KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST:  Applicant was born in Russia. She currently works for a defense contractor as a test
engineer. In 1994, she married an American in the U.S. She became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
2000. Her mother, half-brother, stepfather, and aunt are citizens and residents of Russia. Applicant
visited Russia in 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2002. Applicant has mitigated the foreign influence
security concerns. Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-22144.h1
DATE: 07/31/2007
DATE:  July 31, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-22144
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
JACQUELINE T. WILLIAMS
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Daniel F. Crowley, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
William F. Savarino, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
Applicant was born in Russia. She currently works for a defense contractor as a test engineer.
In 1994, she married an American in the U.S. She became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 2000. Her
2
mother, half-brother, stepfather, and aunt are citizens and residents of Russia. Applicant visited
Russia in 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2002. Applicant has mitigated the foreign influence security
concerns. Clearance is granted.
Ex. 1 (Security Clearance Application, dated December 2, 2004).1
Pursuant to Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as2
amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program  (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended (Directive).
Applicant waived the 15-day notice rule. Tr. 9.3
Tr. 34.4
Id. at 29.5
Id. at 26.6
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 2, 2004, Applicant executed a Security Clearance Application (SF 86).  On1
December 5, 2006, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant a security
clearance and issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR)  to Applicant, detailing the basis for its2
decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) of the revised Adjudicative
Guidelines (AG) issued on December 29, 2005, and implemented by the Department of Defense for
SORs issued after September 1, 2006. The revised AG  was provided to Applicant when the SOR
was issued. 
In a sworn, written statement, dated December 12, 2006, Applicant responded to the SOR
allegations and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on April 17, 2007. On April 30,
2007, Applicant’s attorney filed a Notice of Appearance. A Notice of Hearing was issued on May
1, 2007, scheduling the hearing for May 8, 2007.  The hearing was conducted as scheduled. At the3
hearing, the Government offered one exhibit, Ex. 1. Applicant offered 16 exhibits, Exs. A-Q. All
exhibits were admitted into the record without objection. Prior to the hearing, the Government
submitted nine documents about Russia for administrative notice. The transcript (Tr.) was received
on May 18, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Applicant admitted the factual allegations under subparagraphs 1.a through 1.f. Those
admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete and thorough review of the
evidence in the record, and upon due consideration of same, I make the following findings of fact:
Applicant was born in Russia. She is 39 years old and works as a test engineer for a defense
contractor.  Since 2000, she has worked in the computer field for other contractors. She received her4
bachelor’s degree from a state university in Russia.  In 1992, she immigrated to the U.S. to pursue5
a graduate degree in international business. In Russia, she worked as an interpreter and translator for
a small consulting company that had clients in the U.S. The company sponsored her trip to the U.S.
to continue her graduate education.  She received her master’s degree in 1996 from a well-known6
Id. at 28.7
Id. at 27.8
Id. at 28.9
Id. at 31.10
Id. at 42.11
Id. at 39-40.12
Id. at 41.13
Id. at 41-42.14
Id. at 44.15
Id. at 46.16
Id. at 47.17
Id. at 48.18
4
university.  Her husband is a U.S. citizen and they married in December 1994 in the U.S.  They met7 8
in graduate school. In April 2000, she became a naturalized U.S. citizen.  They adopted their son9
from a Russian orphanage in 2002, and he is an American citizen.  Her son is not a dual citizen of10
the U.S. and Russia. Applicant traveled to Russia in 1993, 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2002.
