KEYWORD: Foreign Influence; Foreign Preference
DIGEST: Foreign preference concerns related to the possession of a Taiwanese passport are
mitigated because the passport was obtained when she was a minor, and it has expired with a
credible intent to not renew it. Concerns persist of undue foreign influence where Applicant’s father
is employed by the Taiwanese government and is a resident citizen of Taiwan. Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 06-24789.h1
DATE: 09/27/2007
DATE:  September 27, 2007
In re:
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SSN:  ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-24789
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ELIZABETH M. MATCHINSKI
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Fahryn Hoffman, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro se
SYNOPSIS
Foreign preference concerns related to the possession of a Taiwanese passport are mitigated
because the passport was obtained when she was a minor, and it has expired with a credible intent
2
to not renew it. Concerns persist of undue foreign influence where Applicant's father is employed
by the Taiwanese government and is a resident citizen of Taiwan. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant. As required by ¶ E3.1.2 of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6
(Jan. 2, 1992), as amended, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) on January 30, 2007,
detailing the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
and Guideline C (Foreign Preference) of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on
December 29, 2005,  and implemented by the Department of Defense effective September 1, 2006.
The guidelines were provided to Applicant when the SOR was issued. In an undated answer to the
SOR, Applicant elected a decision based on the written record without a hearing. On May 23, 2007,
Applicant requested a hearing before a DOHA administrative judge, and the case was assigned to
me on June 29, 2007.
I convened a hearing on August 22, 2007, to consider whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. One government exhibit (Ex.
1), Applicant's security clearance application, was admitted, and testimony was taken from
Applicant. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on September 5, 2007.
The record was held open until September 12, 2007, for Applicant to submit documentation,
including information about her father's employment duties and/or the expiration of her Taiwanese
passport. By facsimile on September 12, 2007, Applicant timely submitted information from the
website of a Taiwanese government office (Ex. A), as well as extracts from her Taiwanese passport
(Ex. B) and U.S. passport (Ex. C). Department Counsel filed a response on September 25, 2007,
indicating the government had no objections, and the documents were admitted.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE
On June 26, 2007, the government requested administrative notice be taken of several
proposed facts concerning Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China).  Authority
to consider the government’s request is set forth in ¶ E3.1.10 of Department of Defense Directive
5220.6 (The Administrative Judge may rule on questions of procedure, discovery, and evidence and
shall conduct all proceedings in a fair, timely, and orderly manner).
The DOHA Appeal Board has ruled that administrative or official notice in administrative
proceedings is broader than judicial notice under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In ISCR Case No.
02-24875 (decided Oct. 12, 2006), the Appeal Board found no error by a DOHA administrative
judge who took  administrative notice of a U.S. State Department Country Report, as the document
was an official U.S. government report relevant to the issues in the case before him, and it was
provided in advance to the applicant who had an opportunity to rebut its contents or to present
alternative information for the judge to notice.
The documents for administrative notice are identified per the government’s request of June 26, 2007, and not1
as in the government’s exhibit list presented at the hearing.
See Background Note: Taiwan, dated April 2007 (I), Background Note: China, dated January 2007 (VIII),2
China: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2006, dated March 6, 2007 (XI), and Consular Information Sheet
on China, dated March 19, 2007 (XII).
See Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, dated October 9, 2006 (II).3
See Intelligence Threat Handbook, excerpts, dated June 2004 (VII). The document was prepared for the4
Interagency OPSEC Support Staff by the Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, a private contractor.
See Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2000 (III) and5
Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2005 (X). 
See 2006 Report to Congress, November 2006 (IX).6
The press releases (IV) and (V) were presented apparently to substantiate that Taiwan actively pursues7
collection of U.S. economic and propriety information. Neither case involves Applicant personally. The April 18, 2006,
press release (IV) concerns the sentencing of a U.S. citizen for conspiring to commit trade secret theft between December
1999 and December 2001 to the benefit of a corporation based in Taiwan. There is no evidence that Taiwan’s
government was involved in, or sanctioned the criminal activity. The January 22, 2007 (V) press release concerns the
sentencing of a former U.S. State Department official for, in part, making false statements to the government concerning
his relationship with a female Taiwanese intelligence officer and by not reporting that he had traveled to Taiwan where
he met with the foreign intelligence officer.
