DATE: October 31, 2007
In Re:
Applicant for Trustworthiness Determination
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ADP Case No. 06-14978
REMAND DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
JOSEPH TESTAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Julie R. Edmonds, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant’s mother and nine siblings are citizens of Morocco. One sibling is a high-ranking
Moroccan government official. Applicant has strong ties of affection to these immediate family
members. He maintains regular, close contact with them. Determination of Trustworthiness is
denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 9, 1993, the Composite Health Care System Program Office (CHCSPO), the
Identifying the position the brother occupies could lead to applicant’s identification.1
2
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASDC3I), entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement which gave DOHA the responsibility to provide trustworthiness determinations for
contractor personnel employed in Information Systems Positions as defined in DoD Regulation
5200.2R, Personnel Security Program, dated January 1987.
On August 31, 2006, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to applicant which
detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to make or continue a determination of trustworthiness,
suitability, and eligibility for applicant to hold a sensitive Information Systems Position (ADP-
I/II/III).
Applicant responded to the SOR in writing on September 25, 2006, and elected to have his
case determined on a written record in lieu of a hearing. Department Counsel submitted the
Government's written case (FORM) on or about February 16, 2007. Applicant filed a response to the
FORM on or about March 29, 2007. The case was assigned to me on April 16, 2007, and a decision
was issued on May 9, 2007. On October 1, 2007, the DOHA Appeal Board remanded the case to me
for issuance of a new decision.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE
Department Counsel’s Motion to amend SOR Paragraph 1.b., set forth on page 4 of the
FORM, is granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant is 56 years of age. He was born in Morocco. He became a United States citizen in
1992. His spouse, to whom he has been married since 1984, was born in the United States. Their two
children were born in the United States.
Applicant’s mother and nine siblings are citizens of Morocco. His mother and seven siblings
reside in Morocco; one sibling resides in a third country and another resides in the United States.
One of applicant’s siblings is a very high-ranking Moroccan government official,  and as such, is1
an agent of Morocco.
Applicant traveled to Morocco in at least 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2002 to visit his family. He
communicates with his mother every three to four weeks by telephone, and with his siblings once
a month by telephone.
In a written statement he gave to the OPM in October 2004, applicant stated he owned a “plot
of farm land” in Morocco. In his response to the SOR, he stated he no longer owns any property in
Morocco.
 
3
I take administrative notice of the following:
1. Morocco, located in North Africa, is a constitutional monarchy, wherein ultimate power
resides with the King, who may, at his discretion, terminate the tenure of any minister, dissolve the
Parliament, call for new elections, or rule by decree. The King is the head of the military and the
religious leader of the majority Sunni Moslem population. Morocco is recognized as a moderate
Arab state. United States-Moroccan relations, characterized by mutual respect and friendship, have
remained strong through cooperation and sustained high-level dialogue.(Background Note Morocco,
U.S. Department of State, July 2006; Government Document for Administrative Notice I.)
2. Morocco considers all persons born to Moroccan fathers to be Moroccan citizens. In
addition to being subject to all Moroccan laws, United States citizens who possess the nationality
of Morocco may be subject to other laws that impose special obligations on citizens of that country.
(Government Document for Administrative Notice II.)
3. In May 2003, Moroccan suicide bombers affiliated with the Salafiya Jihadiya movement
attacked sites in Casablanca, killing 45 people. Subsequently, Moroccan authorities arrested seven
individuals from a Salafiya Jihadiya cell suspected of planning further attacks in that country.
Authorities linked these seven individuals to six Moroccans whom Algerian authorities had returned
to Morocco after their arrest while training with militants from the Algerian terrorist group GSPC.
Later that year, Moroccan authorities dismantled a 17 member incipient terrorist network that was
linked to small terrorist groups in Iraq. Moroccan-born extremists were implicated in the March 2004
train blasts in Madrid. The potential for violence against American interests and citizens remains
high in Morocco. (Consular Information Sheet, Morocco, U.S. Department of State, January 2007;
Government Document for Administrative Notice II.) (Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, U.S.
Department of State, April 2006; Government Document for Administrative Notice III.)
 
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence establishes that applicant’s mother and nine siblings are citizens of Morocco,
and that his mother and seven of his siblings reside in Morocco. The evidence further establishes that
one of applicant’s siblings is a very high-ranking government official, and thus an agent of Morocco.
 
