KEYWORD: Financial
DIGEST: Applicant is a 61-year-old decorated combat veteran of the U.S. Army Reserve, currently
employed by a defense contractor. Applicant co-signed a car loan for his son. His son missed a few
payments. The car was repossessed, and a judgment was awarded against Applicant and his son.
Applicant paid the judgment. Applicant has mitigated the financial considerations concern.
Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 05-14397.h1
DATE: 08/03/2007
DATE:  August 3, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 05-14397
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
EDWARD W. LOUGHRAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
2
Applicant is a 61-year-old decorated combat veteran of the U.S. Army Reserve, currently
employed by a defense contractor. Applicant co-signed a car loan for his son. His son missed a few
payments. The car was repossessed, and a judgment was awarded against Applicant and his son.
Applicant paid the judgment. Applicant has mitigated the financial considerations concern.
Clearance is granted.
Pursuant to Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended1
and modified, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program  (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended (Directive).
FORM see footnote 1.2
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant. On June 26, 2006, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons  (SOR)1
detailing the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial
Considerations) of the Directive. Applicant answered the SOR in writing on August 25, 2006, and
elected to have the case decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel
submitted the Government’s written case on November 7, 2006. A complete copy of the file of
relevant material (FORM) was provided to Applicant, who was afforded an opportunity to file
objections and submit material to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the disqualifying conditions.
Applicant received the FORM on December 28, 2007, and responded on January 18, 2007.
Department Counsel replied to Applicant’s response on July 16, 2007. The case was assigned to me
on July 26, 2007.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
Department Counsel submitted Item 4, Personal Subject Interview, Report of Investigation
(ROI), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), conducted on November 4, 2004, as part of the
documentary evidence to support the allegations in the SOR. This document is void of the
interviewer’s name, signature, and any other type of authentication. Department Counsel contends
Item 4 is admissible “because Applicant chose to have an administrative determination without a
hearing and by doing so alleviated the authentication requirement of Paragraph 20 of the Additional
Procedural Guidance, pursuant to the Appeal Board caselaw.”  In support of his position,2
Department Counsel cites ISCR Case No. 95-0817 (App. Bd. Feb. 21, 1997). Specifically he notes
in that case, the Appeal Board considered the “Certified Results of Interview,” which involved
Applicant’s admissions against interest made to an agent of the Defense Investigative Service and
otherwise admissible under Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE). Department
Counsel’s reliance on this Appeal Board decision is misplaced. The Appeal Board decision
addressed the admissibility of a Certified Results of Interview under Paragraph 22 of the Additional
Procedural Guidance, not the authentication requirement for an ROI established by Paragraph 20 of
the Additional Procedural Guidance. Paragraph 22 specifically involves adverse statements made
against applicants by third parties. That situation is not applicable in this case. Paragraph 20 states
in part: “Official records of evidence compiled in the regular course of business, other than DoD
personnel background reports of investigation (ROI), may be received and considered by the
Administrative Judge without authenticating witnesses.” It elaborates “An ROI may be received with
an authenticating witness provided it is otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”
Department Counsel cites FRE 803(6) in support of his position. FRE 803(6), Hearsay Exceptions;
Availability of Declarant Immaterial, permits various types of documents to be admitted into
evidence provided they were “made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a
person with knowledge, if kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity, all as shown
ISCR Case No. 02-25196 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Jul. 10, 2007).  3
Item 3.4
Id.; Applicant’s response to FORM.5
Items 2-4; Applicant’s response to FORM.6
4
by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with
Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification.”  Item 4 is an unsworn “Personal
Subject Interview” conducted by an unknown person, that is not signed by the interviewer nor
interviewee, nor authenticated by an appropriate witness. It does not comply with FRE 902, which
requires the document to be certified by the custodian or other person authorized to make the
certification. Stated plainly, Item 4 is an ROI, not a Certified Results of Interview. If Item 4 was a
Certified Results of Interview, signed and “authenticated” by the agent who conducted the interview,