See U.S. District Court Eastern District of Virginia, Statement of Facts, dated December 12, 2005 (VI). The8
court records do not pertain to any criminal charge against Applicant.
While a  Taiwanese intelligence official was implicated in cultivating a personal relationship with a U.S. State9
Department official (VI), there is no indication that Applicant has ever been targeted.
3
Applicant objected to the relevance to her case of criminal wrongdoing perpetuated by other
individuals, as represented in the press releases (IV, V) and the district court document (VI).  Facts1
are proper for administrative notice when they are easily verifiable by an authorized source and
relevant and material to the case. For source documentation the government relied on publications
of the Department of State;  the Congressional Research Service;  the Centre for Counterintelligence2 3
and Security Studies;  the National Counterintelligence Center, now known as the Office of the4
National Counterintelligence Executive;  the U.S. China Economic and Security Review5
Commission;  two press releases from the U.S. Department of Justice;  and a record of the U.S.6 7
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.8
After weighing the reliability of the source documentation and assessing the relevancy and
materiality of the facts proposed, I took administrative notice of certain facts as set forth below.9
FINDINGS OF FACT
DOHA alleged under Guideline B, foreign influence, that Applicant’s father is a resident
citizen of Taiwan (SOR ¶ 1.a), who works as an information officer for the Taiwanese government
(SOR ¶ 1.b). Under Guideline C, foreign preference, Applicant was alleged to exercise dual
citizenship with Taiwan and the U.S. (SOR ¶ 2.a) and to have possessed a Taiwanese passport from
Applicant testified that her father has worked for the same department for 23 years, since he graduated from10
college. (Tr. 36) Her sister was born in the U.S. 26 years ago, so it may well be that he has worked for more than 23 years
for the Taiwanese government. She provided no alternative explanation for why her parents would have been in the U.S.
in 1981.
Apparently, the United Kingdom does not confirm automatic citizenship to those born on U.K. soil (“[H]e11
was born there but they have different laws, so just because you were born there doesn’t mean you are a citizen, so his
citizenship is Taiwan.”) Tr. 62 
4
about 1983 to at least February 2006 (SOR ¶ 2.b). Applicant admitted the Taiwanese residency and
citizenship of her father but denied he was employed as alleged. She also admitted dual citizenship
while denying possession of a Taiwanese passport from 1983 to at least February 2006.
After a thorough review of the pleadings, exhibits, and transcript, and having agreed to take
administrative notice, I make the following findings of fact.
Applicant is a 24-year-old systems engineer II who has been employed by a defense
contractor since October 2005. She earned bachelor of science degrees in two disciplines from a
private prestigious technological university in the U.S., in electrical engineering and computer
science in June 2004  and in management science one year later. She seeks a security clearance for
her present duties.
Applicant’s Background and Foreign Ties
Applicant was born in the U.S. in February 1983 to Taiwanese native citizens. For at least
the last 23 years, her father has been employed in public affairs for the Taiwanese government as a
secretary.  Every few years, he is transferred to a different country where he publishes the positions10
of, and disseminates information in the interests of the Taiwanese government. Applicant’s parents
were temporarily in the U.S. for her father’s job when Applicant and her sister (born in April 1981)
were born. Applicant and her sister have U.S. citizenship from birth and derivative Taiwanese
citizenship through their parents.
When Applicant was ten months old, her father was recalled to Taiwan. Applicant resided
in Taiwan until she was six, when her father was transferred to England. While living in England,
Applicant’s parents had a son, who was born in October 1990. Applicant’s brother is a citizen only
of Taiwan.11
In about 1994, the family returned to the U.S. When Applicant was in high school, her father
was sent to Indonesia where he managed a small office of three public affairs personnel for the
Taiwanese government. Applicant’s mother remained in the U.S. with Applicant and her siblings
so that they could attend school here.
