KEYWORD: Personal Conduct; Drugs
DIGEST: Applicant falsified his 2003 security clearance application by failing to disclose a 2001
denial of eligibility for access to sensitive compartment information. He failed to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate this falsification at the hearing. Clearance is denied. 
CASENO: 06-01697.h1
DATE: 06/30/2007
DATE: June 30, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-01697
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARC E. CURRY
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Francisco Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Tr. 48.1
Exhibit G, Reference Letter of Client, dated April 13, 2007.2
Exhibit H, Supervisor’s Reference Letter, dated April 13, 2007.3
NSA Clearance Decision Statement, dated April 25, 2001,as included in Administrative Records at 3. 4
2
Applicant falsified his 2003 security clearance application by failing to disclose a 2001 denial
of eligibility for access to sensitive compartment information. He failed to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate this falsification at the hearing. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 24, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued Applicant
a statement of reasons (SOR) explaining why it was not clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue a security clearance. This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, dated
February 20, 1960, as amended, and DoD Directive 5220.6, dated January 2, 1992, as amended.
Applicant answered the SOR on April 18, 2006. He admitted the allegations in Paragraph 2, denied
those in Paragraph 1, and requested a hearing.
The case was assigned to me on March 9, 2007 after having previously been assigned to
another administrative judge. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on March 30, 2007, scheduling it for
April 24, 2007. During the hearing, I received eight government exhibits,  the testimony of a
government witness, 14 Applicant exhibits, and Applicant’s testimony. DOHA received the
transcript on May 2, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The SOR admissions are incorporated into the findings of fact. In addition, I make the
following findings of fact.
Applicant is a 28-year-old married man with a three-month-old child. He earned a bachelor
of science degree in computer engineering in December 2002, and works as an information
technology consultant.  According to one of his clients, he is highly reliable, effective, and1
trustworthy.  His supervisor is similarly impressed with his job performance.2 3
Applicant used marijuana approximately 20 to 25 times between high school and sophomore
years of college, from May 1998 to December 2000.  In the spring of 2000, he applied for a summer4
internship with a company that required him to obtain a secret clearance and eligibility for access
Exhibit 1, Security Clearance Application, executed May11, 2000.5
Id. at 7.6
Personnel Security Policy Advisory, signed by Applicant May 11, 2000, as included in Exhibit 3, at 5.7
Exhibit 4, Applicant’s Appeal of federal agency’s decision to deny him eligibility for access to SCI, undated,8
at 1.
See Exhibit 4, supra.9
See note 3, supra.10
Answer, dated April 18, 2000 at 1.11
Exhibit 2, DoD Letter of Consent, with Clearance Date of December 15, 2000.12
3
to sensitive compartmented information (SCI.).  This was the first time he had ever applied for a5
security clearance.
On May 11, 2000, he completed the security clearance application, fully disclosing his past
marijuana use.  Upon being hired, he received a personnel security policy advisory memo explaining6
the criteria for maintaining a security clearance. He signed it, certifying that he understood the policy,
and the consequences of failure to abide by it.7
Before beginning the internship, Applicant was required to pass a drug test. In anticipation
of the drug screening process, he had stopped using marijuana for three months in advance.8
Subsequently, he passed the drug test, but immediately resumed using marijuana after beginning the
internship. He used it for its entire duration.9
Shortly after beginning the internship, the National Security Agency (NSA) began
investigating his eligibility for access to SCI. On August 11, 2000, an NSA investigative agent
interviewed him.  Applicant elaborated on his past marijuana use. Also, he expressed an intention10
to continue using it if he did not get the SCI clearance.11
During the time NSA was investigating Applicant for an SCI clearance, the Defense Security
Service (DSS) was concurrently investigating the issue of Applicant’s secret clearance eligibility.
Applicant was granted an interim secret clearance in December 2000, pending the completion of a
background investigation.  At this time, the NSA’s decision regarding Applicant’s eligibility for12
access to SCI was still pending. Applicant was unaware that two DoD agencies were conducting
separate investigations.
