KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant emigrated from China to the United States in 1989 and became a U.S. citizen
in 1999.  She does maintain a relatively close relationship with her parents, who are citizen residents
of China.  Her husband, who also emigrated from China to the United States maintains a similar
relationship with his parents, who are also citizen residents of China. Applicant did not mitigate
security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. Clearance is denied. 
CASENO: 06-18097.h1
DATE: 07/27/2007
DATE:  July 27, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-18097
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ROBERT J. TUIDER
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Francisco Mendez, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Richard Murray, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
G o v e rn m e n t  E x h ib i t  ( G E )  1  ( E le c tro n ic  S ta n d a rd  F o rm  ( S F )  8 6 ,  S e c ur i ty  C le a ra n ce
1
A p p l ica t io n ) .  
O n  A u g u s t  3 0 ,  2 0 0 6 ,  t h e  U n d e r  S e c r e ta r y  o f  D e fe n s e  ( I n te l l ig e n c e )  p u b l i s h e d  a  m e m o r a n d u m
2
d i r e c t in g  a p p l ic a t io n  o f  r e v is e d  A d j u d i c a t iv e  G u id e l in e s  to  a l l  a d j u d i c a t io n s  a n d  o t h e r  d e te r m in a t io n s
m a d e  u n d e r  th e  D i re c t ive  a n d  D e p a r tm e n t  o f  D e fen se  (D o D )  R e g u la t io n  5 2 0 0 .2 -R ,  P e rso n n e l  S e c u r i ty
P r o g ra m  (R e g u la t io n ) ,  d a te d  J a nu a ry  1 9 8 7 ,  a s  a m e n d e d ,  in  wh ic h  th e  S O R  w a s  is su e d  o n  o r  a f te r
S ep tem b er  1 ,  2 0 0 6 .  A p p l ica n t ’s  ca se  i s  r e so lve d  und e r  the  r e v i sed  A d jud ica t ive  G u id e l ine s .
(A p p l ic a n t ’s  r e sp o n se  to  S O R ,  n o ta r iz e d  o n  O c to b e r  2 0 ,  2 0 0 6 ,  r e c e iv e d  a t  D O H A  o n  O c to b e r
3
2 3 ,  2 0 0 6 ) .
2
Applicant emigrated from China to the United States in 1989 and became a U.S. citizen in
1999.  She does maintain a relatively close relationship with her parents, who are citizen residents
of China.  Her husband, who also emigrated from China to the United States maintains a similar
relationship with his parents, who are also citizen residents of China. Applicant did not mitigate
security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 27, 2005, Applicant submitted a Security Clearance Application (SF 86).  On1
September 26, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to her, pursuant to Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended and modified, and Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive),
dated January 2, 1992, as amended, modified and revised.  2
The SOR alleges security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The SOR detailed
reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for her, and
recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted,
continued, denied, or revoked.
In an answer notarized on October 20, 2006, Applicant responded to the SOR allegations,
and elected to have her case decided at a hearing.  On January 3, 2007, the case was assigned to me.3
Her hearing was held on January 31, 2007. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on February
8, 2007. 
PROCEDURAL RULINGS
Administrative Notice
Department Counsel requested administrative notice of the facts in Exhibit (Ex.)
2 through 6. Tr. 14-15. Department Counsel also provided a supporting document (Ex.
4 Id.
G E  1 ,  su p ra  n .  1 ,  a t  S e c t io n s  2  ( d a te  o f  b i r th ) ,  1 0  ( e d u c a t io n ) ,  1 1  ( e m p lo ym e n t ) ,  8  ( s p o u s e ) ,
5
1 3 /1 5  ( re la t iv e s ) ,  1 6  ( m i l i ta r y  se r v ic e ) ,  2 2  ( e m p lo ym e n t ) ,  2 3  ( p o l ic e  r e c o r d ) ,  2 4  ( i l le g a l  d r u g  u s e ) ,  a n d
2 7  ( f ina n c ia l  re c o rd ) ,  i s  the  so u rc e  fo r  th e  fac t s  in  th i s  p a ra g ra p h ,  un le ss  o the rw ise  s ta ted .  
