KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is a 50-year-old interpreter employed by a defense contractor.  One sister, an
uncle, and his wife’s parents are citizens and residents of Afghanistan.  Except for the one sister, he
has had no contact with his wife’s family for over five years, and no contact with his own family
since he immigrated to the U.S. in 1986.  Having worked in the past as an interpreter for the military,
he understands the discretion that is required for such a position.  His ties to the United States
outweigh the risks to his family living in Afghanistan.  He successfully mitigated the security
concerns about foreign influence.  Clearance is granted.
CASENO: 06-24401.h1
DATE: 09/28/2007
DATE:  September 28, 2007
In re:
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SSN:  -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-24401
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CHRISTOPHER GRAHAM
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric H. Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
2
Applicant is a 50-year-old interpreter employed by a defense contractor.  One sister, an uncle,
and his wife’s parents are citizens and residents of Afghanistan.  Except for the one sister, he has had
no contact with his wife’s family for over five years, and no contact with his own family since he
immigrated to the U.S. in 1986.  Having worked in the past as an interpreter for the military, he
understands the discretion that is required for such a position.  His ties to the United States outweigh
the risks to his family living in Afghanistan.  He successfully mitigated the security concerns about
foreign influence.  Clearance is granted.
Government Exhibit 1 (Security Clearance Application (SF 86), dated June 23, 2004).1
Tr. at 6.2
See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 at 4 n.1 (App. Bd. Apr. 12, 2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2006)3
(citing ISCR Case No. 02-18668 at 3 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004)); McLeod v. Immigration and Naturalization  Service,
802 F.2d 89, 93 n.4 (3d Cir. 1986)).
See Stein, ADM INISTRATIVE LAW , Section 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006) (listing fifteen types of facts for administrative4
notice). 
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 23, 2004, Applicant submitted a Security Clearance Application (SF 86).   The1
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a security clearance
for Applicant.  As required by Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within
Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6,
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Directive), dated January 2,
1992, as amended, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on May 29, 2007, detailing the
basis for its decision – security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) of the
Directive.  The President issued revised adjudicative guidelines (Guidelines) on December 30, 2005.
DoD implemented them on September 1, 2006.  Pending official amendment/reissue of DoD
Directive 5220.6, the Guidelines are to be used in all cases when the SOR is dated on or after
September 1, 2006.  Because the SOR was issued after September 1, 2006, DoD policy requires that
this case proceed under the revised guidelines. 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on July 12, 2007, and elected to have a hearing
before an administrative judge.  DOHA assigned the case to me on August 3, 2007, and issued a
Notice of Hearing on August 8, 2007.  I convened a hearing on August 27, 2007, to consider whether
it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant's  security clearance.
Applicant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the rule requiring15days notice of the hearing,
because he had actual notice more than 15 days prior to the hearing.   The government offered five2
exhibits, marked as Exhibits 1-5.  Applicant offered no exhibits.  All exhibits were admitted without
objection.  DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on September 5, 2007.
PROCEDURAL RULINGS
Administrative Notice
Department Counsel requested administrative notice of the facts in Government Exhibits A1
through A8.  Applicant stated he had no objection to administrative notice of the exhibits. 
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for administrative
proceedings.   The most common basis for administrative notice at ISCR proceedings, is to notice3
facts that are either well known or from government reports.   I took administrative notice of various4
facts derived from Government Exhibits A1 through A8, as indicated under subheading
“Afghanistan” of this decision.
Tr. at 10, 17.5
Id. at 19-20.6
Id. at 20-21.7
Id. at 21-25.8
Id. at 26-29.9
Id. at 11-12.10
4
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the allegations contained in the SOR.  The admissions are incorporated
herein as findings of fact.  After a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and
upon due consideration of same, I make the following additional findings of fact: 
Applicant is a 50-year-old interpreter employed by a defense contractor.   He is  married and5
has four children.  His wife has kidney problems and takes as much as 16 different medicationsIn
2005, a fifth child died, after being beaten and robbed while on a trip to Mexico.  After graduating
from high school, Applicant attended an Afghan police academy.  He then worked for a municipal
police force for about 10 years, working narcotics, and attained the rank of captain.   In 1986, he6
immigrated to the United States.  He worked odd jobs in such places as gas stations and convenience
stores until 2004, when he commenced working for a defense contractor.   He has worked overseas7
assignments for the military.  All of his time was spent on various military bases, and he was not
permitted off base, nor was he permitted to have any interaction with foreign nationals off the base.
