KEYWORD: Personal Conduct
DIGEST: Applicant has a history of alcohol-related arrests/convictions (two in all between 1978 and
2002) and grand theft felony arrest/conviction in 1974 that he failed to list in his separate security
clearance applications between 1996 and 2004. These omissions are imputed to have been made
deliberately out of concern his employer would find out and impact on his employment relationship.
His arrests/convictions were not disclosed until confronted in a second DSS interview and are not
mitigated.  Besides these omissions, Applicant falsely induced and falsified a court filing in 2001
about his work and compensation status.  Allegations that Applicant deliberately failed to disclose
his wage garnishment between 1998 and were unsubstantiated.  Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 06-25863.h1
DATE: 09/27/2007 
DATE:  September 27, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-25863
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ROGER C. WESLEY
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Julie R. Edmunds, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant has a history of alcohol-related arrests/convictions (two in all between 1978 and
2002) and grand theft felony arrest/conviction in 1974 that he failed to list in his separate security
clearance applications between 1996 and 2004. These omissions are imputed to have been made
deliberately out of concern his employer would find out and impact on his employment relationship.
His arrests/convictions were not disclosed until confronted in a second DSS interview and are not
mitigated.  Besides these omissions, Applicant falsely induced and falsified a court filing in 2001
about his work and compensation status.  Allegations that Applicant deliberately failed to disclose
his wage garnishment between 1998 and were unsubstantiated.  Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 28, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to
Executive Order 10865 and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2,
1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, which detailed reasons why DOHA could
not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant, and recommended referral
to an administrative judge to determine whether clearance should be granted, continued, denied or
revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR on May 5, 2007, and requested a hearing.  The case was
assigned to me on August 14, 2007, and was scheduled for hearing on September 12, 2007.  A
hearing was held on September 12, 2007, for the purpose of considering whether it would be clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant, continue, deny, or revoke Applicant’s security
clearance.  At hearing, the Government's case consisted of 13 exhibits and a revised blank
Questionnaire for national Security Positions (SF-86) which was received pursuant to the official
notice provisions of the Rule 201(a) of the F.R.Evi.  Applicant, in turn, relied on one witness
(himself) and no exhibits.  The transcript (R.T.) was received on September 20, 2007.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Prior to the commencement of the hearing, Department Counsel moved to amend the SOR
to add a falsification allegation under Guideline E.  Specifically, Department Counsel moved to add
subparagraph 1.f to allege as follows:
 “On or about October 19, 2007, you deliberately falsified material facts to an
authorized investigator for the Department of Defense when you denied that you had
ever been charged with or convicted of any offense related to alcohol, when in truth
you had been charged with and convicted of Driving Under the Influence in 1978 and
also While Ability Impaired in 2002.”  
There being no objection from Applicant, and good cause being demonstrated,  Department’s motion
to amend was granted.  In responding to the amended subparagraph 1.f, Applicant denied the new
allegation.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Under Guideline E, Applicant is alleged to have falsified (a) his security clearance
applications (SF-86) of June 2004, February 1998, and September 1996, by omitting his 2002 and
1978 alcohol-related offenses, his 1974 theft conviction, and his wage garnishments between 1998
and 2001 and (b) his filing a false statement in a local court about his claimed inactive work status
and lack of compensation.  For his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted most of the allegations,
but with qualifications.  He claimed to be under the false assumption that his records covering his
2002 DuI charge and conviction were expunged and to be consistent he answered in the negative as
to his earlier 1978 DuI charge/conviction, as well as his 1974 fraud charge/conviction.  He provides
no explanations of the underlying circumstances with respect to his admitted deliberate omission of
his wage garnishment and claims to have had no proof of his employment status in connection with
his admitted filing of a false statement about his inactive status and lack of compensation in court
documents.  Applicant affirmatively denied only the allegations in amended subparagraph 1.f that
he deliberately denied in an October 2004 DSS interview to being charged and convicted of his 1978
and 2002.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant is a 54-year-old senior consultant of a defense contractor who has held a security
clearance since 1977 and seeks to retain his clearance.  The allegations covered in the SOR and
admitted by Applicant are incorporated herein and adopted as relevant and material findings.
Additional findings follow.
