KEYWORD: Foreign Preference; Personal Conduct
DIGEST: In 1995, Applicant was employed as a visiting scholar/associate professor at a private
university in Taiwan.  While in Taiwan, he voted in an election. Applicant had a Taiwan passport
which he used on three occasions. His foreign passport has now been destroyed. In 2004, Applicant
completed a Security Clearance Application, Standard Form (SF) 86. When he completed his SF 86,
he failed to indicate he had a foreign passport or had visited a foreign country during the prior seven
years. Applicant’s answers were not intentional falsifications. Applicant no longer has ties with
Taiwan and has expressed a willingness to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship. The record evidence
is sufficient to mitigate or extenuate the negative security implications stemming from foreign
preference and personal conduct. Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-10090.h1
DATE: 09/14/2007
DATE: September 14, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-10090
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CLAUDE R. HEINY
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Robert E. Coacher, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Christopher J. Cafiero, Esq.
Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive),1
dated January 2, 1992, as amended.
2
SYNOPSIS
In 1995, Applicant was employed as a visiting scholar/associate professor at a private
university in Taiwan.  While in Taiwan, he voted in an election. Applicant had a Taiwan passport
which he used on three occasions. His foreign passport has now been destroyed. In 2004, Applicant
completed a Security Clearance Application, Standard Form (SF) 86. When he completed his SF 86,
he failed to indicate he had a foreign passport or had visited a foreign country during the prior seven
years. Applicant’s answers were not intentional falsifications. Applicant no longer has ties with
Taiwan and has expressed a willingness to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship. The record evidence
is sufficient to mitigate or extenuate the negative security implications stemming from foreign
preference and personal conduct. Clearance is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 30, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant stating that DOHA could not make the preliminary
affirmative finding  it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security1
clearance for Applicant. The SOR set forth reasons why a security clearance could not be granted
or continued due to foreign preference and personal conduct security concerns.
On April 28, 2007, Applicant answered the SOR and requested a hearing. On June 14, 2007,
I was assigned the case. On July 5, 2007, a Notice of Hearing was issued for the hearing held on July
24, 2007.  At the hearing, Government presented five exhibits (Gov Ex).  Applicant testified, as did
one other witness.  Applicant submitted no exhibits.  Applicant’s counsel asked that ISCR Case No.
00-0275 (Dated October 30, 2000) be considered. On August 1, 2007, DOHA received the transcript
(Tr.).
FINDINGS OF FACT
The SOR alleges security concerns for foreign preference and personal conduct. Applicant
admits: he was employed from August 1993 through June 1996 as a visiting scholar/associate
professor at a university in Taiwan; he received grants while employed at the university; he voted
in a 1995 Taiwanese election; in 1993 he traveled to Taiwan and in 1994 he traveled to Hong Kong;
in 2002, he accompanied his father to Taiwan; and he had a Taiwanese passport that was destroyed
in January 2007. The admissions are incorporated herein as findings of fact. After a thorough review
of the record, I make the following findings of fact.
Applicant is a 48-year-old test engineer who has worked for a defense contractor since July
1997, and is seeking to maintain a security clearance issued in April 1998. 
The SOR list the People’s Republic of China which is different from Taiwan, even though the People’s2
Republic of China insists there is only one China. 
3
In November 1958, Applicant was born on Taiwan, Republic of China .  Both of his parents2
were university professors. His parents were born in mainland China and in 1948 fled to Taiwan
to escape the Communists. (Tr. 32) In 1981, his sister came to the U.S. to study for her master’s
degree. In July 1983, Applicant came to the U.S. to study physics.  In 1986, his brother came to the
U.S. to attend university.  In 1990, Applicant obtained a Ph.D. in physics. In 1990, his mother retired
as a university professor and came to the U.S. to live permanently. His mother, brother, and sister
became naturalized U.S. citizens. (Tr. 47, 68) In December 1991, Applicant became a naturalized
U.S. citizen and obtained a U.S. passport. 
Following graduation from university, Applicant looked for a teaching position in academia.
Finding a lack of jobs in the U.S., he obtained a position as a visiting scholar/associate professor at
a private university in Taiwan. He was employed there from August 1993 through June 1996. As
an associate professor, he taught general physics and obtained grants from a national science council
to pay for equipment and the hiring of graduate assistants. (Gov Ex 5) Grants were necessary to run
labs and conduct research projects. He did not have to be a Taiwanese citizen to obtain the grants.
(Tr. 45) In February 1994, Applicant and his wife traveled on vacation to Hong Kong during
Chinese New Year using his Taiwanese passport. 
Applicant has been married 19 years and has one son who was born in the U.S.  Both his
wife and son are U.S. citizens. (Tr. 33) He met his wife when he was in school. (Tr. 67) 
In May 1995, he voted in an election in Taiwan. Applicant voted for the status quo party
because he knew the U.S. government favored the status quo and did not favor independence for
Taiwan. (Tr. 55)
 In 1995, Applicant decided he did not want a teaching career in physics.  In 1996,
Applicant’s father retired as a professor at a Taiwanese university and moved permanently to the
U.S.  In 1996, Applicant returned to the U.S. where he continued his studies for two additional
semesters. In July 1997, he was hired by his current employer. 
