious security concerns over his having mishandled protected
information  in 1993 to 1994 which led to severe ramifications for him, including being denied
access and terminated in 1995.  Over ten years later he demonstrated how he reformed himself and
made positive changes in behavior.  He now takes all security requirements seriously and persuaded
he is willing and able to comply with security rules.  Significantly, all of his managers from that
earlier period and today have confidence in him.  One observe that Applicant’s dismissal “made
permanent the corrective action” to preclude any “errant behavior” in the future.  His managers
uniformly recommend that his security clearance be reinstated.   Clearance is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR)
to the Applicant on October 4, 2006.  The SOR detailed reasons why the Government could not
make the preliminary positive finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue a security clearance for the Applicant.   The SOR alleged specific concerns over1
Handling Protected Information (Guideline K) in paragraph 1 based on the revised (“new”)
Adjudicative Guidelines (AG)  issued on December 29, 2005, and implemented by the Department2
of Defense, effective September 1, 2006.  Applicant responded to these SOR allegations in an
Answer notarized on October 24, 2006, where he admitted allegations 1.a. and 1.b. and denied
allegations 1.c. and 1.d. with explanations and attached letters of reference.  He requested a hearing.
On December 11, 2006, his counsel entered his appearance.
Department Counsel  on December 8, 2006, indicated the case was ready to proceed.  The3
matter was assigned to another judge on January 4, 2007. Subsequently, a mutually convenient date
for hearing was agreed to.  A Notice of Hearing, issued on February 22, 2007, set the matter for
March 9, 2007, at a location near where Applicant works and lives.  The case was re-assigned to me
on March 5, 2007, because of the unavailability of the previous judge.
At the hearing the Government offered eight exhibits  (Exhibits 1-8) which was admitted into
evidence without objection; also admitted was one document for Administration Notice (AN)
(Exhibit I).  (TR 13, 21-25) Applicant testified, called five witnesses, and submitted Exhibits A &
B. As Department Counsel indicated no objection, the documents were admitted into evidence. (TR
20-24)  The transcript (TR) was received on March19, 2007.
       Applicant was never informed that his Department of Defense top secret clearance had been revoked4
and never received a Statement of Reasons during that period; consequently, he did not appeal.  He did
appeal the CIA denial of his SCI access and did report their decision to deny him SCI access to his manager
at the time.  Defense Contractor #1 then made a corporate decision to deny him access to all classified
information  in February 1995 and to terminate him in March 1995.  He did not contest this decision as he
knew he had done something wrong in mishandling protected information.  (Exhibits 1, 3, 8; TR 198-199;
203-206)
3
At the close of the testimony, Department counsel moved to amend SOR 1.d. to strike the
word “top” and to add “SCI access denied.”  His counsel objected to the use of the word “revoked”
and argued there was no evidence that his secret clearance was revoked though there was evidence
the other agency denied him access to SCI in December 1994.  However, the Applicant’s counsel
did not object to the Department Counsel’s amendment to SOR 1.d.  One exhibit did establish this
allegation, so the motion was granted to amend  1.d. to allege: “Your Secret clearance was revoked
and your SCI access denied by another Government agency on February 3, 1995, due to that
information alleged in subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.c., above.”   (Exhibits 1, 2; TR 208-215)
FINDINGS OF FACT
After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due
consideration of that evidence, I make the following Findings of Fact:
  
Applicant, 52 years old, is an engineer who returned to work for Defense Contractor #1 in
State #1 in August  2003 and continues to work as a senior systems engineer.  He completed an
electronic Security Clearance Application (SF 86) in September  2003 and is seeking a clearance.
Previously, he had worked there from April 1975 to March 1995.  In that period he had a Defense
Department Secret security clearance granted in June 1975; later he was granted a Top Secret
security clearance in January 1991 and also had been granted access to Sensitive Compartment
information (SCI) in January 1991.  He also had a CIA clearance granted in January 1993. However,
he reported on his SF 86 in answer to Question 32: “To your knowledge have you ever had a
clearance or access authorization denied, suspended, or revoked. . . ?” he stated, “Yes 1995/01/??
