KEYWORD: Foreign Influence, Personal Conduct
DIGEST: Based on an assessment of him as a whole person, Applicant mitigated security concerns
over foreign influence as he is fully integrated into U.S. society and became a naturalized U.S.
citizen in December 2000.  Notably, his mother, also a naturalized U.S. citizen since1996,  works
as a civilian for a military organization and has been granted a security clearance.  While his father,
grandfather and his wife’s parents are citizens and residents of China. I conclude it is improbable that
foreign pressure on his relatives could create a situation that could result in the compromise of
classified information as Applicant attests he would report any attempt to the appropriate U.S.
official.  Also, Applicant’s failure to register with the U.S. Selective Service at 18 was not a
deliberate disregard of U.S. legal requirements. Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-17838.h1
DATE: 07/11/2007
DATE:  July 11, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-17838
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
KATHRYN MOEN BRAEMAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Candace Le’i, Esquire, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
       This procedure is required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and Department of Defense Directive1
5220.6, dated January 2, 1992 (Directive), as amended by Change 4, April 20, 1999.   
       Applicant did receive a copy of the DoD Directive 5220.6 which was sent with his Statement of Reasons2
(SOR) on September 29, 2006.  (TR 8; 14)
2
Based on an assessment of him as a whole person, Applicant mitigated security concerns over
foreign influence as he is fully integrated into U.S. society and became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
December 2000.  Notably, his mother, also a naturalized U.S. citizen since1996,  works as a civilian
for a military organization and has been granted a security clearance.  While his father, grandfather
and his wife’s parents are citizens and residents of China. I conclude it is improbable that foreign
pressure on his relatives could create a situation that could result in the compromise of classified
information as Applicant attests he would report any attempt to the appropriate U.S. official.  Also,
Applicant’s failure to register with the U.S. Selective Service at 18 was not a deliberate disregard
of U.S. legal requirements. Clearance is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR)
to the Applicant on November 16, 2006.  The SOR detailed reasons why the Government could not
make the preliminary positive finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
eligibility to Applicant that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a
security clearance for the Applicant.   The SOR alleged specific concerns over foreign influence1
(Guideline B) in paragraph 1 and over Personal Conduct (Guideline E) in paragraph 2 based on the
revised (“new”) Adjudicative Guidelines (AG)  issued on December 29, 2005, and implemented by2
the Department of Defense, effective September 1, 2006.   Applicant replied to the SOR allegations
in an Answer notarized on December 2, 2006, and requested a hearing.
On January 17, 2007, Department Counsel noted the case was ready to proceed.  The matter
was assigned to another judge on January 24, 2007. Subsequently, a Notice of Hearing, issued on
February 22, 2007, set the matter for March 8, 2007, at a location near where Applicant works and
lives.  On February 21, 2007, Applicant waived the 15 day notice requirement in the Directive.  (TR
12)  The case was re-assigned to me on March 5, 2007, because of the unavailability of the previous
judge.
At the hearing the Government withdrew part of SOR allegation 1.e. as Applicant did not
travel to China in November 2003; instead he traveled to Canada.  (Answer; TR 14-17)   The
Government offered exhibits (Exhibits 1-2) which were admitted into evidence without objection;
also admitted was Exhibit 3 which included five documents for Administration Notice (AN)
(Exhibits I-V).  (TR 12; 20-22)  Applicant testified, called two witnesses, but submitted no exhibits
The transcript (TR) was received on March19, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due
consideration of that evidence, I make the following additional Findings of Fact:
       On his security form, he disclosed that his grandmother was a citizen of China and resided; however,3
she died in 2004. (Exhibit 1; TR 26)
 
3
Applicant, a 29-year-old employee, began working for a defense contractor (Employer #1)
in State #1 in August 2004.  In September 2004 he completed a Security Clearance Application
(Standard Form 86).   He was born in the Peoples Republic of China (China) and became a U.S.
citizen in December 2000 and was issued a U.S. passport.  (Exhibit 1; TR 41)
While his mother and father were born in China, his mother initially came to the U.S. in 1985
on a student visa to get a master’s degree.  She became a naturalized U.S. citizen in September 1996.