3
1) to show the basis for the facts in Exs. 2 through 6. Applicant did not object to my
taking administrative notice. Tr. 15. 
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for
administrative proceedings. See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12,
2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006) (citing ISCR Case No.
02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004)); McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)). The most common basis for administrative
notice at ISCR proceedings, is to notice facts that are either well known or from
government reports. See Stein, Administrative Law, Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006)
(listing fifteen types of facts for administrative notice). I took administrative notice of
various facts derived from Exs. 2 through 6 as indicated under subheading “People’s
Republic of China” of this decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT 
As to the SOR’s factual allegations, Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR
except ¶ 1.c.  Her admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a4
complete and thorough review of the evidence of record, I make the following findings
of fact.  
Applicant is 50 years old.  She was born in China in 1956, and she received a5
bachelor of science degree majoring in electrical engineering from a Chinese university
in August 1985. Tr. 65. She came to the U.S. in May 1989 on a student visa to further
her education. After her arrival in the U.S. she was awarded a master of science degree
in electrical engineering, and a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, both from U.S.
universities. 
While she was a student in the U.S., the Chinese government suppressed the
student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 prompting Congress to pass
the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992.  This Act applied to approximately 40,000
Chinese students, to include Applicant, living and studying in the U.S. at that time. AE
A.
She sought expedited processing to become a U.S. citizen at the earliest
opportunity under the Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, and was awarded her
citizenship in August 1999. She was issued a U.S. passport in March 2000. As part of
becoming a U.S. citizen, Applicant took an Oath of Allegiance. AE D. Applicant
credibly testified she took that oath “seriously.” Tr. 34. When she became a U.S. citizen,
under Chinese law, she automatically lost her Chinese citizenship and her Chinese
passport was voided.  Tr. 34-35, AE E. 
4
She does not currently hold a security clearance. She has never been fired from
a job. In July 2005, she began her current employment as a senior professional staff
member at a prestigious U.S. university that does contract work for the government.
There is no derogatory information concerning her police or financial records. She has
never used illegal drugs.
She has no prior U.S. military service. Her husband was also born in China. He
came to the U.S. in August 1989. Applicant and her husband met in the U.S., and were
married in the U.S. in June 1993. They have a 16-year-old U.S.-born son, who is
currently a high school student.  Tr. 66.
Applicant’s mother is 72 years old, and she is a citizen resident of China. During
her working life, she was an engineer.  Applicant’s father is 76 years old, and he is also
a citizen resident of China. During his working life, he was a musician. Both of her
parents retired at age 56, are in good health, and receive pensions from the Chinese
government.  Tr. 47, 57.  Applicant communicates with her parents by telephone,
“usually once every 2 or 3 months.” Tr. 36. She sends her parents money and over the
past five years averaged sending them $1,000.00 to $2,000.00 per year.  Tr. 48.
Applicant testified she is “close” to her parents. Tr. 51, 69.
Applicant visited China in June 1991 for “[t]en days, two weeks.” Tr. 52, 62.
During this visit to China, she stayed with her parents.  Tr. 64. Applicant’s father visited
Applicant and her family in the U.S. in 1994 and 1998, and each visit lasted
approximately one year.  Tr. 62-63.
Additionally, Applicant’s husband is 42 years old and was awarded a bachelor of
science degree in electrical engineering in 1986, and a master of science degree in
electrical engineering in 1989 in China. After coming to the U.S., he was awarded a
second master’s degree in electrical and computer engineering in 1991, and a Ph.D. in
electrical engineering.  Tr. 73.  He, like his wife, applied for U.S. citizenship pursuant
to the Chinese Student Protection Act and became a naturalized citizen in November
1999.  Tr. 76-77, AE F. He was issued a U.S. passport in March 2000.  Tr. 78, AE G.
SOR ¶ 1.c. alleged Applicant’s mother-in-law was in the process of applying for
permanent residence status in the U.S. Applicant denied this allegation and the
government did not offer any rebuttal to Applicant’s denial.  Tr. 55-56.
