KEYWORD: Personal Conduct; Criminal Conduct
DIGEST: Applicant is 57 years old, married to his fourth wife, and they have eight children.  He has
a Ph.D. in electrical engineering and works for a defense contractor.  He failed to disclose his 1969
to 1994 illegal drug use on his security clearance applications in 1996 and 2005.  He admits he
avoided disclosing that information, and that he lied on the 1996 application.  Applicant failed to
mitigate the personal conduct and criminal conduct security concerns.  Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 06-11898.h1
DATE: 07/30/2007
DATE:  July 30, 2007
In re:
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SSN:  -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-11898
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
PHILIP S. HOWE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
D. Michael Lyles, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
David M. Duwel, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
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Applicant is 57 years old, married to his fourth wife, and they have eight children.  He has
a Ph.D. in electrical engineering and works for a defense contractor.  He failed to disclose his 1969
to 1994 illegal drug use on his security clearance applications in 1996 and 2005.  He admits he
avoided disclosing that information, and that he lied on the 1996 application.  Applicant failed to
mitigate the personal conduct and criminal conduct security concerns.  Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant.  As required by Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 ¶ E3.1.2
(Jan. 2, 1992), as amended, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on January 19, 2007
detailing the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline E (Personal Conduct)
and Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on 29
December 2005 and implemented by the Department of Defense effective 1 September 2006.  The
revised guidelines were provided to Applicant when the SOR was issued.  Applicant answered the
SOR in writing on February 16, 2007, and elected to have a hearing before an administrative judge.
The case was assigned to me on May 2, 2007.  I convened a hearing on June 5, 2007, to consider
whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant.  DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on June 21, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant's admissions to the SOR allegations are incorporated here as findings of fact.  After
a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and full consideration of that
evidence, I make the following additional findings of fact:
Applicant is 57 years old, married for the fourth time, and has eight children with his present
wife.  He has an older daughter from a prior marriage.  He has a Ph.D. in electrical engineering.  He
works on computers for a defense contractor.  He had a security clearance in 1977 and 1978, and
then again in 1984 and 1985. (Tr. 26, 31, 32; Exhibits 1, 3, 4)
Applicant first used marijuana in 1968.  His last use was in December 1994.  He used it on
weekends in college between 1969 and 1971.  After that time, he continued to use it, but less
frequently, often monthly.  From 1973 to 1988, he used it three to five times per year.  He purchased
marijuana between 1968 and 1985, and sold it in high school and college.  He also used hashish in
high school and college.  Between 1975 and 1981, he used hashish sporadically, and then reduced
his use to four or five times annually between 1980 and 1981.  His most recent use was in 1993.  He
admits he may have used “speed” in college, and used cocaine three times in 1983.  He tried LSD
25 times between 1969 and 1974.  He injected heroin and morphine at least once in 1974.  Applicant
admitted in his statement of December 17, 1996, that he used illegal drugs while holding a security
clearance in the past, from 1977 to 1978, and 1984 to 1985. (Tr. 18, 26, 32; Exhibits 3, 5)
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On May 28, 1996, Applicant completed a security clearance application (SCA).  He answered
“no” to Question 27 about any illegal drug use in the past seven years.  He answered Question 31
by disclosing his past security clearances.  He gave a statement to a Government investigator on
December 17, 1996, about his life experiences, including a detailed history of his illegal drug use
from 1969 to 1996.  On August 31, 2005, Applicant completed his latest SCA and in answer to
Question 24 about his illegal drug use in the past seven years, whether he had “ever” used a
“controlled substance while possessing a security clearance,” and whether in the past seven years he
was involved in the illegal sale, manufacture, etc., of any illegal drug, all three subparts of that
question, he gave a negative answer.  Question 26 asked Applicant if he had ever been investigated
for a security clearance or been granted one.  He answered “yes.”  Both SCA contained certification
areas for Applicant’s signature, in which he stated his answers on the SCA were true, complete,
accurate, and correct, and that a knowing and willful false statement could be punished by a fine or
imprisonment under Federal law.  Applicant signed both SCA. (Tr. 20-29; Exhibits 1, 4)
Applicant admitted in his December 17, 1996, statement to the Government investigator that
he deliberately falsified his answers to Question 27 about his past illegal drug use, and admits he
“lied.”  In his Interrogatories signed November 27, 2006, Applicant stated that he answered “no” to
Question 24b on his August 2005, SCA because, “This is part of my past.  For years, I have voided
(sic) talking about my drug past.  This is the reason I said “no” to the question.”  At the hearing,
Applicant claimed he misinterpreted Question 24b, thinking it referred back only seven years, as
Questions 24a and 24b did.  Applicant admitted at the hearing the answer to Question 24b should
have been “yes,” and he  should have answered Question 27 in 1996 with a “yes.  He could not
remember why he answered “no” then. (Tr. 20-29; Exhibits 1, 3-5)
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.”  Id. at
527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent the
national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information with Industry
§ 2 (Feb. 20, 1960).  Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the
security guidelines contained in the Directive.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of
demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3.
