KEYWORD: Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is a computer software engineer for a defense contractor.  He was born in
Taiwan, and came to the United States in 1981 to further his education.  He and his wife became
United States citizens in 1992, and they have two sons who are United States citizens.  He owns
property in the United States but not in Taiwan.  His parents, five siblings, parents-in-law, and
brothers-in-law are citizens and residents of Taiwan.  He has a childhood friend that he sees on
his visits to Taiwan.  He has established that his relatives and friend in Taiwan are not in a
position to cause him to be vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion.  Clearance is
granted. 
CASENO: 06-25859.h1
DATE: 09/10/2007
DATE:  September 10, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-25859
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
THOMAS M. CREAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Emilio Jaksetic, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Jeffrey Gutman, Esquire
Applicant Exhibit A (Motion to File Amended Response, dated July 25, 2007).; Applicant Exhibit B (Amended1
& Supplemental Response to Statement of Reasons, dated July 25, 2007).
2
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is a computer software engineer for a defense contractor.  He was born in Taiwan,
and came to the United States in 1981 to further his education.  He and his wife became United
States citizens in 1992, and they have two sons who are United States citizens.  He owns property
in the United States but not in Taiwan.  His parents, five siblings, parents-in-law, and brothers-in-law
are citizens and residents of Taiwan.  He has a childhood friend that he sees on his visits to Taiwan.
He has established that his relatives and friend in Taiwan are not in a position to cause him to be
vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion.  Clearance is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 30, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its decision to deny a security clearance for Applicant.  The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry
(February 20, 1990), as amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive).  The new
adjudicative guidelines (AG), promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
in the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006, will be used to adjudicate this case.  Applicant
acknowledged receipt of the SOR on April 9, 2007.  The SOR alleges security concerns under
Guideline B (Foreign Influence) of the Directive.
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on April 16, 2007.  He admitted all of the allegations
under Guideline B with detailed explanations.  He requested a hearing before an administrative
judge, and the request was received by DOHA on April 17, 2007.  Department Counsel was prepared
to proceed with the case on May 9, 2007, and the case was assigned to another Administrative Judge
on May 14, 2007.  The case was reassigned to another Administrative Judge on June 12, 2007, and
reassigned to me on August 3, 2007.  A notice of hearing was issued on June 28, 2007, for a hearing
on August 15, 2007.  Applicant was unavailable for a hearing from July 10 to August 3, 2007.  The
hearing was convened as scheduled on August 15, 2007.  Four government exhibits, marked
Government Exhibits 1-4, were admitted without objection.  Six Applicant exhibits, marked
Applicant Exhibits A-F, were admitted without objection.  The testimony of the Applicant and two
Applicant witnesses were received during the hearing.  The transcript (Tr.) was received by DOHA
on August 28, 2007.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Applicant moved to supplement and amend his answer to the SOR .  Applicant’s1
supplemental answer does not make any substantial changes to the original answer to the SOR, but
includes additional details and fact for the whole person analysis.  Department Counsel did not
object to consideration of the Supplemental Answer to the SOR except for any portion of the
Tr. 9-14.2
Court Exhibit I.3
Court Exhibits II-XI.4
Court Exhibit XII.5
Court Exhibit XIII and XXV.6
Tr. 15-46.7
Tr. 118-119.8
Tr. 120-128.9
3
supplemental information that is considered argument rather than facts.  The motion to supplement
and amend the answer to the SOR is granted, and is admitted.2
Department Counsel and Applicant requested that administrative notice be taken of facts
pertaining to Taiwan.   Department Counsel presented ten documents to support the facts requested3
to be accepted for administrative notice.   Applicant requested different or additional facts to be4
considered by administrative notice,  and presented 13 documents in support of the request.5 6
Administrative notice was taken of material and relevant facts concerning Taiwan as noted in the
Findings of Facts section of this decision.7
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted all of the allegations under Guideline B.  After a thorough review of the
pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the following essential findings of fact.
