KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant, an engineer with a major defense contractor born in Taiwan and educated in
the U.S. since high school, mitigated security concerns of foreign influence arising from her parents
and brother who are citizens of Taiwan. Her parents have held U.S. green cards for five years. They
have lived in the U.S. half of the year in five of the past six years and all of the past year to prepare
to become U.S. citizens which they expect to obtain in a few months. Her brother works in a low
level job for a privatized telephone company. Her parents hope to sponsor her brother and his wife
and child to come to the U.S. as soon as the parents become citizens. Applicant is fully integrated
into U.S. society and has little contact or interest in her country of birth. Applying the whole person
analysis I conclude in her favor. Clearance is granted. 
CASENO: 04-07704.h1
DATE: 06/30/2007
DATE: June 30, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 04-07704
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CHARLES D. ABLARD
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq. , Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Lawrence Lai, Personal Representative
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SYNOPSIS
Applicant, an engineer with a major defense contractor born in Taiwan and educated in the
U.S. since high school, mitigated security concerns of foreign influence arising from her parents and
brother who are citizens of Taiwan. Her parents have held U.S. green cards for five years. They have
lived in the U.S. half of the year in five of the past six years and all of the past year to prepare to
become U.S. citizens which they expect to obtain in a few months. Her brother works in a low level
job for a privatized telephone company. Her parents hope to sponsor her brother and his wife and
child to come to the U.S. as soon as the parents become citizens. Applicant is fully integrated into
U.S. society and has little contact or interest in her country of birth. Applying the whole person
analysis I conclude in her favor. Clearance is granted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 30, 2006, the Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) pursuant to Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry as amended and modified, and
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified, issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary
affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue a security clearance for Applicant. DOHA recommended the case be referred to an
administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or
revoked.
In a sworn written statement, received April 24, 2006, Applicant responded to the allegations
set forth in the SOR, and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on February 12, 2007.
A Notice of Hearing was issued April 11, 2007 for a hearing held on April 25, 2007. Applicant
waived the 15 day notice requirement. The Government introduced two exhibits and Applicant
introduced nine exhibits at the hearing. All offered exhibits were accepted into evidence. The
government offered twelve official government documents for administrative notice. Three (Exhs.
V, VI, and XII) were excluded from consideration and the rest were admitted. Applicant testified on
her own behalf. The transcript was received on May 4, 2007. 
The record was left open at the request of Applicant for 30 days for receipt of additional
evidence. Applicant submitted additional evidence on in the form of four documents which were
admitted without objection into the record. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted all allegations relating to her family under Foreign Influence-Guideline
B with explanatory information. Those admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After
a complete review of the evidence in the record and upon due consideration of the record the
following additional findings of fact are made:
Applicant is a 38-year-old employee of a major defense contractor working as an engineer
since 1993. She was born in Taiwan, came to the U.S. to attend high school, and lived with an uncle
during her high school years. She graduated with an engineering degree from a major U.S.
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engineering school in 1992 when she also became a naturalized U.S. citizen.
Applicant was married in 1994 to another student she met at the university they attended. She
had been hired after her graduation by the same defense contractor where her husband where her
husband worked. Both of them work on the same program which involves one of many subsystems
of a major weapons system of the Navy. Her annual salary is $80,000 and she and her husband have
a combined annual income of $190,000. Each has a 401(k) valued at over $100,000. They own their
own home with no mortgage valued at approximately $350,000. All their assets are in the U.S. They
have little or no cultural interest in or contact with Taiwanese or Chinese culture or society.
Applicant traveled to Taiwan with her fiance who became her husband on three occasions.
The first was in 1993 before she was employed and in 1997, and 2001 after her employment. The
trips were on family matters. The company was advised of the two trips taken during her
employment. She has held a security clearance since 1994 with no security violations. 
Applicant’s parents and a brother are citizens of Taiwan. Her father retired from an electric
power company where he worked as an accountant. He received a lump sum on retirement and gets
nothing further from the company. Her mother has never worked except as a homemaker. Her
parents visited in the U.S. with Applicant and her husband for several weeks each year during the
first years of their marriage. Since 2002 they have spent half of each year in the U.S. as they were
applying for citizenship. Each has had a green card for the past five years. They have lived with
Applicant and her husband in the U.S. permanently for the past year as they prepare to take the
examination for citizenship (Exhs. I and J). Her parents own a condo in Taiwan where they lived and
also own a house in the U.S. which they purchased to provide rental income for Applicant while she
was in school. The property is still rented.