CIA,”   Subsequently, he was unemployed from May to June 1995 after he was  terminated from4
Defense Contractor #1.  He then worked at another private sector company from 1995 to 1996 in
hourly jobs.  He worked at another company from June 1997 to April 2003 when it was dramatically
down-sized; he then was unemployed from May to August 2003.  (Exhibit 1; TR 29; 31-32; 64-69;
110) 
Applicant’s current work for Defense Contractor #1 involves conceptual missile design.
However, he has not had access to classified information, so there are limits to what he can do.  (TR
70)
Applicant married in June 1979 and has two children born in 1979 ad 1985.  His wife also
has worked for Defense Contractor #1 for 25 years and has a security clearance.  Applicant studied
at a college in State #2 in 1995, but received no degree.  (Exhibit 1; TR 28)  He received an electrical
engineering degree previously in State #3; he initially began work for Defense Contractor #1 as a
coop student beginning in 1975.  (TR 29-30)
4
Handling Protected Information
Prior to the 1993-94 time frame, Applicant never had any security violations in his twenty
years with the company.  (TR 64)  However, in the 1993-94 time period Applicant had multiple job
responsibilities with Defense Contractor #1. He was working on three different classified programs
at the request of management in three separate buildings.  Two projects and buildings were close
together, but the third building was at a more remote location,  two or three miles away from his
other assignments.  (Answer; Exhibit 4; TR 33-37) 
Applicant’s Admitted Security Violations
1.a. Applicant took classified documents home at least six times between 1993-1994.
1.b. Applicant took classified discs home at least three times between 1993-1994.
In December 1994 a senior adjudication officer from another Government agency advised
Applicant that he had undergone the organizations’s security procedures between April and
November 1994 which included three polygraph examinations in June and July 1994.  In those
examinations Applicant provided information that raised security concerns.  He had no authorization
to remove and store classified materials from several documents and reports; but nevertheless, he
took classified information home to update reports.  Because he had repeatedly removed classified
materials in an unauthorized manner, knowingly stored classified materials in an unauthorized
manner, and did not review material stored in his office to confirm it was all stored appropriately,
Applicant was “disapproved” for the SCI access request submitted; the agency also “revoked” his
existing clearances.  He was advised he could appeal the decision within 45 days from the date of
receipt of the letter to provide corrected or new information or mitigating circumstances.  (Exhibit
3) Applicant on January 14, 1994, did explain his involvement in three separate classified projects
in three separate buildings.  He advised that he had shown his program manager the letter of
disapproval and his response.  He admitted that “taking documents home did cross a line that
shouldn’t have been crossed.”  He admitted he had decided to “recalibrate” his thinking. (Exhibit
4)
Applicant admitted he took classified documents marked Secret to his home on at least six
occasions and classified discs home on at least three occasions without authorization between 1993-
1994.  He had no authorized storage container in his home.  Also, he admitted he had processed
classified discs marked Secret on his home computer and would change documents to a different
format at home. He denied the documents were compromised as he transported them with the
required double wrapping. However, he simply stored the classified documents in his briefcase
overnight which does not comply with security regulations.  Applicant had disclosed this practice
where he intermittently took classified items home in polygraph examinations in June and July 1994
which were required for SCI access.  He was advised in December 1994 that he was to be denied SCI
access based on his “deliberate disregard for security practices and procedure.”  He admitted he knew
that by his actions he was violating security rules.  He was given an opportunity to respond but his
only justification was “his need to get home to take his children out of day care and the
inconvenience of not having transportation to go back” to a building which had secure facilities.  He
did not have a safe in the remote building.  After he advised the company subsequently of the denial
of his SCI access, the company itself launched its own investigation and took steps to preclude
       The organization is now known as the Defense Security Service (DSS). 5
5
Applicant from having access to classified information.  A February 1995 report submitted by the
corporate chief of industrial security to the Defense Investigative Service  (DIS) reported Applicant’s5
security violations in a Memorandum entitled: ISM Paragraph 1-304 - Possible Compromise of
Classified Information.  (Answer, Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; TR 35-47; 50-52; 56-57; 83; 89-98;
102; 112)  
Applicant admitted he “cut corners” and had no excuse. He conceded that if a document was
marked “Secret” that it should be treated that way.   (TR 99-100; 103)  His motivation in violating
the security rules was “really just to get the job done.”  (TR 63)
Contested Security Violations Concluded Adverse to Applicant 
SOR 1.c.  Applicant stored classified and SCI documents in a non-secure matter
 at his office between 1993-1994.
