KEYWORD:  Foreign Influence; Foreign Preference
DIGEST:  In 1977, Applicant immigrated to the United States on a student visa. He
completed his education in the United States, married, and became a naturalized U.S.
citizen in 1995. Applicant’s ties of affection and/or obligation and contacts with his
elderly parents and six siblings, who are citizen residents of Iran, pose an
unacceptable risk or concern. His favorable information is not sufficient to mitigate
the foreign influence and preference security concerns. Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 06-25912.h1
DATE: 06/30/2007
DATE: June 30, 2007
                                                                        )
                                                                        )
In re:                                                               )
                                                                        )
           -------------------                                  )      ISCR Case No. 06-25912
           SSN: -----------                                    )
                                                                        )
Applicant for Security Clearance                   )
                                                                        )
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ROBERT J. TUIDER
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Francisco Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
In 1977, Applicant immigrated to the United States on a student visa. He
completed his education in the United States, married, and became a naturalized U.S.
citizen in 1995. Applicant’s ties of affection and/or obligation and contacts with his
elderly parents and six siblings, who are citizen residents of Iran, pose an
unacceptable risk or concern. His favorable information is not sufficient to mitigate
the foreign influence and preference security concerns. Clearance is denied.
  See  E xecu t ive  O rd er  1 0 8 6 5 ,  Sa fegua rd ing  C lassi f ied  In fo rm a t ion  W ith in  Indus try  (F eb .  2 0 ,1
1 9 6 0 ,  as  am e n d e d ,  and  m od if ied ,  and  D ep artm ent  o f  D efense  D irec t ive  52 2 0 .6 ,  D e fe n se  In d u str ia l
P erso n n e l  Secu ri ty  C lea ra n ce  R ev iew  P ro g ra m  ( Jan .  2 ,  19 9 2 )  (D irec tive) ,  a s  am end ed ,  m o d ified ,  and
rev ised .  
  Ad d it io na l ly ,  E x h ib its  (E x .)  1  th rough  1 0  (U .S .  D ep t .  o f  S ta te  d ocum ents  co ncern ing  I ran) ,2
were  m arked  fo r  id en t i fica t ion  and  co nsid e red  fo r  ad m inis t ra t ive  no t ice  on ly.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 1, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR), alleging facts that raise security
concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), and Guideline C (Foreign
Preference). The SOR informed Applicant that based on information available to the
Government, DOHA adjudicators could not make a preliminary affirmative finding
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him access to classified
information.  On March 2, 2007, Applicant answered the SOR (Answer), and1
requested a decision based on the record.  On March 23, 2007, the government
requested a hearing pursuant to ¶¶ E3.1.7 of the Additional Procedural Guidance of
Enclosure (3) of DoD Directive 5220.6. 
The case was assigned to me on April 11, 2007. On May 22, 2007, I convened
a hearing at which the government presented five exhibits, marked GE 1 through 5,
to support the SOR.  Applicant testified on his own behalf, and did not present any2
exhibits nor call any witnesses.  DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on May 31,
2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted all of the SOR allegations with explanations. His
admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a thorough review of all
evidence of record, I make the following additional findings of fact: 
Applicant is 55 years old and has been married to his second wife since
December 1997. His second wife is Iranian born and is a U.S citizen.  They have two
U.S. born daughters, ages six and four. He was previously married to his first wife, a
U.S.born citizen, from August 1986 to November 1991.  That marriage ended by
divorce.    
Applicant was born in Iran and immigrated to the U.S. in January 1977 on a
student visa at age 25. He was awarded a bachelor of science degree in computer
science in May 1980 and awarded a master’s degree in mathematics in December
1982. He became a naturalized U. S. citizen in 1995, and received his U. S. passport
in 1995.  
Applicant has worked for his current employer, a federal contractor, as a
computer specialist, since October 1999. He is a first time applicant for a security
clearance and desires a clearance to enhance his upward mobility within his
company. 
  The facts in the next two paragraphs were obtained from U.S. Dept. of State documents concerning Iran3
in Ex. 2 through Ex. 10.
Applicant’s parents are citizen residents of Iran.  His father is 87 years old
and his mother is 79 years old.  Both his parents are in poor health.  His father is a
retired shoemaker and his mother is a housewife.  Applicant has six siblings who are
citizen residents of Iran, and he also has two siblings who reside in the U.S. 
Applicant’s parents-in-law are also citizen residents of Iran.  Applicant has one
brother-in-law living in the U.S., and one brother-in-law and one sister-in-law who
are citizen residents of Iran.  Tr.26.  