Applicant’s SF-86 omissions of his DuI and felony fraud charges/convictions
In September 1996, Applicant was asked to complete an SF-86.  Question 23d of the SF-86
asked if he had been charged or convicted of any offense(s) related to alcohol or drugs. In responding
to the question, Applicant checked no (see ex. 1 and official notice 1).  While not denying any intent
to materially falsify the SF-86, he attributes his denial to his impression at the time that his 1978 DuI
arrest and conviction had since been expunged, and, as such, he was not required to list it (R.T., at
35).  In the same SF-86, Applicant answered no to question 21, which asked whether he had ever
been charged and convicted of fraud.  While Applicant does not deny any intent to materially falsify
his SF-86, he attributes his denial of any felony fraud charge and conviction to his belief at the time
that his fraud charge and conviction while attending college in 1974 had been resolved by
expungement.  Applicant claims no memory loss or confusion about the questions and cannot avoid
drawn inferences he knowingly and  willingly omitted the alcohol-related and fraud offenses out of
concern disclosure could adversely impact his security clearance and employment.
In February 1998, Applicant was asked to complete another SF-86.  He responded to the
questions inquiring about his alcohol-related and theft offenses in the same way he answered the
questions posed in his earlier 1996 SF-86.  He answered no to each question and attributed both
denials to his desire to maintain consistency with his previous answers and avoid embarrassment
with his employer (R.T., at 48-50).
4
Six years later (in June 2004), Applicant was asked to complete a third updated security
clearance.  In this SF-86, he was asked in question 24 whether he had ever been charged with or
convicted of any offenses related to alcohol or drugs.  He answered no to this question.  Asked in
question 21 of the same SF-86 whether he had ever been charged with or convicted of any felony
offense, he answered no to this question as well.  When queried in question 34 of the same SF-86
whether in the last seven years he had ever had his wages garnished for any reason, again, he
answered no.  In his signed, sworn response to the SOR, Applicant admitted to deliberately omitting
his alcohol-related and fraud offenses.  These admissions have not been drawn and stand as official
admissions.
Applicant attributes his negative responses to each of the questions inquiring about his prior
alcohol and felony offenses to his belief that the underlying 2002 DuI charge/conviction had been
expunged.  He attributes his omissions of his 1978 DuI charge/conviction and his 1974 felony theft
conviction to his desire to maintain consistency with the corresponding answers in each of his
previous security clearance applications (see response and ex. 5; R.T., at 52-53).  He claims no
confusion or memory loss over any of the underlying offenses. Nor does he provide any
documentation to corroborate his claims that the underlying convictions were expunged or subject
to expungement.
Less amenable to reconciliation are Applicant’s consistent omissions of his prior alcohol-
related offenses of 1978 and 2002, respectively, and his 1974 felony fraud conviction.  Each of these
underlying offenses resulted in convictions.   He never listed either of the alcohol-related offenses
due primarily to his concern it could adversely affect his work relationships (see ex. 5).  He did not
want any of his supervisors or colleagues to find out about his fraud conviction either.  Such
concerns are attributable as well to his omissions of his 1974 grand theft arrest and conviction (see
ex. 4).  While Applicant insisted in his second DSS interview that he was not aware his 1974 arrest
was a felony when he completed each of his SF-86s, the charge itself is serious enough to impute
sufficient knowledge of the offense’s felony status as to suggest a concerted effort on Applicant’s
part to employ conscious denial.  Applicant’s employment concerns, while understandable, are not
enough to avert drawn inferences of knowing and wilful concealment of his alcohol-related and fraud
offenses.  
Applicant was first interviewed about his 2004 SF-86 by an DSS agent in October 2004.
When asked about any prior alcohol-related and felony offenses by the agent, Applicant falsely
denied ever being charged or convicted of any alcohol-related or felony offenses (see ex. 5). Not
until pressed by the same agent in a follow-up interview a month later (in November 2004) did he
provide detailed descriptions of the underlying circumstances and his ensuing alcohol-related arrests
in December1978 and October 2002, respectively, and his fraud arrest in April 1974.  When pressed,
he acknowledged that listing any of the alcohol-related offenses would be embarrassing to him and
could impact his job relationship (see ex. 5; R.T., at 49).  Concern about the effect disclosure  might
have on his job is a much more plausible motivational reason for his wanting to omit his prior
alcohol-related and fraud offenses than his claimed understanding about the expungement of the
convictions and his corresponding excuse from listing them for this reason.  Inferences warrant that
Applicant’s omissions of his alcohol and fraud offenses were deliberately made to avert potential
disclosure to his employer and  possible adverse effects on his employment relationship.  
