KEYWORD: Foreign Influence; Foreign Preference
DIGEST: Applicant, a 51-year-old engineer with a leading defense contractor, mitigated security
concerns for foreign preference arising from a father and four siblings residing in Taiwan by showing
his extensive U.S. education since his arrival here in 1987, his security awareness, and strong
financial and educational ties to the U.S. He also mitigated foreign preference allegation concerning
his Taiwan passport by proof of its surrender to his corporate security office. Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-23890.h1
DATE: 07/31/2007
DATE:  July 31, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-23890
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CHARLES D. ABLARD
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
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Applicant, a 51-year-old engineer with a leading defense contractor, mitigated security
concerns for foreign preference arising from a father and four siblings residing in Taiwan by showing
his extensive U.S. education since his arrival here in 1987, his security awareness, and strong
financial and educational ties to the U.S. He also mitigated foreign preference allegation concerning
his Taiwan passport by proof of its surrender to his corporate security office. Clearance is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 9, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) pursuant to
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry as amended and
modified, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified, issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the
preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. DOHA recommended the case be
referred to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued,
denied, or revoked.
In a sworn written statement, dated February 21, 2007, Applicant responded to the allegations
set forth in the SOR, and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on April 4, 2007. A
Notice of Hearing was issued May 8, 2007, for a hearing held on June 1, 2007. The Government
introduced three exhibits at the hearing and requested that administrative notice be taken of eleven
official government documents. The Applicant introduced one exhibit. All exhibits were admitted
into evidence. The Applicant testified on his own behalf. The record was left open for submission
of additional materials by Applicant and three additional documents were submitted on July 12,
2007, and admitted in evidence. The transcript was received on June 13, 2007. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant has denied all allegations under Foreign Preference (Guideline C) and under
Foreign Influence (Guideline B), and offered explanatory information at the hearing and in his post-
hearing submission. The admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a complete
review of the evidence in the record and upon due consideration of the record the following
additional findings of fact are made:
Applicant is a 51-year-old employee of a principal defense contractor working as a
mechanical engineer on structural analysis. He served a mandatory two year period of military
service from 1978-1980 in the Republic of China (Taiwan) as a maintenance officer before entering
a Taiwan university from which he received a bachelor’s degree. He emigrated to the U.S. in 1987
to study until 1993 at a leading engineering school in the U.S., from which he received both a
Master’s degree and Ph.D. He continued in a faculty research position for four years and became a
citizen in 2003. Since then he has worked for two hi-tech companies. He applied for a security
clearance on November 11, 2005, and held an interim clearance until this proceeding was initiated.
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Applicant’s father, brother, and three sisters are citizens of Taiwan. His father is 86 years old
and retired. His brother operates a family business, started by their father, manufacturing machines
to make packing material which he sells in southeast Asia. One of his sisters works in the family
company, the second is a part-time bookkeeper, and the third is retired. He gives a gift of $2,500 a
year to his relatives, although they are self sufficient and do not need help. None of his relatives
worked for the Taiwan government. His father and oldest sister visited him in the U.S. in 2005. His
principal contacts with his relatives are telephone calls 2-3 times a year. 
Applicant held a passport of Taiwan after he became a U.S. citizen but used only his U.S.
passport to travel. He did not realize the possible security consideration of the passport until this
matter arose. His last trip to Taiwan to visit family was in 2005. He also traveled there four times
in 2003-2004 because of an accident, illness, and death of his mother. He may return again sometime
soon to visit his father. The record was left open to provide him an opportunity to provide evidence
of surrender of his passport. He established that he had surrendered and invalidated his Taiwan
passport with the security office of his employer (Exh. B 2 and 3). 
Applicant is married to a college professor with the state university system in their state of
residence. They have no children. His salary is $118,000 per annum and he has assets of
approximately $500,000, including the equity in his home, and savings accounts. He has no financial
interests in Taiwan. His hobbies are tennis and music. 
Applicant has been fully briefed on security requirements by his company and has a keen
interest in preserving U.S. technology, particularly against encroachments by the PRC (Tr. 56). He
loves his work, and is very proud of his U.S. education. He appreciates the responsibilities which
he has been given. He is proud to be giving something in return for his citizenship. He is well
regarded by his colleagues (Exh. A). He follows the rules in the company for all matters and knows
the rules for possible security issues require immediate reporting to security officers.