Applicant denied both in his Answer and at the hearing that he had improperly stored
classified and/or SCI documents in his office as he considered the papers there only “tidbits”as  only
the completed document would be classified.  However, the Special Adjudication Officer’s report
included Applicant’s admission that “over the years” he had “collected a substantial number of
classified materials and have store them inappropriately.”  Although the polygraph officer requested
that Applicant review the material in his office to check for classified documents, Applicant refused
to do so because he believed such a review  would be too time consuming.  He insisted he never took
any SCI documents to his office and never had any documents there that were marked classified and
improperly stored.  He did admit he had a page from an SCI study that was marked “For Official Use
Only.” (Answer; Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,7, 8; TR 47-50; 81-83; 87-88) A witness confirmed that to his
knowledge Applicant never removed any SCI documents from a secure facility.  
Applicant explained that the reason he did not review all the documents in his office in 1993-
1994 was that he was confident he did not have classified documents unsecured in his office.  Also,
it would have been a lengthy procedure; and he had only a limited time commitment to that SCI
project.(TR 111-112) Applicant was an authorized classifier in that period and determined that the
information in his office was not classified.  However, on cross-examination he admitted that
“everything is subject to interpretation.”  (TR 61; 83-84) Today if there was a dispute on
classification, he would go to a classification manager to resolve the issue.  (TR 84-87)
1.d. Applicant’s Secret clearance was revoked and his SCI access denied by another
 Government agency on February 3, 1995, due to that information alleged in
 subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.c., above.
Applicant admitted he was denied SCI access.  The records from that agency also
documented that they revoked his Secret clearance also.  (Exhibit 3) Even though he took some
corrective actions, Defense Contractor #1 in March 1995 decided to terminate Applicant’s
employment as a result of these deliberate security violations.  Applicant did not contest the
termination.  (Exhibits 1, 5; TR 57-61)  Consequently, his DoD clearances were never under
investigation or review as they were administratively terminated.
       Although not formally qualified as an expert, the witness testified on his background in the National6
Industrial Security Program since its inception in 1985 and his previous involvement in the Defense
Industrial Security Program beginning in 1972.  He had twenty years of military and twenty years of civilian
experience at the Department of Defense at DSS.  When he retired in 1990, he was the Deputy Director for
the Industrial Security Program.  Subsequently, he has been a corporate security manager and consultant.
(TR 179-188; 189-192) The consultant was paid to provide the training and paid to appear at the hearing.
(TR 188) His expertise in security matters was established by these credentials.
       While the briefing materials that the consultant provided did not include any specific information about7
the problem of removing classified documents to a residence, he did cover that point in his oral discussions
with the Applicant.  (Exhibit B; TR 194-195)
6
Applicant’s Receptivity to Counseling or Remedial Security Training
Since that 1993-1994 period of the admitted security violations, Applicant has demonstrated
significant remorse over his earlier misconduct.  He has become alert to the importance of following
all security rules.  (TR 72-76; 80-81)  
Also, at the suggestion of his attorney, Applicant sought additional security training in
February and March 2007  from a consultant  in the security field who provided security information6
in two PowerPoint sessions with him.  During this one-on-one security training Applicant had the
opportunity to ask questions via telephone after reviewing slides. Applicant also reexamined with
this security professional his violations from 1993-94.  The security consultant will continue to be
available to the Applicant for questions and clarifications. (Exhibit B; TR 76-79; 109; 182-185) With
his  expertise, the consultant was able to put the security rules in context for Applicant so that he
could understand why those rules were created.  (TR 112-113) In addition, Applicant took a security
class online at his own initiative at his workplace.  He also recently took a three-hour security class
that everyone at the defense contractor facility was required to take.  (TR 108)
In March 2007 Applicant explained what was different today about his approach to security.