In June 1993, Applicant obtained a Taiwanese passport that expired in June 1999. (Gov Ex
3) Applicant had no intention of renewing his Taiwanese passport when it expired. (Tr. 60) In
February 1998, Applicant stated he was willing to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship. (Gov Ex 5)
In March 2002, his mother died and left some open bank retirement accounts in Taiwan that needed
to be closed.  Four days after his mother’s death, Applicant renewed his expired Taiwanese passport.
Applicant accompanied his 74-year-old, severely hearing-impaired father who suffers from
Parkinson’s disease to Taiwan to resolve the financial issues related to his mother’s death.  He was
in Taiwan from April 14, 2002 through April 21, 2002. Following his return from Taiwan, Applicant
never intended to use his Taiwanese passport again. (Tr. 37) In January 2007, the passport was
destroyed by the company’s security officer. (Gov Ex 2) 
In his November 1997 sworn statement (Gov Ex 4) and in his February 1998 sworn
statement (Gov Ex 5), Applicant fully explained his 1995 employment at the Taiwanese university.
The sworn statements explain in detail Applicant’s connection with Taiwan, his education, jobs,
becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen, his relatives and where they lived, foreign travel, and his
4
mandatory service in the Taiwanese military.  In September 2004, Applicant completed a security
clearance application, Standard Form (SF) 86. The SF 86 was completed by a person asking
Applicant questions and the other individual would type out the answers.  After the document was
completed, Applicant was giving the opportunity to review the document. (Tr. 38) Applicant does
not know the name of the interviewer nor does he know if the person was a company employee or
a government employee. (Tr. 52) Department Counsel suggest the interview actually took place in
2005, a year after Applicant completed the SF 86. (Tr51)
Applicant answered “no” to question 13, which asked if he had ever been employed by a
foreign government, firm, or agency. He answered “no” because his 1995 employment with the
Taiwanese university was with a private university and did not involve government employment,
employment by a foreign firm, or foreign agency. 
Even though Applicant had fully disclosed his Taiwanese passport in his November 1997
sworn statement (Gov Ex 4) and in his February 1998 sworn statement (Gov Ex 5), his SF 86
contains a “no” answer to question 15, which asked if he had a foreign passport. Applicant said this
was an oversight.  His answer was “no” to question 16, which asked if he had traveled outside the
U.S. during the previous seven years.  He failed to disclose his one week trip to Taiwan in April
2002. Applicant stated he believed the trip to Taiwan was disclosed elsewhere on his SF 86.
Applicant says it was a mistake not catching the wrong answers to questions 15 and 16. (Tr. 39)
Applicant takes responsibility for failing to catch the mistakes on his SF 86. Applicant stated he
thought he had disclosed this Taiwanese passport during an interview, which took place at his on-
site work location in September 2004. During that interview, Applicant states he offered to surrender
his passport, showed it to the investigator, and indicated the entry and departure date stamps for his
trip to Taiwan in April 2002. (Tr. 40, 70) Applicant does not know the interviewer’s identity or if
he was a company or government employee.
Applicant intends to live permanently in the U.S.  He has no close relatives living outside
of the U.S. He stated he was willing to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship. (Gov Ex 5, Tr. 61)
Applicant considers himself a loyal U.S. citizen. (Gov Exs 4 and 5) Applicant appreciates everything
that the U.S. offers him. (Tr. 67) 
POLICIES
The Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information, dated August 2006, sets forth Disqualifying Conditions (DC) and Mitigating
Conditions (MC) for each applicable guideline. Additionally, each decision must be a fair and
impartial commonsense decision based upon the relevant and material facts and circumstances, the
whole person concept, and the factors listed in Section 6.3 of the Directive. The adjudicative
guidelines are to be applied by administrative judges on a case-by-case basis with an eye toward
making determinations that are clearly consistent with the interests of national security. The
presence or absence of a particular condition or factor for or against clearance is not determinative
of a conclusion for or against an applicant.  However, the adjudicative guidelines should be followed
whenever a case can be measured against this policy guidance. Considering the evidence as a whole,
I conclude the relevant guidelines to be applied here are Guideline C, foreign preference and
Guideline E, personal conduct.
BURDEN OF PROOF
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 (January 27, 1995) at pp. 7-8; Directive, Enclosure 3, Item E3.1.153
5
The sole purpose of a security clearance decision is to decide if it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an applicant. Initially, the
Government must establish, by substantial evidence, that conditions exist in the personal or
professional history of the applicant which disqualify, or may disqualify, an applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information. The burden of proof in a security clearance case is
something less than a preponderance of evidence, although the government is required to present
substantial evidence to meet its burden of proof.  Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but
less than a preponderance of the evidence. All that is required is proof of facts and circumstances
which indicate an applicant is at risk for mishandling classified information, or that an applicant
does not demonstrate the high degree of judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness required of persons
handling classified information.  Additionally, the government must prove controverted facts alleged
in the SOR.  Once the government has met its burden, the burden shifts to an applicant to present
evidence to refute, extenuate or mitigate the government's case.  Additionally, an applicant has the
ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance decision.3
As noted by the United States Supreme Court in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,
528 (1988), “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” A person who has access to classified
information enters into a fiduciary relationship with the government based on trust and confidence.
