KEYWORD: Foreign Influence; Foreign Preference; Outside Activities
DIGEST: Applicant, a 36 year old employee of a major defense contractor, mitigated security
concerns regarding foreign preference from having a Polish passport by the fact that it has expired.
He does not intend to renew it. Also, he mitigated allegations of management and financial
participation in his mother’s business in Lebanon by documenting his discontinuance of those
activities. Applicant failed to mitigate foreign influence security concerns arising because of his
mother’s citizenship and residence as well as business in Lebanon. Also of concern are three siblings
who are citizens of Lebanon and either live there or are temporarily in the U.S. and are dependent
on income from their mother. Clearance is denied. 
CASENO: 06-08562.h1
DATE: 08/31/2007
DATE:  August 31, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-08562
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CHARLES D. ABLARD
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
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SYNOPSIS
Applicant, a 36 year old employee of a major defense contractor, mitigated security concerns
regarding foreign preference from having a Polish passport by the fact that it has expired. He does
not intend to renew it. Also, he mitigated allegations of management and financial participation in
his mother’s business in Lebanon by documenting his discontinuance of those activities. Applicant
failed to mitigate foreign influence security concerns arising because of his mother’s citizenship and
residence as well as business in Lebanon. Also of concern are three siblings who are citizens of
Lebanon and either live there or are temporarily in the U.S. and are dependent on income from their
mother. Clearance is denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 25, 2006, the Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) pursuant to Executive
Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry as amended and modified, and
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified, issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary
affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue a security clearance for Applicant. DOHA recommended the case be referred to an
administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or
revoked.
In a sworn written statement, received November 2, 2006, Applicant responded to the
allegations set forth in the SOR, and requested a hearing. The case was assigned to me on March
26, 2007. A Notice of Hearing was issued April 6, 2007 for a hearing held on April 26, 2007. The
Government introduced three exhibits and Applicant introduced 17 exhibits. All were accepted into
evidence. The government requested that administrative notice (AN) be taken of nine official
government documents. Applicant testified on his behalf. The transcript was received on May 9,
2007. The record was left open for submission of additional evidence until May 29, 2007, and
extended until July 15, 2007. Two sets of document were submitted by Applicant on June 13, 2007,
and July 12, 2007. Both were admitted without objection. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant has admitted all but one allegations under Foreign Influence (Guideline B), denied
the allegation under Foreign Preference (Guideline C), and admitted the allegations under Outside
Activities (Guideline L). He offered explanatory information in his answer, at the hearing, and in his
post-hearing submissions. The admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a
complete review of the evidence in the record and upon due consideration of the record the following
additional findings of fact are made:
Applicant is a 36-year-old employee of a principal defense contractor working since 2004
as an engineer He holds B.S. and Master’s degrees in electrical engineering from a major state
university system and is studying for an M.B.A. He is the eldest child of a Polish-born father and a
Lebanese mother. In 1968 his father was a Polish merchant seaman on a Russian ship that was
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docked in Beirut, Lebanon, when he jumped ship, came ashore, and sought asylum at the U.S.
embassy. It was granted and, during the time the asylum and immigration documents were being
processed, he married Applicant’s mother, a citizen of Lebanon, who was born in Jamaica. 
The family emigrated to the U.S. in 1969 and Applicant was born in 1971. Several months
after his birth the family returned to Beirut to help care for his maternal grandparents. Three more
children, two daughters and another son, were born to the family while they lived in Lebanon. Since
Lebanese citizenship could be acquired only through a Lebanese father the three younger children
were stateless. Their father acquired Polish citizenship for them, and they are also now Lebanese
citizens.
The family was in Lebanon when the sectarian war broke out in 1974. It was difficult to leave
so the family remained. His mother began a business to support the family. Applicant attended a
Catholic school in the Christian section of Beirut for 13 years during which time their home was
bombed twice, once in the sectarian fighting and once by Syrian occupiers. Applicant’s parents
separated, and his father returned to Poland after the Cold War ended in 1989. He died there in 2001.
Applicant returned to the U.S. in 1989 at age 18 and enrolled in a university. He worked in the
defense industry during the first Gulf War for a foreign owned company doing business in the U.S.
