KEYWORD: Drugs; Personal Conduct; Criminal Conduct
DIGEST: Applicant’s deliberate falsifications of his 23 June 2004 and 1 December 2005 clearance
applications, and the drug abuse history he concealed, render him unsuitable for a security clearance.
Clearance denied.
CASENO: 06-24005.h1
DATE: 08/23/2007
DATE:  August 23, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-24005
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Gina Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Required by Executive Order 10865 and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, as amended and
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modified—most recently in August 2006 (Directive).
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Applicant’s deliberate falsifications of his 23 June 2004 and 1 December 2005 clearance
applications, and the drug abuse history he concealed, render him unsuitable for a security clearance.
Clearance denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Applicant challenges the 1 February 2007 Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
Statement of Reasons (SOR) recommending denial or revocation of his clearance because of drug
involvement, personal conduct, and criminal conduct.  He answered the SOR 20 February 2007, and1
requested a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 20 June 2007, and I convened a hearing 30 July
2007. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 8 August 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations. Accordingly, I incorporate his admissions as
findings of fact. He is a 30-year-old senior consultant employed by defense contractors since June
1997. He seeks to retain the security clearance he obtained fraudulently in July 2004.
When Applicant applied for an industrial clearance in June 2004 (G.E. 1),  he deliberately
concealed his drug use between 1996 and June 2004 by answering “no” to question 27 (illegal drug
use, last seven years). In fact, he had a significant history of marijuana use from 1996 to June 2004,
and had used hallucinogenic mushrooms between 2001 and February 2004, and opium at least once
in 2000. Based on his false answers, Applicant was granted an interim secret clearance in July 2004.
His clearance was transferred when he took employment with a new defense contractor in November
2005.
In December 2005, Applicant applied for a clearance upgrade to top secret/special
compartment information (TS/SCI)(G.E. 2) and continued to conceal his drug use by answering “no”
to questions 27 (illegal drug use, last seven years) and 28 (illegal drug use while possessing a
security clearance). In fact, he had continued to use marijuana after being granted an interim secret
clearance in June 2004, to at least a Christmas party in mid-December 2005—after he submitted his
application for clearance upgrade. Applicant acknowledged that he falsified his clearance
applications because he did not want his employer and the government to know about his drug abuse
history.
In January 2006, Applicant was scheduled for a lifestyle polygraph required by another
government agency in conjunction with his December 2005 application for an upgraded clearance.
During the pre-examination interview, he categorically denied having used illegal drugs. However,
after the polygrapher began the examination, she stopped the examination because Applicant was
visibly nervous about the drug questions. Applicant then disclosed that he had used illegal drugs, but
was too nervous to provided details. The polygraph was rescheduled for February 2006 with a
different polygrapher. During the pre-examination interview, Applicant disclosed the full nature and
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extent of his drug abuse, and the polygrapher was satisfied with the examination results. In June
2006, the government agency denied the requested access to SCI because of Applicant’s drug use
and his falsifications of his drug abuse history (G.E. 3).
Applicant accepts full responsibility for his drug use, and acknowledges the invalidity of his
past rationalizations: He was under a lot of cultural pressure from his parents to excel in college, but
he had poor grades. Drug use allowed him to explain his poor grades to himself. He did, however,
understand that drug use was illegal and prohibited by college, employer, and governmental policies.
Applicant states that he has not used any illegal drugs since December 2005, and vows never
to use illegal drugs again. He asserts that he no longer associates with most of the crowd that he used
drugs with. However, he also used marijuana with his brother and his girlfriend-then-wife. She was
a sporadic user with Applicant, but did not know the full extent of his marijuana use when she was
not around. She stopped using marijuana in early 2006, when she became pregnant with their
daughter, now nine-months-old. Applicant cites his new family obligations as further incentive to
remain drug free. Applicant has disclosed his full drug history to his wife and his brother.
Nevertheless, neither his parents nor his sister are aware of his drug history. The record contains no
independent evidence of Applicant’s work performance or character.
POLICIES AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The Directive, Enclosure 2 lists adjudicative guidelines to be considered in evaluating an
Applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative Judges must assess both
disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each adjudicative issue fairly raised by the facts and
circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair and impartial common sense
consideration of the factors listed in Section 6.3. of the Directive. The presence or absence of a
disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or against Applicant. However, specific
adjudicative guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them, as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified information.
Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative
guidelines are Guideline H (Drug Involvement), Guideline E (Personal Conduct), and Guideline J
(Criminal Conduct).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue an Applicant’s security clearance. The government must prove, by something
less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it
establishes a prima facie case against access to classified information. Applicant must then refute,
extenuate, or mitigate the government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the
Applicant bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship with the
government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a compelling interest in
ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement, reliability, and trustworthiness of those
who must protect national interests as their own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest”
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
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¶25.(a) any drug abuse. . .; (c) illegal drug possession, including. . . purchase. . . ; (c) any illegal drug use
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after being granted a security clearance; 
¶26.(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that
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it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
¶26.(b). a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as; . . . (3) an appropriate period of
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abstinence;
¶16.(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel
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security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, . . . [or] determine
security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness. . .;
¶31.(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses; (c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct,
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regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted;
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standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in
favor of the government.2
CONCLUSIONS
The government established a case for disqualification under Guideline H,  and Applicant3
failed to mitigate the security concerns. Applicant’s use and purchase of marijuana, use and purchase
of hallucinogenic mushrooms, and use of opium are neither distant in time or infrequent.  His4
abstinence from drug use—just over 18 months—is inadequate to demonstrate an intent to refrain
from drug use in the future.   I cannot conclude Applicant is unlikely to use illegal drugs in the5
future.  Accordingly, I resolve Guideline H for Applicant.
The government established a case for disqualification under Guideline E and J, and
Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns. He deliberately concealed his illegal drug use from
the government.  He did so knowing that his illegal drug use was prohibited by both company and6
governmental policies. But for the polygraph examination, he might never have disclosed the truth.
Further, none of the Guideline E mitigating conditions apply. The concealed information was
relevant to a clearance decision. Applicant’s falsifications prohibited the government from evaluating
his illegal drug use in a timely fashion, and at a time when such recent drug use would have raised
significant security concerns. In addition, the government detrimentally relied on Applicant’s
falsifications in granting his clearance. Finally, his disclosure of illegal drug use in February 2006
was neither prompt nor forthright. Indeed, for practical purposes, it was forced from him.
Applicant’s Answer clearly establishes that he intended to conceal his illegal drug use from
the government and effect the course of his background investigation. This conduct violated 18
U.S.C. §1001,  whether he was successful in effecting the course of his investigation or not.7
However, in this case his falsifications did influence the investigation, and he was granted his
clearance.
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Applicant’s failure to disclose his illegal drug use demonstrates a lack of candor required of
cleared personnel. The government has an interest in examining all relevant and material adverse
information about an Applicant before making a clearance decision. The government relies on
applicants to truthfully disclose that adverse information in a timely fashion, not when it is perceived
to be prudent or convenient. Further, an applicant’s willingness to report adverse information about
himself provides some indication of his willingness to report inadvertent security violations or other
security concerns in the future, something the government relies on to perform damage assessments
and limit the compromise of classified information. Applicant’s conduct suggests he is willing to put
his personal needs ahead of legitimate government interests. I resolve Guideline E and J against
Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Paragraph 1. Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph h: Against Applicant
Paragraph 1. Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph c: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance denied.
John G. Metz, Jr.
Administrative Judge
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