KEYWORD: Drugs; Personal Conduct; Criminal Conduct
DIGEST: Applicant is a 53-year-old employee of a defense contractor who has held a clearance for
25 years. He smoked marijuana, with varying frequency, between 1971 and January 1999, when he
decided to quit. His teenage son was killed by a drunk driver in 2000, and he has since dedicated
most of his free time to volunteering in crime, substance abuse and drunk-driving prevention
programs. He falsely denied drug use in a 1992 security clearance application, but admitted it in a
1993 interview and has reported accurately on two subsequent applications. Applicant mitigated the
security concerns raised by his drug involvement, personal conduct and criminal conduct.  Clearance
is granted.
CASENO: 06-26398.h1
DATE: 08/06/2007 
DATE:  August 6, 2007
In re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-26398
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
DAVID M. WHITE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Jeff A. Nagel, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Barbara J. Fraser, Personal Representative
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information (August 2006) as1
implemented by Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum of Aug. 30, 2006 for use in adjudication of all cases in which
an SOR had not been issued by Sept 1, 2006. These revised AG replaced those found in enclosure 2 of the Directive,
which is pending revision to incorporate them. Copies of the applicable AG were provided to Applicant with the SOR.
 
2
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is a 53-year-old employee of a defense contractor who has held a clearance for 25
years. He smoked marijuana, with varying frequency, between 1971 and January 1999, when he
decided to quit. His teenage son was killed by a drunk driver in 2000, and he has since dedicated
most of his free time to volunteering in crime, substance abuse and drunk-driving prevention
programs. He falsely denied drug use in a 1992 security clearance application, but admitted it in a
1993 interview and has reported accurately on two subsequent applications. Applicant mitigated the
security concerns raised by his drug involvement, personal conduct and criminal conduct.  Clearance
is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Applicant applied to renew his security clearance on September 28, 2005, in conjunction with
his employment by a defense contractor as a government property manager. On March 30, 2007, the
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to
Applicant, pursuant to Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry,
dated February 20, 1960, as amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as
amended. The SOR detailed reasons, under Guideline H (Drug Involvement), Guideline E (Personal
Conduct), and Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG),  why1
DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant a security clearance for Applicant, and recommended
referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued,
denied, or revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR allegations in a notarized letter dated April 11, 2007, and
a supplemental letter dated April 30, 2007, and elected to have a hearing before an administrative
judge. The case was then assigned to me on June 15, 2007. A notice of hearing was issued on June
19, 2007, and the hearing was held as scheduled on July 13, 2007. The Government offered five
exhibits that were marked as Government Exhibits (GE) 1 through 5, and admitted without
objection. Applicant testified, and offered six exhibits that were marked Applicant Exhibits (AE) A
through F, and admitted without objection. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr) on July 25,
2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the truth of some factual allegations set forth in the SOR pertaining to
drug involvement under AG H (¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, and 1.d). Those admissions are incorporated herein as
GE 3 (Personnel Security Questionnaire (DD Form 398), dated July 1, 1992) at page 6 of 16.2
Id.3
Tr at 40-41.4
GE 2 (Security Clearance Application (SF 86), dated Sep. 25, 1997).5
Id., at 7.6
GE 1 (e-QIP, dated Sep. 28, 2005) at 25-26.7
3
findings of fact. He denied the drug involvement allegation in ¶ 1.b, and the allegations concerning
personal conduct under AG E (¶ 2.a), and criminal activity under AG J (¶ 3.a). After a complete and
thorough review of the evidence in the record, and upon due consideration of same, I make the
following findings of fact:
Applicant is a 53-year-old government property manager for a defense contractor. He has
worked for that firm for 27 years, the last 25 of which he held a security clearance required to
perform his job. He honorably served one five-year enlistment in the Air Force right after high
school. In 1975 he was a flying medic on board air-evacuation cargo planes during Operation Baby
Lift, saving the lives of Amer-Asian babies and young children from orphanages in Saigon. 