Since his father’s death, Applicant is the only member of the family with U.S. citizenship. 
Applicant’s sisters are both Ph. D. candidates in universities in the U.S. and France. His
brother lives in Lebanon with his mother and owns a business based in Beirut doing business in
energy products in South Africa. He plans to move the business to another country. None of his
siblings are married. 
Applicant also obtained a Polish passport in 1995 at his father’s request both as a gesture to
his father’s homeland, and to lessen any likelihood of difficulties in entering Lebanon with a U.S.
passport. He used it only once during a travel ban to Lebanon for U.S. citizens in the 1970's. It
expired in 2005 and he does not intend to renew it (Tr. 123). He visited Poland once at age seven to
meet his grandparents and again in 2001 for the funeral of his father. He has a strong preference for
the U.S. He used his U.S. passport for all travels the past 15 years including trips to Lebanon and
Syria. He speaks Arabic but does not know Polish. 
Applicant’s mother has a successful advising and training business based in Beirut with ten
employees. She began the business in 1989 advising and training companies in the middle east about
networking, business management, and human resource practices. Many of her clients are charities
and NGOs. Half of her clients are in Lebanon, and the other half are primarily in Dubai, and the
United Arab Emirates. She intends to retire and dispose of the business in five years after her two
daughters have finished graduate school since she provides their financial support. She now lives
half of the year in Jordan because of the difficulties in Lebanon caused most recently by the war in
2006 between the forces of Hizballah and Israel. She visits the U.S. regularly once or twice a year
to see Applicant and his family. She owns property in Lebanon valued at over $500,000. His brother
also visits the U.S. frequently. The family comes to the U.S. for holidays and christenings of
Applicant’s three young children. 
Applicant worked for his mother’s company full time as a subcontractor between 2002 and
2004. He organized a business in the U.S. which he used as a vehicle to provide support for her
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company. During that period he traveled to Lebanon five or six times a year. The trips also took him
to Jordan, Syria, Finland and France to visit clients and affiliates. He also continued to provide some
services to her company between 2004 and 2006 after he went to work for his employer. His income
from his mother’s company during that period was approximately $6,000. He also had certain
financial authority for the business including a power of attorney which has been revoked since the
hearing in this matter (Post-hearing submissions 1 and 2).
Applicant has never held a security clearance, but his career opportunities are severely limited
in his company without one. He is financially independent of other members of his family and they
are independent of him. His annual salary is $130,000. He owns his own home and has  $200,000
in equity. He has various savings and brokerage accounts valued at approximately $100,000
including education accounts for his three children. 
Applicant knows the need to preserve U.S. technology. He loves his work, and is very proud
of his U.S. education. He appreciates the responsibilities which he has been given. He is highly
regarded by his company through their evaluations and by his supervisors in their letters of support.
They believe he has a bright future with the company (Exhs. C, D, H, and I) . 
Lebanon is a country with a historic past that has had a functioning multi-party government
that have recognized diverse ethnic and religious groups giving them participation in the
government. It has long been known for its tolerance of divergent views. However, since 1975 it has
been riven by civil wars, outside attacks on its territory, and occupation by Syria. The U.S. is
supportive of the government and works to help it enforce its laws and secure its borders. However,
because of various private armies there is doubt as to whether the government of Lebanon has de
facto control over its own territory (AN 2, 3, and 4)
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at 527
An evaluation of whether the applicant meets the security guidelines includes consideration
of the following factors: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and
maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence
of rehabilitation and other behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential
for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) ¶ 2 (a) Security clearances are granted only when “it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to do so.” Executive Order No. 10865 § 2. See Executive Order
No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
Initially, the Government must establish, by something less than a preponderance of the
evidence, that conditions exist in the personal or professional history of the applicant which
disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information.
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See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. The applicant then bears the burden of demonstrating that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a clearance. “Any doubt as to whether access
to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the
national security.” AG ¶ 2 (b) “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the
side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. See Executive Order No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
CONCLUSION
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate legal
precepts, factors and conditions above, I conclude the following with respect to all allegations set
forth in the SOR: 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence
Conditions under Guideline B that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include contact with a foreign family member who is a citizen of, or resident in a foreign country if
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or
coercion (AG ¶ 7a). Based on the evidence of record, including Applicant’s acknowledgment of
family members living abroad, the Government established a basis for concern over foreign
influence. The Applicant had the burden to establish security suitability through evidence which
refutes, mitigates, or extenuates the disqualification and demonstrates that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant a security clearance. ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).