When DSS granted Applicant the interim secret clearance, he had completed the summer
internship, and was scheduled to return to the employer the following summer. On April 25, 2001,
Exhibit 3, Letter from NSA to Applicant, regarding Denial of SCI access, dated April 25, 2001.13
Exhibit 414
Exhibit 7 at 3.15
 Exhibit 6, Report of Investigation, dated July 16, 2001, at 2.16
Id. at 3.17
Id.18
Exhibit 5, Letter from NSA to Applicant, Re: Denying Appeal, dated September 21, 2001.19
Id. at 2.20
Id.21
Id.22
Id., Tr. 58, 8323
Tr. 83, 86.24
Tr. 85.25
Exhibit 8 at 3.26
Exhibit 8.27
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NSA denied his access to SCI.  Applicant appealed.  He did not return to work for his employer13 14
that summer, as scheduled.15
While the appeal was pending, on July 16, 2001, a DSS agent, as part of the investigation into
Applicant’s eligibility for a secret-level clearance, canvassed his neighborhood in search of
neighbors to interview.  Applicant saw the investigator, and told him he had already been denied16
a clearance, and that any additional investigation was a waste of time.  Later, he faxed the agent the17
NSA paperwork.18
In September 2001, the NSA issued a final decision denying Applicant’s access to an SCI
clearance.  In April 2002, another DSS agent interviewed Applicant. He told the agent he had never19
been denied a clearance, and that he had never been briefed in regard to a security clearance and
safeguarding classified information.  The agent then confronted him with the NSA report.20 21
According to the agent, Applicant appeared confused.  He asked to terminate the interview until he22
could confirm whether NSA’s denial of access to SCI  was indeed a denial of a clearance that he
would have to list on future security clearance questionnaires.  He never contacted NSA.23 24
For the next year and half, Applicant was employed by a number of companies that did not
require him to have a security clearance.  In December 2003, he was hired by a company that25
required one.  He then completed a security clearance application on December 29, 2003.  He26 27
answered “No” in response to Question 32 (Your Investigation Record - Clearance Actions   To your
knowledge have you ever had a clearance or access authorization denied, suspended, or revoked,
Your Use of Illegal Drugs and Drug Activity - Illegal Use of Drugs Since the age of 16 or in the last 7 years,28
whichever is shorter, have you illegally used any controlled substances . . . or prescription drugs?
Tr. 70.29
Tr. 89.30
Tr. 89.31
Tr. 85.32
Tr. 86.33
Tr. 32.34
Question 31 (Your Investigation Record - Investigations/Clearances Granted Has the United States35
Government ever investigated your background and/or granted you a security clearance? (If you can’t recall the
investigating agency and/or the security clearance received, enter (Y)es and follow instructions in the help text for the
fields on the next screen. If you can’t recall whether you’ve been investigated or cleared, enter (N)o.).
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or have you ever been debarred from government employment? (Note: An administrative downgrade
or termination of a security clearance is not a revocation). He disclosed the college drug use in
response to Question 27.28
At the hearing, Applicant stated that he thought he did not need to list the denial of eligibility
for access to SCI because he was not sure whether it constituted a denial,  and had somehow29
“between [the NSA security office] and the security officer [of his employer]  . . .   become under
the impression”  there was a probationary period in which young college students who were denied30
clearances for using drugs in limited amounts could wait three years and reapply for a clearance
without having to list the original denial.  Also, he testified that he met with the FSO of his new31
employer to confirm the accuracy of his impression.  She told him to enter “no,” and that the32
investigator would flag his response if it created a problem.  33
The FSO testified that she did not recall  any conversation with Applicant about his security
clearance application, and that in her 18 years at the company no employee had ever asked her about
Question 32.34
On the December 2003 SF 86, Applicant was also required, among other things, to disclose
whether the government had ever conducted a background investigation into his security clearance
eligibility.  He did not disclose the NSA investigation.35
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in
the evaluation of security suitability In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline,
they are divided into those that may be considered in deciding whether to deny or revoke an
individual’s eligibility for access to classified information (disqualifying conditions) and those that
may be considered in deciding whether to grant an individual’s eligibility for access to classified
information (mitigating conditions).
See generally, Directive, Sec. 2.3, Sec. 2.5.3, Sec. 3.2, and Sec. 4.2.36
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Because the entire process is a scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person
concept,” all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. Specifically these are: (1) the
nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding circumstances; (2) the frequency and recency
of the conduct; (3) the age of the applicant; (4) the motivation of the applicant, and the extent to
which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the
consequences; (5) the absence or presence of rehabilitation; and (6) the probability that the
circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future.
The following adjudicative guidelines are raised:
Guideline E - Personal Conduct: Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of
candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise
questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information.
