KEYWORD: Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant, who was born in India, is a naturalized U.S. citizen. He maintains contact with
his parents and two close friends, all citizens of and residing in India. He mitigated the security
concerns about his possession of a foreign passport after acquiring U.S. citizenship. Available
information also is sufficient to mitigate the security concerns about Applicant’s ties to family and
friends in India. Clearance is granted. 
CASENO: 06-05305.h1
DATE: 09/28/2007
DATE:  September 28, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-05305
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MATTHEW E. MALONE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric Borgstrom, Esquire, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant, who was born in India, is a naturalized U.S. citizen. He maintains contact with
2
his parents and two close friends, all citizens of and residing in India. He mitigated the security
concerns about his possession of a foreign passport after acquiring U.S. citizenship. Available
information also is sufficient to mitigate the security concerns about Applicant’s ties to family and
friends in India. Clearance is granted. 
 Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
 The Adjudicative Guidelines in Directive, Enclosure 2, have been superceded by the Revised Adjudicative2
Guidelines, which were approved by the President on December 29, 2005,and implemented by the Department of
Defense on September 1, 2006. Pending formal revision of the Directive, the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines supercede
the guidelines listed in Enclosure 2 to the Directive. However, they apply only to adjudications or trustworthiness
determinations in which an SOR was issued on or after September 1, 2006. The SOR in this case must be adjudicated
using the old guidelines.
 The FORM included 16 documents (Items 1 - 16) proffered in support of the government’s case. Because3
Department Counsel did not state the basis for their inclusion in the record, I can only assume that Items 8 - 16 were
submitted for Official Notice. I considered the facts to which Department Counsel referred in the FORM that are based
on Items 8 - 16; however, I did not limit myself to Department Counsel’s proffers and considered other information in
those documents that I deemed relevant to my decision.
 FORM, Item 1.4
 FORM, Item 2.5
 FORM, Item 7.6
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant’s request
for a security clearance. On May 26, 2006, DOHA issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons
(SOR),  which specified the basis for its decision –  security concerns addressed in the Directive1
under Guideline B (foreign influence) and Guideline C (foreign preference).  On June 12, 2006,2
Applicant answered the SOR, and requested a determination without a hearing. On July 17, 2006,
and on January 2, 2007, he submitted additional information in response to the SOR.
On February 28, 2007, DOHA Department Counsel submitted a file of relevant materials
(FORM)  in support of the government’s preliminary decision, a copy of which Applicant received3
on March 28, 2007. Applicant was afforded 30 days in which to file a response to the FORM, but
he submitted nothing before the April 12, 2007, deadline. On August 22, 2007, he submitted
information updating his employment status, and indicating he had nothing else to submit in
response to the government’s case. The case was assigned to me on September 10, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The government alleged that Applicant possessed a passport issued by the Republic of India
on April 1, 1997, which was valid through March 31, 2007 (SOR ¶ 1.a). It also alleged that
Applicant’s parents are citizens of and reside in India (SOR ¶ 2.a), and that he has two friends who
are citizens of and reside in India (SOR ¶ 2.b).  In response, Applicant admitted each of the SOR4
allegations.  His admissions are incorporated herein as facts. After a review of the pleadings and all5
of the information submitted by the parties, I make the following additional findings of fact.
Applicant is 43 years old. He was born in India and educated there through college,  but6
studied at a university in the United States between 1992 and 1994 for his MBA, and took advanced
 FORM, Item 5.7
 Id.8
 FORM, Item 3.9
 FORM, Item 7.10
 FORM Items 2, 4, 7.11
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engineering courses at the same university from 1998 to 1999. It is unclear from the record when he
first came to the United States, but he has lived and worked here continuously since at least February
1992, when he was 27 years old.  At the time he submitted his current application for clearance, he7
had been working for a defense contractor for five years as a senior business development manager.
In May 2007, he began working for his current employer, also a defense contractor, as the director
of new product and market development. In August 2002, Applicant was granted a public trust
position for work on a contract with the Federal Aviation Administration.
Applicant married his wife in May 2003. She was born in India, but became a naturalized
citizen in 1990. His wife’s earlier marriage produced two children born and raised in the United
States, but ended when her previous husband was killed in a car accident. His wife has a sister, who
lives in and is a naturalized citizen of the United States, and she has extended family (her parents
are deceased) still in India, with whom Applicant has no contact. Applicant intends to adopt both of
his wife’s children.8
Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen on April 17, 2002. His Indian citizenship ended
at that time, because India does not recognize dual citizenship. He was issued a U.S. passport on
April 30, 2002. In March 1997, he renewed his Indian passport, which would have expired in March
2007. However, on June 16, 2006, India cancelled Applicant’s passport at his request and he has
since relinquished it.  9
Applicant is an only child. His parents are citizens of and reside in India. His mother did not
work outside the home when he was growing up, and his father is now retired from an engineering
career. They have never been employed by or connected to the government of India, do not receive
any government pensions or national healthcare as they are financially independent. Applicant has
returned to India several times to visit his parents, and, as of January 2007, was anticipating a visit
to the U.S. by his parents in the next year.