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at 527
An evaluation of whether the applicant meets the security guidelines includes consideration
of the following factors: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and
maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence
of rehabilitation and other behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential
for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Directive, ¶ E2.2.1. Security clearances are granted only when “it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to do so.” Executive Order No. 10865 § 2. See Executive Order No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
Initially, the Government must establish, by something less than a preponderance of the
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evidence, that conditions exist in the personal or professional history of the applicant which
disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information.
See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. The applicant then bears the burden of demonstrating that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a clearance. “Any doubt as to whether access
to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the
national security.” Directive, ¶ E2.2.2. “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must,
on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. See Executive Order No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors and conditions above, I conclude the following with respect to all allegations set
forth in the SOR: 
Conditions under Guideline B that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include contact with a foreign family member who is a citizen of, or resident in a foreign country if
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or
coercion (AG ¶ 7a). Based on the evidence of record, including Applicant’s acknowledgment of
family members living abroad, the Government established a basis for concern over foreign
influence. The Applicant had the burden to establish security suitability through evidence which
refutes, mitigates, or extenuates the disqualification and demonstrates that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant a security clearance. ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).
By virtue of the relationships of the foreign family members, Applicant’s contacts, though
infrequent, cannot be deemed casual. Mitigating conditions (MC) that might be applicable are a
determination that the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which the
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual group or government and the interests of the U.S. (AG ¶ 8a). The other relevant
MC is that the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,that
he can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. (AG ¶ 8b). While
Applicant’s father lives in Taiwan, he is a an octogenerian and fully retired. His sisters and brother
are either retired or in commercial activities totally unrelated to the government of Taiwan. The
government acknowledged that the type of work done by the family provides a lesser  security risk
than that found in the usual foreign influence case (Tr. 52). I find that both mitigating conditions are
applicable. 
While there is evidence that Taiwan has engaged in economic and military espionage, and
that the PRC may use it as a source of information as stated in official documents (Exhs. VII, X, and
XI), the U.S. has consistently supported the democratically elected government of Taiwan for it’s
efforts at pluralization and multi-party elections (Exh. II). The U.S. regards Taiwan as a key ally in
Asia. Applicant shows no loyalty to Taiwan or the PRC and is a competent professional who knows
how to deal with any pressures that might be brought against him by an agent of a foreign
government.
The applicable guidelines for Foreign Preference Guideline C provide that an individual who
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acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States may be
prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States
(AG ¶ 9). Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include the
possession of a current foreign passport (AG ¶ 10a 1). Security concerns may be mitigated by a
providing evidence that the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security
authority, or otherwise invalidated. (AG ¶ 11e). I conclude from the evidence submitted showing
surrender of the passport to security authorities by Applicant, that the allegation has been mitigated.
In all adjudications the protection of our national security is of paramount concern. Persons
who have access to classified information have an overriding responsibility for the security of the
nation. The objective of the security clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment
of a person’s trustworthiness and fitness for access to classified information. The “whole person”
concept recognizes that we should view a person by the totality of their acts and omissions. Each
case must be judged on its own merits taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and
applying sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis.
Applicant is a person of substance and veracity who is highly educated. He has a responsible
position of trust, and is doing a good job for his company. He provided sincere and credible
testimony as to his relationship with his family, his motivations, and his loyalty to the U.S. He has
established a successful life here building financial and scholarly ties to the U.S. He has a strong
financial stake in the U.S. and none to Taiwan. His contacts with his family are minimal and only
to continue his family obligations. He has no deference to or loyalty to his country of origin.
While the U.S. has had concerns regarding industrial espionage from Taiwan as stated in
official documents (Exhs. III, V, and XI), Applicant shows no loyalty to Taiwan. He is a competent
professional who expresses a knowledge of how to deal with any pressures that might be brought
against him by or through an agent of a foreign government. Other official documents of the U.S.
reflect a continuing need and desire for cooperation with Taiwan on a variety of social and
technological fronts (Exh. II). 
After considering all the evidence in its totality and as an integrated whole to focus on the
whole person of Applicant, I conclude that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
clearance to Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are hereby
rendered as follows:
Paragraph l Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: For Applicant
Paragraph 2 Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
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Subparagraph 2.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b.: For Applicant
DECISION
After full consideration of all the facts and documents presented by the record in this case,
it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance is granted. 
Charles D. Ablard 
Administrative Judge