it would be admissible.  The Government is misguided in its interpretation of Paragraphs 20 and 223
of the Additional Procedural Guidance, the Appeal Board case cited, and the FRE. Department
Counsel has not offered any authoritative reference that states authentication of personal interview
statements is not required when the applicant elects not to have a hearing. The Government may
request a hearing and circumvent the evidentiary issues raised here. They have chosen not to do so,
and should not be permitted to use in a FORM what they could not in a hearing. Nonetheless,
Applicant did not object to Item 4, possibly because he relied on Department Counsel’s erroneous
recitation of the law, or because it contained information that was favorable to Applicant. Item 4 is
admitted as evidence in this case. I will consider those portions of the document that support
Applicant’s position in this case. The nature of the document will be considered when determining
the weight to be accorded the remaining information in Item 4.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant is a 61-year-old employee of a defense contractor. Applicant attended college
overseas from 1965 to 1968. It is unclear what degree he holds, if any. He is married with at least
one child.4
Applicant served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1969 through 1972. He then served in the
U.S. Army Reserve. Applicant was activated in September 1990, and served on active duty until
June 1991, in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. He served in Kuwait as a member
of Task Force Freedom. Applicant received the Army Commendation Medal and the Army
Achievement Medal for his service.  5
Applicant was activated in 2001 to 2002, in support of a homeland security mission. He was
activated again in February 2003, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He deployed to Iraq from
April 2003 to December 2003, as a Sergeant First Class in a military police company. Applicant was
separated from active duty in January 2004. Applicant has since retired from the Army Reserve.
Among other awards, Applicant received the Bronze Star Medal for his service.  The citation reads:6
For exceptionally meritorious performance of duty during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
His outstanding dedication to duty during ground combat in Iraq contributed to the
Applicant’s response to FORM.7
Id.8
Id.9
Id.; Items 2, 4.10
Item 5.11
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overwhelming success of [*****] Corps. His actions are in keeping with the finest
traditions of military service and reflect great credit upon himself, [*****] Corps,
and the United States Army.7
In a recommendation for one of his awards, Applicant’s Company Commander wrote, “[Applicant’s]
action that night showed great resolve and bravery. His actions saved the lives of a family of
innocents, including 2 children and 2 pregnant women in their 3rd trimester.” His Battalion
Commander commented, “[o]utstanding actions by one of the best soldiers in the battalion.
[Applicant’s] actions inspired his subordinates and saved numerous lives.”8
Applicant’s military awards include the above mentioned Bronze Star Medal, Army
Commendation Medal (5  award), Army Achievement Medal (4  award), Meritorious Unitth th
Commendation, Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal, National Defense Service Medal
(3  award), Vietnam Service Medal, Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Service Stars,rd
Armed Forces Reserve Medal, Noncommissioned Officer’s Professional Development Ribbon with
Numeral 3, Army Service Ribbon, Army Reserve Components Overseas Training Ribbon (3rd
award), Kuwait Liberation Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal (K), and Kuwait Liberation Medal
(SA).9
In 1999, Applicant co-signed for a car loan for his son, with his son to make the payments
on the loan. In 2000 to 2001, Applicant’s son experienced financial difficulties, and fell behind on
a few of the payments. Applicant was activated at the time in support of  homeland security. His son
thought he made payment arrangements with the finance company, but the car was repossessed
without notice from Applicant’s garage. Applicant’s son was unaware the car was repossessed. He
believed it was stolen, and reported it to the police. A few months later, they received notice that the
car was sold at auction. In about 2003, Applicant’s son received a letter from a collection agency,
demanding the full payment of the car loan, or be taken to court.10
In 2004, Applicant and his son were sued by the collection agency. In July 2005, a judgment
was awarded against Applicant and his son in the amount of $16,149, with costs, for a total judgment
of $16,619.  11
Applicant’s son made payment arrangements with the creditor, and agreed to pay $100 to
$200 per month until satisfied. Applicant provided proof of four payments made between August
2005 and November 2005, totaling $600. With accrued interest, the debt rose to $17,294, as of
Item 2; Applicant’s response to FORM.12
Items 4, 6-7. While the CBR of June 15, 2006 (Item 6) still reports the tax lien, the CBR of May 13, 200413
clearly reports the lien as paid. Applicant’s old debts were not alleged in the SOR, and are not considered for
disqualifying purposes, but may be considered when analyzing the “whole person,” and the potential application of
mitigating conditions.