He answered that “being fired from a job certainly opens up your eyes.” He admitted his thinking
at the time of the 1993-1994 incidents was wrong as he was more focused on getting the job done
than on complying with the security rules.  He understands more clearly now that he has a lot at
stake. Also, since key managers went “through all the hoops” to bring him back, he would not want
to disappoint them.  (TR 105-107) 
Also, although not formally qualified as an expert, I considered the expertise and impressive
credentials of the security professional who provided training to Applicant and offered his views on
Applicant’s current seriousness about security matters.  Consequently, I give substantial weight to
his conclusions that Applicant “fully understands the rules now.”  He provided his expert opinion
that Applicant is “very serious and he’s very earnest in complying with those rules to the letter.”  (TR
186-187) The consultant explained that Applicant realized “in retrospect” that he should have
followed the security rules.  He believes that Applicant now fully understand that he should not have
taken classified documents to his home.   (TR 192-194)7
References
       Also, the former president was critical of the  company’s decision to terminate Applicant without8
providing for enough due process.  For example,  there was no procedure to allow anyone to be an advocate
for Applicant. 
7
A chief engineer and company director at Defense Contractor #1 was Applicant’s supervisor
at the time of the security violations that led to his dismissal. He acknowledged that the pressure of
supporting multiple projects stressed Applicant to the point of “unacceptable behavior which led to
his dismissal.”   He assessed Applicant as having “sound” intentions as his goal was to meet the need
of the program even though he did not have an option to judge the rules and make his own
exceptions.  Consequently, he continues to view Applicant as “fundamentally trustworthy.”  Also,
he stated that Applicant also possesses talents that are of great value to the national defense.  He
concluded that Applicant has learned the lesson on the “uncompromising nature of information
security rules” and believes that he will in the future abide by them.  He believes Applicant’s
dismissal “made permanent the corrective action that will preclude any errant behavior hence forth.”
Consequently, he recommended the re-instatement of his security clearance.   (Exhibit A)
A manager, now retired from Defense Contractor #1 but who periodically is called back in
to help out, testified on Applicant’s behalf and recommended that his security clearance be
reinstated.  He worked there for ten years as a manager of several small contracts valued at under
$100,000.  He himself held a Top Secret clearance with SCI access. He knew Applicant in 1990 as
he was an engineering specialist who had expertise the manager needed to complete his contracts,
so he would ask Applicant for his assistance.  He also traveled with Applicant and socialized with
him until Applicant left the company in 1995.  He had requested SCI access for Applicant and
subsequently learned that access had been denied by that agency.  This manager was not a reporting
official for Applicant’s work, so never evaluated him.  However, he assessed Applicant’s work as
being of a very high quality and viewed him as reliable and dependable.  The manager noted that
building he worked in had no appropriate area to work on or to store SCI material.  This manager
believes that Applicant never took SCI out of that controlled facility to his home.  However, he was
advised of Applicant’s improper removal of other classified material to his home.  Neither the
agency evaluating Applicant for SCI access nor Defense Contractor #1's management ever asked this
manager for his views at the time of security violations in 1995.  Nevertheless, he believes Applicant
has now “paid for that mistake that he made” and “knows that what he did was wrong.”  He does not
believe that Applicant would ever “go down that road again.” He confirmed that Applicant will
follow security rules going forward as he understands the seriousness of what he did.  This manager
has had informal contact with Applicant since he has been rehired.  He recommended that
Applilcant’s security clearance be reinstated based on his knowledge of his character. (TR 115-138)
The division president of Defense Contractor #1 in the 1993-1995 period who worked for
the company for forty years also testified on Applicant’s behalf.  He retired in 1996 and is now an
independent consultant.  During his tenure, he supervised 8,000 people.  He knew Applicant as he
would do studies or analysis on projects within the company.  The president was working on a
special project in 1995 and did not learn of Applicant’s termination until after he had been
dismissed. He learned that human resources convened a panel to review  the security violations and8
made a decision to dismiss Applicant.  They did not consider any of the extenuating circumstances
in the case.   He was shocked as he assessed Applicant as a sincere, honest and conscientious person.
