KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Foreign influence security concerns were identified after submission of Applicant’s May
2005 security clearance application. In April 2004, Applicant married a Russian national, whose
parents and relatives are resident citizens of Russia. In July 2006, Applicant and his wife separated,
and in October 2006, Applicant formally filed for divorce. The underlying basis for foreign influence
concerns no longer exists. Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 03-25260.h1
DATE: 09/28/2007
DATE:  September 28, 2007
In re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 03-25260
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ROBERT J. TUIDER
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Robert Coacher, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Alan V. Edmunds, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
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Foreign influence security concerns were identified after submission of Applicant’s May
2005  security clearance application. In April 2004, Applicant married a Russian national, whose
parents and relatives are resident citizens of Russia. In July 2006, Applicant and his wife separated,
and in October 2006, Applicant formally filed for divorce. The underlying basis for foreign influence
concerns no longer exists. Clearance is granted.
  Government Exhibit (GE) 2, (Electronic Standard Form (SF) 86, Security Clearance Application.)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 2, 2005, Applicant submitted a Security Clearance Application (SF 86).  On1
February 21, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to him, pursuant to Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended and modified, and Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive),
dated January 2, 1992, as amended, modified and revised.  2
The SOR alleges security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The SOR detailed
reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for him, and
recommended referral to an administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted,
continued, denied, or revoked.
In an answer submitted and signed by Applicant’s attorney on March 9, 2007, Applicant
responded to the SOR allegations, and elected to have his case decided at a hearing. On May 2, 2007,
the case was assigned to me. On June 4, 2007, DOHA issued a notice of hearing scheduling the case
for hearing on August 2, 2007. The hearing was convened as scheduled. I held the record open to
afford Applicant the opportunity to submit additional materials, and Applicant did submit additional
material. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on August 20, 2007. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant denied all the SOR allegations with explanations. After a thorough review of the
record evidence, I make the following additional findings of fact.
Applicant is a 33-year-old staff engineer - systems (2) who has worked for a government
contractor employer since December 1998. He has completed approximately three years of college,
and continues to pursue his degree on a part-time basis. He estimates he has “about a year left”
before graduating and is majoring in management. Applicant has continuously held a security
clearance for 15 years. He was initially granted a secret security clearance in January 1992, which
was later upgraded to a top secret clearance. He holds a top secret clearance. 
Applicant currently resides in Germany and estimates he spends approximately 90% of time
on the road. In April 2004, Applicant married a Russian national he met while he was working in
China. His wife’s parents, grandmothers, aunt, uncle and cousins are resident citizens of Russia. In
conjunction with meeting and marrying his wife, Applicant traveled to Russia a number of times in
  AG ¶ 2(a). “. . . The adjudication process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole3
person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should
be considered in reaching a determination. . . .” The whole person concept includes the consideration of “the nature,
extent, and seriousness of the conduct; the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; the frequency and recency of the conduct; the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; the
extent to which participation is voluntary; the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral
changes; the motivation for the conduct; the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and the likelihood
of continuation or recurrence. . .”
  See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).4
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the years 2002 to 2005. These facts raised foreign influence concerns, which formed the basis of
DOHA issuing Applicant an SOR in February 2007.
In July 2006, Applicant and his wife separated. In October 2006, Applicant’s attorney filed
for divorce. In July 2007, Applicant signed a separation agreement, and his divorce attorney
estimates his divorce will be final in October 2007. Applicant has not communicated with his wife
since October 2006 and it is his understanding she lives with a friend in the U.S. He has had no
communication whatsoever with his in-laws since January 2006, which was the last time he visited
Russia. He does not speak Russian nor do his in-laws speak English and he was only able to
communicate with them when his wife served as a translator.
POLICIES
The Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines (AG) which must be considered in evaluating
an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. The administrative judge must take
into account both disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each AG applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the case. The guidelines are not viewed as inflexible ironclad rules of law. The
presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative of a conclusion
for or against an Applicant. Each decision must reflect a fair and impartial common sense
consideration of the factors listed in Section 6.3 of the Directive, and the whole person concept.3
Having considered the record evidence as a whole, I conclude Guideline B (Foreign Influence) is the
applicable relevant AG.
BURDEN OF PROOF
The purpose of a security clearance decision is to determine whether it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified
information.  A person who has access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship4
with the government based on trust and confidence. The government, therefore, has a compelling
interest to ensure each applicant possesses the requisite judgement, reliability and trustworthiness
of one who will protect the national interests as his or her own. 
  ISCR Case No. 98-0761, at 2 (App. Bd. Dec. 27, 1999)(Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less5
than a preponderance of the evidence); ISCR Case No. 02-12199, at 3 (App. Bd. Apr. 3, 2006)(Substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary
evidence in the record); Directive, ¶ E3.1.32.1.
  Egan, supra n.8, at 528, 531.6
  See Id.; AG ¶ 2(b).7
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The government has the initial burden of proving controverted facts alleged in the SOR. To
meet its burden, the government must establish by substantial evidence  a prima facie case that it is5
not clearly consistent with the national interest for the applicant to have access to classified
information. The responsibility then shifts to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate the
government's case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the applicant carries a heavy
burden of persuasion.  The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution6
of any reasonable doubt about an applicant's suitability for access to classified information in favor
of protecting national security.7
The scope of an administrative judge’s decision is limited. Nothing in this Decision should
be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied
determination as to Applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism.  Executive Order 10865, § 7. \
CONCLUSIONS
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), the government’s concern is that foreign contacts and
interests may be a security concern. If the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial
interests, he or she may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to,
such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain
protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. AG ¶ 6.
AG ¶ 7 sets out conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this
case, including:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend,
or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion;
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group,
or country by providing that information;
  See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8,8
2001).
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The mere possession of close family ties with a person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law,
disqualifying under Guideline B. However, if only one relative lives in a foreign country, and an
applicant has contacts with that relative, this factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for
foreign influence and could potentially result in the compromise of classified information.  8
The government produced substantial evidence raising these two potentially disqualifying
conditions, and the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence and prove a mitigating
condition. The burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the government.
The underlying basis forming a foreign influence concern no longer exists inasmuch as
Applicant has been legally separated since July 2006, has had no contact with his wife since October
2006, filed for divorce in October 2006, signed his separation agreement in July 2007, and his final
divorce decree is pending which will most likely be granted in October 2007. I view the recent
development in Applicant’s personal life sufficient to alleviate any foreign influence concerns and
consider Applicant constructively divorced.
There being no disqualifying conditions, there is no need to apply or discuss mitigating
conditions under this security concern.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, Applicant established it is unlikely he will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of his spouse’s family and the interests
of the United States. His contact with his spouse and in-laws is non-existent. Applicant met his
burden of showing there is little to no likelihood that his relationship with his spouse or her family
could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.
I have carefully weighed all evidence, and I applied the disqualifying and mitigating
conditions as listed under the applicable AGs. I specifically considered Applicant’s answers to the
SOR, his testimony, and favorable evidence he submitted at his hearing. I also considered that there
is no evidence that he has ever mishandled or caused the compromise of classified information.
Considering all available information, and the whole person concept, I find Applicant has mitigated
the foreign influence security concern.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings regarding each SOR allegation as required by
Directive Section E3.1.25 are as follows:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a -1.d For Applicant
DECISION
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In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security
clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.
Robert J. Tuider
Administrative Judge