Applicant and his father joined her in 1988 when he was ten years old.  Applicant received his
education in the U.S.  He has a B.S. and M.S. in engineering from a state university.  (Exhibits 1,
2; TR 25; 28-29) 
Applicant’s mother came to the U.S. from China in 1985 to attend school and earned a
masters degree in education. She and Applicant’s father were divorced in 1989.  She went to work
for a defense language agency in 1992 and was a team leader; she chaired the Chinese Language
Department for five years.  In that job she has a security clearance.  She became a U.S. citizen in
1996. His stepfather is a U.S. citizen and a former U.S. Army officer. (Exhibits 1, 2; TR 25; 28-29;
59-70) 
Foreign Influence 
After he became a naturalized U.S. citizen, Applicant in summer 2001 returned to China to
visit his grandparents  with whom he was very close.  During his stay he met the woman who later3
became his wife.  (Exhibit 1; TR 25-26)  Applicant explained his current contacts in China as
follows:
9 Applicant’s father remains a citizen and a resident of  China as he returned there in 1993
after he was divorced from Applicant’s mother. Applicant has contact with him by telephone
twice a year on holidays and his birthday.  He does not send money to his father. (Exhibit 1;
TR 26; 32) His father taught at a university before he came to the U.S.  He retired when he
returned and invests in the stock market.  (TR 30)  While his mother has urged him to have
contact with his father, she testified that his contact is very limited. (TR 69-70) (SOR 1.a.)
9 Applicant’s grandfather, now 93 years old, is a citizen and resident of China. Before he
retired he was a university administrator.  Applicant  has contact with him by telephone twice
a year on holidays and his birthday.  Applicant stayed with him in 2001, 2002 and 2003 when
he visited China. He does not send gifts or money to his grandfather. (Exhibit 1; TR 26; 33-
34; 42-43; 70) While Applicant has limited contact with his grandfather, is mother explained
that she has frequent contact with her father as he is 93 and is lonely.  He has a retirement
stipend, so Applicant’s mother does not send him any money.  (TR 65-70) (SOR 1.b., 1.e.)
 
9 Applicant’s wife is a citizen of China, but a resident of the U. S. Whom he met when he
visited China in July 2001.  At the time he completed his SF 86 in 2004, he disclosed his
relationship with her as she was a citizen of China who was then studying for an MBA in
4
Canada and also visited him in the U.S.  He visited her in Canada as well as in China twice
in 2002 and again in 2003. (Exhibit 1; TR 26)  She came to the U.S. in 2004 on a student
visa.  (TR 35)  He married her in September 2004.  (TR 18-19) She returned to China in
2004 to visit her parents.  (TR 35) She got her Green Card in 2005 or 2006 based on her
marriage to a U.S. citizen.  She intends to become a U.S. citizen.  (TR 38-39; 58-59)  She
works as an auditor for an accounting firm.  (TR 40; 58) She clarified and confirmed
Applicant’s reports of his visits to China and Canada to visit her and his limited contacts
with his relatives in China.  She recalled that Applicant had sent a $1,000 gift to his father
in 2004 or 2005 with the assistance of her father. (TR 45-58)  (SOR 1.c., 1.e.)
9 Applicant’s wife has parents who live in and are citizens of China with whom she was
contact by telephone twice a week.  Applicant rarely has contact with them.  Her father is a
lawyer and her mother works in the private sector as an office assistant.  (Answer; Exhibit
2; TR 35) She calls her parents three times a week as she is an only child.  Her father who
is 55 is a partner in a large law firm in China and her mother who is 51 works as an office
assistant for a not-for-profit organization.  When she visited them in 2004 and 2005, her
parents give her money -- $10,000 on each visit.  They gave her $6,000 in 2006.  Because
Applicant and his wife plan to buy a home, her parents will provide additional money in
2007: her parents will provide $50,000 for the down payment.  Her parents own their own
apartment in China and have other investments. They plan to visit her in the U.S. in 2007.
Her parents have never been approached by anyone seeking information about her husband.
(TR 45-58) (SOR 1.d.)
If any of Applicant’s relatives in China were approached by someone seeking information
about Applicant, he would report any contact to the U.S. government agency.  He himself never
received any requests or threats by a foreign national that should have been reported or might have
been of security concern when he traveled in China.  (TR 38)  
Is the foreign country known to target United States citizens 
to obtain protected information? 