Applicant’s SF-86 wage garnishment omissions
5
When queried in question 34 of the same 2004 SF-86 whether in the last seven years he had
ever had his wages garnished for any reason, he answered no.  In his answer he admits to deliberately
failing to disclose prior wage garnishments and claims only that financial arrangements with his ex-
wife are resolved and this type of omission occurred under unique circumstances and will not recur.
Applicant provided no explanations of whether or not the garnishment writs were actually levied or
attached to his wages.
Both in his response to the SOR and in his signed, sworn statement of November 2004,
Applicant admitted to having his wages garnished during the period 1998 to 2001.  He attributed the
issued garnishment writs to ongoing arguments over his former spouse’s achieving court-approved
permanent maintenance and ordered retroactive payments on any ordered maintenance (see ex. 5).
 Never informed by the court or his former spouse of her obtained judgments and garnishment orders
(see exs. 8 through 12), he was asked by his company administrator how he wanted to handle the
garnishments.  Since the garnishments had not yet attached to any of Applicant’s accounts, he agreed
in October 2001 to make one lump sum payment of $33,000.00 in full settlement of any and all of
current and future maintenance obligations to his (see exs. 5 and 6; R.T., at 54-60).  Question 34 asks
about wage garnishment in the past tense and clearly references wages actually attached, not subject
to attachment by dint of a court-approved garnishment writ.  Absent any evidence persuasive to
contradict Applicant’s claimed pre-attachment settlement with his ex-wife, Applicant’s settlement
claims are entitled to acceptance. 
Based on a fair reading of question 34 and Applicant’s explanation that the court-entered
judgments and issued garnishments never attached to his wages or bank accounts, Applicant’s
explanations of his answers in his signed, sworn statement and at hearing (R.T., at 58-59) are worthy
of acceptance.  Inferences warrant, accordingly, that Applicant did not deliberately omit his prior
garnishments when responding to question 34 of his June 2004 SF-86.
Applicant’s court filings regarding his work status
Both in his signed, sworn answer and in his November 2004 signed, sworn statement,
Applicant acknowledged that he falsely filed a statement in a state court in 2001 that inaccurately
stated  he was in an inactive work status and not receiving compensation (see response and ex. 5).
He admitted doing so to persuade his ex-wife and attorney to pursue a compromise arrangement with
him regarding her maintenance payments.  His answer is consistent with the statement he provided
the DSS agent in his November 2004 interview.  In this statement, he confirmed he called a company
administrator and asked him “to send me a letter saying I was temporarily laid off in order to
convince my former spouse and her attorney that I needed to compromise arrangement regarding the
maintenance” (ex. 5). Then he states that “he was not really laid-off but was no longer working on
long term projects” (ex. 5).  Nowhere in the statement does he suggest he was actually fired or laid
off, or received no compensation during this supposed lay-off period.  Both by his response and his
interview statements his exchange with his administrator represents a clear and consistent  account
of what transpired.   While Applicant tried initially at hearing to claim he was actually fired by his
employer in January 2001 and generated no significant income after that (R.T., at 38-39), he
ultimately acknowledged to be available after that date for short term assignments in which he earned
some income (R.T., at 61-66).  Applicant’s attempted corrections are not substantive enough to
materially detract from his earlier acknowledgments. 
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While it is less than clear from Applicant’s acknowledged exchange with his company
administrator in 2001 whether the administrator actually wrote such a letter to him, Applicant does
acknowledge filing a letter to this effect in the court presiding over his ex-wife’s maintenance
petition.  While he does insist he took a substantial drop in income from his employer in 2001, he
has never suggested he had no income at all during this 2001 time frame.  Applicant’s subsequent
hearing claims that he experienced a substantial loss of income during this pertinent period in 2001
(R.T., at ) does not alter the inferential effect of his admissions in both his response and November
2004 DSS statement (see ex. 5). 
That Applicant was ultimately successful in working out a compromise maintenance
settlement with his ex-wife (resulting in an agreed $33,000.00 lump sum settlement payment to her)
does not undue his acknowledged deceptive means he employed to produce such a settlement.