Applicant’s mother is 62 and a citizen and resident of Russia. She lives in a remote area of
Russia, where she owns a small flat.  Her mother is a medical doctor and was trained as a11
pediatrician. Her mother is the chief of staff or managing doctor at an orphanage, which is run by
the local government, receiving subsidies from the federal budget.  Over the years, her mother12
placed more than 500 children with American families and received a letter from the U.S. Embassy
last year “thanking her for helping American families adopt children.”  Her mother makes13
approximately $500 a month and often does not get paid regularly.  Her mother visited the U.S. in14
1999 and Applicant opened a joint bank account with her. Applicant stated this about their joint
account: “When tough times come, I basically force her to make small withdrawals so she could
survive.”  She talks weekly to her mother by telephone.  15 16
The SOR alleges that Applicant sends her family in Russia approximately $200 to $300 about
six to eight times per year. She stated that her support to her mother averages about $2,000
annually.  At times, her mother uses the money to purchase boots, mittens, or coats for the children17
in the orphanage.18
Id. at 56.19
Id. at 57.20
Id. at 58.21
Id. at 59.22
Id. at 61.23
Id.24
Id.25
Id. at 64.26
Id. at 66.27
Id. at 80, 78-93.28
Id. at 83.29
Id.30
Id. at 85.31
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Applicant’s stepfather is a citizen and resident of Russia. Her stepfather and mother are no
longer married.  They divorced when Applicant was in college and the last time she spoke to him19
was in 1996. She has no idea where he resides.20
Applicant’s 35-year-old half-brother is a citizen and resident of Russia. He lives in the same
flat with her mother.  He works in the same orphanage with her mother as a computer technician.21
He also owns a small business that sells pet food.  She has an estranged relationship with him since22
their parents’ divorce.  They rarely communicate by telephone or email. His wife also works at the23
orphanage as an accounting assistant.24
Applicant’s 55- or 56-year-old aunt, her mother’s sister, is a citizen and resident of Russia.25
She owns a few retail stores with her husband, selling clothing.  Applicant might speak to her aunt26
twice a year.27
Three witnesses testified on behalf of Applicant. One witness is a World War II Bronze Star
recipient.  He hired Applicant  in about 1997 as an administrative assistant of an investment fund28
group where he worked.  He had daily contact with her during her two and one-half years of29
employment. He intensely scrutinized her background before he hired her as he had about $6 billion
under management at the height of his career.  She left because she wanted to move into a more30
professional career. After leaving, they continue to see each other socially.  He believes that she is31
loyal to the U.S. and that she should be granted a security clearance. He stated this about her
credibility and character:
Id. at 86.32
Id at 93-101, 102-106.33
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Yes, I think she certainly was very valuable to us in the firm, and she is an engaging
young woman who had a good personality and gets along well with people, and she
showed her discretion during the years that she worked for me.32
The other two witnesses met Applicant in late 2004 when she started working at their place
of employment.  They both believe she is honest, loyal, and trustworthy. They endorse her33
application for a security clearance.
Applicant has a strong attachment to the U.S. She owns a home valued at about $300,000.
She maintains both checking and savings accounts as well as retirement accounts. She is actively
involved in her community and her son’s activities at school.
The U.S. and Russia were former adversaries in the Cold War. While relations between the
countries improved after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990, there were issues that remain
contentious, including Russia’s support of the Iranian nuclear program. Russia has assisted the U.S.
in mediating international conflicts and is an ally in the war on terrorism. While its human rights
record has improved since the demise of the Soviet Union, violence and human rights abuses are
again on the rise. Russia has an active, recent, and ongoing program targeting the U.S. As of 2005,
Russia was the most aggressive collector of and accounted for the majority of the targeting of
sensitive and protected U.S. technology. The U.S. State Department cautions Americans traveling
to Russia that there remains a heightened potential for terrorist attacks, although Americans are not
being specifically targeted.
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines to be considered in evaluating
a person’s eligibility to hold a security clearance. Included in the guidelines are disqualifying
conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC) applicable to each specific guideline. Additionally,
each security clearance decision must be a fair and impartial commonsense decision based on the
relevant and material facts and circumstances, the whole-person concept, along with the factors listed
in the Directive. Specifically these are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding
circumstances; (2) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (3) the age of the applicant; (4) the
motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary,
or undertaken with knowledge of the consequences; (5) the absence or presence of rehabilitation; and
(6) the probability that the circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future. Although
the presence or absence of a particular condition or factor for or against clearance is not outcome
determinative, the adjudicative guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured
against this policy guidance.