Applicant telephones his parents “about once a month.”  If he speaks to his
siblings, it is more likely one or more of them happens to be at his parents home
when he calls.  Tr. 28.  Applicant testified he is close to his family in Iran.  Tr. 28.
Applicant’s wife telephones her parents “once a month” and he is not usually home
when she calls them.  Tr. 26-27.  Applicant testified his wife is close to her parents
and two siblings in Iran. Tr. 27.  
Applicant held an Iranian passport issued to him in June 1976, which expired
in February 2006.  He initially stated that he was holding his Iranian passport with
the intent to renew it should an emergency arise with his parents in Iran.  Answer. He
later testified he was “not sure at this point”when asked if he intended to renew his
Iranian passport.  Tr. 18-19.  He later added that if he received word his parents
became ill, he would have to renew his Iranian passport if he were to travel to see his
parents in Iran.  
Applicant traveled to Iran in March 1996 when he received word his father
was having a pacemaker operation.  Tr. 19.  Applicant testified that given his dual
citizenship status, he must use an Iranian passport.  Tr. 20-21.  None of Applicant’s
family members living in Iran work for the Iranian government.  Tr. 23-24.
Applicant owns a home in the U.S., conducts all his banking in the U.S., and
votes in U.S. elections.  He does not own any real or personal property in Iran.
I take administrative notice of the following facts. The United States has not
had diplomatic relations with Iran since April 7, 1980.  Iran is a theocratic Islamic3
republic in which Shi’a Muslim clergy dominate the key power structures. Iran
engages in clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), sponsors international terrorism, intervenes in the internal
affairs of Iraq, undermines the Middle East peace process, and violates the human
rights of the Iranian people. The United States and its allies are attempting to block
Iran’s goals of obtaining nuclear weapons and other WMD and to counter Iran’s
efforts to destabilize Iraq and other the Middle East countries.  
The United States has designated Iran as the most active state sponsor of
terrorism. The United States is concerned about the possibility that Iran could
transfer WMD to terrorists. Iran supports terrorists who attack Israel and Shiite
militias who pursue sectarian violence in Iraq. Iranian born, naturalized U.S. citizens
are warned to carefully consider the risks of travel to Iran because they are still
considered Iranian citizens by Iranian authorities. Iran does not recognize dual
  D ire c t ive , S ec tio n  6 .3 .  s ta te s,  “E a ch  c le ara nc e  d ec is io n  m ust  b e  a  fa ir  and  im p a rt ia l co m m o n4
sense  d e te rmina t io n  b a se d  upo n  co ns id era t io n  of  a l l  the  re levan t  and  m ate r ia l  in fo rma tio n  and  the
p ert ine n t  cr i ter ia  and  ad jud ica t ion  po l icy in  enc losure  2  .  .  .”
  D ire c t ive , ¶  2 (a ) .  s ta te s,  “ .  .  .  T h e  a d j u d i c a t io n  p ro c ess  is  the  c are fu l  we igh ing  o f a  num b e r o f5
var iab les  known as  the  who le  p erso n  co ncep t .  A va i lab le ,  r e l iab le  in fo rma tio n  ab o ut  the  p erso n ,  pa s t and
presen t,  favorab le  and  unfavorab le ,  shou ld  be  conside red  in  reach ing a  de te rmina tion .  .  .  .”  
  See  D e p a rtm e n t o f  th e  N a v y  v .  E g a n ,  48 4  U .S .  51 8 ,  53 1  (19 8 8 ) .6
  ISC R  C ase  N o .  98 -0 7 6 1  a t  2  (A p p .  B d .  D ec .  27 ,  19 9 9 )  (Su b s ta n t ia l  e v id ence  is  m o re  than  a7
sc in t i l la ,  bu t  less  than  a  p repo nd erance  o f the  ev id ence . ) ;  ISC R  C ase  N o .  02 -1 2 1 9 9  a t  3  ( A p p .  B d .  A p r .
3 ,  20 0 6 )  (S ub stan t ia l  ev idence  is  suc h  re levan t  ev idence  as  a  reaso nab le  m in d  m igh t  accep t  as  ad eq ua te
to  sup p o r t  a  co nc lus io n in  l igh t  o f a l l  the  c o ntra ry ev id e nc e  in  the  re co rd .) ;  D ire c t ive , ¶  E 3 .1 .3 2 .1 .
  E g a n ,  su p ra  n .  6 ,  a t  5 2 8 ,  5 3 1 .8
citizenship. The Iranian government has harassed and detained dual citizens of the
United States and Iran.      
