KEYWORD: Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of Russia.  He calls his mother daily and visits
her about once a year.  Applicant became a U.S. citizen in 2001, but he continued to use his Russian
passport to visit his mother.  He has destroyed his Russian passport and taken significant steps to
renounce his Russian citizenship.  He has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign
preference, but he has not mitigated the concerns based on foreign influence.  Clearance is denied.
CASENO: 07-00065.h1
DATE: 09/26/2007
DATE:  September 26, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-00065
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
LEROY F. FOREMAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Jennifer I. Goldstein, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
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Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of Russia.  He calls his mother daily and visits
her about once a year.  Applicant became a U.S. citizen in 2001, but he continued to use his Russian
passport to visit his mother.  He has destroyed his Russian passport and taken significant steps to
renounce his Russian citizenship.  He has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign
preference, but he has not mitigated the concerns based on foreign influence.  Clearance is denied.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 26, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny Applicant a
security clearance. This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Jan. 2, 1992),
as amended and modified (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) approved by the
President on December 29, 2005, and implemented effective September 1, 2006.  The SOR alleges
security concerns under Guidelines B (Foreign Influence) and C (Foreign Preference).
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on March 23, 2007, admitted all but one of the
allegations, offered explanations, and elected to have his case decided on the record in lieu of a
hearing.  On June 22, 2007, he changed his election and requested a hearing.  The case was assigned
to an administrative judge on July 11, 2007, and reassigned to me on July 25, 2007.  It was heard as
scheduled on August 23, 2007.  I kept the record open until September 6, 2007, to enable Applicant
to submit additional evidence.  I received his evidence on August 27, 2007.  Several documents were
in Russian, and I requested Applicant to translate them.  I received the translations on September 5,
2007.  Department Counsel did not object to the additional evidence (Hearing Exhibit (HX) II).  The
documents have been admitted as Applicant’s Exhibits (AX) C, D, and E.  DOHA received the
transcript (Tr.) on September 12, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant’s admissions in his answer to the SOR and at the hearing are incorporated into my
findings of fact.  I make the following findings:
Applicant is a 59-year-old physics engineer for a defense contractor.  He has worked for his
current employer since December 2002.  He has never held a clearance.
Applicant’s supervisor submitted a statement on his behalf attesting to his professional
qualities, maturity, and high level of integrity (AX B).  At the hearing, a retired military officer with
a top secret clearance, who has known Applicant since 2002 as a peer and a supervisor, described
Applicant as “extremely competent,” a valued team member, and a trustworthy person (Tr. 39, 44).
Applicant was born and educated in Russia.  He obtained a Ph.D. in March 1980 from the
P.N. Lebedev Physical Institute, the largest and oldest research center in Russian, regarded as the
flagship of Russian science (Government Exhibit (GX) 1 at 11; GX 2).  While a student at the
Lebedev Institute, he worked as a junior research associate from February 1971 until his graduation,
and then as a senior scientist until December 1992 (GX 1 at 28).  He worked on government
contracts and held a “low level” Russian clearance, roughly equivalent to a “confidential” clearance
(Tr. 42, 56-57).  Before attending the Institute, he worked as a junior research associate at the
Moscow Institute of Electronics Engineering from July 1971 to January 1977 (GX 1 at 28).  
Around 1992, Applicant concluded that Russian science was in disarray, and he came to the
U.S. when he was invited by a U.S. university to join the faculty as a visiting scientist.  After two
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years he moved to another U.S. university, and he decided to stay in the U.S. because of the poor
state of Russian science at the time (Tr. 57-58). 
Applicant married a Russian woman in March 1977.  They have two children, born in Russia.
His son renounced his Russian citizenship at age 18, because he was concerned about his
vulnerability to mandatory military service in Russia (Tr. 59).  Applicant, his wife and two children,
now ages 28 and 26, became naturalized U.S. citizens in 2001. 
Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of Russia.  He calls her almost every day (Tr. 68).
He visited her in 2000, and annually from 2002 to 2007, using his Russian passport (Tr. 65-66).  He
testified he used his Russian passport because Russia does not issue visas to Russian citizens who
left the country after February 1992, and because his use of the Russian passport enabled him to enter
the country without revealing anything about his work in the U.S. (Tr. 50).  
Applicant intended to bring his 87-year-old mother to the U.S., but she was hit by a car in
2004, and her disability made her unable to timely submit her visa application.  She also lost her
birth certificate and was unable to obtain a duplicate due to the inefficiency and corruption of
Russian officials.  A friend is now helping his mother with the paperwork for her application (Tr.