Accordingly, inferences warrant of Applicant’s filing a false statement in a pending court proceeding
in 2001 indicating he was in an inactive work status and not receiving compensation. Further,
inferences warrant that Applicant filed such a letter to attempt to persuade his ex-wife and her
attorney that he did not have available compensatory funds from his work to satisfy her maintenance
demands and cover the entered judgment and issued writs of garnishment and needed a compromise
arrangement with her. 
POLICIES
The revised Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information (effective September 2006) list Guidelines to be considered by judges in the decision
making process covering DOHA cases.  These Guidelines require the judge to consider all of the
"Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying” (Disqualifying
Conditions), if any, and all of the Mitigating Conditions, if any, before deciding whether or not a
security clearance should be granted, continued or denied.  The Guidelines do not require the judge
to assess these factors exclusively in arriving at a decision.  In addition to the relevant Adjudicative
Guidelines, judges must take into account the pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and
mitigation set forth in E.2.2 of the Adjudicative Process of Enclosure 2 of the Directive, which are
intended to assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial common sense decision.
Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following adjudication policy factors
are pertinent herein:
Personal Conduct
The Concern: Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of
candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about
an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information.  Of special
interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process
or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. 
Burden of Proof
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By virtue of the precepts framed by the revised Adjudicative Guidelines, a decision to grant
or continue an applicant's security clearance may be made only upon a threshold finding that to do
so is clearly consistent with the national interest.  Because the Directive requires Administrative
Judges to make a common sense appraisal of the evidence accumulated in the record, the ultimate
determination of an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance depends, in large part, on the
relevance and materiality of that evidence.  As with all adversary proceedings, the Judge may draw
only those inferences which have a reasonable and logical basis from the evidence of record.
Conversely, the Judge cannot draw factual inferences that are grounded on speculation or conjecture.
The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) It must prove any controverted fact[s] alleged
in the Statement of Reasons and (2) it must demonstrate that the facts proven have a material bearing
to the applicant's eligibility to obtain or maintain a security clearance.  The required showing of
material bearing, however, does not require the Government to affirmatively demonstrate that the
applicant has actually mishandled or abused classified information before it can deny or revoke a
security clearance. Rather, consideration must take account of cognizable risks that an applicant may
deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing admitted or
controverted facts, the burden of persuasion shifts to the applicant for the purpose of establishing his
or her security worthiness through evidence of refutation, extenuation or mitigation of the
Government's case.
CONCLUSIONS
Applicant is a senior consultant for a defense contractor who has held a security clearance
for over 30 years and has raised security concerns over his alleged (a) omissions in the security
clearance applications he completed between 1996 and 2004,(b) a false statement about his
employment status he filed in a pending court that was presiding over his ex-wife’s maintenance
petition, and ©) false statements he made to a DSS investigator in October 2004 about his alcohol-
related and felony fraud offenses. 
Applicant’s SF-86 and DSS interview omissions
Particularly serious and difficult  to reconcile with the trust and reliability requirements for
holding a security clearance are the timing and circumstances of Applicant’s omissions of his two
prior alcohol-related charges and convictions in 1978 and 2002, respectively, and his felony fraud
charge/conviction in 1974, in the security clearance applications he completed in 1996, 1998 and
2004, and his withholding of information pertaining to these offenses until he was confronted in an
ensuing DSS interview in November 2004.  So much trust is imposed on persons cleared to see
classified information that candor lapses must be scrupulously evaluated.   
Applicable disqualifying conditions under the Adjudicative Guidelines for personal conduct
are as follows: DC 16(a) (the deliberate omission, concealment, falsification or misrepresentation
of relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement
or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits
or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary
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responsibilities) and 16(b) (deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning
relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other
official government representative).  
Applicant’s manifest reasons for omitting his prior alcohol and fraud offenses (i.e.,
embarrassment over disclosing any of his alcohol and fraud offenses that he had historically omitted
in prior SF-86s, for fear of impact on his job) have never been considered sufficient by the Appeal
Board to mitigate raised trust concerns associated with the omissions.  Mitigation difficulty is
compounded by his failure to promptly correct his SF-86 omissions before being confronted in his
ensuing second DSS interview in November 2004.  In the past, the Appeal Board has denied
applicants availability of the predecessor mitigating condition of MC 17(a) (the individual made
prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being
confronted with the facts) where the applicant has waited many months to timely correct a known
omission. Compare ISCR Case No. 97-0289 (Appeal Bd. January 1998) with DISCR Case No. 93-
1390 (Appeal Bd. January 1995). 
