KEYWORD: Foreign Influence; Foreign Preference
DIGEST: Applicant is a 46-year-old audit supervisor for a defense contractor.  He came to the
United States in 1997, and became a United States citizen in 2004.  He obtained a United States
passport that same year.  He has family members and friends who are citizens and residents of
Nigeria.  He has continuous contact with these people.  Applicant obtained a new Nigerian
passport in June 2006, and used it to enter Nigeria in March 2007.  He has not surrendered the
passport.  Applicant failed to present sufficient information to mitigate security concerns for
foreign influence and foreign preference.  Clearance is denied. 
CASENO: 07-03309.h1
DATE: 07/30/2007
DATE:  July 30, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-03309
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
THOMAS M. CREAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Julie R. Edmnds, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
2
Applicant is a 46-year-old audit supervisor for a defense contractor.  He came to the United
States in 1997, and became a United States citizen in 2004.  He obtained a United States passport
that same year.  He has family members and friends who are citizens and residents of Nigeria.  He
has continuous contact with these people.  Applicant obtained a new Nigerian passport in June 2006,
and used it to enter Nigeria in March 2007.  He has not surrendered the passport.  Applicant failed
to present sufficient information to mitigate security concerns for foreign influence and foreign
preference.  Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 10, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearing and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its decision to deny a security clearance for Applicant.  The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry
(February 20, 1990), as amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), using the
Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
implemented by the Department of Defense for all SORs issued after September 1, 2006.  Applicant
acknowledged receipt of the SOR on May 21, 2007.  The SOR alleges security concerns under
Guideline B (Foreign Influence), and Guideline C (Foreign Preference).
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on May 30, 2007.  He admitted all but one of the
allegations, allegation l, under both guidelines, and provided a clarification for allegation 1.l, that
he denied.  He elected to have the matter decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing.
Department Counsel submitted the Government’s written case on June 13, 2007.  Applicant
received a complete file of relevant material (FORM) on June 25, 2007, and was provided the
opportunity to file objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the disqualifying
conditions.  He proved additional information on July 8, 2007, and Department Counsel noted no
objections to consideration of the additional information on July 12, 2007.  The case was assigned
to me on July 19, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant is 46 years old and has been an audit supervisor for a defense contractor for eight
years.  He was born in Nigeria and came to the United States at age 35.  He received his accounting
degree from a Nigerian university before immigrating to the United States in 1997.  He became a
United States citizen in March 2004, and received a United States passport in May 2004.  He also
admitted that he renewed his Nigerian passport in July 2006 after becoming a United States citizen.
His Nigerian passport is still current and in his possession.  He used it in March 2007 to enter
Nigeria to see his mother.  He is married and his wife is a dual United States and Nigerian citizen
residing with Applicant in the United States.  He has two minor children born in the United States
who are citizens and residents of the United States.
Item 3; Item 4, at 6-7, 18-25.1
Item 3.2
Response to FORM., dated July 8, 2007.3
Item I.4
Item III.5
Item IV.6
Item V.7
3
His mother is a resident and citizen of Nigeria.  He has four siblings who are citizens and
residents of Nigeria.  His in-laws are both citizens and residents of Nigeria.   Applicant also admits1
he has brothers-in-law, three of which are residents and citizens of Nigeria, and one a citizen of
Nigeria residing in Finland.  He also admits he has four close friends, three who are citizens and 
residents of Nigeria, and one a citizen of Nigeria residing in the United States.  He also admits he
owns real estate and stocks in Nigeria.2
Applicant noted that he does not represent any foreign government, especially the
government of Nigeria.  He is not and has never been a member of any militant organization that is
a threat to the security of the United States.  He maintains contact with his family members and old
friends in Nigeria.  Some of these contacts are with fellow religious leaders.3
Nigeria is Africa’s most populated country, with over a half of the population of all of Africa.
Nigeria became independent from Great Britain in 1960, and has a constitutional parliamentary
government.  The country was ruled by the military until 1999 when there was a democratic election
bringing back civilian rule.   The Department of State continuously issues travel warnings because4
of chaos and lawlessness in Nigeria.  Lawlessness in Nigeria leads to car bombings, kidnaping of
foreigners, and violent crimes.  Violence is particularly acute in the Niger Delta region.  Religious
tension between Muslims and Christians results in occasional acts of communal violence.  Al-Qaida
leadership has expressed interest in overthrowing the government.  Road and air travel are
dangerous.   The government’s human rights record is poor and government officials commit serious5
human rights abuses.  These include the abridgment of rights to change government, politically
motivated killings by security forces, use of excessive force and torture, restriction on free speech
and press, and other physical human rights abuses.   Nigeria has made progress in a fragile6
democracy.  Nigeria is one of the United States’ key strategic partners in Africa.  It become a major
player in Africa helping to negotiate settlements with other countries and play a vital role in
peacekeeping operations.  Nigeria remains relatively stable although ethnic and religious clashes in
part of the country are common.7
POLICIES
The President has “the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).8
Directive ¶ E2.2.1.9
AG ¶ 2(a).10
Id.11
See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.12
Directive ¶ E3.1.14.13
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002); see Directive ¶ E3.1.15.14
4
security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . .
that will give that person access to such information.”   Eligibility for a security clearance is8
predicated upon the applicant meeting the security guidelines contained in the Directive.9
The Directive sets out the adjudicative guidelines for making decisions on security clearances.