Applicant was married to his first wife from 1974 to 1994. His son was born in 1981, and
his daughter was born in 1984. He and his wife went through difficult periods for almost ten years
prior to their 1994 divorce, and he underwent counseling to try to save the marriage. Ultimately, his
wife simply left him and the children, and he became their single parent. They formed “a team,” and
he and his children became even closer and more interdependent. Applicant remarried for, as he
testified, “11 months, 2 weeks, 3 days, and 6 hours,”to a woman who also had children. The
marriage didn’t work from the start. He described it as, “difficult at best,” and after trying marriage
counseling, they decided to divorce. He married his current wife, a very impressive lady who served
as his personal representative, in May 2004. 
Applicant testified that he thought he first obtained a security clearance in 1992. However,
his 1992 Personnel Security Questionnaire stated that he had held a clearance since 1982.  When he2
filed that Questionnaire, he answered “No” to question 22.a, that inquired whether he had ever used
narcotics or marijuana.  He did so because he was a single parent by then, and was afraid that3
admitting drug use might cause him to lose his job.  During the ensuing interview in March 1993,4
Applicant admitted to some casual, recreational use of marijuana, and experimentation with cocaine
a few times, during 1983 and 1984. His clearance was continued, and he again applied for renewal
in 1997.  In response to question 27, inquiring about drug use during the last seven years, and5
question 28, inquiring about drug use while holding a clearance, he responded “Yes,” and reported
using marijuana three times during January 1993.  During the June 1998 follow-up interview, he6
explained that he was offered the marijuana by friends while at parties, was depressed by his pending
divorce, and shared some with them. His clearance was again continued. When he submitted his
currently pending Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-QIP), he reported
marijuana use approximately 50 times from 1971 to 1999, including while he held a clearance.7
Tr at 32-38, 42-46.8
Tr at 18-19, 23, 25, 31-32.9
AE C; AE D; Tr at 22-26, 34-36.10
AE C; AE D; Tr at 24-26.11
AE E.12
AE F.13
4
Applicant explained his history of marijuana use at the hearing as being somewhat regular
during high school, and decreasingly frequent, except for that period in 1983 to 1984, ever since. He
never purchased marijuana, or used it by himself. His use was confined to smoking marijuana that
was being passed around at parties, and he felt peer pressure to participate. He last used marijuana
at a party in January 1999, and made the conscious decision never to do so again because of the risk
to his children should something happen to him, and to avoid setting a bad example for them. His
use of cocaine was limited to three occasions during the early 1980s. He no longer goes to any
parties where drug use might occur, and would leave immediately if he accidentally did so.8
Applicant was a professional ski instructor, and his son was a world class snow boarder. The
two of them spent all the time they could together in the mountains. After graduation from high
school, his son took a year before starting college to work at an ice cream company and travel around
the U.S. and Canada snow boarding during his time off work. One evening in 2000, his son went out
in a friend’s car and was killed by a drunk driver. The accident was so bad, he was not allowed to
see his son’s remains. This was such a severe mental and emotional trauma that he was relieved of
many of his responsibilities at work for 18 months. He became severely depressed and almost
suicidal.  9
Five years ago, Applicant found an organization of victims of drunk drivers. He began
volunteering three or more times a week to go to courts, prisons, police stations, and schools
addressing people who had been caught driving under the influence and others about the dangers and
impact of driving while impaired by alcohol or drugs. He and his main partner in this endeavor,
herself a victim of a drunk driver, are well known, highly effective, and in high demand around the
county and state for these services. These efforts, and his remarriage, have focused his life on helping
others. While still grieving, he is no longer depressed and has returned to full duties at work. His
declaration that he will never again use marijuana or any illegal drug was sincere, credible, and
convincing.    10
Applicant submitted the live testimony of his DUI Impact Panel partner and two letters of
recommendation, attesting to his integrity, honesty,  trustworthiness, and love for his country.  He11
also submitted a letter from one young man who had been greatly moved by his presentation.12
Finally he submitted a copy of the security award he received from his company, recognizing his
exceptional performance, diligence and awareness of security requirements.13
POLICIES            
AG  ¶ 2.14
Id., at ¶¶ 2(b), 2(c).15
“Substantial evidence [is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might  accept as adequate to support16
a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.”  ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006)
(citing Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1).  “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.”  Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).  “Substantial evidence” is “more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4  Cir. 1994).th
5
The revised AG that replaced Enclosure 2 of the Directive set forth adjudicative
guidelines which must be considered in the evaluation of security suitability. In addition to brief
introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines are divided into
disqualifying conditions (DC) that may raise security concerns, and mitigating conditions (MC) that
may reduce or negate security concerns. Applicable DCs and MCs must be considered in deciding
whether to grant, continue, deny or revoke an individual’s eligibility for access to classified
information. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those
which would mitigate security concerns, are set forth and discussed in the conclusions section below.
