DATE: October 24, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-18918
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARC E. CURRY
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Richard A. Stevens, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant’s potential vulnerability to coercion through his relatives who are Iranian citizens
and residents generates a security concern. Upon analyzing his strong character and his longstanding
ties to the United States, in tandem with the fact that he previously overcame intimidation and
coercion from the Iranian government, I conclude he has mitigated the security concern. Clearance
is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tr. 50.1
See generally, Hearing Exhibits I-VIII.2
Tr. 69.3
2
On May 11, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued Applicant
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) explaining why it was not clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue a security clearance. This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, dated
February 20, 1960, as amended, and DoD Directive 5220.6, dated January 2, 1992, as amended. He
answered the SOR on May 22, 2007, admitting Paragraphs 1 and 2, denying Paragraphs 3 and 4, and
requesting a hearing.
The case was assigned to me on July 23, 2007. On August 14, 2007, DOHA issued a notice
of hearing scheduling it for September 12, 2007. During the hearing, I received five government
exhibits, two Applicant exhibits, and the testimony of two Applicant witnesses. At the close of the
hearing, I left the record open through September 26, 2007 to allow Applicant to submit additional
exhibits. That day, he submitted two additional exhibits that I incorporated into the record. DOHA
received the transcript on September 20, 2007.
RULINGS ON EVIDENCE
At the hearing, department counsel moved to withdraw the allegations under Paragraph 3 of
the SOR, and I granted the motion.  Also, at department counsel’s request, I took administrative1
notice of  several relevant adjudicative facts about Iran. They are as follows:
1. Iran is hostile to the interests of the United States, and the State Department has designated
it as a state sponsor of terrorism;
2. Iran is attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction;
3. Iran has an abysmal human rights record. The abuses include summary executions, lack
of fair public trials, arbitrary arrest and detention, and severe restrictions on civil liberties including
speech, press assembly, association, movement, and privacy; and,
4. Iranian security forces have at times monitored the social activities of its citizens, entered
homes and offices, monitored phone conversations, and opened mail without court authorization.2
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The SOR admissions are incorporated into the findings of fact. In addition, I make the
following findings of fact.
Applicant is a 41-year-old divorced man with no children. He was born in Iran and emigrated
to the U.S. in 1993 after living in Germany for six years. He has been a naturalized U.S. citizen since
1998. He is a personal protection officer.   He is undergoing a security clearance investigation as part3
Tr. 85.4
Tr. 71.5
Tr. 109.6
Tr. 108.7
Tr. 109.8
Tr. 33.9
Tr. 101.10
Tr. 31.11
Tr. 101.12
Tr. 33.13
Tr. 34.14
Tr. 104. The charges were ultimately dismissed.15
Tr. 105-106.16
Tr. 106.17
3
of his application for a job as a translator.  He earned an associate’s degree in economics from an4
Iranian university in 1986.5
Applicant’s father was a high-ranking officer in the Iranian army under the Shah’s regime.6
He retired in the early 1970s.  After the 1979 revolution, his family was harassed by extremists who7
spray painted death threats on the walls of their home. The harassment grew so severe that they had
to separate for their safety and seek “secure and secret place[s] to survive.”  Approximately a year8
later, the revolutionary fervor subsided, allowing them to reunite.9
From 1984 to 1986, Applicant served as an infantryman in the Iranian army.  At the time, the10
country was at war with Iraq, and military service was mandatory.  While in the Army, Applicant11
was involved in front-line combat.12
Applicant returned home in 1986 after he completed his military service. Shortly thereafter,
he was charged with leaving the military without returning his weapon, and was jailed. The charges
were false. The government manufactured them because of his family background, and because
Applicant “was not agreeing with their politics.”13
According to Applicant, gun violations in Iran are capital crimes.  His uncle, an Iranian14
equivalent of a local district attorney, managed to get him released from jail while the charges were
pending.  Applicant then fled the country, crossing the border into Turkey overnight on a donkey.15 16
Once Applicant reached Turkey, he caught a plane bound for Germany, where a distant
relative lived. Shortly after arriving, Germany granted him political asylum.  The entire episode,17
Tr. 105.18
Tr. 72.19
He had previously studied martial arts while living in Iran. 20
Tr. 73.21
Tr. 119.22
Exhibit 1, Security Clearance Application, dated October 14, 2004, at 2-3; Exhibit A, Reference Letter of23
Former Supervisor, dated September 1, 2007.
Tr. 119.24
Tr. 118.25
Exhibit D, Supervisor’s Reference Letter, dated April 29, 2007.26
Exhibit D.27
Tr. 63.28
4
beginning with his flight from Iran to the granting of political asylum, took two to three months.
Applicant feared that his life would have been in jeopardy if he had to return to Iran.