He had no adverse contact with any foreign authorities, and maintains no contact with any other
foreign national he may have met on those trips.  Since he left home in 1986, he has not seen any of
his family living if Afghanistan except one sister in 2005.  She contacted him about his son’s
accident.  He has no family contact because of his job, and because if he saw them, they would
inquire about his job and ask him for money.8
Applicant’s wife’s parents are citizens and residents of Afghanistan.  It has been five years
since he has seen his mother-in-law.  His father-in-law is in the retail business, selling groceries,
carpets, and other items.  His wife has no contact with her father since he took another wife, as
permitted under Muslim law.  She calls her mother every three or four months.9
Applicant’s spouse is a citizen of Afghanistan, and resides in the United States.  His wife
applied for citizenship but did not pass the writing test.  One son has passed the test but forgot the
court date when he was to have been sworn-in.   At least two of his children are citizens of10
Afghanistan.  Two other children are citizens and residents of the United States.  A sister is a citizen
and resident of Afghanistan.  He has visited her twice since emigrating to the United States.  He has
contact with her by phone about six times a year.  He’s never been contacted or approached by any
representative from a foreign government regarding his sister and does not feel he can be put under
duress or blackmail due to his relationship with his sister.  He is aware of his responsibility to report
 Government Exhibit 4 (Applicant’s Interview, dated December 29, 2005) at 1-4.  11
Id. at 29-31.12
Administrative Exhibit 1 (US Department Of State, Background Note: Afghanistan, dated May 2007) at 1-6.13
5
any such incident to his security officer if he was ever approached.  He has never been approached
by a representative from a foreign government.
Applicant has another sister who is a citizen and resident of the US.  One brother is a resident
and citizen of the United States, and has worked as a translator for the same company that Applicant
worked for. Another brother, born in Afghanistan, is now a resident and citizen of Germany.  An
uncle, who he has little or no contact with,  is a citizen and resident of Afghanistan.   Applicant has11
not had any business contacts or developed any new personal relationships in a foreign country.  He
has no business or financial interest in a foreign country.  He does not engage in any activity that he
fears disclosure of that activity could lead to blackmail or coercion.  He is not engaged in any illegal
activities.  There have been no request or threats by any foreign national that Applicant should have
reported.
Applicant traveled to Afghanistan on at least two occasions to visit his sister who lives there.
He provided financial support to various family members living in Afghanistan when the Taliban
was still in control, but hasn’t done so since 2002, and would not now because of his job.12
Afghanistan
Afghanistan has been an independent nation since August 19, 1919, after the British
relinquished control.  A monarchy ruled from 1919 until a military coup in 1973.  Following a
Soviet-supported coup in 1978, a Marxist government emerged.  Relations between Afghanistan and
the Soviet Union became tense after the Soviet Union moved to take advantage of the 1978 coup.
In December 1979, Soviet forces invaded and occupied Afghanistan.  Afghan freedom fighters,
known as mujaheddin, opposed the communist regime.  The resistance movement eventually lead
to an agreement known as the Geneva Accords, signed by Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States,
and the Soviet Union, which ensured Soviet forces withdrew by February 1989.  The mujaheddin
were no party to the negotiations for the accords and refused to accept them.  As a result, a civil war
continued after the Soviet withdrawal.  Fighting continued among militias with ethnic, clan,
religious, and personality differences.  To resolve these differences, leaders of Peshawar-based
mujaheddin groups established an interim Islamic Jihad Council in mid-April 1992 to assume power
in Kabul.  Rival factions created a great deal of political turmoil.  The country sank into anarchy.
In the mid-1990s, the Taliban rose to power, largely due to the anarchy and  warlordism that arose
after the Soviet withdrawal.  By the end of 1998, the Taliban expanded its control until it occupied
about 90% of the country.  The Taliban sought to impose an extreme interpretation of Islam on the
entire country and committed massive human rights violations, particularly against females.  The
Taliban also committed serious atrocities against minority populations and provided sanctuary to
Osama bin Laden, Al Qa’ida, and other terrorist organizations.  After the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, demands to expel bin Laden and his followers were rejected by the Taliban.  U.S.
and coalition forces commenced military operations in October 2001 that forced the Taliban out of
power.  A new democratic government took power in 2004.13
Administrative Exhibit 4 (US Department Of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006-Afghanistan,14
dated March 6, 2007) at 1-2.