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).14
Id. at 527.15
Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960). 16
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).17
Id.; Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ E2.2.2.18
Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.19
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February 2006. On October 4, 2006, Applicant paid the judgment with a check for $18,155. The
check cleared on October 10, 2006.12
Applicant had several delinquent debts from a number of years ago that were all paid in 2004,
or earlier. A federal tax lien was filed in October 1997, for $11,248. The tax resulted when Applicant
changed employment and withdrew an IRA, incurring a tax liability. Applicant thought the taxes
were withheld from the disbursement. The tax was paid in 1998. The other debts were incurred when
Applicant was deployed. The credit bureau report (CBR) of June 15, 2006, lists the tax lien and the
amount owed for the judgment, but lists no other delinquent debts.13
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  As Commander in Chief, the President has14
“the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national security and to determine
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to15
grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to do so.”  An applicant has the ultimate burden of16
demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his or her
security clearance. The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations
should err, if they must, on the side of denials.  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant17
should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such
sensitive information.  The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a18
determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the applicant has not
met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a
clearance.  19
The Directive sets forth potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions
(MC) under each guideline. Additionally, each security clearance decision must be a fair and
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impartial commonsense decision based on the relevant and material facts and circumstances, the
whole-person concept, along with the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3 and ¶ E2.2.1 of the
Directive.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those
which would mitigate security concerns, pertaining to the adjudicative guidelines are set forth and
discussed in the conclusions section below.
CONCLUSIONS
I have carefully considered all the facts in evidence and the legal standards discussed above.
I reach the following conclusions regarding the allegations in the SOR.
Guideline F: Financial Considerations 
An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal or
unethical acts to generate funds to meet financial obligations.
Based on all the evidence, Financial Considerations Disqualifying Condition (FC DC)
E2.A6.1.2.1 (A history of not meeting financial obligations), and FC DC E2.A6.1.2.3 (Inability or
unwillingness to satisfy debts), apply in this case. Applicant co-signed for his son’s auto loan,
accepting responsibility if his son did not maintain payments for this debt. The car was repossessed
and a judgment was obtained against Applicant and his son.
I have considered all the Financial Considerations Mitigating Conditions (FC MC), and
especially considered FC MC E2.A6.1.3.1 (The behavior was not recent), FC MC E2.A6.1.3.2 (It
was an isolated incident), FC MC E2.A6.1.3.3 (The conditions that resulted in the behavior were
largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected
medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation)), FC MC E2.A6.1.3.4 (The person has
received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem
is being resolved or is under control), and FC MC E2.A6.1.3.6 (The individual initiated a good-faith
effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts). 
The judgment was not paid until October 2006, so the behavior is recent and FC MC
E2.A6.1.3.1 does not apply. There is only one debt listed in the SOR, but Applicant had several other
debts, which were all resolved by 2004. Since 2004, the judgment has to be considered an isolated
incident. FC MC E2.A6.1.3.2 is partially applicable. 
Applicant co-signed for his son’s car loan. While he was activated, it was repossessed
because his son did not maintain the payments. Those are conditions that were largely beyond
Applicant’s control. Applicant did not address the problem himself until October 2006. Applicant
merits partial application of FC MC E2.A6.1.3.3. 
There is no evidence Applicant received counseling, so FC MC E2.A6.1.3.4 is not applicable.
Applicant paid the only debt listed in the SOR in October 2006. Applicant’s old debts were resolved
several years ago. He is now current on all his debts. FC MC E2.A6.1.3.6 is applicable.
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Whole Person Analysis
The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in
reaching a determination. In evaluating Applicant’s case, I have considered the adjudicative process
factors listed in the Directive. I have also considered all the evidence, and every finding of fact and
conclusion discussed above. 
Applicant is a combat veteran, who served our country through three conflicts. The accolades
by his superiors in Iraq are truly inspiring. The only listed concern in the SOR is a judgment incurred
because Applicant co-signed a car loan for his son, and the car was repossessed while Applicant was
activated. The debt has been paid. This one paid debt does not make Applicant a security risk. 
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions and evaluating all the evidence
in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based
on his financial issues.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1.  Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is
granted.
Edward W. Loughran
Administrative Judge