 
Throughout the process, he was assisted by a smuggler whom he paid $3,000.  His family18
helped him accumulate the money by selling much of their personal valuables.19
While living in Germany, Applicant earned a black belt in kickboxing.  He then started20
working various jobs in security at several night clubs, and eventually became a professional
bodyguard.21
Applicant emigrated to the United States in 1993. In 1994, after four months of specialized
training, he obtained a professional bodyguard’s license.  Since that time, he has worked several22
stints as a professional bodyguard, in addition to other related occupations such as private
investigations and hotel security. Over the years, he has taken extensive continuing education courses23
in order to retain his bodyguard’s license.  In addition to his professional bodyguard’s license, he is24
licensed to carry firearms in 35 states.25
Applicant has worked for the same company since 2003. He was recently promoted to director
of personal protection.  Also, he works as a firearm instructor for a subsidiary company.26 27
Applicant is highly respected on the job and in his community. A character witness who is a
police officer testified at the hearing. Having observed Applicant in his professional capacity when
they worked together on a part-time security enforcement job, and in his personal capacity as a
longtime friend, he described him as a “man of honor . . .whose greatest mission is to serve the
U.S.”  Among the former employers who praised his professionalism include a retired special agent28
Exhibit A.29
Exhibit B. The former supervisor did not elaborate upon which agency he worked as a personnel security30
specialist.
Id.31
Tr. 93.32
Tr. 96.33
Tr. 97.34
Tr. 116.35
Exhibit 1 at 5.36
Tr. 113.37
Tr. 110.38
Tr. 112.39
Tr. 112.40
Tr. 113.41
5
with the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Internal Affairs,  and a former personnel security29
specialist.30
Applicant’s parents and two of his sisters live in Iran. He has not seen them since he fled Iran
in 1987.  Applicant’s relationship with his father is strained.  They do not correspond, and have only31 32
talked with one another once in the past five years.  Applicant is close to his mother. He considers33
her a friend, and talks with her once a week.  His parents have been separated for approximately 1034
to 15 years.
Applicant’s sisters living in Iran are both homemakers. He talks to them every two to four
months.  He has another sister. She is a citizen and resident of the Netherlands. He visited her in the35
Netherlands approximately two years ago.  Currently, he talks to her a few times per week.  There36 37
is no record evidence of when she emigrated from Iran.
Applicant has one brother. He is a citizen and resident of the Netherlands. He emigrated there
from Iran in 2001. In the ten years before he left Iran, he worked in law enforcement.  He exclusively38
focused on drug interdiction. He was an honest agent working in a corrupt system.  Fearing39
retribution against him by drug lords or other corrupt officials, he sought asylum in the Netherlands.40
Applicant traveled to the Netherlands to visit his brother in approximately 2001. Although he has not
seen him since then, he talks to him “a couple of times a week.”41
Exhibit 2 at 8.42
Id.43
Answer.44
Tr. 42.45
Tr. 78.46
ISCR Case No. 03-12882 (App. Bd. July 20, 2005).47
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Applicant has no financial interests in Iran.  He does not receive a pension from Iran for his42
service in the Iranian military.43
Applicant did not disclose that he had a brother and sister living in the Netherlands, as
required on his security clearance application. He did not have their addresses at the time he
submitted the application.  When he obtained the information, he provided the information to a44
security clearance investigator.  He listed all his other relatives, disclosed his service in the Iranian45
military, and disclosed his father’s prior service as a high-ranking officer in the Iranian army.
Approximately two years after emigrating to the United States, Applicant legally changed his
name. He adopted an Americanized name to “honor the custom and culture of the country.”46
POLICIES
The adjudicative guidelines, as revised December 29, 2005, and implemented September 1,
2006, apply to the analysis of this case. In addition to brief introductory explanations for each
guideline, they are divided into those that may be considered in deciding whether to deny or revoke
an individual’s eligibility for access to classified information (disqualifying conditions) and those that
may be considered in deciding whether to grant an individual’s eligibility for access to classified
information (mitigating conditions).
The mere presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not dispositive of
a case.  Instead, their analysis is part of a broader adjudicative process which involves the47
consideration of all available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and
unfavorable. 
As part of this process, a number of variables known as the “whole person concept” must be
evaluated. Specifically these are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of
the conduct; (4) the age of the applicant; (5) the extent to which the participation is voluntary; (6) the
presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for
the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of
continuation or recurrence.
Since the protection of national security is the paramount consideration, the final decision in
each case must be reached by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance is “clearly
See generally, Directive, Sec. 2.3, Sec. 2.5.3, Sec. 3.2, and Sec. 4.2.48
Adjudicative Guideline (AG) Paragraph 9.49
AG Paragraph 6.50
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consistent with the national interest.”  In reaching this decision, I have drawn only those conclusions48
that are based on the evidence contained in the record.
The government is responsible for presenting evidence to establish facts in the SOR that have
been controverted. The applicant is responsible for presenting evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by the government, and has the ultimate burden
of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security decision.
CONCLUSIONS
Foreign Preference
“When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over
the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are
harmful to the interests of the United States.”  Here, Applicant’s service in the Iranian Army in the49
mid - 1980s triggers the application of Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition 10(a)(2): exercise
of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through
the foreign citizenship of a family member [including] military service or a willingness to bear arms
for a foreign country.
Applicant’s Iranian military service was compulsory, and occurred before he emigrated to the
United States. Foreign Preference Mitigating Condition 11(c): exercise of the rights, privileges, or
obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the
individual was a minor, applies.