An administrative judge need not view the adjudicative guidelines as inflexible, ironclad
rules of law. Instead, acknowledging the complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are
intended to be applied in conjunction with the factors set forth in the Adjudicative Process provision
of the Directive,  to assist the administrative judge in reaching fair and impartial, common sense14
decisions.
The entire decision-making process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables
known as the “whole person concept.” All available, reliable information about the person, past and
present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in making a meaningful decision. The
Adjudicative Process factors which an administrative judge should consider, in addition to the
applicable guidelines, are: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, so the final decision in
each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that issuance of a clearance must be clearly
consistent with the interests of national security. Any doubt as to whether access to classified
information is clearly consistent with national security must be resolved in favor of the national
security.   In reaching this decision, only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based15
on the evidence contained in the record were drawn, and no inferences were grounded on mere
speculation or conjecture.
In the decision-making process, facts must be established by “substantial evidence.”  The16
burden of producing evidence initially falls on the government to establish a case which
demonstrates, in accordance with the Directive, it is not clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue an applicant's access to classified information. “Department Counsel is
Directive ¶ E3.1.14.17
Directive ¶ E3.1.15.18
ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005); ?The Administrative Judge [considers] the record19
evidence as a whole, both favorable and unfavorable, evaluate[s] Applicant’s past and current circumstances in light of
pertinent provisions of the Directive, and decide[s] whether Applicant ha[s] met his burden of persuasion under Directive
¶ E3.1.15.”  ISCR Case No. 04-10340 at 2 (App. Bd. July 6, 2006). 
AG ¶ 24.20
6
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to establish facts alleged in the SOR that
have been controverted.”   “The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence17
to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department
Counsel, and [Applicant] has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance
decision.”  Once it has met its initial burden of production, the burden of persuasion (including any18
burden to disprove a mitigating condition) never shifts to the government.  19
A person seeking access to classified information seeks to enter a fiduciary relationship with
the government predicated upon trust and confidence. It is a relationship that transcends normal duty
hours and endures throughout off-duty hours as well. It is because of this special relationship that
the government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to
whom it grants access to classified information. Decisions under this Directive include, by necessity,
consideration of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information. Section
7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that any adverse industrial security clearance
decision shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the
loyalty of the applicant concerned,” so the decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not
necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. It is merely an indication the applicant
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for
issuing a clearance.
CONCLUSIONS
As set forth in the Directive, every recommended personnel security decision must be a fair
and impartial overall common sense decision based on all available evidence, both favorable and
 unfavorable.  The decision must be arrived at by applying the standard that the grant or continuance
of a security clearance or access to classified information is clearly consistent with the interests of
national security.  
Guideline H: Drug Involvement
“Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions about an
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment and because it
raises questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.”20
Applicant admitted using cocaine three times during the early 1980s and marijuana while in high
school, regularly for about six months around 1983, and once or twice a year thereafter until January
Drug abuse is defined as the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from21
approved medical direction. Regulation, Appendix 8, Guideline H ¶ 24(b).
