KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Mexico, having been born in the U.S. of
Mexican parents. He chose to pursue his higher education and profession in the U.S. He destroyed
his Mexican passport when he learned it raised security issues.  His wife was born in Ukraine,
educated in the U.S., met and married Applicant in the U.S., and intends to become a U.S. citizen.
Security concerns based on foreign influence are mitigated.  Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-23918.h1
DATE: 09/14/2007 
DATE:  September 14, 2007
In re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-23918
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
LEROY F. FOREMAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Jennifer I. Goldstein, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Virginia Gomez, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
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Applicant is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Mexico, having been born in the U.S. of Mexican
parents. He chose to pursue his higher education and profession in the U.S. He destroyed his
Mexican passport when he learned it raised security issues.  His wife was born in Ukraine, educated
in the U.S., met and married Applicant in the U.S., and intends to become a U.S. citizen.  Security
concerns based on foreign influence are mitigated.  Clearance is granted.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 14, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny Applicant a
security clearance. This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Jan. 2, 1992),
as amended and modified (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) approved by the
President on December 29, 2005, and implemented effective September 1, 2006.  The SOR alleges
security concerns under B (Foreign Influence).
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on April 30, 2007, admitted all the allegations except
one, and requested a hearing.  The case was assigned to an administrative judge on July 6, 2007, and
reassigned to me on July 25, 2007, based on workload.  The case was heard as scheduled on August
22, 2007.  DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on August 31, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant’s admissions in his answer to the SOR and at the hearing are incorporated into my
findings of fact.  I make the following findings:
Applicant is a 33-year-old orbital analyst for a defense contractor involved in satellite
development.  He is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Mexico, having been born in the U.S. of Mexican
parents (Applicant’s Exhibit (AX) S at 4).  He has never held a security clearance.
Applicant’s supervisors and colleagues uniformly described him as talented, honest, hard
working, and dedicated (AX E, J, T, X).  He completed formal training on protection of proprietary
information (AX F), and he enjoys a reputation for careful adherence to company rules and protocols
for protecting proprietary and sensitive information (AX B, C, D).  He demonstrated his familiarity
with the protocols during his testimony (Tr. 31-33).  He has received awards for technical excellence
(AX G), and was rated as “highly effective” in 2004, 2005, and 2006 (AX H). 
Applicant’s father is a medical doctor and medical researcher.  He is a citizen of Mexico.
He received his medical degree in Mexico in 1971, was licensed to practice in the U.S. in 1974, and
returned to Mexico in 1977 (AX Q).  He is a department head at a government-operated medical
institute in Mexico and a professor at a government-operated university in Mexico, but most of his
income comes from his private practice (Tr. 36-39).  Although the medical institute is a government
organization, its members maintain academic and professional independence (AX P).  He frequently
travels to the U.S. to work on medical matters (Tr. 72).
Applicant’s mother is a homemaker and has never worked outside the home.  His brother is
a dual citizen of the U.S. and Mexico, working in Mexico as an engineer (Tr. 41). 
Although Applicant’s parents own their home debt-free and enjoy a comfortable income,
they live modestly and avoid ostentatious displays of their economic status (Tr. 39-40).  None of his
family members are active in politics (Tr. 40-41).
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Applicant and his brother were born while their parents were living in the U.S., and they
returned to Mexico with their parents in 1977.  When Applicant was 18 years old, he went to the
American Consulate in Mexico and told them he was concerned about losing his U.S. citizenship.
He was assured he could retain his U.S. citizenship, and he renewed his U.S. passport (Tr. 56).  
Applicant attended college in the U.S., graduating in May 2000 with degrees in aerospace
engineering and electrical engineering (AX T).  He began working for a defense contractor in the
U.S. after graduating from college, and he obtained a master’s degree in engineering management
while working full time (AX V; Tr. 27).
Applicant obtained a Mexican passport in September 2002, for convenience and to avoid
paying the foreign airport use tax when he visited his family in Mexico (GX 2 at 2; Tr. 55).  He
destroyed his Mexican passport in the presence of his facility security officer when he learned it
raised security issues (GX 2 at 29).
Applicant maintains email contact with his family and talks to them on the telephone about
every other week (Tr. 42).  His family has visited him twice in the U.S., on his college graduation
and on his wedding day (Tr. 42).  He has visited Mexico about 12 times in the last seven years,
mostly for family events (Tr. 43, 57; Answer to SOR).  He belongs to a recreational flying club that
sometimes flies to Mexico to enjoy the beaches or the scenery, and a charitable flying club that flies
medical professionals and supplies to poor communities in Mexico (AX W; Tr. 57-58).
Applicant testified at the hearing that he does not regard himself as a dual citizen, but as an
American (Tr. 56).  He testified he cannot envision returning to Mexico.  He appreciates the
opportunity provided by the U.S. to attain success through his own efforts rather than family status
or place of birth (Tr. 60-61).