He agreed that Applicant had made an error in judgment in taking classified materials home. He
believed Applicant was very dedicated to the success of the programs where he was assigned to
8
work.  Later, the president was able to get Applicant’s termination status changed so that he could
be re-hired as the president did not believe that “the punishment” fit the “crime.”  In his experience
at the corporation, he observed that normally Applicant’s security violations would have led to a
suspension for a period of time, not a termination.  The division president reported that he effected
a change of  status: instead of recording Applicant’s termination as  “dismissal with prejudice” it
was revised to state that Applicant was laid off because he did not have the proper security
clearances. (TR 139-155)
A senior manager from the advanced program office who knew Applicant in the 1989 to
1995  period and was also involved in the decision to rehire him also testified on his behalf.  He has
had a DoD Top Secret clearance since 1977.  In the earlier period he and Applicant worked as peers
on classified projects on a daily basis. He assesses Applicant as honest, conscientious and
trustworthy so he was surprised to learn of Applicant’s security violations in taking classified
material home.  He observed him to be generally very conscientious with respect to classified
material.  He recommended to a manager that Applicant be rehired as he assessed Applicant as a
“brilliant individual” who could be a valuable asset even without a security clearance.  Applicant is
currently handling company proprietary information.  He is “diligent in handling that information.”
(TR 156-162)  He assesses Applicant as having a heightened awareness today more so than any other
employee in the company.  He does not supervise Applicant, but Applicant does work for his
programs. He recommended Applicant’s security clearance be reinstated.  (TR 162-166)
A systems engineering manager who is now Applicant’s supervisor also testified on
Applicant’s behalf.  He has a Secret clearance and has been his supervisor since October 2005 and
sees him on a daily basis.  He was been evaluated as very good.  He is diligent and dependable.  He
assesses Applicant as willing and able to follow company rules.  He recommended that Applicant’s
clearance be reinstated as he trusts him to follow the rules and finds him a real asset to his team.  He
stated that Applicant had taken the training offered by the company on how to handle proprietary
information.  (TR 168-177)
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines to consider in evaluating an
individual's security eligibility which  are divided into conditions that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying and conditions that could mitigate security concerns.  In deciding whether
to grant or continue an individual's access to classified information, the mere presence or absence
of any adjudication policy condition is not decisive.  Based on a consideration of the evidence as a
whole in evaluating this case, I weighed these relevant Revised Adjudication Guidelines:
Guideline K: Handling Protected Information 
33. The Concern. Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulatiions for
protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an individual’s
trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such
information, and is a serious security concern.
 The responsibility for producing evidence initially falls on the Government to demonstrate
that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant's access to
     Executive Order No. 10865 § 7.9
       33. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:  (b) collecting10
or storing classified or other protected information at home or in any other unauthorized location; (c) loading,
drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise handling classified reports, data, or other
information on any unapproved equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word processor, or
computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard, handheld, “palm” or pocket device or other adjunct
equipment;. (g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other sensitive information.
9
classified information.  Then the Applicant presents evidence to refute, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate in order  to overcome the doubts raised by the Government, and to demonstrate persuasively
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the clearance.  Under the
provisions of Executive Order 10865, as amended, and the Directive, a decision to grant or continue
an applicant's security clearance may be made only after an affirmative finding that to do so is clearly
consistent with the national interest. In reaching the fair and impartial overall common sense
determination, the Administrative Judge may  draw only those inferences and conclusions that have
a reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record.  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides industrial security clearance
decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the
loyalty of the applicant concerned.” The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not
necessarily a determination as to the allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism of an applicant.  It is merely9
an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of
Defense have established for issuing a security clearance.
CONCLUSIONS
Handling Protected Information
The Government established security concerns over Applicant’s mishandling of protected
information.  Applicant’s conduct falls within conditions that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying (DC) : (b), (c), (d).  Applicant admitted his conduct was a violation of security rules10
when he made a decision to bring classified information and discs home where they could not
properly be secured.  When he disclosed these careless and expedient practices in polygraph
examinations, he was denied access to SCI and his secret clearance with that agency was revoked.