A Guideline B concern exists when an individual seeking a favorable trustworthiness
determination is bound by ties of affection, influence, or obligation to immediate family in a foreign
country. A person who places a high value on family obligations or fidelity to relationships in
another country may be vulnerable to duress by the intelligence service of the foreign country or by
agents or residents from that country engaged in industrial espionage, terrorism or other criminal
activity. The more faithful an individual is to family ties and obligations, the more likely the chance
that the ties might be exploited to the detriment of the United States. Having an immediate family
member occupy a high-ranking position in another country only heightens the risk.
The application of disqualifying conditions under Guideline B is not limited to countries
hostile to the United States. ISCR Case No. 02-18668 at 4 (App. Bd. Feb. 10, 2004.) The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding sensitive information from persons,
organizations, or countries not authorized to have access to it, even if their interests are not opposed
to those of the United States. Moreover, history has demonstrated that individuals have wrongfully
 In his 2004 written statement to the OPM, applicant claimed he remains a Moroccan2
citizen because Moroccan government policy prohibits the renunciation of Moroccan citizenship
in situations like his.
In his 2004 written statement to the OPM, he stated, “I do understand my rights,3
privileges and obligations to both the United States and Morocco.”
 As noted in the Findings of Fact, Morocco considers all persons born to Moroccan4
fathers to be Moroccan citizens. Accordingly, the Moroccan government still considers applicant
to be a Moroccan citizen. This means that while in Morocco, applicant may be subject to other
4
passed sensitive information to countries not hostile to the United States, and terrorist acts against
the United States and its allies have been carried out by individuals residing in or citizens of
countries not hostile to the United States. Applicant's case requires the recognition that international
terrorist groups are operating in Morocco and the surrounding region. American citizens with
immediate family members who are citizens and residents of Morocco could be vulnerable to
coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
The facts of this case require application of Disqualifying Conditions E2.A2.1.2.1 (an
immediate family member . . . is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country),
E2.A2.1.2.3 (relatives . . . who are connected with any foreign government), and E2.A2.1.2.6.
(conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a
foreign government).
An applicant may mitigate foreign influence security concerns by demonstrating that foreign
family members are not agents of a foreign power and are not in a position to be exploited by a
foreign power in a way that could force an applicant to choose between loyalty to the foreign family
members and loyalty to the United States. (Mitigating Condition E2.A2.1.3.1.)  Since applicant’s
brother is a high-ranking agent of the Moroccan government, this mitigating condition is not
applicable.
An applicant may also mitigate foreign influence security concerns if he shows his contacts
and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent. (Mitigating Condition
E2.A2.1.3.3.)  In view of applicant’s regular and frequent contact with his mother and siblings, this
mitigating condition is not applicable.
In reaching my decision in this case, I have also considered the factors set forth in Section
E2.2 of the Directive. On balance, they do not help applicant. Applicant has lived in the United
States for many years, married a native-born American, and has worked and raised his two children
here. These are factors in his favor. However, he is still a Moroccan citizen,  which leaves him2
connected to, and is some respects obligated to, Morocco.  He voluntarily maintains close and3
regular contact with his immediate family members in Morocco, one of whom is a very high-ranking
Moroccan official. This close contact includes trips to Morocco every two to three years. These trips
significantly increase his vulnerability to foreign influence, particularly since he is a citizen of
Morocco.   In view of the foregoing, Guideline B is found against applicant.4
laws that impose special obligations on citizens of that country.
5
There is nothing in the evidence that suggests applicant is not a loyal American citizen and
a credit to his adopted country. Applicant's allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are not at issue in these
proceedings. Therefore, nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest I have based this
decision, in whole or in part, on any express or implied decision as to applicant's allegiance, loyalty,
or patriotism. He simply was unable to put forward evidence that could mitigate the security
concerns discussed herein and demonstrate that he would not be vulnerable to foreign influence that
would result in the compromise of sensitive information.
FORMAL FINDINGS
GUIDELINE B: AGAINST THE APPLICANT
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to make or continue a determination of trustworthiness, suitability and
eligibility for applicant to hold a sensitive Information Systems Position.
____________________________
Joseph Testan
Administrative Judge