KEYWORD: Security Violations; Personal Conduct; Criminal Conduct
DIGEST: Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a defense contractor. Applicant had a successful
Naval career until 1988, when his dereliction of duty and altering of a ship’s log led to his
nonjudicial punishment (NJP). Classified documents were utilized as part of Applicant’s NJP.
Applicant took a copy of the classified documents home in 1989, and stored them in his personal
residence until 2001, when he revealed his possession of the documents in an interview in
conjunction with a government polygraph. Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns based
on his security violations, personal conduct, and criminal conduct. Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 05-14135.h1
DATE: 06/26/2007
DATE:  June 26, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 05-14135
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EDWARD W. LOUGHRAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Richard Stevens, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Joyce E. Peters, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
2
Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a defense contractor. Applicant had a successful
Naval career until 1988, when his dereliction of duty and altering of a ship’s log led to his
nonjudicial punishment (NJP). Classified documents were utilized as part of Applicant’s NJP.
Applicant took a copy of the classified documents home in 1989, and stored them in his personal
residence until 2001, when he revealed his possession of the documents in an interview in
conjunction with a government polygraph. Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns based
on his security violations, personal conduct, and criminal conduct. Clearance is denied.
Pursuant to Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as1
amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program  (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended (Directive).
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant. On March 21, 2006, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons  (SOR)1
detailing the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline K (Security Violations),
Guideline E (Personal Conduct), and Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) of the Directive. Applicant
answered the SOR in writing on June 1, 2006, and elected to have a hearing before an administrative
judge. The case was assigned to me on March 28, 2007. A Notice of Hearing was issued on April
4, 2007, scheduling the hearing for  May 3, 2007. The hearing was conducted as scheduled to
consider whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security
clearance for Applicant. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on May 16, 2007.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
The Government offered six exhibits that were marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1
through 6, and admitted without objections. The list of Government exhibits was marked as Hearing
Exhibit (HE) I. 
Department Counsel requested administrative notice be taken of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (HE II); 18
U.S.C. § 793 (HE III); and provisions of Department of Defense Directive 5220.22-M (HE IV).
There was no objection and administrative notice is taken of HE II to IV.
Applicant testified and offered two exhibits that were marked Applicant Exhibits (AE) A and
B, and admitted without objections.
The Government made a verbal motion to amend the Statement of Reasons by deleting the
word and figures “May 7, 2001” on the second line of SOR ¶ 1.a, and substituting “July 6, 2001.”
There was no objection, and the motion was granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant’s admissions to the allegations in the SOR are incorporated herein. In addition,
after a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following
findings of fact.
Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He is married with two adult
stepchildren. Applicant was commissioned in the United States Navy upon graduation from a service
academy. After commissioning, he was selected to attend a prestigious university, and obtained a
Tr. at 20-22; GE 1; AE A.2
Tr. at 25-26, 66; Applicant’s response to SOR at 3; AE A.3
GE 3, 4.4
GE 3 at 1.5
4
Master of Science degree. Applicant was promoted several times in the Navy. In 1988, he was a
Lieutenant Commander (0-4).  2
Applicant was the Engineer Officer for a U.S. Navy nuclear submarine from 1986 to 1988.
As the Engineer Officer, Applicant was responsible for all aspects of the operation of the nuclear
reactor and the engineering plant.  3
On October 23, 1988, the submarine was preparing to get underway. Applicant received a
telephone call from the Engineering Duty Officer who discovered a problem with a valve in the
engineering plant. Navy records state that a problem of this magnitude warranted the immediate
relief of the Engineering Duty Officer and the Engineering Duty Petty Officer who were involved
in the incident, and to immediately conduct a formal critique to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the incident. Applicant did not direct that the above actions be taken. Applicant came
aboard the submarine later that evening. He reviewed the engineering log the next day. The log from
the day before read, “valve found open.” Applicant changed the log to read, “valve found one turn
open.” The problem was not brought to the attention of the Executive Officer or the Commanding
Officer until a senior enlisted person in the engineering department reported to the Executive Officer
on November 4, 1988, that a significant problem had occurred.  4
As a result of his actions in October 1988, Applicant received nonjudicial punishment (NJP)
on February 2, 1989, and was found to have committed violations of Article 92 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (UCMJ), dereliction in the performance of his duties, and Article 134 of the
UCMJ, willfully and unlawfully altering a public record, as follows:
That on or about 23 October 1988, he willfully failed to take appropriate corrective
action upon learning of a significant problem in the engineering plant and that he
willfully failed to report this problem.