Applicant’s brother lives in Taiwan and works as a lineman for a telephone company which
has been privatized. The government still holds a minority interest in the company with most of the
stock held by commercial financial entities (Exh. J 1-3). He served a mandatory two year military
duty as required by the Taiwan government. He visited Applicant and her husband in the U.S. once
in 2006 for a sight-seeing trip. She talks to him only once a year and exchanges cards on significant
days. He is married with a young son. As soon as Applicant’s parents-in-law become citizens they
intend to sponsor the family to come to the U.S. (Tr. 167). 
Applicant is highly regarded for her work in her job by her supervisors and colleagues who
submitted statements on her behalf. She has an excellent reputation for honesty, work ethic and her
technical engineering skills are superb. She carefully adheres to the rules of the company for all
matters and knows the security rules and requirements. She receives annual security briefings and
knows that any possible breach would require immediate reporting to security officers (Exhs. A-G).
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at 527
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An evaluation of whether the applicant meets the security guidelines includes consideration of the
following factors: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and
maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence
of rehabilitation and other behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential
for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Directive, ¶ E2.2.1. Security clearances are granted only when “it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to do so.” Executive Order No. 10865 § 2. See Executive Order No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
Initially, the Government must establish, by something less than a preponderance of the
evidence, that conditions exist in the personal or professional history of the applicant which
disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information.
See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. The applicant then bears the burden of demonstrating that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the applicant’s clearance. “Any doubt as to
whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved
in favor of the national security.” Directive, ¶ E2.2.2. “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should
err, if they must, on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. See Executive Order No. 12968 §
3.1(b).
“A security risk may exist when an individual’s immediate family and other persons to whom
he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States
or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that
could result in the compromise of classified information.” Directive, ¶ E2.A2.1.1. Having
immediate family members who are citizens of, and residing in a foreign country, may raise a
disqualifying security concern. Directive, ¶ E2.A2.1.2.1.
CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors and conditions above, I conclude the following with respect to all allegations set
forth in the SOR: 
Conditions under Foreign Influence Guideline B that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying include an immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close
ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident in a foreign country. (E2.A2.1.2.1.) Based
on the evidence of record, including Applicant’s admissions, the Government established reasons
to raise security concerns because of foreign influence. Having established such reasons, the
Applicant had the burden to establish security suitability through evidence which refutes, mitigates,
or extenuates the disqualification and demonstrates that it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant a security clearance. ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).
Possible mitigating conditions that might be applicable to allegations relating to her family
are a determination that the individuals in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position
to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty
to the persons involved and the U.S.(E2.A2.1.3.1.), and contacts and correspondence with foreign
citizens are casual and infrequent. (E2.A2.1.3.3.) By definition parents and siblings are persons with
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close ties of affection. Thus, the specific mitigating conditions are not applicable.
In all adjudications the protection of our national security is of paramount concern. Persons
who have access to classified information have an overriding responsibility for the security of the
nation. The objective of the security clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment
of a person’s trustworthiness and fitness for access to classified information. The “whole person”
concept recognizes that we should view a person by the totality of their acts and omissions. Each
case must be judged on its own merits taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and
applying sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis.
Applicant is a person of substance and veracity who has a responsible position of trust and
is doing and has done a good job for her company for 13 years. She provided sincere and credible
testimony as to her family, motivations, and loyalty to the U.S. She is totally integrated into U.S.
culture, and divorced from any cultural contact with her country of origin. The status of her parents
in becoming U.S. citizens certainly lessens any likelihood of coercion or pressure from them
adversely affecting security interests. Her brother has a low level job with a privatized company in
Taiwan. She communicates with him infrequently and he may become a U.S. citizen if sponsorship
by their parents becomes possible. 
While there is evidence that Taiwan has engaged in economic and military espionage, and
that the PRC may use it as a source of information as stated in official documents (Exhs. IV, and XI),
the U.S. consistently has supported Taiwan for its democratically elected government (Exh. II).
Applicant shows no loyalty to Taiwan or the PRC and is a competent professional who has
demonstrated that she knows how to deal with any pressures that might be brought against her by
an agent of a foreign government.
After considering all the evidence in its totality and as an integrated whole to focus on the
whole person of Applicant, I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
clearance to Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are hereby
rendered as follows:
Paragraph l Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: For Applicant
DECISION
After full consideration of all the facts and documents presented by the record in this case,
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it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance is granted. 
Charles D. Ablard 
Administrative Judge