KEYWORD: Foreign Preference; Foreign Influence
DIGEST: Applicant is 58 years old and came to the U.S. in 1976 with her husband and son from
Iran. In 1985 they all became U.S. citizens. She has returned to Iran three times using an Iranian
passport. She has returned her passport to Iran and renounced her Iranian citizenship. She has no
family or friends or financial interests in Iran. All of her brothers and sisters and mother live in the
U.S. and are U.S. citizens. She is a successful business woman who started her own business. She
has successfully mitigated the security concerns raised under Guideline C, Foreign Preference, and
Guideline B, Foreign Influence. Clearance is granted. 
CASENO: 07-00894.h1
DATE: 10/03/2007
DATE:  October 3, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-00894
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CAROL G. RICCIARDELLO
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Alison O'Connell, Esq., Department Counsel
Richard Stevens, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Sheldon I. Cohen, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
AE O, P and Q.1
2
Applicant is 58 years old and came to the U.S. in 1976 with her husband and son from Iran.
In 1985 they all became U.S. citizens. She has returned to Iran three times using an Iranian passport.
She has returned her passport to Iran and renounced her Iranian citizenship. She has no family or
friends or financial interests in Iran. All of her brothers and sisters and mother live in the U.S. and
are U.S. citizens. She is a successful business woman who started her own business. She has
successfully mitigated the security concerns raised under Guideline C, Foreign Preference, and
Guideline B, Foreign Influence. Clearance is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant a security clearance
for Applicant. DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on July 11, 2007, detailing the basis for
its preliminary decision–security concerns raised under Guideline C (foreign preference) and
Guideline B (foreign influence). This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified, Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Jan.
2. 1992), as amended and modified (Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines approved
by the President on December 29, 2005, and implemented effective September 1, 2006 (Guidelines).
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on July 19, 2007, and elected to have a hearing before an
administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on August 16, 2007. With the consent of the
parties, and to accommodate their schedules, I convened a hearing on September 17, 2007, to
consider whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant a security clearance for
Applicant. The Government offered five exhibits for admission into the record, marked as GE 1-5.
The exhibits were admitted into evidence without objections. The Government also offered for
administrative notice HE I-IX. Applicant objected to HE IX as being argumentative. I took
administrative notice of HE I-VIII. I did not take administrative notice of HE IX, because it was
merely a summary of information included within all of the other HE exhibits. Applicant testified
on her behalf in addition to three witnesses, and offered 24 exhibits, marked as AE A-X. The
exhibits were admitted into evidence without objections. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.)
on September 25, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant’s admissions to the allegations in the SOR are incorporated herein. In addition,
after a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following
findings of fact.
Applicant is a 58-year-old woman who came to the U.S. from Iran with her husband in 1976
so they could complete their education. Both earned bachelor’s degrees in Iran and master’s degrees
from U.S. universities. Applicant earned a second bachelor’s degree in the U.S.  They each have1
completed the course study for their PhDs, but not their dissertations. Applicant intends to complete
Tr. 118.2
Tr. 30-31.3
Tr. 4.4
Tr. 121.5
Tr. 121-122.6
Tr. 130.7
AE H, I, J, K, L, M, and N; Tr. 123-131.8
AE R; Tr. 131-132.9
The information in this paragraph is at Tr. 36-43, 137-142.10
Tr. 46-47.11
Tr. 35.12
3
her PhD in the future.  Her husband is 64 years old and has worked as an accountant, in professorial2
positions and in senior administration positions for a state university for 26 years.  They have been3
married since 1970 and have one son, who was born in the Iran. He has a Ph.D., is a neuroscientist,
and is married and living in the U.S.  Applicant, her husband, and their son became naturalized U.S.4
citizens in October 1985. Applicant is a first time applicant for a security clearance.
Applicant worked in the registrar’s office at a U.S. university from 1979 until 1989.  She left5
in 1989 and was self-employed as a consultant to a bank as an information systems analyst until
2000.  From 1990 to 1998 she taught engineering courses at the university where she was formally6
employed.  In 2000, she started her own company and is the owner, president and chief executive7
officer. Her company employs eight people.  In 2004 she was certified to teach courses in a8
neighboring state’s university system.9
Applicant’s husband’s parents are deceased. He has a brother living in the U.S. who is a
naturalized U.S. citizen. The only family he has remaining in Iran are two sisters. Applicant and her
husband have been estranged from the sisters since their wedding day in 1970 when a family
disagreement occurred. Neither Applicant nor her husband has had any communication with them
since their wedding day. Prior to Applicant’s mother-in-law’s death in 2005, she would advise them
about the sisters’ well being. Since her death, neither Applicant or her husband has learned anything
about them, nor have they sought any information about them. They do not know if they are still
living. There remains a bitter estrangement and neither Applicant or her husband has had any contact
with them in the past nor do they intend to in the future. Since her husband’s mother’s death they
have not been in contact with his brother. Her husband has no other living relatives in Iran.  Her10
husband’s family supported the pre-1979 regime and after the revolution three of his family
members were executed, two within 48 hours of each other.  Her husband has not returned to Iran11
since coming to the U.S. in 1976 and has no intentions of ever returning.  He has not held an Iranian12
passport since becoming a U.S. citizen. He has not maintained any contacts with anyone in Iran.