That on 24 October 1988 he willfully and unlawfully modified a 23 October 1988
entry in the Engineering Log.5
Applicant was awarded a punitive letter of admonition. The punitive letter of admonition was issued
on February 7, 1989, and included:
The nature of your violations of the UCMJ are indicative of your profound failure to
be forthright and honest in the performance of your duties. The tenets of mature
leadership, unquestionable integrity, and sound moral character are the very
fundamentals upon which the Navy’s Officer Corps is founded. Your actions clearly
diminished the command climate within your ship and the respect which an officer
GE 3.6
Id.7
GE 4 at 6.8
Id. at 5.9
Id. at 4.10
5
must instill in his subordinates. I cannot tolerate such conduct by a commissioned
officer and will not tolerate your specific conduct in this matter.6
Applicant appealed his NJP on February 21, 1989. The appeal was denied. Applicant’s appeal
was classified as “CONFIDENTIAL,” and not included in the report of nonjudicial punishment, in
order to keep the report unclassified.7
Applicant’s Commanding Officer submitted a request to the Naval Military Personnel
Command on February 6, 1989, that Applicant be detached for cause from the submarine based upon
misconduct and unsatisfactory performance resulting from the events that led to his NJP. The
Commanding Officer wrote:
[Applicant] was derelict in the performance of his duties as Engineer Officer in
[submarine name] from 23 October 1988 through 4 November 1988 when he
willfully failed to report a significant problem which occurred in the engineering
plant on 23 October 1988 to the Executive Officer or Commanding Officer.
[Applicant] was provided sufficient information to determine that a significant
problem had occurred on 23 October 1988 and 24 October 1988. The problem was
not brought to the attention of the Executive Officer or Commanding Officer until
a senior enlisted person in the engineering department reported to the Executive
Officer on 4 November 1988 that a significant problem had occurred.8
Applicant provided a statement in response to the request for detachment for cause on
February 15, 1989, writing:
The statements contained in this letter are patently false. From the day I relieved until
the day I was relieved as Engineering Officer, [submarine name], I was 100 per cent
devoted to carrying out my duties and responsibilities as Engineer and to upholding
the highest tenets of the Naval Nuclear Power program. I did nothing to violate those
tenets or abdicate those responsibilities.9
Applicant’s Commanding Officer forwarded an endorsement to Applicant’s statement in
response to the request for detachment for cause on February 28, 1989, writing, “not concurring with
[Applicant’s] statement. The statements in the basic letter are accurate.”10
Applicant submitted a statement on May 3, 1989, concerning the punitive letter of
admonition he received from his NJP. He wrote:
GE 3.11
GE 4 at 1.12
Tr. at 30, 45, 121.13
GE 1 at 1; GE 2 at 1. Applicant’s security clearance application of March 11, 2002, states that he moved to14
his current address in May 1989. I find the personnel security questionnaire of August 9, 1990, which lists the above
information to be more accurate. It was closer to the move. Additionally, while in the Navy, Applicant worked in a
different geographic location than after he resigned his commission. 
GE 2 at 3. A small part of the document was cut off when photocopied, as indicated by the words in brackets.15
6
I made absolutely no effort to cover up, conceal, or lessen the severity of any
problems within the engineering plant while serving as Engineer Officer, [submarine
name]. I did not foster an attitude or condone a climate which would tolerate, for a
single instant, such actions. The implication that as Engineer Officer, responsible
for upholding the highest tenets of integrity and leadership in the nuclear navy, I
willfully disregarded those principles for one day out of an outstanding career as a
safe, reliable, aggressive submariner and naval nuclear engineer is implicitly
contradictory and unfathomable. In a manner entirely uncharacteristic of someone
attempting to withhold information or deny culpability I zealously pursued the
prosecution of fact and the notification of others concerning the problem which
ultimately resulted in [letter of admonition].