From August 26, 1998, to September 7, 1998, Applicant traveled to Taiwan to see her father
on a Taiwanese passport issued to her by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in the
Applicant testified she already had a U.S. passport when she obtained her Taiwanese passport (Tr. 36) The12
only U.S. passport in evidence (Ex. C) was issued after her Taiwanese passport (Ex. B), although she testified the current
passport was “a form renewal.” (Tr. 75).
It is not clear whether she presented her U.S. passport or her Taiwanese passport to enter Indonesia on that13
trip as she submitted only the identifying information for her U.S. passport, and her Taiwanese passport bears stamps
only showing entry into, and exit from Taiwan in 2000.
Applicant testified that every few years, Taiwan’s public affairs office would pay for the family to fly to14
Taiwan to visit her father. Applicant expressed her belief that the Taiwanese government paid for a one-way ticket for
her in the summer of 2000 (Tr. 41), and on that trip, her mother used “a special sort of identification” which gained their
entry into Taiwan (Tr. 42, 71). Applicant’s Taiwanese passport bears stamps confirming she used her Taiwanese passport
to both enter and exit Taiwan.
Applicant testified to her recollection, she presented her Taiwanese passport when she left the U.S. The copies15
of her now expired Taiwanese passport and of her current U.S. passport do not show any stamps from U.S. immigration
officials.
At her hearing, Applicant testified that her sister was also a dual citizen of the U.S. and Taiwan. (Tr. 55)16
5
U.S. on November 26, 1996. The passport was valid to November 26, 2002.  Her parents applied for
the Taiwanese passport for her because it would facilitate her travel to Asia.12
On March 8, 1999, Applicant was issued her U.S. passport. She has not used that passport
for foreign travel. Applicant traveled to Indonesia with her mother in July 2000 to see her father.13
Their plane fare was partially covered by the Taiwanese public affairs office.  Before they returned14
to the U.S., Applicant and her mother stopped off in Taiwan to visit family members, including her
mother’s siblings. Applicant presented her Taiwanese passport to enter and exit Taiwan.15
In September 2000, Applicant began her undergraduate studies in the U.S. While in college,
she used her U.S. passport as an identity card to travel on the airline shuttle between her home and
college as she did  not have a driver’s license at the time. On her graduation from college, Applicant
asked her father’s opinion on which employment offer she should accept. He did some research on
the companies and their employee benefits and advised her which offer she should accept.
In October 2005, she started working for her present employer doing systems integration
work on an unclassified air traffic control project.  Seeking a security clearance so that she can work
on a classified project for the U.S. military, Applicant completed a Questionnaire for Sensitive
Positions (SF 86) on February 13, 2006. She disclosed her dual citizenship with Taiwan and the U.S.,
the U.S. residency but Taiwanese citizenship of her mother and brother, and the Taiwanese residency
and citizenship of her father. She reported her sister’s residency and citizenship as U.S.  Applicant16
responded “YES” to question 17D [“LAST 7 YRS, ACTIVE PASSPORT ISSUED BY A FOREIGN
GOVERNMENT?”]. She indicated possession of a Taiwanese passport from an estimated February
1983 (her date of birth) to February 2006 (present), and added that she had the passport by default
because her parents are Taiwanese citizens. Applicant did not have her Taiwanese passport with her
when she completed the SF 86 and decided to indicate that she had the passport for her entire life
since she did not know when it expired. In response to question 18 concerning any foreign countries
visited, Applicant listed pleasure trips to Taiwan from July 1997 to August 1997 [sic] and to
Indonesia from July 2000 to August 2000.
6
Applicant has not visited her father in Taiwan since he was recalled there from Indonesia in
2001. She sees him about once a year, most recently in January 2007 when he came to the U.S. to
visit his spouse and children over the New Year’s holiday.