Administrative Exhibit 2 (US Department Of State, Consular Information Sheet-Afghanistan, dated September 15,15
2006) at 1.
Administrative Exhibit 6 (Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence, dated January 11, 2007)16
at 3.
Id.  at 1-3.17
Administrative Exhibit 4, supra, note 14, at 2; Administrative Exhibit 3, (US Department Of State, Travel Warning-18
Afghanistan, dated April 4, 2007) at 1; Administrative Exhibit 6, supra, note 16, at 3.
Administrative Exhibit 5 (US Department Of State, Country Reports on Terrorism-2006, Chapter 2, Country Reports:19
2005, South and Central Asia Overview, dated April 30, 2007) at 1-3; Administrative Exhibit 8 (US Department Of State,
Country Reports on Terrorism-2005, Chapter 5, Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview, dated April 28,
2006) at 2. 
Administrative Exhibit 6, supra, note 16, at 1.20
6
Despite the new democratic government, Afghanistan’s human rights record has remained
poor.  The causes for this include the continuing deadly insurgency, the weakness of central
governmental institutions, and ongoing recovery efforts from two decades of war.  Abuses include
extra-judicial killings, torture, official impunity, restrictions on freedoms of press, religion,
movement, and association, violence and societal discrimination against women and minorities.  In
addition, numerous people including civilians were killed by security and factional forces, as well
as by terrorists and insurgents, including the Taliban and Al Qa’ida.14
Despite progress made since the Taliban was deposed, Afghanistan still faces many daunting
challenges, among these are: defeating an active insurgency; recovering from more than 20 years of
civil strife; dealing with many years of drought; and rebuilding a shattered infrastructure.
Additionally, Afghanistan faces the challenge of developing a rule of law within its borders.   Many15
of the challenges are significantly exacerbated by terrorism.16
The director of national intelligence reports that Afghanistan has been unable to provide good
governance and sustain the rule of law within its borders.  He further states that this inability enables
non-state actors and hostile states to assault the fundamental building blocks of international order,
helping to create terrorist safe havens, and ungoverned regions that endanger the international
community and its citizens, thereby threatening the national security of the United States and support
for freedom and democracy.17
Taliban and Al Qa’ida forces, in addition to other insurgents, continue to operate in
Afghanistan, and have killed numerous civilians during the attacks.   Although programs and18
military operations designed to combat terrorism and lawlessness have been continuing, there was
an increase in activity by terrorist groups in Afghanistan during 2005 and 2006.   Several non-state19
actors, including international terrorist groups, conduct intelligence activities as effectively as
capable state intelligence services.   While progress has been made, the Taliban-led insurgency20
remains strong and resilient, particularly in the Pashtun south and east, and they have been able to
Administrative Exhibit 5, supra, note 19, at 1-2.21
Administrative Exhibit 8, supra, note 19, at 2.22
Administrative Exhibit 3, supra, note 18, at 1-3.23
7
continue recruiting foot-soldiers from its core base of rural Pashtuns.   Terrorists and anti-coalition21
militants targeted international non-governmental organization and United Nations workers, as well
as recipients of non-governmental assistance.22
The State Department, in a recent travel warning, warns against travel to Afghanistan by US
citizens due to ongoing threats to kidnap or assassinate U.S. citizens and non-governmental workers
and the inability of Afghan authorities to maintain order or ensure security.  The warning notes
activity of terrorist groups and other groups hostile to the U.S. within Afghanistan.  Terrorist actions
may include, but are no not limited to, suicide operations, bombings, assassinations, carjackings,
rocket attacks, assaults, or kidnappings..  No part of Afghanistan is safe or immune from violence.23
POLICIES
In an evaluation of an applicant’s security suitability, an administrative judge must consider
the “Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified Information”
(Guidelines).  In addition to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative
guidelines are divided into Disqualifying Conditions (DC) and Mitigating Conditions (MC), which
are used to determine an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible ironclad rules of law.  Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed
in the adjudicative process. Guideline ¶ 2.  An administrative judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal
is a fair, impartial and common sense decision.  Because the entire process is a conscientious
scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept,” an administrative judge
considers all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable, in making a decision. Guideline ¶ 2(c).
Specifically, an administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors
listed at Guideline ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5)
extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
Since the protection of the national security is the paramount consideration, the final decision
in each case is arrived at by applying the standard that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being
considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.”