The government, therefore, has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the
requisite judgment, reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national interests. The
“clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt
about an applicant’s suitability for access to classified information in favor of protecting national
security.  Security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials. 
CONCLUSIONS
The Government has satisfied its initial burden of proof under foreign preference. The
concern arises when an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country
over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that
are harmful to the interests of the United States.  Conditions that could raise a security concern and
may be disqualifying include: 10(a) “exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign
citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member.”
This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession and/or use of a foreign passport and (7) voting in
a foreign election. 
In 1995, Applicant obtained a job with a Taiwanese university.  Having a job in a foreign
country in and of itself without more is not a condition that raises concern under foreign preference.
It is the identity of the employer that may give rise to a security concern if that employer is a foreign
government, agency, or firm. While so employed he obtained grants from the Taiwan National
Science Council, but part of the duties of any university professor or associate professor is to seek
grants so graduate students can be employed, equipment purchased, and research conducted.  While
in Taiwan, he did vote in a 1995 election, which is a condition that could raise a security concern.
However, the voting occurred 12 years ago when Applicant was living in Taiwan, has not been
repeated, and is unlikely to be repeated.
6
Applicant had a Taiwanese passport which he let expire in June 1999.  It is likely the
passport would not have been renewed but for his mother’s death in March 2002.  When his mother
died she had financial matters to be attended to in Taiwan.  Applicant accompanied his 76-year-old,
hearing-impaired father to Taiwan.  Applicant was in Taiwan one week.  This was the only trip for
which the renewed passport was used.  The passport has since been destroyed by the company’s
security officer. Mitigating Condition (MC) 11(e) “the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to
the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated,” applies. He has expressed a willingness
to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship.  MC 1(b) “individual has expressed a willingness to renounce
dual citizenship,” applies. 
The security concern with personal conduct is conduct involving questionable judgment, lack
of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of
special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance
process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. Conditions that could
raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include 16(a) “deliberate omission, concealment,
or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal
history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness,
or award fiduciary responsibilities.”
 The Government has shown Applicant's answer to questions 15 and 16, which asked about
his foreign passport and foreign travel, were incorrect.  Applicant takes responsibility for failing to
catch the mistakes on his SF 86. In November 1997, Applicant made a detailed statement discussing
everything of relevance regarding his background in Taiwan.  He discussed his foreign passport,
foreign travel, his relatives, his education, and work at Taiwanese university in 1995. In February
1998, Applicant again gave a detailed sworn statement about his education, growing up in Taiwan,
his employment as a visiting associate professor at the Taiwanese university, his travel to Hong
Kong during the Chinese New Year, and his relatives. Having made such detailed sworn statements,
it fails to follow that he would deliberately fail to disclose information about his foreign passport
and foreign travel when he completed his September 2004 SF 86.
Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of a material fact in any written document
or oral statement to the Government when applying for a security clearance is a security concern.
But every inaccurate statement is not a falsification. A falsification must be deliberate and material.
It is deliberate if it is done knowingly and willfully. Applicant had previously made two, formal,
sworn statements about his foreign passport and foreign travel. Applicant has denied intentional
falsification. Applicant acknowledged his behavior and admitted he did not fill out the questionnaire
properly. After hearing Applicant’s testimony, observing his demeanor, and evaluating all the
evidence of record, I found his testimony credible on the falsification issue. Having already
informed the government of his previous foreign travel and possession of a Taiwanese passport, I
find it unlikely Applicant would have intentionally withheld this information on his SF 86. I am
satisfied the incorrect answers were not an intentional falsification of his SF 86. 
When asked in question 13 if he had ever been employed by a foreign government, firm, or
agency he answered “no” because his employment was with a private foreign university which he
did not believe was a foreign government, firm, or agency.  There was no deliberate falsification in
response to this question.
7
Security clearance determinations involve a careful weighing of a number of variables
known as the whole person concept. In reaching my conclusions I have also considered: the nature,
extent, and seriousness of the conduct; Applicant’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; the
circumstances surrounding the conduct; Applicant’s voluntary and knowledgeable participation; the
motivation for the conduct; the frequency and recency of the conduct; presence or absence of
rehabilitation; potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and the probability that the
circumstance or conduct will continue or recur in the future. 
All of Applicant’s close family lives in the U.S.  He has no remaining ties with Taiwan.  He
owns no property there nor does he have any financial accounts there. Applicant’s son and wife are
U.S. citizens.  Applicant’s loyalty is with the U.S. I find for Applicant as to foreign preference. I find
Applicant did not intentionally falsify his SF 86 and find for him as to personal conduct.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings as required by Section 3, Paragraph 7, of Enclosure 1 of the Directive are
hereby rendered as follows:
Paragraph 1 foreign preference: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2 personal conduct: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is
granted.
_____________________________
Claude R. Heiny 
Administrative Judge