The Government provided for Administrative Notice several documents regarding China
including a State Department Background Note on China, a country report on human rights practices
from 2005, a Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives report, an annual report on
foreign economic collection and industrial espionage, and an Intelligence Threat Handbook that
included a section on China (“Threat Handbook”).  (AN I to V) The Threat Handbook observed,
“There is no evidence that the PRC considers Chinese-Americans to be more vulnerable to approach
than any other group.” The PRC uses “whatever feelings of obligation the targeted individual may
have toward China, family members in China, old friends in China, etc.”  PRC’s approach is “not
to try to exploit a perceived vulnerability but to appeal to an individual’s desire to help China out
in some way.”  (AN V at 21)  Department Counsel argued that security concerns exist because of
China’s poor human rights records, its possession of strategic nuclear weapons and missiles, its
being a rival of the U.S. since the Cold War, and its having actively targeted the U.S. with legal and
illegal intelligence-gathering programs for economic intelligence.  (TR 73-74)
Failure to Register for the Draft
5
When Applicant was 18, he did not know under U.S. law it was mandatory to register for the
draft.  He relied on his mother to explain such requirements to him; she testified credibly she did not
understand what “draft” meant.  At 26 after he got the SOR, he learned for the first time he should
have registered, but then when he attempted to register on line he learned he was too late as he had
passed the upper age limit of 25.  (Exhibit 2; TR 26-27; 39-40; 41; 60-70) 
Applicant’s mother explained she did not understand the requirement of her son to register
for the draft.   She did not understand what the word “draft” meant at the time he applied to go to
college in 1996.  She thought it meant he had to join the military and she did not feel he was mature
enough to do so.  (TR 59-70) (SOR 2.a.)
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines to consider in evaluating an
individual's security eligibility.  They are divided into conditions that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying and conditions that could mitigate security concerns in deciding whether
to grant or continue an individual's access to classified information.  But the mere presence or
absence of any given adjudication policy condition is not decisive.  Based on a consideration of the
evidence as a whole in evaluating this case, I weighed relevant Adjudication Guidelines as set forth
below :
Guideline B - Foreign Influence
6. The concern:  Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that
is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign
interest.  Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of
the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located,
including , but not limited to, such considerations as to whether the foreign country
is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is
associated with a risk of terrorism.  
Guideline E:  Personal Conduct
15. The Concern.  Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor,
dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified
information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and a candid answers
during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the
security clearance process.  
The responsibility for producing evidence initially falls on the Government to demonstrate
that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant's access to
classified information.  Then the Applicant presents evidence to refute, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate in order  to overcome the doubts raised by the Government, and to demonstrate persuasively
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue the clearance.  Under the
provisions of Executive Order 10865, as amended, and the Directive, a decision to grant or continue
       7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:  4
(a.)  contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or a person  who is a
citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;  
(e.)  A substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country. . . .which could subject the
individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.
       8.  Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: 5
(a.)  the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization,
or government and the interests of the U.S.
(c.) contact and correspondence with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood
that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;
(e.)  The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of
contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups or organizations from a foreign country;
(f.)  the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are
unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate or pressure the
individual.
6
an applicant's security clearance may be made only after an affirmative finding that to do so is clearly
consistent with the national interest. In reaching the fair and impartial overall common sense
determination, the Administrative Judge may  draw only those inferences and conclusions that have
a reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record.
CONCLUSIONS
Foreign Influence
Applicant mitigated the Government’s security concerns over possible foreign influence
raised by Applicant's close ties of affection to citizens of China, his father, his grandfather and his
wife’s parents.  The security concern under Guideline B, Foreign Influence, requires an assessment
under disqualifying condition (DC) 7.(a.) of the security risk  that may exist when an individual's4
family member “is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”   Applicant has visited
his relatives in China, but only on a limited and infrequent basis.  He reported these visits to his
company, but he never experienced any pressure that raised a security concern.  Given the fact that
both his own relatives are retired and he has limited contact with him, they seem an unlikely target
of the government of China.  Applicant has limited contact with his wife’s parents.  While his wife’s
parents do work in China, she reported they have never been pressured for information about
Applicant.  On the other hand, their generosity to the couple raises another concern: (7. e.)  A
substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country. . . .which could subject the
individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.  
While I have considered these concerns, I conclude Applicant has presented evidence to meet
the burden of mitigating  those circumstances either under the mitigating conditions (MC) outlined5
in the revised guidelines or by a whole person analysis.  Applicant's only family ties to China are his
7
father and grandfather, both retired, with whom he has limited contact and only intermittent visits.