ISCR Case No. 96-0277 (July 11, 1997) at 2.34
ISCR Case No. 97-0016 (December 31, 1997) at 3; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.14.35
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).36
ISCR Case No. 94-1075 (August 10, 1995) at 3-4; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.37
ISCR Case No. 93-1390 (January 27, 1995) at 7-8; Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.38
Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.39
Id.40
Id.; Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ E2.2.2.41
Executive Order 10865 § 7.42
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The sole purpose of a security clearance determination is to decide if it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an applicant.  The Government34
has the burden of proving controverted facts.  The burden of proof is something less than a35
preponderance of evidence.  Once the government has met its burden, the burden shifts to an applicant36
to present evidence of refutation, extenuation, or mitigation to overcome the case against him.37
Additionally, an applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance
decision.38
No one has a right to a security clearance  and “the clearly consistent standard indicates that39
security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable40
doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved
in favor of protecting such sensitive information.  The decision to deny an individual a security41
clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication42
that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance.
CONCLUSIONS
I have carefully considered all the facts in evidence and the legal standards, and I reach the
following conclusions.
Guideline ¶ 6 articulates the Government’s concern regarding foreign influence. “Foreign
contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign
interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country
in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain
protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.”
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Applicant’s mother, half-brother, stepfather, and aunt are residents and citizens of Russia. She
has visited her family in Russia at least five times between 1993 and 2002. Applicant has frequent
contact and a close relationship with her mother. The relationship with her mother creates a heightened
risk of foreign pressure or attempted exploitation because her mother is a resident and citizen of Russia
and Russia actively seeks intelligence, classified, and economic information from U.S. businesses. Her
close connection to her mother also creates a potential conflict of interest because this relationship is
sufficiently close to raise a security concern about her desire to help her mother by providing sensitive
or classified information. Her relationship with her mother is sufficiently substantial to potentially
subject her to a heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation.  Consequently, Foreign Influence
Disqualifying Conditions ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion)
and ¶ 7(b) (connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology
and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information)
apply.
Various conditions can mitigate the foreign influence security concerns. The most important
mitigating factor is Applicant herself and her total commitment to the U.S. through her employment
with major defense contractors for the past seven years. She married an American and they have a
home in the U.S. Moreover, she has not sought dual citizenship for her son in Russia. Although her
mother and half-brother work for a state-run orphanage, they are in a remote town in Russia and
neither one has any affiliation with the Russian government. None of her relatives living in Russia
pose a potential security threat or are in a position likely to be influenced by the Russian government.
None of them work for the Russian government or are involved in work that might create security
issues for the U.S. Russia is a country where there is a heightened risk because of their active
intelligence gathering activities aimed at the U.S. Thus, Foreign Influence Mitigating Condition ¶ 8(a)
(the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located,
or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual
will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group,
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.) applies. 
Applicant has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S. She has lived
in the U.S. since 1992. Her husband is a U.S. citizen and her son was born in the U.S. Because of
Applicant’s deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., she can be expected to
resolve any conflict  in favor of the U.S. Thus, ¶ 8(b) (there is no conflict of interest, either because
the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country
is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest)
applies. Accordingly, allegations 1.a through 1.f of the SOR are concluded in favor of Applicant.
I considered carefully all the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in this case in
light of the “whole person” concept, keeping in mind that any doubt as to whether access to classified
information is clearly consistent with national security must be resolved in favor or the national
security. Looking at the whole person, Applicant presents a highly credible case that she would not be
influenced by anything contrary to the best interests of the U.S. Her residence in the U.S. for more than
15 years, her marriage to an American, and her career record with several major defense contractors
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for more than seven years effectively refute the risk that she would now take any action that would
jeopardize U.S. security interests. She has assimilated into U.S. customs and culture and continues to
embrace the U.S. as her home. I conclude Applicant has mitigated the potential security concerns
arising from her personal ties to Russia. I find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to
grant a clearance to Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1. Guideline B (Foreign Influence): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.
Jacqueline T. Williams
 Administrative Judge