Applicant’s mother-in-law is 70 years old, and she is a citizen resident of China.
Applicant’s father-in-law is 76 years old, and he is also a citizen resident of China.
Both of her in-laws are retired medical doctors. Tr. 80. They receive pensions from
private sources. Tr. 97. Applicant’s husband typically communicates with his parents
by telephone “every two or three months.”  Tr. 37, 80. Applicant’s husband also sends
his parents money comparable to the amounts his wife sends to her parents. Tr. 84. 
Applicant’s husband works at the same place of employment as she does and they
share the same supervisor. Applicant’s supervisor testified on her behalf and stated
“she’s done an outstanding job,” and is a very dedicated, trustworthy and valued
employee. Tr. 110-113.
T h e  c o n te n ts  o f  th e  P R C  se c t io n  a re  f ro m  E x s .  2  th ro u g h  8 .
6
5
Applicant testified that if the Chinese government attempted to exert pressure on
her through family members to extract sensitive information, she would immediately
report such contact to the appropriate security official.  Tr. 43.  
Applicant is registered and exercises her right to vote in the U.S. and volunteers
at her son’s school.  Tr. 66-67. Applicant and her husband own a home in the U.S.
valued at $800,000.00 and they own two automobiles.  Tr. 41. Applicant’s husband
earns $112,400.00 per year and Applicant earns $115,900.00 per year. They both have
401(k) plans through work, conduct all their banking in the U.S., and maintain
investments in the U.S.  Applicant and her husband’s net worth is approximately $1.1
million.  Tr. 92.
People’s Republic of China  6
China has an authoritarian, Communist government. China has a poor human
rights record, suppresses political dissent, and practices arbitrary arrest and detention,
forced confessions, torture, and other prisoner mistreatment.
China is a nuclear power with a large Army. China is geographically vast, and has
a population of over one billion people. It has significant resources, and an economy
that in recent years has expanded about 10% per year. China aggressively competes with
the United States in many areas. China’s competitive relationship with the United States
exacerbates the risk posed by Applicant’s Chinese connections.  
China actively collects military, economic and proprietary, and industrial
information about the United States because of the following circumstances: (1) its
position as a global superpower; (2) its military, political, and economic investments
in the Pacific Rim and Asia; (3) its leading role in development of advanced technology
that China desires for economic growth; and (4) China considers the large number of
Americans of Chinese ancestry as intelligence targets. China’s active intelligence
gathering programs focus on sensitive and protected U.S. technologies.