Applicant is a 52-year-old computer software engineer.  He has a bachelor’s degree in
economics from a university in Taiwan, and a master’s degree in computer engineering from a
university in the United States.  He completed the course work for a doctorate in computer
engineering from an United States university, but has not completed his dissertation.  He is married
with two sons.  His wife was born in Taiwan but is a United States citizen.  His two sons were born
in the United States and are United States citizens.8
Applicant was born in Taiwan in 1955.  He attended schools in Taiwan ending with the
award of a bachelor’s degree.  He took the competitive examination and started working for a
commercial bank in Taiwan in 1977.  He worked at the bank until 1981, when he emigrated to the
United States to pursue graduate work in computer software engineering.  He received a master’s
degree from a United States university and started working for companies in the United States.
Applicant became a United States citizen in 1992.  After receiving his master’s degree, he worked
for various companies in the computer programming field, leaving each for better positions and
advancement in other companies.  In 2002, he commenced working for a defense contractor in
positions not requiring a security clearance.   He submitted his security clearance application in9
Government Exhibit 1 (Electronic Questionnaire for Investigative Processing, (E-QIP), dated October 26,10
2005).
Tr. 109-114; 175-17; Government Exhibit 2 (Response to Interrogatories, dated February 22, 2007), at 6-28.11
This exhibit included a copy of the Taiwan passport and the FSO’s statement of destruction.  See, Applicant Exhibit F
(Applicant’s Resume, undated).
Tr. 127-136.12
Tr. 159-169.13
4
2005.10
Applicant had a Taiwanese passport when he emigrated to the United States.  He renewed
his Taiwanese passport in 1996, after becoming a United States citizen.  He went to a Taiwan interest
office in the United States for a visa to enter Taiwan for a periodic visit.  The Taiwan officials asked
to see his Taiwanese passport to be able to spell his Chinese name using Chinese characters.
Because the passport was about to expire, the official asked Applicant if he wished to renew the
passport.  Applicant renewed the passport.  He never used it and it expired in 2002.  He turned this
passport over to his facilities security officer (FSO) who destroyed it.  The only passport he has, and
the only passport he has used since he became a United States citizen, is his United States passport.
Applicant believes he is a dual citizen of both Taiwan and the United States because of Taiwan’s
citizenship laws.  He is willing to take the necessary steps to renounce his Taiwanese citizenship.
He requested instructions to do so but has not taken any steps to renounce the citizenship.  He never
voted in Taiwan or performed or undertaken any other citizenship activity. He did the two-year
compulsory military service required of all healthy Taiwanese men.  Applicant has no business or
financial interests in Taiwan.  All of his financial, property, and business interests are in the United
States.   11
Applicant’s parents are citizens and residents of Taiwan.  Applicant’s father is an 80-year-old
retired civil engineer for the local town, and in poor health.  He is partially paralyzed from a stroke,
is totally unable to care for himself, and must relying on a live-in care giver to provide the essentials
of daily living.  His mother has always been a housewife working at home.  His parents stay at home,
and his mother assists with his father’s care.  His father received a lump sum pension payment when
he retired.  As is the practice in Taiwan, the lump sum payment went to a bank and draws a high
interest.  His parents are able to live within the interest resources except for the funding required for
his father’s medical care.  His father receives no other payments from the government.  Applicant
and his other siblings assist his parents in paying the live-in health care provider.  Applicant’s sends
his parents about $4,500 annually to help defray the cost.  When his father dies and no longer needs
the health care, Applicant will not be required to send money to his parents.   He feels a sense of12
filial piety or sacred duty to assist with the care of his parents.  Since he is not the oldest son, he does
not have primary responsibility for their care but he does have a duty to assist with their care.  He
does not discuss his work with his parents.  They only know he is involved in computer work.  13
Applicant has two older and two younger brothers and a younger sister who are citizens and
residents of Taiwan.  One of his younger brothers received a masters degree in architecture from a
United States university and returned to Taiwan to open his own architecture firm.  His other
younger brother has visited the United States on a tour.  All of his other siblings have never been to
Tr. 136-142, 169-178.14
Tr. 168-171.15
Tr. 143-146, 163-165.16
Re, 83-89; Applicant Exhibit D (Taiwan Passport, dated June 12, 1996, expired June 19, 2002).17
5
the United States.  They have no plans to move to the United States.  His oldest brother works in
construction as a civil engineer for a private company doing school construction.  His second oldest
brother is a retired teacher, who receives some form of pension from the government.  His youngest
brother runs an architectural firm, and his other younger brother works for him as his office manager.