[Submarine name]’s Commanding Officer felt the allegations raised by the problem
were groundless. He found no basis for questioning my integrity or for charging
dereliction, much less willful dereliction, following his in-depth scrutinization of the
key events.11
The detachment for cause request was approved by the Naval Military Personnel Command
on October 13, 1989.  12
Applicant resigned his commission in the Navy in October 1989. He has worked for the same
defense contractor since he left the Navy, and has held a security clearance since then. Applicant
received security training on an annual basis while in the Navy. He also received annual security
training from his current employer.  Applicant moved in October 1989, to the same geographic area13
in which he currently lives and works. He moved to his current residence in about May 1990.14
Applicant submitted a personnel security questionnaire on August 9, 1990. Question 17.a
asked:
Have you ever been arrested, charged, cited, or held by Federal, state, or local law
enforcement or juvenile authorities [section missing] whether the citation was
dropped or dismissed, or you were found not guilty? (Include all courts-martial or
non-judicia[l] [section missing] while in military service. You may exclude minor
traffic violations for which a fine of $100 or less was imp[osed] [section missing].15
Id. This information is not considered for disqualifying purposes, but may be considered in assessing16
Applicant’s credibility, when analyzing the “whole person,” and the potential application of mitigating conditions.
GE 5.17
7
Applicant answered “No” to this question.  16
In 2001, Applicant was investigated for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI). The investigation process involved polygraphs and interviews in conjunction with the
polygraph. Applicant was interviewed on May 7, 2001. A signed statement was not taken. The report
of the security representative/polygrapher who interviewed Applicant, states:
SUBJECT was relieved for cause while serving in the Navy. HE was serving aboard
the [submarine name] in 1989 when HE was the Engineer of the boat. HIS crew was
going through the procedures of lighting off the power plant when they left a valve
open instead of closing it. No damage was done but because two other boat crews
had done the same thing after a message had been sent cautioning crews to be careful
the Navy took punitive action against the Engineer of the Boat, SUBJECT. HE was
not aboard the boat when the incident occurred, but as HE was Chief Engineer HE
received non-judicial punishment of a Letter of Reprimand and relieved of HIS
position. HE resigned his commission shortly thereafter. HE denied any other
punitive action taken against HIM. (capitals in original)17
Applicant had another interview on July 5, 2001. The Report of Interview (ROI) from May
7, 2001, was reviewed with Applicant, and he verified it as being accurate and correct. There was
no signed statement on this occasion either. The ROI of the July 5, 2001 interview states:
SUBJECT received non-judicial punishment and was relieved of HIS position in
October 1989, after one of HIS crewmembers failed to properly secure a high-pressure
valve that was part of the nuclear power plant. SUBJECT advised HE was punished
because HE was in charge of the crewmember that failed to follow the standard
operating procedure. SUBJECT advised that during his non-judicial punishment
hearing HE took several notes and made several photocopies of the procedures for
operating a naval nuclear power plant. SUBJECT advised that the information that
was contained in HIS notes and photocopies was classified. SUBJECT advised that
since his hand written notes did not go through a classification officer, HE believes
the classification of the notes and photocopies are “CONFIDENTIAL”.  SUBJECT
advised that the notes and photocopies that HE had during the hearing measured
approximately one inch thick.  SUBJECT took the documents to HIS personal
residence subsequent to HIS non-judicial punishment hearing and currently has them
stored in a box in HIS closet. SUBJECT advised that he was disgruntle[d] with the
U.S. Navy, for punishing HIM for a mistake that HE personally did not make.
SUBJECT advised that HE resigned HIS commission with the U.S. Navy after they
relieved HIM of HIS command. SUBJECT advised that HE kept the classified
documents at HIS residence because HE had a personal vendetta against the U.S.
