KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: The federal government need not wait until an applicant actually mishandles classified
information before it can deny access to such information.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 05-06935.a1
DATE: 07/30/2007
DATE: July 30, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: --------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 05-06935
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On January 25, 2006, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  The SOR was amended on motion of the government without objection from
the Applicant.  On January 31, 2007, after the hearing,  Administrative Judge Elizabeth M.
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Matchinski denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant
to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s unfavorable clearance
decision under Guideline F is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Applicant argues that the Judge should have concluded that the security concerns raised by
his history of financial difficulties had been mitigated because his unpaid debts predated his current
job, he has been attempting to consolidate those debts and obtain a bank loan to pay them off, if
possible, and he has had no security issues during his four and one half years with his current
employer.  Applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate that the Judge erred. 
The federal government need not wait until an applicant actually mishandles or fails to
properly handle classified information before it can deny or revoke access to such information.  See
Adams v. Laird, 420 F. 2d 230, 238-239 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970).  An
applicant with good or exemplary job performance may engage in conduct that has negative security
implications.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 99-0123 at 3 (App. Bd. Jan. 11, 2000).  The Directive's
Guidelines set forth a variety of examples of off-duty conduct and circumstances which are of
security concern to the government and mandate a whole-person analysis to determine an applicant's
clearance eligibility.  A whole-person analysis is not confined to the workplace.  See ISCR Case No.
03-11231 at 3 (June 4, 2004).
“[T]here is a strong presumption against granting a security clearance.” Dorfmont v. Brown,
913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9  Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).  Once the governmentth
presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish mitigation.
Directive ¶ E3.1.15.   The application of disqualifying and mitigating conditions does not turn simply
on a finding that one or more of them apply to the particular facts of a case.  Rather, their application
requires the exercise of sound discretion in light of the record evidence as a whole.  See, e.g., ISCR
Case No. 01-14740 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan.15, 2003).  Thus, the presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact,
the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs
the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  An applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of
the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to
demonstrate that the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.
The Applicant has not met his burden of demonstrating that the Judge erred in concluding
that the financial considerations allegations had not been mitigated.  Although Applicant strongly
disagrees with the Judge’s conclusions, he has not established that those conclusions are arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.32.3.
In this case, the Judge found that Applicant had a history of not meeting financial obligations
which extended over many years.  At the time the case was submitted for decision he still had
significant outstanding debts and was still attempting to make arrangements to repay them.  In light
of the foregoing, the Judge could reasonably conclude that Applicant’s financial problems fell within
the disqualifying conditions and had not been mitigated because they were recent and still ongoing.
The favorable record evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s
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decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-28041 at 4 (App.
Bd. June 29, 2005).  The Board does not review a case de novo.   Given the record that was before
her, the Judge’s ultimate unfavorable clearance decision under Guideline F is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan  
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin          
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields        
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board