Foreign Influence
“Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or
coercion by any foreign interest.”  Here, Applicant’s contacts with his parents and two sisters50
residing in Iran and his two siblings residing in the Netherlands raise the issue of whether Foreign
Influence Disqualifying Condition (FI DC) 7 a): contact with a foreign family member, business or
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or a resident in a foreign country
if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion, applies. Although friendly countries can engage in activities involving coercion,
persuasion or duress of an individual to gather classified information as readily as hostile countries,
ISCR Case No. 02-04786 (App. Bd. June 27, 2003, at 5).51
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the risk of such activity is heightened with hostile countries because such countries are “not likely to
have scruples about pressuring one of its citizens” to obtain classified information.  51
Iran is both intensely authoritarian and hostile to the United States. Consequently, FI DC 7(a)
applies to Applicant’s relationship with his family members who are citizens and residents of Iran.
Conversely, no record evidence exists of either any enmity between the Netherlands and the
U.S. or any deprivation of human rights of the Dutch people by its government. FI DC 7(a) does not
apply to Applicant’s relationship with his sister living in the Netherlands. Although Applicant’s
brother was previously a special agent in Iran before emigrating to the Netherlands, his work was
limited to drug interdiction. Moreover, he quit the job more than six years ago, and sought asylum
in the Netherlands out of disgust for his home country. Under these circumstances, FI DC 7(a) does
not apply to Applicant’s relationship with his brother, either.
Applicant’s father’s position in the Shah’s regime placed himself and his family at risk after
the 1979 revolution. Later, it served as an underlying factor leading to the false weapons charge
against Applicant in the mid-1980s. Consequently, although they are estranged, Applicant’s father’s
status with the former regime and the history of persecution continue to create a risk of coercion.
Foreign Influence Mitigating Condition (FC MC) 8(a): the nature of the relationships with foreign
persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons
in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to
choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the
interests of the U.S., does not apply to Applicant’s relationship with his father.
Applicant’s family experienced persecution after the 1979 revolution, and the government
remains extraordinarily repressive. Consequently, FC MC 8(a) is also inapplicable to Applicant’s
relationship with his mother and sisters living in Iran. The infrequent, casual nature of Applicant’s
communication with his sisters could conceivably trigger the application of FC MC 8(c): contact or
communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it
could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. However, their contact is not casual and
infrequent enough to overcome the risk of coercion posed by the Iranian government in light of its
uniquely hostile and repressive nature.
Applicant has lived in the U.S. for more than 12 years. To acknowledge his profound
appreciation for American culture and ideals, he legally changed his name, adopting an Americanized
one. His closest friend, the police officer who testified at the hearing, is a U.S. citizen. FC MC 8(b):
there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest, applies.
Personal Conduct
“Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to
comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness
AG Paragraph 15.52
ISCR Case No.  03-09053 (App. Bd. March 29, 2006 at 5).53
See ISCR Case No. 01-26893 (App. Bd. October 16, 2002).54
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and ability to protect classified information.”  Here, Applicant’s omission of his siblings living in52
the Netherlands from his 2004 security clearance application raises the issue of whether Personal
Conduct Disqualifying Condition 16 (a): deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant
facts from any personnel security questionnaire, applies. Given that Applicant listed his service in
the Iranian army, his father’s status in the Shah’s government, and his relatives living in Iran, I
conclude that his explanation for not listing his two siblings in the Netherlands was credible. PC DC
16(a) does not apply.
Whole Person Concept
Applicant is potentially vulnerable to coercion by the Iranian government through his relatives
living in Iran. His emphatic statement that he would not succumb to such coercion does not trigger
the applicability of FC MC 8 (a). Because an analysis of the potentially applicable mitigating
conditions is merely one component of the security suitability analysis, however, his statement must
be evaluated further in the broader context of the whole person concept. 
According to the Appeal Board, “an applicant’s stated intention about what he or she might
do in the future under some hypothetical set of circumstances is merely a statement of intention that
is not entitled to much weight, unless there is record evidence that the applicant has acted in a similar
manner in the past.”  Here, Applicant has acted in a similar manner in the past. When he considered53
fleeing Iran in 1987, he was keenly aware, as one who had previously experienced persecution by the
Iranian government, of the potentially fatal consequences to himself and his family if he failed. This
neither deterred him from fleeing nor his family from helping him. In this context, Applicant’s
statement that he would not succumb to any future pressure from the Iranian government is entitled
to significant weight.
In weighing Applicant’s statement in this manner, I am in no way implying that the
government must wait until the Iranian government threatens him or his family, then see how he
responds to such threats.  Rather, I have evaluated it in conjunction with a number of other positive54
factors including his courage, character, credibility, professional competence, and longstanding ties
to the U.S. When viewed together, these positive factors outweigh the security concerns generated
by the presence of his immediate family members in Iran. I conclude he has carried the burden.
Clearance is granted.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Paragraph 1 - Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 2 – Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
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Subparagraphs 1.a-1.f: For Applicant
Paragraph 3 - Guideline F: WITHDRAWN
Paragraph 4 - Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraph 4.a: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.
Marc E. Curry
Administrative Judge