Although he denied it, there was also evidence that he improperly storied classified information in
his office and refused a request to review the material there to assure its safeguarding.  By his
conduct in 1993 to 1994 he violated provision of the Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding
Classified Information (DoD 5220.22-M).  While he provided an explanation for why he engaged
in these improper security practices, he provided no defense that was persuasive to either the agency
who denied him access or the company who terminated him when his access was denied.
Significantly, Applicant promptly reported these security access denial issues to his manager and also
provided details for the corporate security investigation.  Nevertheless, despite some remedial steps
on his part, the corporation made a decision to terminate him which he did not challenge. 
       35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:  (a) so much time has elapsed since11
the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individuals current’ reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgement; (b)
the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a
positive attitude toward the discharge of security responsibilities; (c) the security vioaltions were due to
improper or inadequate training.
10
Subsequently, he had a variety of other corporate jobs.  As he was highly regarded for this
technical expertise within the company, he was ultimately re-hired in 2003.   He remains highly
regarded both by managers who knew him in his earlier tenure and by the managers who supervise
him since he was re-hired in 2003.  He established that he has reformed his conduct and provided
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he falls within mitigating conditions (MC).   Under MC (a),11
Applicant has acknowledged his violations of security rules were serious and showed remorse.
Given his twenty year history with the company,  this behavior in taking these short-cuts was unusual
and infrequent.  He previously had a prior history of compliance with security rules.  Any new
violations are unlikely to recur as he as had to focus on the seriousness and importance of these
security requirements.  In addition, he has sought additional security training from a consultant in
the field who could explain to him, not only the rule, but the rationale and basis for the rule.  Not
only does he predict such violations will not recur but all of the managers who know him testified
favorably on his behalf and recommended that his security clearance be reinstated.  He has taken
correction action to overcome this serious problem. Also, these violations, while serious, did happen
oven ten years ago.  Now he has substantially reformed his conduct.   
Notably, the chief engineer and company director who was Applicant’s supervisor at the time
of the security violations that led to his dismissal continues to view Applicant as “fundamentally
trustworthy.”  Also, he noted that Applicant  possesses talents that are of great value to the national
defense.  He concluded that Applicant learned the lesson on the “uncompromising nature of
information security rules” and offered his assessment that Applicant will in the future abide by
them.  Consequently, he recommended the reinstatement of his security clearance.   
Also, his current supervisor views his current work performance as  good and recommended
that his clearance be reinstated.  All his supervisors and managers from the earlier work history and
from the current work assignments express confidence in him as a reliable, trustworthy and a person
of good judgment.  Also they all recommended him that his security clearance be reinstated.
Thus, I conclude Applicant established MC (a).  Significantly, he now shows a positive
attitude toward the discharge of security responsibilities as demonstrated by his own testimony and
the assessment of high level managers. Consequently, he also falls within MC (b).  While there was
no argument made that Applicant’s violations occurred because of improper or inadequate training,
and MC (c) does not apply, nevertheless he sought out additional security training and has complied
with all the current proprietary training required in his current position where he is uncleared but
handles other sensitive information with appropriate safeguards.  
Viewing him as a whole person, I find his transformation on the importance of security rules
potent as his earlier motivation for taking these security short-cuts was not to advantage himself, but
to juggle a heavy workload with his family responsibilities.  While his rationale does not excuse his
past misconduct, it demonstrates that his motivation as his goal was to meet a very heavy workload
11
in a stressful environment of three projects conducted at three different locations.  Significantly, his
supervisor from the earlier period offered his assessment that Applicant’s 1995 dismissal “made
permanent the corrective action that will preclude any errant behavior hence forth.”  
 After considering the Adjudicative Process factors and the Adjudicative Guidelines, I rule
for  Applicant on subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.d. under SOR Paragraph 1.
FORMAL FINDINGS
After reviewing the allegations of the SOR in the context of the Adjudicative Guidelines in
Enclosure 2 and the factors set forth under the Adjudicative Process section, I make the following
formal findings:
Paragraph 1. Guideline K: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d.: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant.  Clearance is
granted.
Kathryn Moen Braeman
Administrative Judge