POLICIES
The Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines which must be considered in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. Foremost
are the Disqualifying and Mitigating conditions under each adjudicative guideline
applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. However, the guidelines are
not viewed as inflexible ironclad rules of law. The presence or absence of a
disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative of a conclusion for or
against an Applicant. Each decision must also reflect a fair and impartial common
sense consideration of the factors listed in Section 6.3 of the Directive,  and the4
whole person concept.  Having considered the record evidence as a whole, I conclude5
Guideline B (Foreign Influence), Guideline C (Foreign Preference) are the applicable
relevant adjudicative guidelines.
BURDEN OF PROOF
The purpose of a security clearance decision is to resolve whether it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s eligibility for
access to classified information.  The government has the initial burden of proving6
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. To meet its burden, the government must
establish a prima facie case by substantial evidence.  The responsibility then shifts7
to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the government’s case. Because no
one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant carries the ultimate burden of
persuasion.  8
A person who has access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government based on trust and confidence. The government,
therefore, has a compelling interest to ensure each applicant possesses the requisite
judgment, reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national
interests as his or her own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest”
  See  Id ;  D irec t ive  E nc lo sure  2 ,  ¶  2 (b) .9
  See  IS C R  C a se  N o .  0 3 -0 2 3 8 2  a t  5  (A p p .  B d .  F eb .  1 5 ,  2 0 0 6 ) ;  IS C R  C a se  N o .  9 9 -0 4 2 4  (A p p .1 0
B d . Feb .  8 ,  20 0 1 ) .
standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an applicant’s suitability
for access to classified information in favor of protecting national security.9
The scope of an administrative judge’s decision is limited. Nothing in this
Decision should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or
in part, on any express or implied determination as to Applicant’s allegiance,
loyalty, or patriotism.  Executive Order 10865, § 7. 
CONCLUSIONS
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), the government’s concern is that
“foreign contacts and interest may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties or foreign financial interests, [he or she] may be manipulated or induced to
help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S.
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but
not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target
United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk
of terrorism.” Guideline ¶ 6.
Guideline ¶ 7 indicates conditions that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying in this case, including:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s
obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information;
The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is
not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one
relative lives in a foreign country, and an applicant has contacts with that relative,
this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could
potentially result in the compromise of classified information.  Applicant has10
frequent contacts (at least once a month) and a close relationship with his father,
who is a resident and citizen of Iran. These contacts create a heightened risk of
foreign pressure or attempted exploitation because there is the possibility that
  T he  focus is  no t the  coun try o r  i ts  peop le ,  bu t  i ts  ru le rs  and  the  na tu re  o f the  gove rnmen t they1 1
im p o se .  T h is  ap pro ach  reco gnizes  tha t  i t  m akes  sense  to  trea t  each  co untry in  acco rd ance  with  the  le v e l
o f  sec uri ty  co ncern  o r  th rea t  i t  p re sen ts  to  the  U nited  S ta tes .  
Iranian agents may exploit the opportunity to obtain intelligence, classified, or
economic information about the United States. His connection to his parents, and to
a lesser extent his siblings and in-laws, also create a potential conflict of interest
because his relationships are sufficiently close to raise a security concern about his
desire to help family members or the government of Iran by providing sensitive or
classified information. 
The Government produced substantial evidence raising these two potentially
disqualifying conditions, and the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence
and prove a mitigating condition. As previously indicated, the burden of disproving a
mitigating condition never shifts to the Government.
Three Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions under Guideline ¶ 8 are
potentially applicable to these disqualifying conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will
be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the
interests of the U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense
of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual
can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest; and
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for
foreign influence or exploitation.
After considering the totality of the facts and circumstances in Applicant’s
case, I conclude that none of the mitigating conditions apply. Applicant has feelings
of affection and/or obligation for his parents and six remaining sibling in Iran. The
closeness of the relationship is demonstrated by Applicant’s telephone contacts to
his parents, and his visit to Iran in 1996. 
In deciding whether Applicant’s family members are in a position to be
exploited, I considered Iran’s form of government;  Iran and the United States have11
not had diplomatic relations since 1980; Iran is the most active state sponsor of
terrorism; Iran’s clandestine effort to acquire weapons of mass destruction; Iran’s
aggressive efforts to undermine the Middle East peace process; and its intervention
into the internal affairs of Iraq. I also considered the government of Iran’s dismal
human rights record and serious human rights abuses. The security concerns raised
by Iran are heightened because of Iran’s hostile stance toward the United States, and
its blatant support of terrorism. 