Navy. SUBJECT denied providing the classified documentation to anyone or
compromising the information in any fashion. SUBJECT denied committing any acts
Id.18
Tr. at 54-56, 111; Applicant’s response to SOR.19
Tr. at 111.20
GE 5.21
GE 6.22
Applicant’s response to SOR at 2-3.23
8
to hurt the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Government . . .  SUBJECT advised at the end of the
interview, HE knew it was a violation of the law to have classified information at HIS
residence. (capitals in original)18
On about July 6, 2001, Special Agents of the FBI and the Naval Criminal Investigative
Service (NCIS) went to Applicant’s house. Applicant granted them permission to search and they
seized the documents that Applicant discussed with the interviewer the day before.  There was no19
documentary evidence presented from the FBI, NCIS, or other government agency, that the
documents seized from Applicant’s house were classified. Applicant testified that he did not receive
anything from any agency informing him whether the documents contained classified information.20
On September 30, 2002, a Notification of Denial of Access to Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) was issued against Applicant based upon the information contained in the ROI
of July 5, 2001.  On December 13, 2002, the decision to deny SCI access became final as Applicant21
“chose not to appeal the denial decision.”22
Applicant submitted a response to the Statement of Reasons on June 1, 2006. In his response,
he described the events leading to his NJP:
During routine preparations for starting the ship’s propulsion reactor prior to leaving
port, the onboard engineering duty section made a procedural error that temporarily
rendered one of several reactor control systems ineffective for several minutes - in
short, following a system test, an air system vent valve was left open instead of being
shut. The duty section discovered the error a short time later and corrected it.
According to policies in place at the time, such a procedural error required an
investigation and a report to higher authority. The error was not properly reported to
me, as the Chief Engineer, or the ship’s Commanding Officer. Several days later,
upon learning of the events, I initiated an investigation and upon return to port
informed the ship’s parent squadron engineering staff.
As Chief Engineer I was responsible for every aspect of the operation of the ship’s
nuclear reactor and its engineering plant. As such during the subsequent investigation
I was held and accepted full responsib[ility] for the incident.23
Id. at 3.24
Id. 25
Id. at 1.26
Tr. at 104.27
Tr. at 34, 101; GE 4 at 6.28
Tr. at 33.29
9
In his response to the SOR, Applicant discussed the interview with the polygrapher in July
2001, and the search of his residence the following day. He stated that in 1989, the squadron staff
provided him with “what was referred to as [his] copy of the investigating officer’s report.”  He24
wrote that during his discussion with the polygrapher:
I commented that I probably had a copy of the investigating officer’s report. At this
point I also realized and volunteered that the procedural steps outlined in the report
concerning the incident might have been classified “confidential - formerly restricted
data” although I did not recall exactly what was in the copy of the report the Navy
had given me. In general, however, it is my recollection now that information
concerning nearly all aspects of operating a naval nuclear power plant would have
been classified or restricted in 1989. The following day, an agent from the FBI and
an agent from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, visited my home, where we
searched through the file boxes and located the investigative report sealed in the same
box it had been for the last eleven or twelve years. I then voluntarily gave the agents
my copy of the incident report.25
Applicant also wrote in his response to the SOR:
[D]uring each security clearance investigation and each periodic update to my TOP
SECRET security clearance, I have fully disclosed the reactor incident, the non-
judicial punishment I received in 1989 from the Navy resulting from the incident, and
the command climate and events surrounding the incident.26
Applicant repeated the above in his testimony at his hearing.  As addressed above, this was not a27
true statement as Applicant did not report the NJP on his 1990 personnel security questionnaire.
Applicant provided contradictory or inaccurate explanations about the incidents at his
hearing. He testified that he was contacted by the Executive Officer three to four days after he
changed the log, vice the approximately 11 days indicated in the Navy records.  28
Applicant testified he received the telephone call about “what I thought at the time was a
simple valve alignment.”  He testified that when he read the log the next day, he noted an entry that29
indicated a valve had been open. He remembered the telephone call that stated a valve had been
Tr. at 34.30
Tr. at 65.31
Tr. at 101.32
Tr. at 35.33
Tr. at 39, 52-56, 75, 87, 94-95, 109.34
Tr. at 40, 74, 86.35
10
partially open, so he changed the log.  Applicant was later asked by Department Counsel as it relates30
to the safety of the plant, if there was a distinction between a valve on a high pressure system being
one turn open or fully open, to which Applicant responded, “[p]robably not on a large ship.”31
Applicant testified that when he found out the truth about the valve, he realized that a significant
event had occurred. Applicant later testified that the information he initially received from the duty
officer was not sufficient to initiate an investigation.  He testified that after he conducted his32
investigation, he recommended to the Commanding Officer that the incident be reported, but the CO
did not report it, which Applicant felt was improper:
I felt that the guidelines at the time clearly said that this incident should be reported
to higher authority. That’s part of how the Navy nuclear program operates. These sort
of incidents, no matter how small, get reported. They get aggregated and become
lessons learned for the entire fleet. That’s how the navy nuclear program operates;
by self reporting.33
Applicant never fully explained if as he first testified, that from a safety standpoint, there was
no distinction between a valve one turn open and fully open, why the partially open valve did not
constitute “a significant event,” which would have triggered an investigation. He also did not
adequately address why it was appropriate for him to change a log entry made by another officer.