Applicant has decided to make her permanent home in the U.S. where she has lived since she
was 11. Exposed to the cultural and social influences of the U.S., Applicant feels more American
than British. She still maintains contact with some elementary school friends in England, and visits
them from time to time, but she has stronger connections with her high school and college friends
in the U.S. Applicant does not think of herself as a citizen of Taiwan and is willing to renounce
Taiwanese citizenship. She does not know the island very well, has little recollection of her life there
when she was a young child, and even though her father is there, he moves every few years for his
job. Applicant has made no effort to renew her Taiwanese passport as she does not need it, and she
has no intent to renew it. She does not think that Taiwan recognizes her as a citizen since she has not
been required to comply with laws imposed on Taiwanese citizens, and does not receive health
benefits, pay taxes, or have a national identity card from Taiwan. She does not belong to any
Taiwanese cultural organizations in the U.S.
Applicant and her mother jointly own the townhouse that her mother moved into in
December 2005. Applicant pays the $2,500 monthly mortgage. Applicant currently resides in an
apartment near her work. Applicant has about $15,000 in savings in the U.S. She has no financial
assets in Taiwan.
As of August 2007, Applicant’s sister was living and working in the U.S. Her brother was
in high school in the U.S. Both her siblings intend to remain permanently in the U.S. Applicant
believes her brother intends to become a U.S. citizen. When Applicant’s sister turned 21, she applied
for permanent residency in the U.S. for their mother. Applicant’s mother is still awaiting her “green
card.” When Applicant or her sister inquires about the delay, they are told it is pending a background
investigation.
 The Taiwanese government office employing Applicant’s father covers domestic and
international publicity, compilation, translation, audio-visual materials, mass media guidance and
regulation, publication affairs, motion picture and broadcasting affairs, planning. Its main mission
is to inform the public, both abroad and in Taiwan, of the government’s policies, regulations, and
actions, and to promote the development of the mass media (film, television, publishing). According
to the office’s website (Ex. A), the domestic information office releases news on major government
administrative policies; disseminates information domestically about government policies, laws, and
regulations; collects and reflects public sentiments, handles public relations within the country for
the executive branch of the central government, and maintains “constant liaison’ with the legislature.
Its international department disseminates information about Taiwan internationally, gathers and
responds to international media reports, and maintains the department’s foreign language websites.
As of August 2007, Applicant’s father was working  in Taiwan. What Applicant knew of his
duties is that he was working on a health referendum and on generating the press release notifying
the public domestically of a new law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. (Tr. 32) Due to be
stationed elsewhere, Applicant’s father has requested to be assigned to the press division at the
TECO in Applicant’s locale in the U.S. where there is presently an opening. Applicant believes he
intends to become a U.S. citizen when he retires. Her father turned 56 in early August 2007. He has
7
no plans to retire before her 16-year-old brother graduates from college. Applicant’s father does not
manage any personnel in his office in Taiwan. Applicant corresponds with her father via electronic
mail when there is an issue that needs to be discussed. She has kept him apprised of her mother’s
condition since her mother had surgery in July 2007, and last emailed him in early August on his
birthday. He had considered coming to the U.S. for his spouse’s operation but decided not to because
of the flight costs. Applicant’s father knows she is a systems engineer who writes
requirements/designs systems, but he has not asked her about specific projects.
Applicant has extended family members (aunts, uncles, and cousins) who are resident
citizens of Taiwan. Applicant has visited with them when she was in Taiwan. She does not
correspond with them because of the language barrier. They do not speak English. Applicant has
limited conversational knowledge of Chinese gained through listening to her parents converse with
each other in their native language. Her parents spoke English to her when she was growing up.
Administrative notice was taken of the following adjudicative facts. The government of
Taiwan is a multiparty democracy. The United States recognizes that there is only one China, that
the government of the PRC is the sole legal government of China, and that Taiwan is part of China.