Considering the totality of the circumstances in his case, Applicant did not
establish it is unlikely he will be placed in a position of having to choose between
the interests of his family and the interests of the U.S. His frequent contacts and
close relationship with his parents and siblings could potentially force him to
choose between the United States and Iran. He did not meet his burden of showing
there is little likelihood that his relationship with his family could create a risk for
foreign influence or exploitation.
Guideline ¶ 8(b) partially applies because Applicant has developed a
sufficient relationship and loyalty to the U.S., that he can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. He has lived in the United
States since he was 25 years old. He was educated in the United States, and became
a U.S. citizen in 1995. His wife and two U.S. born children are citizen residents of
the United States. All of his financial investments and business are in the United
States. His contacts and linkage to the United States are greater than his linkage to
Iran. Although this mitigating condition is partially applicable, these facts are
insufficient to overcome the security concerns.
Under Guideline C (Foreign Preference), the government’s concern is that
“when an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign
country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information
or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”  Guideline
¶ 10.
Guideline ¶ 10 indicates conditions that could raise a security concern and
may be disqualifying in this case, including:
(A) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member.
This includes but is not limited to:
(1) possession of a current foreign passport;
The Government produced substantial evidence raising one potentially
disqualifying condition, and the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence
and prove a mitigating condition.  As previously indicated, the burden of disproving
a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government.  
Although Applicant’s Iranian passport has expired, it is clear from his
testimony he wishes to keep his options open to renew it should the need arise to
visit his aging parents in Iran.  As such, I am unable to apply any mitigating
conditions.
In addition to the enumerated disqualifying and mitigating conditions as
discussed previously, I have considered the general adjudicative guidelines related to
 ISC R  Case  N o .  0 3 -0 4 1 4 7  a t  3  (A pp .  B d .  N ov .  4 ,  200 5)  (quo t ing  ISC R  Case  N o .  02 -01 09 3  a t1 2
4  (Ap p .  B d .  D ec .  11 ,  20 0 3 ) .
  See ISCR Case No. 02-13595 at 3 (App. Bd. May 10, 2005) (stating an applicant has "a very heavy burden13
of persuasion to overcome the security concerns" when parents and siblings live in Iran); ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at
4 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006) (articulating "very heavy burden" standard when applicant's family members live in Iran).
  D o rfm o n t v .  B ro w n ,  91 3  F .2d  13 9 9 ,  14 0 1  (9  C ir .  19 9 0 ) .1 4 t h
the whole person concept under Directive ¶ E2.2.1. “Under the whole person
concept, the Administrative Judge must not consider and weigh incidents in an
applicant’s life separately, in a piecemeal manner. Rather, the Judge must evaluate
an applicant’s security eligibility by considering the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and circumstances.”  The directive lists nine adjudicative process factors12
(factors) which are used for “whole person” analysis. Additionally, other
“[a]vailable, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination.” Directive ¶ E2.2.1.
Ultimately, the clearance decision is “an overall common sense determination.”
Directive ¶ E2.2.3.    
Applicant’s mitigating evidence weighs towards grant of his security
clearance. Applicant has lived in the United States for 30 years, and is a naturalized
U.S. citizen. His testimony shows he is a loyal U.S. citizen. His wife is also a
naturalized U.S. citizen and his two children are U.S. born citizens. His ties to the
United States are stronger than his ties to family members in Iran. There is no
evidence he has ever taken any action which could cause potential harm to the
United States. He takes his loyalty to the United States very seriously, and he has
worked diligently for his current defense contractor employer for over seven years.
He was candid and respectful in his remarks, and he appears to be an individual who
is conscientious, responsible, mature, and of high integrity. 
Notwithstanding his favorable information, the heightened risk of foreign
exploitation remains. Applicants with immediate family members living in Iran have
a "very heavy burden of persuasion" to demonstrate that their contacts with those
family members do not pose a security risk.13
“Because of the extreme sensitivity of security matters, there is a strong
presumption against granting a security clearance. Whenever any doubt is raised . . .
it is deemed best to err on the side of the government’s compelling interest in
security by denying or revoking [a] clearance.”  After weighing the disqualifying14
and mitigating conditions, all the facts and circumstances, in the context of the
whole person, I conclude he has not mitigated the foreign influence security
concerns. 
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the
SOR, as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:         
Paragraph 1, Guideline B:  AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a – 1.e Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
        Subparagraphs 1.a. - 2.b.:            Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue eligibility for a
security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Robert J. Tuider
Administrative Judge