His sister is an administrative assistant for a business.  None of his relatives work for the Taiwan
government.   Most of Appellant’s contacts with his siblings are with his second oldest brother, the14
retired teacher.  He talks to him about every two or three months discussing family matters and his
sons and their education.  His only other sibling communication is basically when he visits Taiwan.
He usually visits his family in Taiwan every two or three years.  Sometimes it is more frequent
depending on the health of his parents.  He goes with his family but sometimes he has to go by
himself.  His last visit to Taiwan was three weeks during the summer of 2007.  His entire family,
wife and sons, visited his parents, his siblings, and his wife’s family.  He does not discuss his work
with his siblings, even the retired teacher that he communicates with the most.   He has never been15
approached by any individual, family member, friend, or official on his trips to Taiwan to discuss
his work.  He has never been asked to provide any information on any projects he has or was
working.  No one has ever requested information from him about his work.
Applicant contacts and sees a childhood friend when he visits Taiwan.  The friend is the lead
accountant for a department of the central bank of Taiwan.  He communicates with his friend by
telephone only occasionally becasue they are both busy with their families and work.  He does
communicate with the friend by e-mail for special occasions like birthdays.  He contacts the friend
and other school acquaintances when he visits Taiwan, and they meet for dinner.  They talk about
current Taiwan events and their families.  They do not talk about his job or occupation, except telling
them he is in computers.  He does not feel any loyalty or obligation to his friend.  However, he feels
the relationship is more than a casual because they have maintained a long friendship.16
Applicant met his wife when they were in college in Taiwan and they were married in 1984.
She followed her husband to the United States in January 1985 to further her education.  She became
a United States citizen in 1992, and resides with Applicant and her family in the United States.  Her
Taiwan passport was renewed in 1996 after she became a United States citizen, but has expired and
is not current.  She does not remember why she applied for and received the new Taiwan passport.
She never used her Taiwan passport since becoming a United States citizen.  She only has a current
United States passport.  She has never voted in Taiwan or performed any other citizenship activity
in Taiwan.  However, she believes she is a dual citizen of Taiwan and the United States.  She has
not taken any steps to renounce her Taiwan citizenship.  She is also a computer program engineer
working as a business systems analyst for a major United States internet service provider.  She held
a security clearance for two years while working on a classified project for a defense contractor.  She
does not work on classified projects in her present position.17
Applicant’s wife’s parents and two brothers are citizens and residents of Taiwan. Her parents
Tr. 90-103.18
Tr. 140-143.19
Tr. 60-80.20
Applicant Exhibit C (Letter, dated August 8, 2007).21
6
owned a small shop but are retired.  Her brothers now run the shop.  None of her relatives worked
for the Taiwan government.  She talks to her mother a few times a month by telephone.  She will
occasionally talk to her father if he is available when she calls.  Applicant rarely talks to her family
except on holidays or as a courtesy.  She mainly talks about her parents’ health and her children.
They never discuss Applicant’s work.  She does not send money to her family except at New Year’s
as part of custom and tradition.  She does not own any property in Taiwan or expect to inherit
anything from her parents.  Since becoming a United States citizen, she usually travels to Taiwan
about every three years to visit family and friends.  Since coming to the United States, she has
returned to Taiwan about four or five times.  Her last trip was in the summer of 2007.  She and
Applicant usually visit her family a few times when they are in Taiwan.  They always stay with his
family and not with her family.   Applicant knows of no reasons for them to be subject to18
exploitation.  His only obligation to them is to care for their daughter, his wife.  As a son-in-law, he
has no obligation to care for them.  He never communicates with his brothers-in-law and only sees
them when he visits his wife’s family.  They never discuss his work.19
Applicant is well regarded at work by his supervisors and co-workers.  A group leader for
Applicant’s employer testified that he has known Applicant for over two years.  He does not have
direct supervision over Applicant, but does supervise Applicant on some of his work projects.  He
sees Applicant frequently, a few hours a week.  He travels with him to present material to
government clients.  As a project lead, he does provide performance information on Applicant to
Applicant’s supervisor.  His reports on Applicant are always very positive.  The clients are also very
positive about Applicant’s work.  He has never observed Applicant doing anything that would raise
any security concerns.20
Applicant presented a letter of recommendation from his employer’s associate department
head.  The individual has known Applicant for over two years, and is responsible for monitoring his
performance and development.  Applicant is a dedicated, honest, and responsible individual.  He is
professional and highly ethical.  He is convinced Applicant will clearly have the interest of national
security if granted access to classified information.21
During World War II and after, a civil war was fought on the mainland of China between the
Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Chinese.  In 1949, the Chinese Communis Party was
victorious and established a government on the mainland.  The Nationalist Chinese fled to Taiwan
and established a government.  Taiwan has developed steadily since then and is now the world’s 17th
largest economy.  Taiwan became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2002, further
expanding its trade opportunities and further strengthening its standing in the global economy.  This
prosperity established economic and social stability.  