Nonetheless, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the U.S. conducts unofficial relations with
Taiwan. Although the U.S. terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty, it has continued to sell appropriate
military defensive material to Taiwan. The PRC has surpassed the U.S. as Taiwan’s most important
trading partner, but Taiwan maintains a large military establishment whose primary mission is the
defense of Taiwan against the PRC, which is seen as the predominant threat and has not renounced
the use of force against Taiwan. It is U.S. policy that the resolutions of disputes between Taiwan and
China be peaceful. Taiwan is a major international trading power and a member of the World Trade
Organization. It enjoys normal trade relations with the U.S., and ready access to U.S. markets. The
U.S. State Department reports that Taiwan has taken dramatic steps to improve respect for human
rights and create a democratic political system since ending martial law. In the past, organizations
in Taiwan employed unlawful methods to obtain U.S. economic and intelligence information.
Taiwan was listed as an active collector of U.S. economic intelligence as of 2000. As recently as
2004, a female Taiwanese intelligence officer cultivated a covert relationship with a U.S. State
Department official. 
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at 527.
The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for
access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb.
20, 1960). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue [her] security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3
(App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).
8
The revised Adjudicative Guidelines set forth potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and
mitigating conditions (MC) under each guideline. In evaluating the security worthiness of an
applicant, the administrative judge must also assess the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3
of the Directive. The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. It is merely an indication
the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance.
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline B—Foreign Influence
Under Guideline B, foreign influence, foreign contacts and interests may be a security
concern if the individual has divided loyalties, or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government that is not in U.S. interests, or
is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can
and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial
interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as to whether the foreign country
is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with
a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6). Applicant shares an understandably close bond to her father, who has
been employed for at least the last 23 years by the office of the Taiwanese government whose
primary mission is to inform the public, both abroad and in Taiwan, of the government’s policies,
regulations, and actions, and to promote the development of the mass media (film, television,
publishing) in Taiwan. Disqualifying condition (DC) ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure or coercion), applies.
The familial bond with her father is too strong to satisfy the first prong of mitigating
condition ¶ 8(a) (the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these
persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it
is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interest of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.).  Even though
Applicant sees her father only about once or twice a year, she also corresponds with him by
electronic mail and sought his advice when she was offered several jobs on her graduation from
college. The risk of Applicant  being placed in a position where she would have to choose between
her father and the U.S. is diminished somewhat by the fact that Taiwan does not have a hostile
relationship with the U.S., and is not known to sponsor terrorism. Taiwan has made considerable
progress in achieving democratic elections, civil liberties, and stable, viable governmental
institutions. As reported by the U.S. State Department, Taiwan has taken dramatic steps to improve
respect for human rights and create a democratic political system since ending marital law in 1987.
Almost all restrictions on the press have ended, restrictions on personal freedoms have been relaxed,
and the prohibition against organizing new political parties has been lifted. While the U.S. does not
support independence for Taiwan and is committed to a one China policy, under the Taiwan
Relations Act, signed into law on April 10, 1979, the U.S. is obligated to help Taiwan defend itself,
including making available defensive arms and defensive services to Taiwan. U.S. commercial ties
9
with Taiwan have been maintained and expanded since 1979, and Taiwan is not likely to jeopardize
its relationship with the U.S. by overly pressuring its citizens.
Even nations with a history of friendly relations, however, do not always have the same
interests. Taiwan was listed as an active collector of U.S. economic intelligence as of 2000. As
recently as 2004, a female Taiwanese intelligence officer cultivated a covert relationship with a U.S.
State Department official that bears troubling implications, although no proof of, active collection
efforts by or on behalf of the Taiwanese government. Applicant’s evidence fails to persuade that she
is not at a heightened risk of undue foreign influence because of her father’s employment with the
Taiwanese government. Although his duties involve the open dissemination of information rather
than intelligence or security, he is required to promote the Taiwanese government’s interests. What
little is known about his job history suggests he is likely in a position of some responsibility and/or
prominence in the public affairs office in Taiwan. He was stationed abroad in the U.S. and U.K.,
countries of significant international influence and power with whom Taiwan wants to maintain
favorable relations. He was in charge of the press office (albeit of only three persons) in Indonesia.