Applicant has no financial interests of his own in India. He has no bank accounts, property
interests, or investments there. As their only child, his parents have named him the beneficiary on
their joint bank accounts. He also would be the legal heir to their estate.10
Applicant and his wife have two close friends, a married couple, with whom they keep in
touch by telephone or e-mail on a regular basis, and who they see whenever they visit India. The
husband is a retired stock broker, and the wife is retired from a job with the United States Agency
for International Development at the U.S. Embassy in India. These friends visited him and his wife
in the U.S. in 2005.11
 FORM, Items 9 and 10.12
 FORM, Items 11and 13.13
 FORM, Item 9.14
 FORM, Item 15.15
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India and the U.S. have had close relations ever since India obtained its independence from
Great Britain in 1947. The two governments continue to work closely in pursuit of mutual interests
in such issues as international management of  nuclear technology, preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and the global war on terror. Because India is important to strategic U.S. interests
in the region, the two countries have also engaged in several joint military exercises to ensure
stability in southern and southwest Asia. The Indian government buys most of its nuclear technology
from the U.S., and it has an excellent record when it comes to protecting its nuclear arsenal. 
Since the end of the Cold War, India has been an advocate of issues important to non-aligned
nations, and is a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Not
only does India enjoy close relations with the U.S., but it is working to strengthen its ties and
advance its mutual interests with France, Israel, China, Iran, the European Union, Japan, and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).12
India’s human rights record in 2006 was often uneven. Throughout its history, India’s caste
system, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic population, and the vestiges of colonial domination have
challenged India’s ability to govern certain parts of the country. As a result of sometimes violent
separatist movements, provincial law enforcement authorities and military militias have used
excessive force to maintain order and defeat domestic terrorism. Terrorism and separatist activities
are generally done in furtherance of internal issues, and are most violent in limited and remote
geographic regions. Despite these problems, India is still an open society in which the rule of law
is prominent.13
India, the world’s most populous democracy, uses a federal form of government, similar to
the United States, but with more authority vested in the central government. It has a bicameral
legislature modeled after Britain’s parliament, and its members are selected through open elections
involving several political parties. India also has an active market-oriented economy, and conducts
most of its international trade with the U.S.  India is included, along with other countries with whom14
the U.S. has good relations, on the U.S. State Department’s list of the most active collectors of
industrial information and technology.15
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).16
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.17
 See Egan; see also Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 2(b).18
 Enclosure 2.19
 Directive, 6.3.20
 “Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be21
considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should
consider the following factors: (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding
the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual's
age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence
of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
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POLICIES AND BURDEN OF PROOF
A security clearance decision is intended to resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to have access to classified16
information. The government bears the initial burden of producing admissible information on which
it based the preliminary decision to deny or revoke a security clearance for an applicant.
Additionally, the government must be able to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the
government meets its burden, it establishes that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest
for an applicant to have access to classified information. The applicant must then present sufficient
evidence to refute, extenuate or mitigate the government’s case. Because no one has a right to a
security clearance, applicants bear a heavy burden of persuasion to comply with the government’s
compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgement, reliability and
trustworthiness of one who will protect the national interests as his or her own.  The “clearly17
consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an
applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.18
The Directive sets forth adjudicative guidelines  for consideration when evaluating an19
applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Security clearance decisions must reflect
consideration of disqualifying and mitigating conditions listed under each adjudicative guideline as
may be applicable to the facts and circumstances of each case. Each decision must also reflect a fair
and impartial common sense consideration  of the factors comprising the “whole person concept”20
and listed in E2.2.1 of the Directive.  The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating21
condition is not determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific
applicable guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they
represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified information. Having
considered the pleadings and the record evidence as a whole, I conclude the relevant adjudicative
guidelines to be applied here are Guideline B (foreign influence) and Guideline C (foreign
preference).
CONCLUSIONS
 Directive, E2.A3.1.1. The Concern: When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a22
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are
harmful to the interests of the United States. 
 Directive, E2.A3.1.2.1. The exercise of dual citizenship; E2.A3.1.2.2. Possession and/or use of a foreign23
passport;
 Directive, E2.A2.1.1.24
 Directive, E2.A2.1.2.1. An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of25
affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country.
 Directive, E2.A2.1.3.5. Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's26
security responsibilities.
  Directive, E2.A2.1.3.1. A determination that the immediate family member(s), (spouse, father, mother, sons,27
daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to
be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s)
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Foreign Preference. The government alleged in SOR ¶ 1.a security concerns under
Guideline C  stemming from Applicant’s possession of a passport issued by the government of India22
on April 1, 1997, which was valid for 10 years. Such circumstances require consideration of DC 1
and DC 3.  Based on the information Applicant submitted in response to the SOR on July 17, 2006,23
Department Counsel acknowledged the absence of information showing the passport was used after
Applicant became a U.S. citizen, and that the foreign passport was cancelled and relinquished.
Additionally, his foreign passport was legally void in India as soon as he acquired U.S. citizenship.