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access
to classified information, and it lists the disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions for each
guideline.  The adjudicative guidelines for this case are the guidelines promulgated by the President
on December 29, 2005, and implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2007.  Each
clearance decision must be fair, impartial, and a commonsense decision based on the relevant and
material facts and circumstances, and the whole person concept.10
The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance.  An administrative
judge must apply the “whole person concept,” and consider and carefully weigh the available, reliable
information about the person.  An administrative judge should consider: (1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the applicant’s age and maturity at the
time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the
potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation of
recurrence.11
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special relationship with the
government.  The government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those
individuals to whom it grants access to classified information.  The decision to deny an individual a
security clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.   It is merely12
an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of
Defense have established for issuing a clearance.
Initially, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts in the SOR that
disqualify or may disqualify the Applicant from being eligible for access to classified information.13
Thereafter, Applicant is responsible for presenting evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate
facts.   An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the14
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). 15
ISCR Case No. 99-0597 (App. Bd. Dec 13, 2000).16
ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996) (quoting DISCR Case No. 92-1106 (App. Bd. Oct. 7,17
1993))
Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b).18
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national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”   The government is under no duty to15
present evidence to disprove any Adjudicative Guideline mitigating condition, and an Administrative
Judge cannot assume or infer that any particular mitigating condition is applicable merely because the
government does not present evidence to disprove that particular mitigating condition.   “[T]he16
Directive presumes there is a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.”   “Any doubt as to whether access to17
classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the
national security.” 18
Based upon a consideration of the evidence, I find the following adjudicative guidelines most
pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case:
Guideline B - Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has
divided loyalties or foreign financial interest, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person,
group, organization, or government in such a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.  Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located,
including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target
United States citizens to obtain information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
Guideline C - When an Applicant acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign
country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those which
would mitigate security concerns, pertaining to the adjudicative guidelines are set forth and discussed
in the conclusions section below.
CONCLUSIONS
I carefully considered all of the facts in evidence and the legal standards discussed above.  I
reach the following conclusions regarding the allegations in the SOR.
Applicant’s family members and friends in Nigeria raise Foreign Influence Disqualifying
Condition (FI DC) ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion).  Applicant
has family members, his mother and siblings, his in-laws and brothers-in-law, friends and professional
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associates, who are all citizens and residents of Nigeria.  He admits he has continuous contact with
these people that he considers natural and generally acceptable.  Applicant’s ownership of property and
stock in Nigeria also raises FI DC ¶ 7(e) (a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a
foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the
individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation).  Applicant admits he owns property
and stock in Nigeria from his early life in his native country.  The presence of individuals and property
and financial interests in Nigeria creates a heightened risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion for Applicant because of the general nature of violence and lawlessness in
Nigeria as well as terrorist activities.  There is no heightened concern for his brother-in-law who is a
resident of Finland, and his friend who is a resident of the United States.  Security concerns for these
two individuals has not been established.
The disqualifying conditions can be mitigated by Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI
MC) ¶ 8(a) (the nature of the relationship with foreign persons, the country in which these persons
are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely
the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization or government and the interests of the U.S.); FI MC ¶ 8(b) (there is
no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign
person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. Interest); FC MC ¶ 8(c) (contact or communication with foreign
citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation); and FC MC ¶ 8(f) (the value or routine nature of the foreign business,
financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be
used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual).  The relationship between
Applicant and his family and friends in Nigeria is not causal and is not infrequent.  He admits to
maintaining contact with them which he describes as natural and generally acceptable.  Since
Applicant’s family and friends are located in Nigeria, a country that is violent, has significant criminal
activity, with terrorism and lawlessness that the United States State Department continuously issues
a travel warning for the country, Applicant can be placed in a position to chose between his family and
friends and the interests of the United States.  Applicant presents no information that the family and
friends are not vulnerable to activities or individuals that would exploit, manipulate or pressure
Applicant to make such choices.  
Additionally, Applicant does not present sufficient information to conclude that he has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the United States that he would resolve conflicts
in favor of the United States.  In fact, the information leads to a conclusion that he does not have long
standing loyalties.  He came to the United States only 14 years ago.  He obtained a Nigerian passport
after he became a United States citizen and had a United States passport.  He has not established that
his relationships and loyalty to the United States is deep and longstanding.  At best, his loyalties are
split between Nigeria and the United States.
Applicant presented no information on the nature of his property and financial interests in
Nigeria.  While the property interest may be small and the stock worth only $15,000, Applicant has
not presented any information that the interests could not result in a conflict or could not be used to
influence, manipulate or pressure.  Applicant has failed to mitigate the security concerns for foreign
influence.
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Applicant’s possession of a valid Nigerian passport raises Foreign Preference Disqualifying
Condition (FP DC) ¶ 10(a)(1) (exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship after
becoming a U.S. Citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member.  This includes but is
not limited to : (1) possession of a current foreign passport.  This disqualifying condition can be
mitigated by Foreign Preference Mitigating Condition (FP MC) ¶ 11(d) (use of a foreign passport is
approved by the cognizant security authority, and ¶ 11(e) (the passport has been destroyed,
surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated).  Applicant renewed his
Nigerian passport in June 2006, and used it in March 2007 to enter Nigeria.  He presented no
information that he had the approval of a security official to use the passport.  Applicant has the
passport in his possession and it has not been destroyed or surrendered to cognizant security authority.
Applicant’s possession of a current usable Nigerian passport establishes a foreign preference for
Nigeria.  I find against Applicant for foreign preference.
I carefully considered all of the circumstances in light of the “whole person” concept.  I
conclude Applicant is not eligible for access to classified information. 
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as required by Section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.i.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.j.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.k.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.l: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.m.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.n.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.o.: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b.: Against Applicant
8
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national security to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.  Clearance
is denied.
Thomas M. Crean
Administrative Judge