By virtue of the relationships of the foreign family members, Applicant’s contacts, cannot
be deemed casual. Mitigating conditions (MC) that might be applicable are a determination that the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which the persons are located, or the
positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual group or
government and the interests of the U.S. (AG ¶ 8a). The other relevant MC is that the individual has
such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,that he can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. (AG ¶ 8b). While I believe Applicant could qualify under
that MC because of his long residency in the U.S. since age 18 thus having lived all his mature life
in the U.S., his extended complex and internationalized family relationships pose a myriad of
unanswered questions about possible pressures that could be brought to bear on him. While I have
no concerns about Applicant or his relatives in view of their family history and present work, they
live in a troubled part of the world with many hostile groups. While their own specific community
is not in question, they are surrounded by others such as terrorist organizations, occupiers, and
would-be occupiers who pose a threat to others in the area and could cause pressure to be brought
on him.. 
Guideline C: Foreign Preference 
The applicable guidelines for Foreign Preference Guideline C provide that an individual who
acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States may be
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prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States
(AG ¶ 9). Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include the
possession of a current foreign passport (AG ¶ 10a 1). 
Security concerns may be mitigated by a providing evidence that the passport has been
destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated. (AG ¶ 11e) I
conclude from the evidence submitted showing expiration of the passport and lack of intent to renew
it by Applicant, that the allegation under Guideline C has been mitigated. 
Guideline L: Outside Activities 
The applicable Guidelines cited in the SOR concerning Outside Activities-Guideline L
provides as disqualifying conditions (DC) involvement in certain types of outside employment or
activities if they pose a conflict with an individual’s security responsibilities and could create an
increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information (AG ¶ 36). Conditions that could
raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include any service, whether compensated,
volunteer, or employment with a foreign country; any foreign national; or a representative of any
foreign interest (AG ¶ 37 a 1,2, and 3).
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns (MC) include:  
1 Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it
does not pose a conflict with an individual’s security responsibilities
or with national security interests of the U.S.(AG ¶ 38 a).
2 The individual terminated the employment or discontinued the
activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her
security responsibilities. (AG ¶ 38 b).
The type of work done by Applicant for his mother and the work of her company is not of
a type to pose a conflict with his security responsibilities for his employer. He has terminated his
legal relationships in the U.S. with his mother’s company. I conclude that he has successfully
mitigated the security concerns under Guideline L. 
In all adjudications the protection of our national security is of paramount concern. Persons
who have access to classified information have an overriding responsibility for the security of the
nation. The objective of the security clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment
of a person’s trustworthiness and fitness for access to classified information. The “whole person”
concept recognizes that we should view a person by the totality of their acts and omissions. Each
case must be judged on its own merits taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and
applying sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis.
Applicant is a person of substance who is well educated and ambitious. He has a responsible
position of trust, and is doing an excellent job for his company. He provided sincere and credible
testimony as to his relationship with his family, his motivations, and his loyalty to the U.S. He has
established a successful life here building financial ties to the U.S. He has a strong financial stake
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in the U.S. He has no deference to or loyalty to either Lebanon or Poland. However, the multitude
of family connections and uncertainties in a tumultuous part of the world where possibilities exist
to bring pressure on Applicant leads me to conclude that it is premature at this time to grant a
clearance to him because of the potential for pressure or coercion.
After considering all the evidence in its totality and as an integrated whole to focus on the
whole person of Applicant, I conclude that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to
grant clearance to Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are hereby
rendered as follows:
Paragraph l. Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g.: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a.: For Applicant
Paragraph 3. Guideline L: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 3.b.: For Applicant
Subparagraph 3.c.: For Applicant
DECISION
After full consideration of all the facts and documents presented by the record in this case,
it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance is denied. 
Charles D. Ablard 
Administrative Judge
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