Regulation, Appendix 8, Guideline E ¶ 15.22
7
1999, when he stopped for good. He never tested positive for any drug use, and the only reason it
is known is because he honestly admitted it in connection with multiple security clearance renewal
applications since 1993. He denied ever purchasing or owning marijuana or other drugs, and he
merely shared in using them when being passed around at parties. There is no evidence to the
contrary. He also admitted that some of his marijuana use occurred while he held a security
clearance. The Government has established the truth of SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c, and 1.d. The Government
did not present any evidence to establish the truth of SOR ¶ 1.b, which Applicant denied.
Applicant’s conduct raises security concerns under two drug involvement disqualifying
conditions (DI DC). DI DC 25(a) (“any drug abuse”)  and DI DC 25(g) (“any illegal drug use after21
being granted a security clearance”) apply to his admitted use of marijuana with varying frequency
from 1971 to January 1999, and use of cocaine a few times during the early 1980s. Although
Applicant did not remember having a clearance before 1992, he stated on the application he
submitted that year that he had held a clearance since 1982. No other DI DC applies.
After considering all of the possible drug involvement mitigating conditions (DI MC), two
of them squarely apply to Applicant’s situation. DI MC 26(a) (“the behavior happened so long ago,
was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast
doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness or good judgment”) does apply to
mitigate drug involvement security concerns. The last incident took place more than 8 years ago, and
the last drug use of any frequency was some 24 years ago. He no longer attends parties where drugs
might be present, and is fully engaged in law-enforcement programs to deter and prevent substance
abuse after his son’s tragic death. His prior drug use, even when holding a clearance, is highly
unlikely to recur, and no longer casts doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness, or judgment under his
present circumstances.
Applicant has disassociated himself from drug-using associates and contacts, now avoids the
environment where drugs were used, has been abstinent for more than eight years, and compellingly
demonstrated his intent not to abuse drugs in the future during his testimony, all of which further
mitigate any security concerns under DI MC 26(b). DI MC 26(c) involving prescription drugs, and
DI MC 26(d) concerning rehabilitation and treatment programs do not apply.
Guideline E: Personal Conduct
“Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to
comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any failure to
provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to
cooperate with the security clearance process.”22
After considering all of the personal conduct disqualifying conditions (PC DC), only PC DC
16(a) (“deliberate omission, concealment or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel
security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations,
8
determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities”) applies to Applicant’s conduct.
He falsified his answer concerning prior drug use on his 1992 Personnel Security Questionnaire, and
did so because he thought answering truthfully might endanger his job. He subsequently and honestly
admitted his drug use in his 1993 and 1998 interviews, and on his 1997 and 2005 clearance
applications. No other PC DC applies.
Having considered all of the personal conduct mitigating conditions (PC MC), several apply.
PC MC 17(a) (“the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment,
or falsification before being confronted with the facts”) does not apply. His 1993 admission to the
drug use came during an interview when, although not confronted with any known facts, he was
being questioned about the truthfulness of his denial. This does not rise to the level of voluntary
correction and disclosure required by Appeal Board precedent under the former adjudicative
guidelines which, though not necessarily binding for interpretation of the reworded PC MC, guides
this decision. Applicant never asserted that concealment of his drug use was caused by improper
advice or legal counsel, so PC MC 17(b), addressing such situations, is inapplicable. 
PC MC 17(c) (“the offense was so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so
infrequent, or it happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment”) does apply to mitigate
Applicant’s conduct. This falsification was more than 15 years ago, and he has fully and freely
disclosed the omitted information on two subsequent clearance applications, during two security
interviews, and at the hearing itself. Taken together, this history establishes that recurrence is
unlikely, and the conduct casts no doubt on his present judgment, trustworthiness and reliability. The
falsification was known 24 years ago. He has maintained a clearance ever since, has had no security
violations, and in fact received formal recognition for his security performance. 