Until 1986, Taiwan's political system was effectively controlled by one party, the
Kuomintang.  Since ending martial law in 1987, Taiwan has taken dramatic steps to improve respect
See, United States,. Department of State's Background Note: Taiwan, dated April 2007.22
See, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress: Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy23
Choices, dated October 9, 2006.
See, Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage.  While the report24
is undated, the government’s request for administrative notice refers to the document as a 2000 report.  There are a
number of examples in this report of espionage on U.S. economic and industrial activities by Taiwanese officials or
companies. Also of note is a Private Industry Survey by officials of the National Counterintelligence Center listing
Taiwan as one of the most active collectors of economic and industrial espionage. The list of most active collectors was
developed by contacting nearly a dozen selected Fortune 500 companies for their view of the problem of foreign
economic collection and industrial espionage. Only a small sampling, 12 of 500, of companies were contacted. The
companies and individuals contacted are not identified.  The report was given minimal weight.
See, United States State Department Background Notes, Taiwan, dated April 2007; United States Department25
of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices-2006, China (Taiwan Only) dated March 6, 2007).
Public Law 96-8.26
7
for human rights and create a democratic political system. The United States has been committed
to maintaining cultural, commercial, and other nonofficial relations with Taiwan since January 1979,
when it formally recognized the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole
legal government of China. By formal act of Congress (Taiwan Relations Act of 1979), the United
States is committed to provide Taiwan with military defensive arms in support of Taiwan's security
and stability in the region.  The United States also stated it would maintain cultural, commercial, and
other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.  Despite the United States clear and consistent
position that Taiwan and the mainland are part of one China, United States commercial ties have
expanded with Taiwan and the United States is supportive of Taiwan's membership in international
organizations, such as the World Trade Organization and the Asian Development Bank.   While still22
pursuing a closer relationship with Taiwan, the official United States position on Taiwan and
mainland China seems to be a criticism of mainland China’s buildup opposite Taiwan with periodic
cautions and warnings to the effect that United States support for Taiwan is not unconditional, but
has limits.  Smooth United States and PRC relations are an important tool in cooperating against
terrorism and maintaining stability in Pacific region.  Faced with competing pressures and the
continuing transformation on both the PRC and Taiwan systems, the United States government may
be facing new and more difficult policy choices concerning Taiwan in the next few years.23
The parties disagree on the character of Taiwan. The government claims Taiwan poses a
threat to national security because, in the past, it was one of the countries most actively engaged in
industrial espionage and the collection of foreign economic information.   It presented information24
concerning individual’s in the United States convicted of engaging in espionage practices with
Taiwan companies or officials.  It also notes Taiwan’s proximity to mainland China and the national
security threat from PRC.  On the other hand, Applicant established that Taiwan has a democratic
political system, has made dramatic steps toward improving its respect for human rights, has ended
restrictions on freedom of the press and the formation of new political parties, and has relaxed
restrictions on personal freedoms.   The relationship between the United States and Taiwan is25
defined in the Taiwan Relations Act which was a recognition of Taiwan by the United States.26
Taiwan has a long history of friendly relations with the United States, including substantial levels
of foreign trade. The claims of the parties are not irreconcilable. Taiwan can still be an ally and
friend but pose a security threat because of efforts to obtain national security information.