POLICIES
In an evaluation of an applicant’s security suitability, an administrative judge
must consider the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility For Access to
Classified Information” (Guidelines). In addition to brief introductory explanations for
each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines are divided into Disqualifying Conditions
(DC) and Mitigating Conditions (MC), which are used to determine an applicant’s
eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible ironclad rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
 “S u b s ta n t ia l  e v id e n c e  [ i s ]  su c h  re le v an t  e v id e n c e  a s  a  re a so n a b le  m in d  m ig h t  a cc e p t  a s
7
a d e q u a te  to  su p p o r t  a  c o n c l u s i o n  i n  l ig h t  o f  a l l  th e  c o n t r a r y  re c o rd .”   IS C R  C a se  N o .  0 4 -1 1 4 6 3  a t  2
(A p p .  B d .  A u g .  4 ,  2 0 0 6 )  (c i t in g  D ir  e v id e n c e  in  t h e  e c t iv e  ¶  E 3 .1 .3 2 .1 ) .   “T h is  i s  so m e th in g  le ss  th a n
th e  w e i g h t  o f  th e  e v id e n c e ,  a n d  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f  d r a w in g  tw o  in c o n s is te n t  c o n c lu s io n s  f r o m  th e
e v id e n c e  d o e s  n o t  p r ev e n t  [ a  J ud g e ’s ]  f in d in g  f ro m  b e in g  s up p o r te d  b y  s ub s ta n t ia l  e v id e n c e .”  C o n so lo
v .  F e d e r a l  M a r i t im e  C o m m ’ n ,  3 8 3  U .S .  6 0 7 ,  6 2 0  ( 1 9 6 6 ) .   “S u b s ta n t ia l  e v id e n c e ”  i s  “m o r e  th a n  a
sc in t i l la  b u t  le s s  t h a n  a  p r ep o n d e ra n ce .”  S e e  v .  W a sh in g to n  M e tro .  A re a  T ra n s i t  A u th . ,  3 6  F .3 d  3 7 5 ,
3 8 0  ( 4  C i r .  1 9 9 4 ) .th
“ T h e  A d m in is t r a t iv e  J u d g e  [ c o n s id e r s ]  th e  r e c o r d  e v id e n c e  a s  a  w h o le ,  b o th  fa v o r a b l e  a n d
8
u n fa vo ra b le ,  e v a lu a te [s ]  A p p l ic an t ’s  p a s t  a n d  c u r re n t  c ir c um s ta nc es  in  l ig h t  o f  p e r t in e n t  p ro v is io n s  o f
th e  D ire c t iv e ,  a nd  d e c id e [ s]  w he th e r  A p p l ic a n t  h a [ s ]  m e t  h is  b u rd e n  o f  p e r su a s io n  u n d e r  D ire c t iv e  ¶
E 3 .1 .1 5 .  IS C R  C a s e  N o .  0 4 -1 0 3 4 0  a t  2  (A p p .  B d .  J u ly  6 ,  2 0 0 6 ) .”  
6
factors listed in the adjudicative process. Guideline ¶ 2. An administrative judge’s over-
arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. Because the
entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole
person concept,” an administrative judge considers all available, reliable information
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
Guideline ¶ 2(c).
Specifically, an administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative
process factors listed at Guideline ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the
conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and
maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which participation is voluntary; (6)
the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7)
the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
Since the protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, the
final decision in each case is arrived at by applying the standard that “[a]ny doubt
concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be
resolved in favor of national security.” Guideline ¶ 2(b). In reaching this decision, I
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences grounded
on mere speculation or conjecture.
In the decision-making process, facts must be established by “substantial
evidence.”  The Government initially has the burden of producing evidence to establish7
a case which demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, that it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s access to
classified information. Once the Government has produced substantial evidence of a
disqualifying condition, the burden shifts to Applicant to present “witnesses and other
evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven
by Department Counsel, and [applicant] has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to
obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Directive ¶ E3.1.15. The burden of disproving
a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at
5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).8
7
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions under this Directive include, by
necessity, consideration of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail
a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual,
risk of compromise of classified information.
 
The scope of an administrative judge’s decision is limited. Section 7 of Executive
Order 10865 specifically provides that any adverse industrial security clearance decision
shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to
the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  An adverse determination is not a finding that
an applicant is disloyal to the United States, but merely that he or she has not met the
stringent standards, established by the President, to be eligible for access to classified
information. 
CONCLUSIONS
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all
appropriate legal precepts, factors, and conditions, including those described briefly
above, I conclude the following with respect to the allegations set forth in the SOR:
Guideline ¶ 6 explains the Government’s concern about “foreign contacts and
interests” stating, “if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests,
[he or she] may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization,
or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or
coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial
interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the
foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information
and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.”
Guideline ¶ 7 indicates conditions that could raise a security concern and
may be disqualifying in this case, including:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation
to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire
to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;
8
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons; regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is
not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative
lives in a foreign country, and an applicant has contacts with that relative, this factor
alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially
result in the compromise of classified information. See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5
(App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001). 