By omitting his prior alcohol-related and fraud offenses in his security clearance applications
and ensuing October 2004 DSS interview, Applicant concealed materially important background
information needed for the government to properly process and evaluate his security updates.  His
attributed reasons for his omissions (fear of adverse impact on his job) are not sustainable grounds
for averting inferences of falsification.  Weighing all of the circumstances surrounding his omissions
of his DuI/felony fraud charges and lack of any prompt, good faith corrections, Applicant’s claims
lack the necessary probative showing to avert drawn conclusions that he knowingly and deliberately
withheld material background information about his prior alcohol-related and felony fraud
convictions in both the security clearance applications he completed and the first DSS interview he
submitted to in October 2004. Accordingly, subparagraphs 1.a through 1.c and 1.f are concluded
unfavorable to Applicant.
By contrast, favorable conclusions warrant with respect to SOR allegations that Applicant
deliberately omitted the writs of wage garnishment issued against him between 1998 and 2001, but
never attached to Applicant’s wages or earnings.  Applicant’s proofs that the garnishment writs were
never levied on his wages before he worked out a lump sum settlement with his ex-wife were
accepted.  Without proofs of actual attachments or levies on Applicant’s wages, Applicant could
truthfully claim that his wages were never garnished.  Question 34 of his 2004 SF-86 looks to actual
wage garnishments in the past tense and manifestly does not cover issued writs that were not served.
Accordingly, the allegations covered in subparagraph 1.d are unsubstantiated. 
Applicant’s false court statement re: his employment status
Security significant, too, is Applicant’s admitted statement he filed in 2001 with the court
presiding over his ex-wife’s maintenance claims.  After enlisting his company administrator to send
him a letter misstating the status of his employment, he then filed a statement with the court
indicating he was in inactive work and not receiving compensation.  Neither of these statements were
true, for by his own accounts, Applicant was never actually laid off without pay.  Applicant’s hearing
claims that he was never in an inactive work status are belied by his response admissions and the
answers he provided the DSS agent in his second interview with Applicant in November 2004. 
9
Applicable to Applicant’s admitted deceptive actions is DC 16(d) (credible adverse
information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient for an
adverse determination, but which when combined with all available information supports a whole-
person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor,
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the
person may not properly safeguard protected information.  This includes but is not limited to
consideration of:
(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release
of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other government
protected information; 
(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the workplace; 
(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations;
(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer’s time or resources).
Both Applicant’s inducement of his company administrator to file a false statement concerning his
employment and compensation status and his ensuing filing of a false statement in court regarding
his employment status reflect material acts of deceit that are not mitigated under any of the
potentially available mitigating conditions of the Guidelines for personal conduct.
Considering Applicant’s deceitful actions with regards to hi ex-wife’s maintenance judgment
and garnishment writs from the standpoint of both the guidelines and a whole-person assessment,
Applicant’s cannot be considered isolated, but rather reflect a pattern of dishonest conduct that
reflect adversely on his judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.  Consequently, the allegations
covered by subparagraph 1.e must be concluded unfavorable to Applicant.  Taking into account all
of the evidence produced in this record and the available guidelines in the Directive (inclusive of the
E2.2 factors), unfavorable conclusions warrant with respect to sub-paragraph 1.e of Guideline E.
In reaching my decision, I have considered the evidence as a whole, including each of the E2
2.2 factors enumerated in the Adjudicative Guidelines of the Directive.
FORMAL FINDINGS
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR and ensuing conclusions reached in the context of
the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS, CONDITIONS, and the factors listed above, I make
the following FORMAL FINDINGS:
GUIDELINE E (PERSONAL CONDUCT): AGAINST APPLICANT
Sub-para. 1.a: AGAINST APPLICANT
Sub-para. 1.b AGAINST APPLICANT
Sub-para. 1.c: AGAINST APPLICANT
Sub-para. 1.d FOR APPLICANT
Sub-para. 1.e AGAINST APPLICANT
Sub-para. 1.f: AGAINST APPLICANT
10
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance.  Clearance is denied.
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge