KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: The government’s evidence failed to establish that Applicant was at heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion because of his limited family
connections to Bangladesh. Eligibility for an ADP I/II/III position granted.
CASENO: 06-01410.h1
DATE: 08/23/2007 
DATE:  August 23, 2007
In Re:
------------------------------
SSN: -----------
Applicant for ADP I/II/III Position
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
ADP Case No. 06-01410
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Emilio Jaksetic, Esquire, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
William F. Savarino, Esquire
SYNOPSIS
The government’s evidence failed to establish that Applicant was at heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion because of his limited family
connections to Bangladesh. Eligibility for an ADP I/II/III position granted.
Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, dated  21
January 1992—as amended and modified, most recently in August 2006 (Directive). Adjudication of this case is
controlled by the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, approved by the President on December 29, 2005,which were
implemented by the Department of Defense on 31 August 2006. The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines supercede the
guidelines listed in Enclosure 2 to the Directive, and they apply to all adjudications or trustworthiness determinations
in which an SOR was issued on or after September 1, 2006.
INS functions have been transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the organization has2
been renamed Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS).
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Applicant challenges the 5 March 2007 Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
Statement of Reasons (SOR) recommending denial or revocation of his eligibility for an ADP I/II/III
position because of unresolved foreign influence concerns.  He answered the SOR 27 April 2007,1
and requested a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 14 June 2007, and I convened a hearing 23
July 2007. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 1 August 2007.
 FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the allegations of the SOR. Accordingly, I incorporate those admissions
as findings of fact. He is a 33-year-old quality assurance manager for a defense contractor, and seeks
access to sensitive personnel information. He has not previously had a background investigation. 
Applicant was born in Bangladesh in July 1973, and grew up there. He immigrated to the
U.S. in 1996, when he won the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)  diversity lottery,2
awarding him legal permanent resident (LPR) status. He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in April
2002, and obtained his first U.S. passport in June 2002. He applied for the diversity lottery because
of his dream to come to the U.S. to study and be able to work (Tr. 40). He attended community
college in the U.S. before transferring to a university to complete his undergraduate degree in
computer science in January 2002. All his financial assets are in the U.S.
Applicant’s parents and his two sisters are resident citizens of Bangladesh. His father is a
civil attorney with no government affiliation. His mother is a life-long housewife. Applicant provides
them no financial support, and he receives none from them. His two sisters are housewives. One is
married to an attorney who was an associate with her father before striking out on his own. The other
is married to an accountant. None of the four of them have any affiliation with the government of
Bangladesh.
Applicant has sponsored his parents and siblings to immigrate to the U.S. (A.E. D). His
parents’ petitions have been approved, and they await final processing through the U.S. Department
of State National Visa Center. His sisters’ petitions are still pending, but siblings occupy a lower
priority than parents of U.S. citizens, and generally must wait longer to have their petitions approved.
3
 Applicant has 25-30 cousins who are resident citizens of Bangladesh. He sees them
occasionally when he travels to Bangladesh to visit family, as he has done in December 1998,
December 2000, December 2003, July 2006, and February 2007. He has no contact with any of them
when he is in the U.S.
Applicant’s supervisor for the last three years in the quality assurance division testified that
Applicant is an excellent software tester, and handles sensitive information appropriately (Tr. 29).
Applicant completes on-line security training annually to stay apprised of security requirements (Tr.
57).
Bangladesh obtained its independence from Pakistan in 1971, and pursuant to its 1972
constitution, has a democratic parliamentary form of government. It is one of the world's poorest and
most densely populated countries, with a population of 146 million people and a per capita GDP of
$456. Bangladesh remains one of the few democracies in the Muslim world, but suffers from a
dysfunctional political system, weak governance, and pervasive corruption. Nevertheless,
Bangladeshis regard democracy as an important legacy of their war for independence. However in
January 2007, the government declared a state of emergency, suspended certain fundamental rights,
and postponed the scheduled January 2007 elections until late 2008.
Despite a poor human rights record, Bangladesh is generally a force for moderation in
international forums, and is also a long-time leader in international peacekeeping operations. Its
activities in international organizations, with other governments, and its regional partners to promote
human rights, democracy, and free markets are coordinated and high profile. U.S.-Bangladesh
relations are excellent. Further, Bangladesh has become a valuable U.S. ally in the global war on
terrorism. While Bangladesh has witnessed the emergence of a dangerous terrorist group, the JMB,
which has identified the governments of the U.S. and the United Kingdom as alleged enemies of
Islam and has the goal of imposing a fundamentalist Islamic society on Bangladesh, the government
has banned the group and pursues its leaders to limit its effectiveness in Bangladesh. There was no
JMB-linked violence in 2006, and U.S. and Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies cooperated well
on several cases related to domestic and international terrorism.
Bangladesh is not a known collector of U.S. intelligence or sensitive economic information.
Bangladesh is not known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information. Bangladesh is not
on the U.S. Department of State’s list of current travel warnings, although the State Department
notes that the security situation in Bangladesh remains fluid.
Applicant’s roommate, a former college friend, is—like Applicant—a native-born
Bangladeshi who became a naturalized U.S. citizen. In January 2007, the roommate was granted his
eligibility for an ADP I/II/III position administratively by DOHA based on an SOR and answer that
are virtually indistinguishable from Applicant’s, except that Applicant has cousins in addition to
parents and siblings living in Bangladesh (SOR 1.c.)(A.E. A-C). The roommate was a listed contact
on Applicant’s application (G.E. 1).
 A memorandum from Carol A. Haave, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Counterintelligence and3
Security to DOHA Director, Adjudication of Trustworthiness Cases (Nov. 19, 2004), directed that adjudication of
trustworthiness cases for ADP I, II, and III positions be resolved using the provisions of the Directive rather than, as
originally drafted, DoD Regulation 5200.2-R, DoD Personnel Security Program , as amended (Regulation). Positions
designated as ADP I or ADP II are classified as sensitive positions in section AP10.2.1 of the Regulation. ADP III
positions are nonsensitive positions. (Regulation, AP102.3.1) By virtue of the aforementioned memorandum, however,
even though they are nonsensitive positions, ADP III cases are treated in the same way and adjudicated under the same
guidelines and procedures as ADP I and II cases.
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).4
4
POLICIES AND BURDENS
The Directive, Enclosure 2 lists adjudicative guidelines to be considered in evaluating an
applicant’s suitability for access to sensitive information.  Administrative Judges must assess both3
disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each adjudicative issue fairly raised by the facts and
circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair and impartial common sense
consideration of the factors listed in Section 6.3. of the Directive. The presence or absence of a
disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or against Applicant. However, specific
adjudicative guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them, as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified information.
Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative
guideline is Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue an Applicant’s security clearance. The government must prove, by something
less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it
establishes a prima facie case against access to classified information. Applicant must then refute,
extenuate, or mitigate the government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the
Applicant bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship with the
government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a compelling interest in
ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement, reliability, and trustworthiness of those
who must protect national interests as their own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest”
standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in
favor of the government.4
CONCLUSIONS
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and interests may
raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, 2) may
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way
contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 6.5
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7.(a).6
5
influence adjudications can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the
foreign contact or financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information requires5
careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target protected information,
and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that information, and the individual’s
susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive. More specifically, an individual’s contacts
with foreign family members (or other foreign entities or persons) raise security concerns only if
those contacts create a heightened risk or foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion.6
In this case, the government failed to establish a case for disqualification under Guideline B.
Considering first the foreign country involved, Bangladesh and the U.S. enjoy excellent foreign
relations. However, while Bangladesh has a poor human rights record, it is a voice of moderation
in its international relations, promotes democracy in its region, and has actively cooperated with the
U.S. in ending global terrorism. Bangladesh is not known to target protected U.S. information, nor
is it known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information. Further, this case contains
evidence that the government has concluded, in at least one case, that Bangladesh poses insufficient
risk of targeting protected information. While Department Counsel correctly observes that DOHA’s
decision to grant eligibility in ADP Case No. 05-11711 (A.E. C) does not specifically address
Bangladesh and lacks precedential value for this case, Department Counsel is incorrect in suggesting
that DOHA’s decision does not support favorable inferences about the government’s overall view
of the risk posed by Bangladesh. In addition, the only other DOHA case to have considered
Bangladesh under the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines (ISCR Case No. 06-14160) similarly
concluded that Bangladesh posed insufficient risk to protected information. Again, that decision has
no precedential value for this case, but does provide support for my conclusion that Bangladesh
neither seeks protected information from the U.S. nor targets its former citizens to obtain that
information. The risk that Bangladesh might seek protected information from Applicant is low, if
not non-existent.
On the Applicant side of the equation, the government produced no evidence that there was
any risk, much less a heightened risk, of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion because of Applicant’s limited family contacts in Bangladesh. Applicant has sponsored
his parents and sisters for immigration to the U.S. His parents’ petitions have been approved. None
of Applicant’s immediate family members (or his sisters’ husbands) have any affiliation with the
government of Bangladesh. He contacts his cousins only when he is in Bangladesh, and he does not
always see the same cousins when he travels to Bangladesh. There is nothing in the circumstances
of their being in Bangladesh, or in Applicant’s contacts with his parents and sisters, to heighten the
risk that he could be impelled to provide protected information to Bangladesh. I resolve Guideline
B for Applicant.
6
FORMAL FINDINGS
   Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Subparagraph b: For Applicant
Subparagraph c: For Applicant
Subparagraph d: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the information presented, it is clearly consistent with the interests of
national security to grant Applicant a position of public trust.
 
John G. Metz, Jr.
Administrative Judge