52, 70).  His mother is “practically recovered” from her injuries and is willing to come to the U.S.
and live with Applicant and his family (Tr. 69).
Applicant’s mother receives a pension and benefits from the Russian government (Tr. 63).
During World War II, his mother was drafted and served in a medical unit for two years (Tr. 64). 
His mother has never visited him in the U.S. (Tr. 65).  Neither Applicant nor any member of his
family was a member of the Communist Party (Tr. 64-65).  
Applicant does not consider himself a Russian citizen (Tr. 61).  He testified he does not like
or trust the current Russian government (Tr. 72).  In July 2007, Applicant obtained the necessary
forms to renounce his Russian citizenship.  At the time of the hearing, he had completed the forms
and was awaiting documentation from the Russian Revenue Service confirming that he had no tax
and property liability in Russia (AX C, D, and E; Tr. 60-61).
In August 2007, Applicant surrendered his Russian passport to his facility security officer,
who cut it into pieces and put the pieces in a burn barrel (AX A).  He testified he will not be able to
visit Russia again until he completes the process of renouncing his Russian citizenship (Tr. 66-67).
At the request of Department Counsel, and without objection from Applicant, I took
administrative notice of relevant adjudicative facts about Russia (Tr. 24; HX II).  The government
of the Russian Federation consists of a strong president, a prime minister, a bicameral legislature,
and a weak judiciary.  The U.S. and Russian share common interests on a broad range of issues.  The
U.S. and Russia are engaged in reduction of strategic arsenals, and they share a basic goal to stem
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  They are allies in the war on terrorism.  Russia is
a participant in efforts to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear program, and takes part in the Middle East
Peace Process “Quartet,” along with the United Nations and the European Union.  
On the other hand, Russia has an active, ongoing economic collection program targeting U.S.
technology.  It also has a strong intelligence organization retained from the Soviet Union, including
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specialized, technical intelligence activities targeting the U.S.  It has an intelligence service that
works outside Russia by targeting researchers involved in national security and the environment.
It operates a facility in Cuba targeting U.S. signal operations.  It sells technology for missiles and
weapons of mass destruction, for money and diplomatic influence, to other counties including China,
Venezuela, India, and Iran.  It has internal problems with terrorist activity including suicide
bombings, assassinations, and kidnapings.  It has a poor human rights record, with problems
including government corruption, media suppression, politically motivated abductions,
disappearances, poor prison conditions, and arbitrary arrest and detention.  Dual U.S.-Russian
citizens risk being viewed as Russian citizens and not allowed to leave Russia without a Russian
passport.
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.”  Id. at
527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.  Eligibility for a security clearance is
predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the Guidelines.  Each clearance
decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision based on the relevant and material
facts and circumstances, the whole person concept, the disqualifying conditions and mitigating
conditions under each specific guideline, and the factors listed in AG ¶¶ 2(a)(1)-(9).
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special relationship with the
government.  The government must be able to have a high degree of trust and confidence in persons
with access to classified information.  However, the decision to deny an individual a security
clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  See Exec. Or. 10865
§ 7.  It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the
Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal
or professional history of the applicant which disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  “Substantial evidence” is
“more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The Guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between
proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See
ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the
burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  See Directive ¶
E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”  ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App.
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Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). 
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The SOR alleges Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of Russia (SOR ¶ 1.a), she
decided to remain in Russia after Applicant had gained U.S. approval for her entry into the U.S.
(SOR ¶ 1.b), and Applicant traveled to Russia on multiple occasions (SOR ¶ 1.c).  It also alleges he
worked at the Lebedev Physical Institute in Moscow, Russian, from 1977 to 1992, before he came
to the U.S. (SOR ¶ 1.d).  The concern under this guideline is as follows: “Foreign contacts and
interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial
interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or
government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to,
such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain
protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.”  AG ¶ 6.
Two disqualifying conditions under this guideline are relevant to this case.  First, a
disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member, business or
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion.” AG ¶ 7(a). Second, a disqualifying condition may be raised by “connections to a
foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(b).  The evidence
that Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of Russia raises the “heightened risk” in AG ¶7(a)
and the “potential conflict of interest” in AG ¶ 7(b), shifting the burden to Applicant to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United States has
a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person,
organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person,
organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-
11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over
matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly
nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific,
and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd.
Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S.,
and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is
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associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions
or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed
in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization,
or government and the interests of the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). Applicant obviously is very close to his
mother.  His mother is dependent on the Russian government for her pension and other benefits.  The
government has a poor human rights record and actively targets the U.S. for industrial as well as
military espionage.  I conclude AG ¶ 8(a) is not established.