Because India does not recognize dual citizenship, he ceased to be a citizen of India on April 17,
2002. Accordingly, the government asserts, and I agree, that the security concerns about Applicant’s
foreign passport no longer exist. I conclude Guideline C for the Applicant.
Foreign Influence. The government presented sufficient evidence to support the factual
allegations in the SOR. As to SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b, Applicant’s parents are citizens of and reside in
India. The record is silent about how often Applicant talks to his parents, but he has traveled to India
several times to see them. Applicant and his wife also have close friends with whom they keep in
touch on a regular basis. These facts raise security concerns under Guideline B; that is, a security risk
may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants, and other persons to whom
he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States
or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that
could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries
or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an
individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.  More specifically, of the24
disqualifying conditions (DC) listed under Guideline B, DC 1  must be considered in light of the25
available information about Applicant’s parents and friends.
Of the mitigating conditions listed (MC) under Guideline B, MC 5  must be considered.26
Available information shows Applicant’s interests are in the U.S., where he has lived and owned
homes since the 1990s. The fact he may inherit his parents’ estate and/or the contents of their bank
accounts is speculative at best, because it is also possible he may predecease his parents. Also
applicable to these facts is MC 1.  Despite its disjunctive wording, to apply MC 1 it must be shown27
involved and the United States.
 ISCR Case No. 02-14995 at 5 (App. Bd. July 26, 2004). (Foreign Influence Mitigating Condition 1 is28
bifurcated in nature and cannot be applied unless there is sufficient credible record evidence that an applicant's family
members, cohabitant or associates in question are (a) not agents of a foreign power, and (b) not in a position to be
exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the applicant to choose between the person(s) involved and the
United States. (Previous citations omitted.)).
 See footnote 21, supra.29
 Department Counsel averred in the FORM (p. 11 - 14) that the only potentially applicable “whole person”30
factor to be considered in cases of possible foreign preference is whether there is potential for pressure, coercion,
exploitation, or duress. While the other whole person factors pertain to conduct or specific events, making them logically
inapposite to most foreign influence cases, they are not “the only ones that may be considered in performing a whole
person analysis in a Guideline B case...[M]any others raised by the facts of a given case can be properly factored in to
a judge’s evaluation of an applicant’s worthiness of a security clearance.” ISCR Case 04-11414 (March 5, 2007), at 4
(citations omitted).
8
the persons in India to whom Applicant has close ties are not agents of a foreign power, and are not
vulnerable to exploitation by a foreign government so that Applicant would have to choose between
their well being and the interests of the United States.  As to the first prong of MC 1, none of28
Applicant’s foreign ties works for the Indian government or is an agent thereof. They are all retired
and live independently of government benefits. Indeed, one of his close friends retired from
employment by a U.S. agency. 
As to the second prong involving potential for coercion, available information shows that
India is an open society, governed through a democratically-elected legislature and executive,
checked by an independent judiciary. While there are notable problems regarding human rights
abuses by India, all of the available information probative issue shows Applicant’s parents and
friends are not likely to be subject to the actions noted in the record. The U.S. and India enjoy close,
mutually supportive political and trade relations, are working together in the global war on terror,
and their interests in controlling nuclear proliferation are generally aligned. I am mindful of the
information showing India is active in industrial espionage. Nonetheless, I conclude that there is little
likelihood India, a nation generally friendly toward the United States, will try to leverage Applicant’s
relationship with his parents and friends to gain access to the information with which Applicant
works. Based on the foregoing, I conclude SOR ¶¶ 1.a and 1.b for the Applicant, and further
conclude available information is sufficient to mitigate the security concerns raised under Guideline
B.
Whole Person. Having assessed the facts presented in this record and applied the appropriate
adjudicative factors, pro and con, under Guideline B and Guideline C, I turn now to a review of the
record before me in the context of the whole person factors.  Applicant is 42 years old and has lived29
in the United States for nearly 20 years. He is married to a naturalized U.S. citizen, and helped raise
her three children, now grown, from a previous marriage. He has established his life in the U.S., but
has quite naturally kept in touch with his parents and friends, none of whom has ties to the Indian
government. For the same reasons that Guideline B MC 1 applies, I conclude in this context that
there is little likelihood of coercion by the Indian government because, in addition to the adjudicative
factors already discussed,  Applicant is fully entrenched in the U.S., has no foreign financial30
interests, and is unlikely to compromise his life here.
 See footnote 20, supra.31
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A fair and commonsense assessment  of the entire record before me shows the government’s31
doubts about Applicant’s suitability to have access to classified information are based on reliable
information about his earlier possession of a foreign passport and his close ties to foreign citizens.
However, available information is also sufficient to resolve those doubts. Accordingly, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant’s request for access to classified information.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings regarding each SOR allegation are as follows:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C (Foreign Preference): FOR THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a:   For the Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B, (Foreign Influence): FOR THE APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a - 2.b:   For the Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant a security clearance for the Applicant. Clearance is granted.
Matthew E. Malone
Administrative Judge