Applicant denied having a “vendetta” against the Navy, and he denied telling the polygrapher
that he did. He denied telling the polygrapher that he was storing classified documents. He denied
taking any notes during his NJP. He stated there were no notes among the files that were seized. He
testified he did not deliberately transport and store classified information at his residence.34
Applicant testified that immediately prior or right after the NJP, he received a copy of a series
of documents that were used at his hearing. Although the response to the SOR clearly states it was
a copy of the investigating officer’s report, Applicant testified that he did not remember exactly what
documentation he received, or what was seized in July 2001.  35
In the response to the SOR, Applicant stated that it was his recollection that information
concerning nearly all aspects of operating a naval nuclear power plant would have been classified
or restricted in 1989. At the hearing, he was asked if just about everything relating to the
maintenance and operation of a nuclear power submarine is classified, to which he responded, “I
Tr. at 77.36
Tr. at 78.37
Tr. at 80.38
Tr. at 82.39
This information is not considered for disqualifying purposes, but may be considered in assessing Applicant’s40
credibility, when analyzing the “whole person,” and the potential application of mitigating conditions.
Tr. at 29; AE A.41
AE B.42
Tr. at 117-118, 122, 127, 144-145.43
11
don’t know if that is a fact or not.”  He was asked if the technical manuals and procedure manuals36
for the nuclear reactor had at least a confidential classification, to which he responded, “I don’t know
exactly.”  He eventually admitted they were “probably” confidential.  He further testified:37 38
I have no reason to believe what I was provided at the time [w]as classified. It was
not described as classified. It was not marked as classified. I didn’t even know to this
day whether it was classified or not.39
After considering all the evidence, I find that Applicant did have classified documents in his
possession from about February 1989 to July 2001. I further find that Applicant knew the documents
were classified when he first bought them to his residence. I find there was no disclosure or
compromise of the classified documents. I also find that Applicant transported the classified
documents when he moved in October 1989, and again when he moved in May 1990.
I find Applicant intentionally falsified his personnel security questionnaire in 1990, when he
failed to list his NJP. I find Applicant misrepresented or minimized his actions aboard the submarine
when he was questioned by the polygraphers in May and July 2001, in his response to the SOR, and
at his hearing. I further find that Applicant provided false testimony at his hearing when he denied
intentionally taking home and storing classified documents.  40
Prior to the incidents leading to his NJP, Applicant’s Navy record was superb. In addition
to his outstanding fitness reports, Applicant was awarded two Navy Achievement Medals and three
Navy Commendation Medals. His Commanding Officer recommended him for assignment as
Executive Officer and eventual command of a submarine, and for accelerated promotion to
Commander.  His performance evaluations since he joined his current company in 1989, have also41
been excellent.  A supervisor from his company testified that Applicant is an excellent manager,42
extremely technically competent, with very good judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. He stated
Applicant complies with all internal corporate regulations and security regulations, and recommends
Applicant maintain his security clearance. An executive with his company testified Applicant is
reliable with good judgment. Applicant has not had any security incidents involving his employer.43
Neither of Applicant’s character witnesses had complete knowledge of the events leading to
Applicant’s NJP, or of his security infractions.
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).44
Id. at 527.45
Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960). 46
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).47
Id.; Directive, ¶ E2.2.2.48
Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.49
12
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  As Commander in Chief, the President has44
“the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national security and to determine
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to45
grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to do so.”  An applicant has the ultimate burden of46
demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his or her
security clearance. The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations
should err, if they must, on the side of denials.  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant47
should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such
sensitive information.  The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a48
determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the applicant has not
met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a
clearance.  49
The Directive sets forth potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions
(MC) under each guideline. Additionally, each security clearance decision must be a fair and
impartial commonsense decision based on the relevant and material facts and circumstances, the
whole-person concept, along with the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3 and ¶ E2.2.1 of the
Directive.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those
which would mitigate security concerns, pertaining to the adjudicative guidelines are set forth and
discussed in the conclusions section below.