Applicant has relatively frequent and regular contact with her parents as does
her husband with his parents.  These contacts, whether out of affection or obligation
with her immediate family members, create a heightened risk of foreign pressure or
attempted exploitation. Her relationship with these immediate family members also
creates a potential conflict of interest because it is sufficiently close to raise a security
concern about her desire to help her parents and brothers by providing sensitive or
classified information. 
Applicant admitted and the Government produced substantial evidence of these
three disqualifying conditions, and the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence
and prove mitigation. As previously indicated, the burden of disproving a mitigating
condition never shifts to the Government.
Three Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions under Guideline ¶ 8 are
potentially applicable to these disqualifying conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense
of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for
foreign influence or exploitation;
Guideline ¶ 8(a) does not apply to her relationships with her parents. Her
contacts with these immediate family members are not casual and infrequent. If she
does not contact these family members out of affection, she certainly does so
9ISCR Case No. 03-04147 at 3 (App. Bd. Nov. 4, 2005) (quoting  ISCR Case No. 02-01093 at 4 (App. Bd. Dec. 11,
2003)); ISCR Case No.05-02833 at 2 (App. Bd. Mar. 19, 2007) (citing Raffone v. Adams, 468 F.2d 860 (2nd Cir. 1972) (taken
together, separate events may have a significance that is missing when each event is viewed in isolation).
 S e e  IS C R  C a s e  N o .  0 2 -2 4 5 6 6  a t  3  (A p p .  B d .  J u ly  1 7 ,  2 0 0 6 )  ( s ta t i n g  t h a t  a n  a na lys is  u nd e r
1 0
th e  e ig h th  A P F  ap p a re n t ly  w i th o u t  d isc uss io n  o f  th e  o th e r  A P F s  w a s  su s ta in a b le ) ;  IS C R  C a se  N o .  0 3 -
1 0 9 5 4  a t  5  (A p p .  B d .  M a r .  8 ,  2 0 0 6 )  ( so le  A P F  m e n t io n e d  i s  e ig h th  A P F ) ;  IS C R  C a s e  N o .  0 3 -1 7 6 2 0  a t
4  (A p p .  B d .  A p r .  1 7 ,  2 0 0 6 )  ( r e m a n d ing  gr a n t  o f  c le a ra nc e  b e c a u se  J ud g e  d id  no t  as se ss  “ th e  re a l i s t ic
p o ten t ia l  fo r  e x p lo i ta t io n ” ) ,  b u t  se e  I S C R  C a s e  N o .  0 4 -0 0 5 4 0  a t  6  ( A p p .  B d .  J a n .  5 ,  2 0 0 7 )  ( r e j e c t in g
c o n te n t io n  th a t  e ig h th  A P F  i s  e xc lu s iv e  c i r c u m sta n ce  in  wh o le  p e r so n  a na lys is  in  fo r e ig n  in f lu e nc e
c a s e s ) .
9
understandably out of obligation. Applicant could be placed in a position of having to
choose between her parents and the interests of the United States.
Guideline ¶ 8(b) does not apply because Appellant has not demonstrated, in the
evidence she presented, a sufficient relationship and loyalty to the U.S. that she can
be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. Although
she lived in the United States since 1989, and became a U.S. citizen in 1999, she has
not demonstrated that she has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties
in the U.S. such that she can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of
the U.S. interest. The facts presented by Applicant are insufficient to overcome the
security concerns as discussed in the “whole person” analysis, infra.  
Guideline ¶ 8(c) does not apply because of the regularity and consistency of her
contact with immediate family members in China.  