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is no conflict
of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in
favor of the U.S. interest.”  AG ¶ 8(b).  Applicant is deeply committed to the U.S. and has little use
for the current Russian government, but he is also deeply committed to his mother and concerned
about her welfare.  I conclude Applicant has not carried his burden of establishing AG ¶ 8(b).  No
other mitigating conditions are relevant to the facts of this case.
Applicant presented uncontroverted evidence that his mother’s decision to remain in Russia,
alleged in SOR ¶ 1.b, was the result of her injury and subsequent disability, and not due to any
change of heart on her part or Applicant’s.  I conclude any security implications of his mother’s
failure to follow through on the plan to move to the U.S. have been explained away, and I resolve
SOR ¶ 1.b in Applicant’s favor.
Because Applicant’s studies and employment at the Lebedev Physical Institute, alleged in
SOR ¶ 1.d, occurred before he came to the U.S. and became a U.S. citizen, and there is no evidence
that he has any continuing contacts with the Institute, I conclude his involvement with the Institute
has minimal security significance.  Although this conduct is alleged under Guideline B, the
underlying premise of AG ¶ 11(c) (conduct occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen)
under Guideline C is relevant and is established by the evidence.  
Guideline C (Foreign Preference)
The SOR alleges Applicant exercised dual U.S.-Russian citizenship (SOR ¶ 2.a) and used
his Russian passport after he obtained a U.S. passport (SOR ¶ 2.b).  The concern under this guideline
is as follows: “When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country
over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that
are harmful to the interests of the United States.”  AG ¶ 9.  A disqualifying condition may arise from
“exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or
through the foreign citizenship of a family member,” including but not limited to “possession of a
current foreign passport.”  AG ¶ 10(a)(1).  Applicant’s possession and use of a Russian passport after
becoming a U.S. citizen establishes this disqualifying condition.
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Since the government produced substantial evidence to raise the disqualifying condition in
AG ¶10(a)(1), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate the facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  Three mitigating conditions are relevant.  First, security
concerns under this guideline may be mitigated by evidence that “dual citizenship is based solely on
parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country.”  AG ¶ 11(a).  Second, they also can be mitigated
by evidence that “the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.”  AG ¶
11(b).  Third, they can be mitigated if “the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant
security authority, or otherwise invalidated.”  AG ¶ 11(e).  All three mitigating conditions are
established.
Dual citizenship is not a disqualifying condition, unless it is exercised.  Thus, the allegations
in SOR ¶ 2.a have little security significance standing alone.  The allegations in SOR ¶ 2.b are
premised on Applicant’s dual citizenship, thus incorporating and duplicating SOR ¶ 2.a.  When the
same conduct is alleged twice in the SOR under the same guideline, one of the duplicate allegations
should be resolved in Applicant’s favor. See ISCR Case No. 03-04704 (App. Bd. Sep. 21, 2005) at
3 (same debt alleged twice).  Accordingly, I resolve SOR ¶ 2.a. in Applicant’s favor.  
Whole Person Analysis
In addition to considering the specific disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each
guideline, I have also considered: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the applicant’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  AG ¶¶
2(a)(1)-(9).  Some of these factors are discussed above, but some merit additional comment.
Applicant is a mature adult who has lived in the U.S. for 15 years.  He and his family
members have been U.S. citizens for six years.  He is loyal to the U.S. and has little use for the
current Russian government.  He has destroyed his Russian passport and taken significant steps to
renounce his Russian citizenship, even though it will make visits to his aging mother more difficult.
Nevertheless Russia’s human rights record and its active intelligence activities targeting the U.S. are
factors that weigh heavily against granting Applicant a clearance.  If Applicant and his mother follow
through with plans for her to move to the U.S., the security landscape may be significantly different
for Applicant.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.37-E3.1.41 (reconsideration authorized after one year).  
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines B and C,
considering the bonds of affection and obligation between Applicant and his mother, considering the
nature of the Russian government and its intelligence activities directed at the U.S., and evaluating
all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the security
concerns based on foreign preference, but he has not mitigated the concerns based on foreign
influence. Accordingly, I conclude he has not carried his burden of showing that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant him a security clearance.
FORMAL FINDINGS
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The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1. Guideline B (Foreign Influence): AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a:  Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline C (Foreign Preference): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. Clearance is denied.
LeRoy F. Foreman
Administrative Judge