CONCLUSIONS
I have carefully considered all the facts in evidence and the legal standards discussed above.
I reach the following conclusions regarding the allegations in the SOR.
Guideline K: Security Violations
ISCR Case No. 03-26888 (App. Bd. Oct. 5, 2006).50
ISCR Case No. 97-0435 at 5 (App. Bd. July 14, 1998).51
13
Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual’s trustworthiness,
willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.
Based on all the evidence, I find Security Violations Disqualifying Condition (SV DC)
E2.A11.1.2.2 (Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence) applies. Applicant
brought classified documents to his residence in 1989, without authorization, and maintained them
until July 2001.
Security violations are one of the strongest possible reasons for denying or revoking access
to classified information, as they raise very serious questions about an applicant's suitability for
access to classified information. Once it is established that Applicant has committed a security
violation, he has a very heavy burden of demonstrating that he should be entrusted with classified
information. Because security violations strike at the very heart of the industrial security program,
an Administrative Judge must give any claims of reform and rehabilitation strict scrutiny. In many
security clearance cases, applicants are denied a clearance for having an indicator of a risk that they
might commit a security violation (e.g., alcohol abuse, delinquent debts or drug use). Security
violation cases reveal more than simply an indicator of risk.  The frequency and duration of the50
security violations are also aggravating factors.51
The Security Violations Mitigating Conditions (SV MC) that could mitigate security
concerns include actions that: SV MC E2.A11.1.3.1 (Were inadvertent); SV MC E2.A11.1.3.2 (Were
isolated or infrequent); SV MC E2.A11.1.3.3 (Were due to improper or inadequate training); and
SV MC E2.A11.1.3.4 (Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security
responsibilities). 
Applicant intentionally transported and maintained classified documents without
authorization. SV MC E2.A11.1.3.1 does not apply. Applicant transported the classified documents
to his residence in about February 1989. He transported them again when he moved in October 1989,
and again when he moved in May 1990. He kept them at his current residence until they were seized
in July 2001. Because he transported them several times and kept them for more than twelve years,
I cannot give Applicant the total benefit of SV MC E2.A11.1.3.2. There was no evidence of
improper or inadequate training. SV MC E2.A11.1.3.3 does not apply.
Applicant has not been involved in any security incidents with his employer. They believe
he possesses a positive attitude towards the discharge of his security responsibilities. SV MC
E2.A11.1.3.4 partially applies. 
Guideline E: Personal Conduct
Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations  could indicate that the person may
not properly safeguard classified information.
14
I have considered the Personal Conduct Disqualifying Conditions (PC DC), including PC DC
E2.A5.1.2.1 (Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers,
neighbors, and other acquaintances), PC DC E2.A5.1.2.4 (Personal conduct or concealment of
information that increases an individual’s vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress, such
as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal, professional, or
community standing or render the person susceptible to blackmail), and PC DC E2.A5.1.2.5 (A
pattern of dishonesty or rules violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement
made between the individual and the agency). I conclude the above disqualifying conditions apply
to the incidents which led to Applicant’s NJP, and to his security violations.
I have considered all the Personal Conduct Mitigating Conditions (PC MC), especially PC
MC E2.A5.1.3.5 (The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate
vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress). The passage of time has lessened Applicant’s
vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress. I also find Applicant significantly reduced his
vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress when he informed the polygrapher that he possessed
classified material, and it was seized the next day. PC MC E2.A5.1.3.5 is established.
Guideline J: Criminal Conduct
A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about an applicant’s judgment,
reliability, and trustworthiness.
Applicant transported classified documents to his residence without authorization in 1989.
He moved them later in 1989, and again in 1990. He kept them at his residence until federal agents
seized them in July 2001. Applicant’s actions constitute a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 793(f):
Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, note, or information,
relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negligence permits the same to be
removed from its proper place of custody . . . , or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or
destroyed, or (2) having knowledge that the same has been illegally removed from
its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of its trust, or lost, or
stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, and fails to make prompt report of such loss, theft,
abstraction, or destruction to his superior officer- - - Shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
Applicant was a military officer in 1989, and subject to the UCMJ, when he transported the
classified materials without authorization. I find his actions regarding the classified materials also
constituted a violation of Article 133 of the UCMJ, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.