Applicant was married in June 2007 to a citizen of Ukraine residing in the U.S.  He met his
spouse while she was in the U.S. on a student visa.  They dated for about a year before they were
married.  Applicant sponsored her for status as a conditional U.S. permanent resident after they were
married (Tr. 34).  She intends to relinquish her Ukrainian citizenship and become a U.S. citizen as
soon as she is eligible (Tr. 35; AX A).  She is a certified public accountant and works for a large
accounting firm in the U.S. (Tr. 35).
Applicant’s father-in-law is a professor at a “construction university “in Ukraine.  His
mother-in-law previously was a department head within Ukraine’s Ministry of Economic Affairs,
but she now works for a private cell phone company (AX A; Tr. Tr. 46-47).  They both reside in
Kiev, the capital of Ukraine.  They have never been involved in military or intelligence activities
(AX A at 2).
Applicant has visited with his mother-in-law four times and his father-in-law twice.  On one
occasion the four of them went on vacation to Hawaii, and on another they spent two weeks together
touring Europe.  His in-laws did not come to their wedding.  His mother-in-law visited shortly after
their marriage and on his wife’s graduation from college (Tr. 47-48).  His in-laws speak very
rudimentary English, and he cannot speak or understand Ukrainian.  Applicant can speak some
Russian, as do his in-laws, but they prefer to converse in Ukrainian (Tr. 49).  He has no email or
telephonic contact with them (Tr. 50).  Applicant’s wife communicates by email with her parents,
telephones them once every one or two months, and visits them about once a year (AX A at 3).
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Applicant’s wife has two older brothers in Ukraine, who are college graduates but are
unemployed (AX A at 2).  His wife considers them “losers” and has no contact with them (Tr. 80).
At Department Counsel’s request, and without objection from Applicant, I took
administrative notice of relevant adjudicative facts about Ukraine (Tr. 13; GX 3-6; Hearing Exhibit
(HX I). 
Ukraine has a parliamentary-presidential type of government since becoming independent
of the Soviet Union in 1991.  It is undergoing profound political and economic change as it moves
toward a market economy and multiparty democracy.  After the first free elections in December
1991, presidential elections were marred by government intimidation and electoral fraud.  The
presidential election in 2005 and local elections in March 2006 were markedly more fair.  Ukraine
has significant human rights problems. Torture, arbitrary detention of persons critical of the
government, and warrantless violations of privacy are illegal but common.  
Ukraine inherited a military force of 780,000 from the Soviet Union, which is seeking to
modernize.  Ukraine participates in six United Nation peacekeeping missions and has a small
number of troops serving in supporting roles with Coalition forces in Iraq.   
Ukraine’s foreign policy goals include membership in the World Trade Organization, the
European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Ukraine has peaceful and constructive
relations with its neighbors.  Relations with Russia are difficult and complex, however, due to
differing foreign policy priorities in the region, energy dependence, payment arrears, disagreement
over stationing of Russian military forces, and some boundary disputes.  
Ethnic Russians are concentrated in the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine, constituting
about 17.3% of the population.  They are suspicious of Ukrainian nationalism and support close ties
with Russia.  However, Kiev, where Applicant’s in-laws live, is in the northern part of Ukraine (GX
3 at 1).
At Applicant’s request, without objection from Department Counsel, I took administrative
notice of the following relevant adjudicative facts about Mexico.  Mexico is a federal republic.  It
is a friendly neighbor of the U.S., with whom it shares extensive commercial, cultural, and
educational ties.  Traditionally, Mexico has maintained its interests abroad and projected its
influence through moral persuasion.  Its foreign relations are based on the principles of
nonintervention and self-determination.  It does not target U.S. citizens to obtain military or
economic information, nor does it coerce its own citizens to obtain knowledge about the U.S.  To
the contrary, the U.S. and Mexico collaborate on security issues ranging from terrorism to drug
trafficking, as well as many other issues (AX O, R; Tr. 22-23).
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.”  Id. at
527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants
SOR ¶ 1.f initially alleged Applicant’s father-in-law was a Department Head within Ukraine’s Ministry of1
Economic Affairs.  At Department Counsel’s request, and without objection from Applicant, I amended the SOR to
conform to the evidence by substituting “mother-in-law” for “father-in-law.”  (Tr. 90-91.)
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eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.  Eligibility for a security clearance is
predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the Guidelines.  Each clearance
decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision based on the relevant and material
facts and circumstances, the whole person concept, the disqualifying conditions and mitigating
conditions under each specific guideline, and the factors listed in AG ¶¶ 2(a)(1)-(9).
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special relationship with the
government.  The government must be able to have a high degree of trust and confidence in persons
with access to classified information.  However, the decision to deny an individual a security
clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  See Exec. Or. 10865
§ 7.  It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the
Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal
or professional history of the applicant which disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  “Substantial evidence” is
“more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The Guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between
proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See
ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the
burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  See Directive ¶
E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”  ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3
(App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side
of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). 