See, Consular Information Sheet-China, dated March 19, 2007; United States Department of State, Country27
Report on Human Rights Practices-2006: China (including Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), dated March 6, 2007.
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).28
Directive ¶ E2.2.1.29
AG 2(a).30
8
The government contends that the PRC must be considered when discussing security threats
from Taiwan because of its proximity to Taiwan.  It is noted that China is hostile to the United States
and has interests inimical to those of the U.S.  China is ruled by a totalitarian government that
depends on the suppression of its people for continuation in power. The PRC government has a poor
record of human rights that features, among other things, repression of political and religious
dissenters.  China is known to engage in espionage against the United States, both economically,
militarily, and technically.  Chinese security personnel place foreign visitors under surveillance and
subject them to search without their knowledge or consent.  27
POLICIES
The President has “the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national
security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . .
that will give that person access to such information.”   Eligibility for a security clearance is28
predicated upon the applicant meeting the security guidelines contained in the Directive.29
The Directive sets out the adjudicative guidelines for making decisions on security clearances.
Enclosure 2, amended by the new Administrative Guidelines, of the Directive sets forth the standards
for determining eligibility for access to classified information, listing the disqualifying conditions and
mitigating conditions to be considered for each guideline.  Each clearance decision must be fair,
impartial, and a commonsense decision based on the relevant and material facts and circumstances,
the whole person concept.
The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance.  An administrative
judge must apply the “whole person concept,” and consider and carefully weigh the available, reliable
information about the person.  An administrative judge should consider: (1) the nature, extent, and
seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at
the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence
of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the
potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation of
recurrence.30
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special relationship with the
government.  The government must be able to repose a high degree of trust and confidence in those
individuals to whom it grants access to classified information.  The decision to deny an individual a
See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.31
Directive ¶ E3.1.14.32
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002); see Directive ¶ E3.1.15.33
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002). 34
ISCR Case No. 99-0597 (App. Bd. Dec 13, 2000).35
ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996) (quoting DISCR Case No. 92-1106 (App. Bd. Oct. 7,36
1993))
Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see Directive ¶ E2.2.2.37
9
security clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.   It is merely31
an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of
Defense have established for issuing a clearance.
Initially, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts in the SOR that
disqualify or may disqualify the Applicant from being eligible for access to classified information.32
Thereafter, Applicant is responsible for presenting evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate
facts.   An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the33
national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”   The government is under no duty to34
present evidence to disprove any Adjudicative Guideline mitigating condition, and an Administrative
Judge cannot assume or infer that any particular mitigating condition is applicable merely because the
government does not present evidence to disprove that particular mitigating condition.   “[T]he35
Directive presumes there is a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.”   “Any doubt as to whether access to36
classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the
national security.” 37
CONCLUSIONS
I carefully considered all of the factors in evidence and the legal standards discussed above.
I reach the following conclusions regarding the allegations in the SOR.
Under Guideline B, foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign
person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in United States interest, or is
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.  Adjudication under this Guideline can and
should consider the identity of the foreign county in which the foreign contact or financial interest is
located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to
target United State citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associate with a risk of terrorism.
Applicant admits his parents and siblings are citizens and residents of Taiwan.  He admits he
has a close friend since childhood who is a citizen and resident of Taiwan.  He admits his parents-in-
law and two brothers-in-law are citizens and residents of Taiwan.  Appellant’s admitted relatives and
friends who are citizens and residents of Taiwan raise Foreign Influence Disqualifying Condition (FI
10
DC) ¶ 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other
person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion).  Each individual contact by
itself may not create a heightened risk of foreign influence, but the totality of the contacts does indicate
there may be a heightened risk of foreign influence.