Guideline H: Improper or illegal involvement with drugs, raises questions regarding
an individual’s willingness or ability to protect classified information. Drug abuse or
dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Conditions pertaining to these adjudicative guidelines that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying, as well as those which could mitigate security concerns, are set forth and discussed
in the conclusions below.
Since the protection of national security is the paramount consideration, the final decision
in each case must be reached by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance is “clearly
consistent with the national interest.”  In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions36
that are based on the evidence contained in the record.
The Government is responsible for presenting evidence to establish facts in the SOR that
have been controverted. The applicant is responsible for presenting evidence to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by the Government, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision.
CONCLUSIONS
Personal Conduct
When Applicant met with an investigative agent in April 2002, he failed to tell him, when
asked, that he had been denied access to SCI in September 2001. This omission raises the issue of
whether Personal Conduct Disqualifying Condition (PC DC) E2.A5.1.2.3 (Deliberately providing
false or misleading information concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security
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official, competent medical authority, or other official representative in connection with a personnel
security or trustworthiness determination) applies.
When Applicant completed the 2000 SF 86, he was 21 years old, and had never previously
applied for a security clearance application. Also, he was unaware that the government initiated two
separate investigations after he completed the application. Moreover, agents continued to investigate
his eligibility for a secret-level clearance while his appeal of the NSA denial of SCI eligibility was
pending, and after NSA issued a final denial of SCI eligibility in September 2001. Under these
circumstances, his April 2002 statement to the agent that he had never been officially denied a
clearance was based upon a reasonable, but mistaken  misunderstanding of the effect of the 2001
denial of access to SCI, and did not constitute a deliberate falsification.
Conversely, Applicant completed his most recent SF 86 approximately18 months after he
spoke with the agent in 2002. This constituted ample time to resolve any lingering confusion about
the meaning of his denial of SCI access. Nevertheless, Applicant failed to list the denial of access
to SCI in response to Question 32 of the SF 86.
Also, Applicant’s contention that he believed he was under some sort of probationary period
that negated the requirement to list the 2001 denial of SCI access on the SF 86 was not credible. The
NSA documents unequivocally indicate that he was investigated in the summer of 2000, issued an
initial denial in April 2001, and issued a final denial in September 2001 after an appeal. They do not
reference a probationary period. Moreover, he never mentioned anything about a probationary period
when he spoke with an agent in 2002.
Applicant’s assertion that someone from either NSA or his old employer told him of a
probationary period was uncorroborated. Moreover, his assertion that he spoke with the FSO about
this issue was contradicted by the FSO’s testimony.
Applicant falsified the SF 86 by failing to disclose the 2001 denial of SCI access in response
to Question 32. PC DC E2.A5.1.2.2 (The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of
relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement,
or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits
or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary
responsibilities), applies without mitigation.
Drug Involvement
Applicant’s marijuana use triggers the application of Drug Involvement Disqualifying
Condition (DI DC) E2.A8.1.2.1 (Any drug abuse). The significance of Applicant’s marijuana use
is exacerbated by his continued use after gaining a job in May 2000 that required a security clearance
and expressly prohibited illegal drug use.
Applicant was a 21-year-old college student when he began working for the company that
required the security clearance. He has not smoked marijuana since December 2000. In the years he
has been marijuana-free, he has graduated from college, held steady jobs, gotten married, and started
a family. Drug Involvement Mitigating Condition (DI MC) E2.A8.1.3.1 (The drug involvement was
not recent), and DI MC E2.A8.1.3.3 (A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future),
apply. He has mitigated the drug involvement security concern. For the same reasons, any concerns
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his past drug use posed with respect to his personal conduct, as cross-alleged in SOR subparagraph
2.c, are also mitigated.
Whole Person Concept
Applicant’s youth and immaturity when he smoked marijuana, combined with the amount
of time that has elapsed since he last used it, mitigates the drug involvement security concern. Also,
the severity of his failure to disclose his earlier denial of SCI on his SF 86, as required, is offset
somewhat by his disclosure of his marijuana use that triggered the denial. I am unable to conclude,
however, that the security concern has been mitigated. Upon comparing Applicant’s testimony with
the FSO’s testimony, and reviewing the investigative agents’ reports of their respective meetings
with Applicant, I conclude that he is a bright, talented individual who deliberately omitted
information from the SF 86 that he did not want to disclose, and chose to concoct a clever, yet
specious explanation for the omission rather than telling the truth. Clearance is denied.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Paragraph 1 – Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2 - Guideline H: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a through 2.g: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Marc E. Curry
Administrative Judge