One notable element is assessing these security concerns is the fact that Applicant’s mother has
worked for the U.S. military for more than 15 years and has a security clearance.  While his wife has
contacts frequently with her parents, both report no evidence of any foreign duress or influence on
Applicant and/or his immediate family in China.  On balance, both he and his wife have substantial
professional incomes, they are not dependent and would not be influenced by the financial gifts of
his wife’s parents.
Thus, despite the concerns over China economic espionage and human rights record, I
conclude any risk would appear to be slight and clearly manageable under MC (a.).  Applicant is a
U.S. citizen who was educated here and his mother has long had a security clearance.  Notably, the
Threat Handbook indicates that PRC’s approach is “not to try to exploit a perceived vulnerability
but to appeal to an individual’s desire to help China out in some way.”  (AN V at 21) Given
Applicant’s deep ties to the U.S., there is no evidence that he would have any motivation to “help
China out” by his efforts.  While his wife remains a citizen of China, she is working for a U.S.
company and has her green card and intends to become a U.S. citizen.  Moreover, Applicant made
evident that at any hint of any coercion or pressure on herself or his family, he would immediate
report such coercion to a corporate security officer.  Thus, I find  there is no substantial likelihood
that he would be subject to duress merely because of these family ties.  While he traveled to China,
that travel alone does not raise a security concern.  His trips were with his U.S. passport which he
fully disclosed to his employer and on his security form.
While his wife’s family have made substantial gifts to his father and to the couple, they have
substantial resources and the couple themselves both work as professionals.  Consequently, in
comparing the value of the gifts to their other income, the fall within MC (f.) as  the value of the
foreign financial interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used
effectively to influence, manipulate or pressure the individual.
Also I have evaluated him under the whole person adjudicative process guidelines:  
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the
conduct; (5) the voluntariness of the participation; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the
conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  (AG 2. Adjudication Process)
Looking at all of these circumstances, I conclude Applicant has overcome  foreign influence
security concerns.  Given his strong and lengthy ties to the U.S. since he has lived in the U.S. since
1988 and became a U.S. naturalized citizen in 2000, there is limited potential for coercion,
exploitation or duress.  Since Applicant came to the U.S., he has seen no indicators that the
government of China has tried to exploit his relationship with his relatives in China.  If he did he
would report any attempts to U.S. officials.  While China does have a bad record on human rights
and has a history of having targeted plans for economic intelligence, it is a country in transition from
a planned economy to a market economy began at the end of 1978.  After review all of the evidence
I conclude,  there is little  potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress. 
      See ISCR Case No. 03-09483 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov.17, 2004)(explaining holding in ISCR Case No. 02-6
23133 at 5 (App. Bd. Jun. 9, 2004)).
8
Security clearance decisions are predictive judgments about an applicant's security eligibility
in light of the applicant's past conduct and present circumstances.  Department of Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518, 528-29 (1988).  Contacts with citizens of other countries are relevant to security
determinations only if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or
pressure through threats against those foreign relatives.  Acts indicative of foreign influence warrant
careful scrutiny.  After considering the Adjudicative Process factors and the Adjudicative Guidelines,
I conclude these ties are not of such a nature as to create any tangible risks of undue pressure on
Applicant, so foreign influence security concerns are mitigated.  Thus, I resolve SOR paragraph 1
and subparagraphs 1.a. and 1.e. in Applicant's favor.
Personal Conduct
Under Guideline E, conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty,
or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s
reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. In this case Applicant admits
he failed to register with the U.S. Selective Service when he was 18 as he did not know about this
obligation, and his mother did not understand the process.  She testified credibly that she thought to
register was to enroll in the military.  He tried to take corrective action later, but was over 25, so
could not do so.  While none of the personal conduct guidelines really address this type of failure
to comply with U.S. law, I found his and his mother’s explanation credible that it was a failure to
act, and not a deliberate disregard of U.S. legal requirements.  
An administrative judge must consider the record evidence as a whole to determine whether
there is direct or circumstantial evidence concerning an applicant’s intent or state of mind at the time
the omission occurred.   Based on Applicant’s credible testimony and review of him as a whole6
person, I conclude that Guideline E  in favor of Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
After reviewing the allegations of the SOR in the context of the Adjudicative Guidelines in
Enclosure 2 and the factors set forth under the Adjudicative Process section, I make the following
formal findings:
Paragraph 1. Guideline B FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e.: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline E FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a.: For Applicant
9
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant a security clearance to the Applicant.
Kathryn Moen Braeman
Administrative Judge