Guideline ¶ 2(b).  In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable,
logical and based on the evidence contained in the record.  Likewise, I have avoided drawing
inferences grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
“Substantial evidence [is] such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion24
in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.”  ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 2 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006) (citing
Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1).  “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [a Judge’s] finding from being supported by substantial
evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).  “Substantial evidence” is “more than a
scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4  Cir. 1994).th
“The Administrative Judge considers the record evidence as a whole, both favorable and unfavorable, evaluates25
Applicant’s past and current circumstances in light of the provisions of the Directive, and decide[s] whether Applicant
has met his burden of persuasion under Directive ¶ E3.1.15.”  ISCR Case No. 04-10340 at 2 (App. Bd. July 6, 2006).
Executive Order 10865, § 7.26
8
In the decision-making process, facts must be established by “substantial evidence.”   The24
Government initially has the burden of producing evidence to establish a case which demonstrates,
in accordance with the Directive, that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue an applicant’s access to classified information.  Once the Government has produced
substantial evidence of a disqualifying condition, the burden shifts to Applicant to present “witnesses
and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel, and [applicant] has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a
favorable clearance decision.”  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The burden of disproving a mitigating condition
never shifts to the Government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).25
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary relationship with
the Government predicated upon trust and confidence.  This relationship transcends normal duty
hours and endures throughout off-duty hours.  The Government reposes a high degree of trust and
confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to classified information.  Decisions under this
Directive include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk an applicant may deliberately or
inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information.  Such decisions entail a certain
degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
The scope of an administrative judge’s decision is limited.  Nothing in this Decision should
be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied
determination as to Applicant’s allegiance, loyalty, or patriotism.26
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline ¶ 6. The Concern. Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help
a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest
is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known
to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.
See ISCR Case No. 03-02382 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2006); ISCR Case No. 99-0424 (App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2001).27
9
Guideline ¶ 7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying
include:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person
who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that
relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
The Government produced substantial evidence of these two disqualifying conditions, and
the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence and prove a mitigating condition.  As previously
indicated, the burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the Government.
Three Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions under Guideline ¶ 8 are potentially applicable
to these disqualifying conditions:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.
 Guideline ¶ 7 does not, by its express terms, exclude from consideration applicants with
relatives or associates in countries where terrorism has occurred, any more than it excludes persons
from countries where there are foreign governments, foreign political organizations, or foreign non-
governmental organizations.  Rather, it focuses on a very specific type of threat–the risk of a foreign
power exploiting an applicant’s foreign relatives in such a way as to cause an applicant to act
adversely to the interests of the United States.  The mere possession of close family ties with a
person in a foreign country is not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B.  However,
if only one relative lives in a foreign country, and an applicant has contacts with that relative, this
factor alone is sufficient to create the potential for foreign influence and could potentially result in
the compromise of classified information.   Applicant has no frequent contacts or a close27
relationship with his family.  He has seen one sister in the last five years.  He has no telephone
contact with them.  He owns no property in Afghanistan.  
The nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the United States, and its human
rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are
See ISCR Case No. 02-13595 at 3 (App. Bd. May 10, 2005) (stating an applicant has “a very heavy burden of28
persuasion to overcome the security concerns” when parents and siblings live in Iran).  See also ISCR Case No. 04-11463
at 4 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006) (articulating “very heavy burden” standard when an applicant has family members living
in Iran).
10
vulnerable to government coercion.  The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly
greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated with
or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence operations
against the United States.  The hostility of the Taliban, Al Qu’aida, and other terrorist organizations
in Afghanistan to the United States places a “very heavy burden of persuasion” on Applicant to
demonstrate that his immediate family members in Afghanistan do not pose security risks and he is
not in a position to be forced to choose between loyalty to the United States and his family
members.   With its adversarial stance and its dismal human rights record, it is conceivable that28
these forces in Afghanistan would target any citizen in an attempt to gather information from the
United States.  The government of Afghanistan is, on the other hand, friendly to the U.S. and has
been a partner in over-throwing the Taliban and Al Qu’aida in Afghanistan.  
There is no evidence that Applicant’s family are or have been political activists or journalists,
challenging the policies of the Afghan government. Likewise, there is no evidence that these
relatives work for the Afghan government or military or any news media.  There is no evidence that
the Afghan government has approached any of his Afghan family for any reason, and in particular,
has not approached them since his work for the military there in 2004 and 2005.  There is no
evidence that his family living in Afghanistan engages in activities which would bring attention to
themselves or that they are even aware of his work.  As such, there is a reduced possibility that they
would be targets for coercion or exploitation by the Afghan government.