The adjudication process is based on the whole person concept.  All available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, is to be taken into account in reaching a decision as
to whether a person is an acceptable security risk.  The revised Adjudicative Guidelines set forth
potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC) under each guideline. In
evaluating the security worthiness of an applicant, the administrative judge must also assess the
adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3 of the Directive. The decision to deny an individual a
security clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. See Exec. Or.
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10865 § 7. It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and
the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance. 
In evaluating the security worthiness of an applicant, the administrative judge must also
assess the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3 of the Directive.  Those assessments include:
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct,
and the extent of knowledgeable participation; (3) how recent and frequent the behavior was; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6)
the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood
of continuation or recurrence (See Directive, Section E2.2.1. of Enclosure 2). Because each security
case presents its own unique facts and circumstances, it should not be assumed that the factors
exhaust the realm of human experience or that the factors apply equally in every case.  Moreover,
although adverse information concerning a single condition may not be sufficient for an unfavorable
determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or
recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or other behavior specified in the
Guidelines.
The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a determination as
to the loyalty of the applicant.  See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.  It is merely an indication that the applicant
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for
issuing a clearance.
Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal
or professional history of the applicant that disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information.  The Directive presumes a nexus or rational connection
between proven conduct under any of the disqualifying conditions listed in the guidelines and an
applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  All that
is required is proof of facts and circumstances that indicate an applicant is at risk for mishandling
classified information, or that an applicant does not demonstrate the high degree of judgment,
reliability, or trustworthiness required of persons handling classified information.  ISCR Case No.
00-0277, 2001 DOHA LEXIS 335 at **6-8 (App. Bd. 2001).  Once the Government has established
a prima facie case by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of
demonstrating that is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance. ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. 2002).  “Any doubt as to whether access to
classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the
national security.” Directive ¶ E2.2.2.  “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must,
on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  See Exec. Or. 12968 § 3.1(b).
Based upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, I find the following adjudicative
guidelines most pertinent to an evaluation of the facts of this case:
Guideline E: Personal Conduct: The Concern: Conduct involving questionable judgment,
lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information.  Of
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special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance
process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. ¶15
Guideline J: Criminal Conduct: The Concern: Criminal activity creates doubt about a
person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness.  By its very nature, it calls into question a
person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations. ¶30
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline E—Personal Conduct
This cases depends heavily on Applicant’s credibility.  On two SCA he deliberately failed
to disclose his past illegal drug use.  Looking at the two SCA from 1996 and 2005, no one would
know of his extensive drug use history.  He admitted he deliberately lied in 1996 when confronted
by the Government investigator.  He admitted on the Interrogatories in 2006 that he deliberately
failed to disclose his drug use history again because it was in his past and he willfully avoided
talking about his drug use history.  He also failed to fully disclose information to the Government
investigator in 1996 about his LSD and marijuana use.