PC MC 17(d) (“the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to
change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors
that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely
to recur”) also applies in partial mitigation.  Applicant first admitted the falsification back in 1993,
and continues to do so. He has taken positive steps to eliminate his drug involvement that put his job
or security clearance at risk and caused him to answer falsely in the first place. He has fully revealed
his past involvement, and has an extended period of demonstrated integrity.
PC MC 17(e) (“the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability
to exploitation, manipulation, or duress”) also mitigates the security concerns here.  He has been
abstinent for more than eight years. He fully intends to continue this lifestyle, which reduces or
eliminates his vulnerability. He did not eliminate drug involvement in response to any threat to his
job or clearance, but for family and personal reasons that have been heavily reinforced by events
since then.
PC MC 17(f) (“the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable
reliability”) does not apply, since Applicant admitted the falsification. PC MC 17(g)(“association
with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or occurs under circumstances that do not cast
doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules
and regulations”) would apply to mitigate any security concerns under PC DC 16(g), which were not
alleged in this case, but has no mitigating effect on concerns raised under PC DC 16(a).
AG ¶ 30.23
9
Guideline J: Criminal Conduct
“Criminal activity creates doubt about a person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness.
By its very nature, it calls into question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules
and regulations.”  The only crime alleged in the SOR was the falsification of the 1992 Personnel23
Security Questionnaire discussed above under AG E. His drug use, while admittedly illegal, was not
alleged as a security concern. For the reasons discussed above under AG H, the drug use does not
raise any independent security concerns under AG J.
Criminal conduct disqualifying condition (CC DC) 31(a) (“a single serious crime or multiple
lesser offenses”) and CC DC 31 (c) (“allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of
whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted, or convicted”) both apply to raise
potential security concerns about Applicant’s falsification as alleged in SOR ¶ 3.a. Although known
for 24 years and never pursued as a crime, falsification on a clearance application can be prosecuted
as a felony and is especially significant in determining worthiness to hold a clearance. No other CC
DC applies.
Criminal conduct mitigating condition (CC MC) 32(a) (“so much time has elapsed since the
criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness or good judgment”) does
apply to mitigate this falsification for the same reasons discussed above concerning PC MC 17(c).
Applicant also established CC MC 32(d) (“there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including
but not limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution,
job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community
involvement”). He has not falsified his subsequent security clearance submissions for 15 years, and
has an excellent employment record, particularly in the area of security. He has engaged in highly
constructive community involvement for more than five years, directly supporting law enforcement
efforts and combating substance abuse. Applicant did not assert, and the record would not support
any other CC MC.  
Whole Person Analysis 
I have considered the “whole person” concept in evaluating Applicant’s risk and vulnerability
in protecting our national interests. His drug involvement consisted of three experimental uses of
cocaine, and marijuana use, primarily during and before the early 1980s. Between 1984 and January
1999, he used marijuana once or twice a year, on average, when it was being passed around at a party
and he felt peer pressure to participate. He knew what he was doing was wrong, and decided to
abstain from any drug use in January 1999 out of concern for his then 18 and 15-year-old children.
He was devastated when his son was killed in 2000 by a drunk driver. He has volunteered
extensively for the past five years with law enforcement and other crime prevention programs against
substance abuse and drunk driving. He is now in a happy, healthy and stable marriage. He has
admitted his conduct in connection with security clearance renewals since 1993. His 1992
falsification was a long ago, has not been repeated, and is unlikely to recur. Accordingly, Applicant
10
has mitigated the security concerns raised by his drug involvement, personal conduct, and criminal
conduct. It is clearly in the interest of national security to continue his access to classified material.
FORMAL FINDINGS           
            Formal Findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline H: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E:                               FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline J: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: For Applicant
DECISION            
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is
granted.
David M. White             
Administrative Judge