I am not satisfied that Applicant violated 18 U.S.C. § 641, which criminalizes embezzlement
and theft of U.S. Government property. There is insufficient evidence that Applicant stole the
classified documents, as opposed to simply making a photocopy, or having them handed to him. 
Criminal Conduct Disqualifying Condition (CC DC) E2.A10.1.2.1 (Allegations or
admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged), and CC
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DC E2.A10.1.2.2 (A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses) both apply to Applicant’s
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) and Article 133 of the UCMJ. 
I have considered all the mitigating conditions and especially considered Criminal Conduct
Mitigating Condition (CC MC) E2.A10.1.3.1 (The criminal behavior was not recent), CC MC
E2.A10.1.3.2 (The crime was an isolated incident), and CC MC E2.A10.1.3.6 (There is clear
evidence of successful rehabilitation). The gravamen of 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) is Applicant’s actions
in 1989, when he transported the classified documents. I find CC MC E2.A10.1.3.1 is applicable.
While the crime occurred in 1989, Applicant maintained the fruits of the crime, the classified
documents, without authorization until July 2001. When determining whether Applicant’s criminal
act was an isolated incident, I also considered Applicant’s violations of the UCMJ which led to his
NJP, which are criminal acts. I also considered Applicant’s intentional falsifications to the U.S.
Government, as addressed above. Under these circumstances, I conclude the crime was not an
isolated incident, and there is no clear evidence of successful rehabilitation. CC MC E2.A10.1.3.2
and CC MC E2.A10.1.3.6 do not apply.
Whole Person Analysis
The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in
reaching a determination. In evaluating Applicant’s case, I have considered the adjudicative process
factors listed in the Directive. I have also considered all the evidence, and every finding of fact and
conclusion discussed above. 
Applicant had an outstanding record in the Navy until he committed the misconduct which
led to his nonjudicial punishment. Applicant’s dereliction of duty no longer serves as a major
concern. His altering of the log is a greater concern, as it directly relates to Applicant’s honesty,
judgment, and truthfulness, and is part of a larger pattern. Applicant compounded his lack of
judgment by taking home classified documents, transporting them twice, and storing them until July
2001. I considered the reports of Applicant’s interview by the polygraphers. Since the interviewers
or other authenticating witnesses did not testify, I had to look to the four corners of the documents,
and compare the reports with the other evidence in the case, and with Applicant’s testimony.
Applicant denied the statements in the report that he was disgruntled with the Navy and that he had
a vendetta against the Navy. Having reviewed all the evidence, and particularly Applicant’s own
statements in GE 3 and 4, I am convinced that in 1989, Applicant was disgruntled with the Navy,
and he did not feel he received fair treatment. I believe this was the motivation for his taking home
the classified documents.
Applicant has not been arrested or charged with anything since his 1989 NJP. He has been
as successful in his post-Navy career as he was in the Navy prior to his NJP. He is a well respected
senior level employee of a defense contractor. I take this all into consideration under the whole
person. I also considered that Applicant falsified a security questionnaire in 1990, and provided false
information in his response to the SOR, and in his testimony at his hearing. When all the evidence
is considered, I find Applicant to be a person who is willing to bend or break the rules when he feels
it is in his best interest, be it altering a log, taking home and storing classified materials, submitting
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a falsified security questionnaire, or providing false or misleading statements in response to the SOR
and in his testimony at his hearing.
I have weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions and evaluated all the evidence in
the context of the whole person. Applicant committed a twelve-year-long security violation. Having
committed a security violation, Applicant has a very heavy burden of demonstrating that he should
be entrusted with classified information. I am required to give any claims of reform and
rehabilitation strict scrutiny. I conclude Applicant has established several mitigating conditions, but
they were insufficient to overcome the overriding security concerns. Applicant has not mitigated the
security concerns based on his security violations, personal conduct, and criminal conduct.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1.  Guideline K: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2.  Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2.  Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance
is denied.
Edward W. Loughran
Administrative Judge