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The SOR alleges Applicant’s wife is a citizen of Ukraine living in the U.S. (SOR ¶ 1.a), her
parents are citizens and residents of Ukraine (SOR ¶ 1.e), and her mother was a department head in
Ukraine’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (SOR ¶ 1.f).   It also alleges his parents are citizens and1
residents of Mexico (SOR ¶ 1.b), his father works for a government-run hospital in Mexico (SOR
¶ 1.c), and his brother is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Mexico residing in Mexico (SOR ¶ 1.d).  
The concern under this guideline is as follows: “Foreign contacts and interests may be a
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that
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is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication
under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign
contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether
the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or
is associated with a risk of terrorism.” AG ¶ 6.
Three disqualifying conditions under this guideline are relevant to this case.  First, a
disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member, business or
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  Second, a disqualifying condition may be raised by “connections to a
foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(b).  Third, a
security concern may be raised if an applicant is “sharing living quarters with a person or persons,
regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion”  AG ¶ 7(d).  All three disqualifying conditions are raised by
the evidence in this case.
Family ties with persons in a foreign country are not, as a matter of law, automatically
disqualifying under Guideline B. However, such ties raise a prima facie security concern sufficient
to require an applicant to present evidence of rebuttal, extenuation or mitigation sufficient to meet
the applicant’s burden of persuasion that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue a security clearance for the applicant.  See Directive¶ E3.1.15; ISCR Case No. 99-0424,
2001 DOHA LEXIS 59 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).  An applicant has the burden of proving a
mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it is never shifted to the government.  See ISCR
Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United States has
a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person,
organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person,
organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-
11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over
matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly
nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific,
and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd.
Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S.,
and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is
associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions
or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed
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in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization,
or government and the interests of the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a).  The totality of an applicant’s family ties
to a foreign country as well as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-
22693 at 7 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). 
Applicant is clearly independent of his parents, but he enjoys a good familial relationship
with his parents and brother.  He is less close to his in-laws.  “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption
that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to, the immediate family members of the person's
spouse.”  ISCR Case No. 01-03120, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 94 at *8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002).
Applicant has rebutted that presumption for his two Ukrainian brothers-in-law, with whom he has
no relationship.  He did not indicate any particular affection for his mother-in-law and father-in-law,
but he offered nothing to rebut the presumed ties of obligation to them.  Neither Applicant’s
immediate family members nor his in-laws are engaged in military or intelligence activities, and they
do not work for businesses involved in economic espionage.  
Mexico is a friendly country with close ties to the U.S.  Ukraine also is a friendly country,
striving for acceptance by the U.S. and Europe.  Neither country targets the U.S. for military or
economic intelligence.  Although Ukraine’s human rights record is spotty, neither country has a
reputation for mistreating its citizens or citizens of other countries to obtain military or economic
intelligence.  The nature of both country’s governments, their human rights record, and  their
relationships with the U.S. are clearly not determinative.  Nevertheless, they are all relevant factors
in determining whether either Mexico or Ukraine would risk damaging their relationship with the
U.S. by exploiting or threatening their private citizens in order to force a U.S. citizen to betray the
U.S.  After considering Applicant’s family ties to Mexico and Ukraine individually as well as in
totality, I conclude AG ¶ 8(a) is established.
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is no conflict
of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in
favor of the U.S. interest.”  AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant is close to his family in Mexico, and less close to his in-laws in Ukraine.
However, he chose to be educated in the U.S., clearly regards himself as a citizen of the U.S., and
saw his professional future as in the U.S.  He was candid, sincere, and credible at the hearing.  I am
satisfied he would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.  Accordingly, I conclude AG
¶ 8(b) is established.
Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated by showing that “contact or
communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it
could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.” AG ¶ 8(c). There is a rebuttable
presumption that contacts with an immediate family member in a foreign country are not casual.
ISCR Case No. 00-0484 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2002).  Applicant has regular contact with his family
members in Mexico, but virtually no direct contact with his in-laws in Ukraine.  Communication
with his Ukrainian in-laws is severely inhibited by a language barrier.  I conclude AG ¶ 8(c) is
partially established for his in-laws in Ukraine.
Whole Person Analysis
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In addition to considering the specific disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each
guideline, I have also considered: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the applicant’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  AG ¶¶
2(a)(1)-(9).  Some of these factors were discussed above, but some merit additional comment.
Applicant was candid, sincere, and persuasive at the hearing.  He has chosen a life and
profession independent of his parents.  He has impressed his colleagues as well as supervisors with
his good character, hard work, and careful adherence to the protocols for protecting sensitive
information.  His enthusiasm for his work and his affection for the U.S. were obvious during the
hearing.  His spouse also appears to have broken from her past and is pursuing her future with him
in the U.S.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B, considering
the nature of the countries involved, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole
person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence.
Accordingly, I conclude he has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant him a security clearance.
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FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my findings as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1.  Guideline B FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.g For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant Applicant a security clearance.  Clearance is granted.
LeRoy F. Foreman
Administrative Judge