In determining if Applicant’s family and friend in Taiwan cause security concerns, I considered
that Taiwan is an ally of the United States, has a defense agreement with the United States, and is one
of the United States’ substantial trading partners.  I considered that Taiwan improved its human rights
position and its people enjoy basic freedoms.  While the United States has a one-China policy, the
United States does maintain cultural, commercial, and other ties with Taiwan.  I considered that
Taiwan does engage in economic and other types of espionage, and there are instances of Taiwan
officials and companies engaging in such espionage with individuals in the United States.  There are
no indications that in these instances Taiwan was targeting United States citizens to provide economic
or other sensitive information.  I also considered that faced with new and competing national interest,
the United States policy toward Taiwan could change.  While Taiwan is a country that is friendly to
the United Stares, even as a friendly country, it could engage in espionage against United States
interests.  Friendly countries may have profound disagreements with the United States or have engaged
in espionage against United States economic, scientific, or technical interest.  A friendly relationship
is not determinative, but it makes it less likely that a foreign government would attempt to exploit a
United States citizen through relatives or associates in that country.  Taiwan is not a hostile country,
nor are its interests inimical to the United States.  The United States and Taiwan are large democracies,
enjoy good relations, and are trading partners.  It is reasonable to considered that Taiwan would not
take any action to jeopardize their friendly position with the United States because of their need for
trade and defense assistance from the United States.  It would be consider an act unfriendly to the
interest of the United States to coerce its citizens with relatives in the United States to pressure their
United States relatives to provide economic or other espionage information against the interest of the
United States.  While none of the considerations by themselves dispose of the issue, they are all factors
to be considered in determining Applicant’s vulnerability to pressure or coercion from his family
members in Taiwan.
I considered the proximity of PRC to Taiwan and that the PRC is very actively engaged in
economic and other espionage against the United States.  I considered that PRC’s interests are against
United States interests.  However, I also note that none of Applicant’s relatives are in PRC and there
is no connection of his family with PRC.  So, the consideration of PRC is not a significant factor in
considering Applicant’s vulnerability to pressure or coercion.
While Applicant and his wife share living quarters, his wife is a United States citizen residing
in the United States, and does not create by herself a security concern for Applicant.  The security
concern raised by Applicant’s wife’s family are a direct security concern for Applicant, so FI DC ¶ 7(d)
(sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship
creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) need not be
considered as a separate disqualifying condition.
Department counsel argues that FI DC ¶ 7(h) (indications that representatives or nationals from
a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion) is raised by the information presented.
11
The only information presented concerned general indications of past actions of Taiwanese officials
engaging in espionage activities.  The disqualifying condition specifically pertains to indication that
representatives of the country are increasing the vulnerability of the individual (Applicant) for possible
future exploitation.  There are no indications of any targeting of Applicant for future exploitation.  The
disqualifying condition has not been raised.
Applicant has raised Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) ¶ 8(a) (the nature of the
relationship with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or
activities of those persons in that country are such that is unlikely the individual will be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or
government and the interest of the United States).  Applicant presented information that his father is
a retired civil engineer from a local government.  He received a lump-sum payment as a pension and
uses the interest for living expenses.  As such, he is not dependent on any government entity for his
pension.  His father is also very ill requiring continuous medical care.  His mother was a housewife
who appears to be healthy, and the interest from the father’s retirement fund will sustain her in her
remaining years.  Applicant’s siblings are professional working for private businesses in Taiwan.  They
are engineers, architects, retired teachers, and office managers.  His wife’s parents are retired shop
keepers.  His brothers-in-law have taken over their parents’ shop.  His friend works for the central
bank in Taiwan but he is not a high officer or official in the bank.  He is a lead accountant for one of
the department within the bank.  He sees the friend for dinner on his trips to Taiwan.  Applicant’s
information concerning his family members’ living conditions, life style, and professions, and the
nature and extent of his relationship with his friend show it is unlikely Applicant will be placed in a
position to choose between the interests of his family and friend and the interests of the United States.
Applicant has established that his family and friend in Taiwan do not present a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  They are ordinary citizens
leading normal lives which also does not indicating a heightened risk of exploitation, pressure, or
coercion.  The positions and activities of his family and friend and the fact they are in Taiwan show
that it is unlikely that Applicant will be placed in a position of being coerced or pressured to choose
between these people and his interests in protecting the national security of the United States.  FI MC
¶ 8(a) applies.
Applicant has raised FI MC ¶ 8(b) (there is no conflict of interest either because the
individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that
the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest).