“Whole Person” Analysis 
In addition to the enumerated disqualifying and mitigating conditions as
discussed previously, I have considered the general adjudicative guidelines related to
the whole person concept under Directive ¶ E2.2.1. “Under the whole person concept,
the Administrative Judge must not consider and weigh incidents in an applicant’s life
separately, in a piecemeal manner. Rather, the Judge must evaluate an applicant’s
security eligibility by considering the totality of an applicant’s conduct and
circumstances.”  The directive lists nine adjudicative process factors (APF) which are9
used for “whole person” analysis.  Because foreign influence does not involve
misconduct, voluntariness of participation, rehabilitation and behavior changes, etc., the
eighth APF, “the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress,” Directive ¶
E2.2.1.8, is the most relevant of the nine APFs to this adjudication.  In addition to the10
eighth APF, other “[a]vailable, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination.”
Directive ¶ E2.2.1.  Ultimately, the clearance decision is “an overall common sense
determination.”  Directive ¶ E2.2.3.    
The Appeal Board has held that the whole person analysis can properly factor in
“[o]ther matters such as evidence of an applicant’s personal loyalties; the nature and
extent of an applicant’s family’s ties to the U.S. relative to his [or her] ties to a foreign
S e e  IS C R  C a se  N o .  0 4 -0 6 2 4 2  a t  2  (A p p .  B d .  Ju n e  2 8 ,  2 0 0 6 ) .  
1 1
10
country; his or her social ties within the U.S.; and many others raised by the facts of a
given case.” ISCR Case No. 04-00540 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 5, 2007).  
Substantial mitigating evidence weighs towards granting Applicant’s security
clearance. Applicant has lived in the United States for 18 years, and she has been a
naturalized citizen for eight years. When she became a U.S. citizen, she swore
allegiance to the United States. Her husband is also a naturalized U.S. citizen and her
son is a U.S.-born citizen. There is no evidence she has ever taken any action which
could cause potential harm to the United States. Applicant does appear to take her
loyalty to the United States very seriously, and she has worked diligently for a defense
contractor for two years.  
Five circumstances weigh against Applicant in the whole person analysis. First,
China is a nuclear power and China’s government is a rival of the United States. China
is an authoritarian, Communist state. More importantly for security purposes, China
actively seeks classified and industrial/economic information. China may attempt to use
her parents and in-laws who live in China to obtain such information. Second, she had
significant connections to China before she emigrated to the United States in 1989. She
was born in China, and spent her formative years there. Third, her parents and in-laws
are citizen residents of China. Her contacts with her parents as well as her husband’s
contacts with his parents demonstrate a sense of loyalty and obligation to them which
continues. Fourth, she visited China one time in 1991 for approximately two weeks to
see her family since she arrived in the U.S. Her father has visited Applicant and her
family in the U.S. two times in 1994 and 1998 and stayed approximately one year for
each visit. Individually, these contacts may appear minimal, but collectively they
demonstrate a sense of obligation and a connection with family members in China. Fifth,
other than her husband, she has no other known immediate family members or other
persons with whom she maintains a close relationship living in the U.S.  
Applicant successfully refuted the allegation alleged in SOR ¶ 1.c. as factually incorrect.  The
government did not present any evidence in rebuttal.
“Because of the extreme sensitivity of security matters, there is a strong
presumption against granting a security clearance. Whenever any doubt is raised . . .  it
is deemed best to err on the side of the government’s compelling interest in security by
denying or revoking [a] clearance.” Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F.2d 1399, 1401 (9  Cir.th
1990).  After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, all the facts and
circumstances, in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not
mitigated the security concerns pertaining to foreign influence. This is a close case, but
ultimately the evidence leaves me with doubts as to Applicant’s security eligibility and
suitability.  
I take this position based on the law, as set forth in Department of Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518 (1988), my “careful consideration of the whole person factors”  and11
supporting evidence, my application of the pertinent factors under the Adjudicative
Process, and my interpretation of my responsibilities under the Guidelines. Applicant has
11
not mitigated or overcome the government’s case. For the reasons stated, I conclude she
is not eligible for access to classified information.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:         
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:  AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue eligibility for a security
clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Robert J. Tuider
Administrative Judge