 
Guideline ¶ 8 (c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent
that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation applies
because he has little or no contact with his family.   
Applicant’s statement about his loyalty to the United States is credible, and there is no reason
to believe that he would take any action which could cause potential harm to his U.S. family or to
this country.  If the Afghan government should threaten harm to his family members living in
Afghanistan to obtain classified information from him or otherwise contact him, I am persuaded that
he would report this activity to the U.S. authorities.  There is no evidence that he has failed to follow
the rules or failed to require those around him to do the same on projects requiring security
clearances.  There is no evidence that he lacks the respect and trust of his employer, his friends, and
family or that he lacks honesty and integrity.  There is no evidence that he has revealed to his family
in Afghanistan the nature of his work or about applying for a security clearance. 
Whole Person Concept
In addition to the enumerated disqualifying and mitigating conditions as discussed
previously, I have considered the general adjudicative guidelines related to the whole person concept
under Directive ¶ E2.2.1.  The directive lists nine adjudicative process factors which are used for
“whole person” analysis.  Foreign influence and foreign preference do not involve misconduct,
voluntariness of participation, rehabilitation and behavior changes, etc.  Accordingly, the eighth
adjudicative process factor is probably the most relevant.  Directive ¶ E2.2.1.8.  The eighth factor
See ISCR Case No. 02-24566 at 3 (App. Bd. July 17, 2006) (stating that an analysis under the eighth whole person29
factor apparently without discussion of the other factors was sustainable); ISCR Case No. 03-10954 at 5 (App. Bd. Mar.
8, 2006) (sole whole person factor mentioned is eighth factor in discussion of Judge’s whole person analysis for Iranian-
American’s case).  
Compare ISCR Case No. 03-23259 at 2 (App. Bd. May 10, 2006) (noting Judge did not assess “the realistic potential30
for exploitation” but affirming denial of clearance based on contacts with Iranian family members); with ISCR Case No.
03-17620 at 4 (App. Bd. Apr. 17, 2006) (remanding grant of clearance because Judge did not assess “the realistic
potential for exploitation”).
See ISCR Case No. 04-06242 at 2 (App. Bd. June 28, 2006).31
11
provides, “the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress.”  Afghanistan’s government29
is not hostile to the United States but does not conform to widely accepted norms of human rights.
Applicant has multiple family members who live in Afghanistan, but he has almost no contact with
them.  Under the circumstances, it is unlikely there would be significant possibility of pressure,
coercion, exploitation or duress.  
As indicated in the statement of facts, there are many other countervailing, positive attributes
to Applicant’s life as a U.S. citizen that weigh towards granting a clearance.  He is patriotic, loves
the United States, and would not permit Afghanistan to exploit him.  He has close ties to the United
States.  His closest family members are his wife and four children.  They are U.S citizens and live
with him.  Because his wife and children live in the United States, they are not vulnerable to coercion
or exploitation by a foreign power, except possibly indirectly through relatives, who still live or visit
Afghanistan.  He has lived in the United States 21 years.  He owns property in the United States.
The “whole person” analysis in a Guideline B case should include “the totality of an applicant’s
conduct and circumstances (including the realistic potential for exploitation)” as well as the eighth
factor discussed in the previous paragraph.   In this case, Applicant’s potential for exploitation is30
low.  I base this finding on his credible and sincere testimony, and I do not believe he would
compromise national security, or otherwise comply with any Afghan threats.  After weighing the
disqualifying and mitigating conditions, all the facts and circumstances, in the context of the whole
person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security concerns pertaining to foreign influence.  
Based on the Appeal Board’s Guideline B jurisprudence pertaining to cases involving Afghan-
Americans, who have frequent contacts with family members living in Afghanistan, Applicant’s
security eligibility and suitability can be approved.  I take this position based on the law, as set forth
in Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), my “careful consideration of the whole person
factors”  and supporting evidence, my application of the pertinent factors under the Adjudicative31
Process, and my interpretation of my  responsibilities under Enclosure 2 of the Directive.  I conclude
Applicant is eligible for access to classified information.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1. Guideline : FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
12
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.  Clearance is granted.
Christopher Graham
Administrative Judge