Applicant’s vulnerability to duress is also important.  Applicant and his wife have been in the United
States for over 23 years, and have been citizens of the United States for over 15 years.  They have two
sons, born and educated in the United States and are citizens of the United States.  Applicant and his
wife have substantial financial interest in the United States and have no financial interest in Taiwan.
The couple are gainfully employed by businesses in the United States.  The wife at one time was
granted a security clearance when performing defense contracting work.  Applicant is considered a
highly valuable employee.  While Applicant and his family have made numerous and repeated trips
to Taiwan, they were solely for the purpose of visiting family.  Applicant has demonstrated that he is
not unusually vulnerable to duress. Applicant has a sense of loyalty or obligation to his family and
friend in Taiwan.  But he also has long standing relationship and connections in the United States.  He
has demonstrated that these relationships will lead him to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of
the United States.  FI MC ¶ 8(b) applies.
AG ¶ 2 (8).38
AG ¶ 2 (4).39
12
Applicant has raised  FI MC ¶ 8(c) (contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual
and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation).  The vulnerability to duress of Applicant’s relatives and friend in Taiwan is important.
Applicant has the burden of presenting information to refute, extenuate, or mitigate the security
concerns raised by the government.  Applicant’s contacts with his relatives and friend in Taiwan are
not casual.  Applicant is in contact with his mother every few months.  His father is ill so his contacts
with him are minimal.  He has minimal contacts with his siblings, except for a brother who he talks
to every few months.  He rarely talks to his friend, but occasionally exchanges e-mails and sees him
on every visit to Taiwan.  He does not consider his friendship as casual since it has continued since
childhood.  He rarely if ever talks to his in-laws, but his wife talks to her mother a few times a month.
While these contacts are infrequent, they are with  family members and a friend, so they are not casual.
They are maintained because the relationships are deeply held.  When considering the contacts either
individually or collectively, they are not casual.  Accordingly, FI MC 8(c) does not apply. 
As noted above, FI DC 7(h) has not been raised.  However, if it was raised, Applicant has
presented information to refute and mitigate the security concern.  Applicant has never been
approached or questioned about is work by any family member, friend, or Taiwan official.  When in
Taiwan, no one asked about his employer or his work projects.  No one has indicated to him that his
family or friends are under pressure or duress by the Taiwan government because of him.  He has
shown that there are no indications that representative or individuals in Taiwan are acting to increase
his vulnerability to exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion. 
I carefully considered all of the circumstances discussed above in regard to disqualifying and
mitigating conditions as well as the following factors in light of the “whole person” concept.  The
“whole person” concept requires consideration of all available information about Applicant, not a
single item in isolation, to reach a common sense determination concerning Applicant’s security
worthiness.  Applicant’s family and friends in Taiwan both individually and collectively are in
positions and circumstances that make it unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position to choose
between the interests of  his family and friend and the interest of the United States, or can be exploited,
pressured, or coerced because of them.   Applicant has been in the United States for over 23 years and38
a citizen of the United States for over 15 years.   His wife and sons are with him in the United States39
and they are United States citizens.  He has accumulated significant assets in the United States.  His
co-worker and his supervisor consider him to be security conscious.  He does not discuss his work with
his family, friends, or in-laws in Taiwan.  He does travel to Taiwan periodically for the purpose of
visiting family.  Applicant and his wife have no property or income in Taiwan.  Their assets are solely
in the United States.  Applicant’s life story is an example of the success of many immigrants to the
United States.  He came to the United States early in his life to better himself through education.  He
remained here and has been a citizen for over 15 years.  His wife came to the United States for the
same reason and is a successful professional.  Their children were born in the United States and are
citizens.  The family enjoys a typical United States life style with small vestiges of their Chinese
culture.  Applicant is a trusted employee.  As a good son, he takes care of his parents and visits them
periodically.  All of his visits to Taiwan were for family purposes rather than any connection to the
AG ¶ 2 (7).40
13
Taiwanese government.   He has established that his motivation for his contacts and activities with40
his family and friend in Taiwan do not indicate a security risk.  He has presented sufficient information
to mitigate any security concerns under the “whole person” concept.  I conclude Applicant is eligible
for access to classified information.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national security to grant a security clearance for Applicant.  Clearance is granted.
Thomas M. Crean
Administrative Judge