While Applicant’s attorney attempts to mitigate these deliberate falsifications by stating the
Government learned of them in 1996 during the investigation and gave Applicant a security
clearance, the issuance of one clearance is not an automatic guarantee of a subsequent one.  The SCA
asked Applicant in 2005 to give truthful answers, and he certified on the SCA his answers were true,
complete, and correct.  Yet they were not.  Again, Applicant deliberately hid his past illegal drug use.
Applicant has a Ph.D. in electrical engineering.  He now claims he misinterpreted Question
24b.  With his education level, and the type of work he does, if he misreads or misinterprets manuals
and instructions, he could do himself and others harm.  Someone that well educated cannot claim
he cannot read a simple question on a government form, especially one that had the keyword “ever”
underlined as it does.  
The Government established its prima facie case.  I conclude the Disqualifying Conditions
applicable are ¶16a involving “deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts
from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to
conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, or determine trustworthiness,” ¶16b
by “deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant facts to an
investigator or other official government representative,” and ¶16e “personal conduct, or
concealment of information about one’s conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation,
manipulation, or duress, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s
personal, professional, or community standing.”  Applicant is not credible in his explanations about
why he failed to make full disclosure of his drug use history.  His testimony at the hearing
demonstrated a lack of contrition for his actions, or no remorse for his falsifications.  His attempts
to explain how he, as a Ph.D. holder, could not understand Question 24b, and could not remember
when he had previous security clearances, were not persuasive or believable.
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I examined the Mitigating Conditions in ¶17.  Applicant made no efforts to correct his
concealment.  His 1996 statement was made only after the Government investigator confronted him.
In November 2006, his statement clearly was that he avoided telling anyone about his drug history,
showing a conscious, willful, and knowing concealment and falsification.  There was no bad advice
given him.  His drug history was not minor, or infrequent, nor were there unique circumstances.  He
claims he has not used illegal drugs since December 1994, but he also admitted he is a liar, so he is
not believable.  He has not obtained any type of drug counseling to verify his claimed present
abstinence, nor has he demonstrated any positive steps he took to reduce his vulnerability.  None of
the other Mitigating Conditions remotely could be applicable.  The burden of proof of Mitigating
Condition applicability is on Applicant, and he showed nothing to support a contention that any
might apply.
Guideline J—Criminal Conduct
Applicant committed a series of offense involving illegal drug use between 1969 and 1994,
at least.  There are allegations of these offenses, regardless of whether he was formally charged,
formally prosecuted or convicted.  He admitted he lied on the 1996 SCA and the 2005 SCA because
he avoids disclosing his drug use history.  Disqualifying Conditions ¶31a and ¶31c apply.
Considering the mitigating conditions under ¶32, while time has elapsed since Applicant
claims he last used illegal drugs, he continues to lie about his history.  There is not evidence of any
rehabilitation for his mendacity on the SCA.  While ¶32(a) and ¶32(d) might have applied, there is
no mitigating evidence to support them.  None of the other mitigating conditions apply.
Whole Person Analysis
“The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance.” AG ¶ 2(a). “Each
security clearance decision must be a fair and impartial common sense determination based upon
consideration of all the relevant and material information and the pertinent criteria and adjudication
policy.” Directive ¶ 6.3. “Available, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination.” AG ¶ 2(a). In
evaluating Applicant’s case, I have considered the adjudicative process factors listed in the AG ¶
2(a).
Applicant’s age and educational level show he was mature at the time he committed the
falsifications.  He should have known better than to falsify his SCA after having answered
investigator’s questions in 1996, based on his age and education.  He lied to the Government
investigator in 1996 about his drug history.  His drug use was extensive, and he continues to lie
about it to the Government.  His mendacity was voluntary and repeated.  His motivation for lying
was to retain his job and hide his past.  There is substantial potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, and duress in such circumstances.  He repeated his lying twice, so there is the great
likelihood that he will repeat it again.  He has shown he does not have the self-discipline and
integrity to be trusted with classified information, and that he is unreliable.
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I conclude the Personal Conduct security concern against Applicant.  I conclude the Criminal
Conduct security concern against Applicant.  I conclude the “whole person concept” against
Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1. Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Philip S. Howe
Administrative Judge