His duties bring him in daily contact with other Taiwanese government officials who could exert
influence.
Security concerns could be overcome by deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties
in the U.S. (see ¶ 8(b) ( there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty
or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual
has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest)). A U.S. citizen from birth
only because her father happened to be stationed here at the time, Applicant did not begin to
establish ties to the U.S. until she moved here in about 1994 with her family. Yet she has spent the
most formative years of her still relative youth in the U.S. where she was influenced by her peers and
American culture as a student in public school and then at a private university. She elected to pursue
job opportunities in the U.S. Since about December 2005, she co-owns with her mother the
townhouse her mother lives in. She testified credibly that she considers herself to be solely a citizen
of the U.S. and she has strong relationships with her high school and college friends.
But her familial circumstances, albeit not within her control,  make it very difficult to predict
with confidence what she will do if faced with any undue foreign influence. While not alleged, she
has close bonds, both familial and economic (through co-ownership of the townhouse) with her
mother, a Taiwanese citizen who does not enjoy the protections of U.S. citizenship or even
permanent residency. Her application for permanent residency, filed for her by Applicant’s sister in
about 2002, is still pending a background investigation. The family has made a significant sacrifice
in her father’s long separations from them for the sake of Applicant and her siblings’ educations in
the U.S., but it is also clear that the Taiwanese government information office is aware of this
sacrifice as well. The office partially covered the cost of Applicant’s and her mother’s trip to
Indonesia to see Applicant’s father in 2000, and they were given some credential to facilitate their
entry that is not available to the general public in Taiwan. Should Applicant’s father be transferred
to the local press office at the TECO, he will have regular contact with other Taiwanese government
employees.
Guideline C—Foreign Preference
10
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over
the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are
harmful to the interests of the United States. (AG ¶ 9). The government’s concerns of foreign
preference are based largely on dated or incorrect information such as the expiration date of the
Taiwanese passport. Were it not for her parents’ Taiwanese citizenship, Applicant would not be a
citizen of Taiwan (see ¶ 11(a) (dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a
foreign country)). While her use of a Taiwanese passport in preference to her U.S. passport in 2000
constituted the active exercise of dual citizenship (see DC ¶ 10(a) (exercise of any right, privilege,
or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship
of a family member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport),
she was only 17 when she used the passport and acted on the advice of her mother, who thought it
would ease access if the border official was familiar with the language of the passport (i.e., Chinese
as opposed to English). MC ¶ 11(c) (exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign
citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor)
is pertinent. Furthermore, she has not possessed a valid Taiwanese passport for some time. Her
Taiwanese passport expired in November 2002 and it has been cancelled (Ex. B). She does not
intend to renew it. Accordingly, concerns of unverifiable travel that require the destruction, surrender
or invalidation of a foreign passport (see ¶ 11(e) (the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to
the cognizant security, or otherwise invalidated)) no longer exist.
Applicant credibly testified to a preference for the U.S. She considers herself solely a U.S.
citizen and her ties to Taiwan are solely familial. Although she has traveled to Taiwan to see her
father and visited with extended family members while there, she is not that familiar with the island.
She has no assets there, has never paid taxes, voted, or performed military or other service for
Taiwan. It is clear she has little sense of obligation or affinity to Taiwan. She left there before she
developed any appreciation for life in Taiwan, or any significant friendships. When stating her
preference, she indicated she felt more American than British. Apparently the five or so years she
spent in the U.K. as an elementary student had more impact on her than did her time in Taiwan. 
Whole Person Analysis
The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. (AG ¶ 2(a)).
Applicant is a very well educated young professional who, along with her mother and siblings, has
endured long absences from her father because of his work for the Taiwanese government. While
she has demonstrated a clear preference for the U.S., she is at heightened risk of exploitation,
pressure, or influence because of her close bonds to her parents whose lives have been dictated in
significant part by the Taiwanese government for at least the past 23 years.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
11
Paragraph 2. Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For  Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Elizabeth M. Matchinski
Administrative Judge