Tr. 134-136.13
Tr. 142.14
Tr. 142-144.15
Id.16
Tr. 145.17
Tr. 246. There was a great deal of confusion as to when Applicant went to the ISIR to assist her father.18
Applicant repeatedly was confusing 1998 and 1988 and some of the testimony interchanged 1998 and 1988. Although
she would firmly state one date, she would then confuse it with the other. I do not find she was untruthful or not credible,
but rather she genuinely and unintentionally confused the dates, thereby making it confusing for everyone.
Tr. 256.19
4
Applicant has four sisters and two brothers who are all naturalized U.S. citizens living in the
U.S.  Her mother is 82 years old and a naturalized U.S. citizen living in the U.S. Her father was a13
naturalized U.S. citizen and died in 2006. He is buried in the U.S. She has no immediate family
living in Iran.14
In 1988 Applicant obtained an Iranian passport so she could bring her father into the U.S.
as a permanent resident.  She was not permitted to do the paperwork through the Interests Section15
of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Embassy of Pakistan (ISIR) without a valid Iranian passport.16
This is the office that a U.S. citizen must use because there are no diplomatic ties with Iran. She did
not use the passport for travel at that time, but only to assist her father in coming to the U.S.17
In 1998, Applicant’s father wanted to return to Iran to retrieve family heirlooms of
sentimental value that were in storage.  They had to go to the ISIR. She could not gain entry to ISIR18
unless she had a valid Iranian passport. Applicant accompanied her father to the ISIR because his
language skills were limited. She filled out the application to renew her expired Iranian passport.
She stated she listed her citizenship as U.S. A special stamp was required on all Iranian passports
to enter and exit Iran. Her father never returned because he became ill with cancer before he could
begin the trip.  She did not use the Iranian passport at this time. 19
Applicant renewed her Iranian passport to travel to Iran in 2002. She did not think she could
travel on a U.S. passport. Her father was ill with cancer and his brother was tragically killed in a car
accident. Her father wanted to go to the funeral in Iran, but due to his health Applicant volunteered
to be the family representative who would accompany her mother to attend the funeral. Her other
siblings all had jobs or contracts with the U.S. government or had children to care for that made it
more difficult for them to make the trip. Her parents were devastated by the death and it was not
feasible for her elderly mother to travel alone. Applicant needed her Iranian passport to enter Iran.
She exited the U.S. on her U.S. passport and entered Iran on her Iranian passport. They planned to
stay in Iran for 40 days to observe the culturally regimented grieving process and religious
observances. They stayed for approximately three to four weeks and left early because her mother
became ill. Applicant commented that her mother is Muslim; however Applicant does not follow
The information in this paragraph is at Tr. 145-150,198-199.20
Tr. 200-202.21
Tr. 45, 153, 203.22
AE F and G are documents verifying Applicant’s dental treatment and their translations.23
The information in this paragraph is at Tr. 154-162, 204-207..24
5
that faith, but follows her heart. She did not reconnect with any relatives other than to observe the
customs associated with the funeral.  20
In October/November 2004, Applicant returned to Iran for dental surgery. She had her
Iranian passport stamped again and it was not renewed, but rather the validity of the passport was
extended.  She had dental problems and was told by her U.S. dentist that the implant procedures21
that were required were considerably less expensive in Iran. Her dentist in the U.S. recommended
a U.S.-trained Iranian dentist in Iran. Applicant explained she needed five dental implants. The cost
of the implants in the U.S. were approximately $3,000 to $3,800 per tooth, costing approximately
$15,000-$19,000 for the whole procedure. The same dental procedures in Iran would cost
approximately $1,800, plus travel expenses.  22
Through her dentist in the U.S. she was provided the name of Dr. M in Iran. She had
obtained Dr. M’s name from Dr. D who is an Iranian born gynecologist in the U.S. It was Dr. D’s
brother Dr. X who was the dentist in Iran who worked with Dr. M who would perform the surgery.
Applicant contacted Dr. M’s office in Iran and made arrangements to have the surgery done in Iran.
She used her frequent flyer miles to travel to Iran. She did not have any difficulty entering the
country on her Iranian passport. She had the surgery and stayed at a hotel afterwards.  Dr. X’s wife23
learned Applicant was recuperating in a hotel by herself and provided her comfort with food. Neither
Applicant or Dr. X’s wife were acquainted with each other prior to this trip. Dr. X’s wife also
insisted that Applicant stay in their home during her convalescence, which Applicant accepted. She
stayed with them approximately two weeks. She did not pay them for their hospitality. She traveled
to the clinic by private taxi every other day for two weeks. She did not go anywhere else, but stayed
in bed. Due to the bruising and the necessity to ensure Applicant had healed properly from the
surgery, Dr. M determined it would be a mistake to finish the procedure on this trip. She had no
contact with the Iranian government. She did not contact her estranged sisters-in-law while in Iran
or any other distant relative.  24
In May 2005 Applicant returned to Iran to complete the dental procedure. Again she did not
have difficulty entering Iran on her Iranian passport. She stayed in Iran for three weeks and the
dental procedure was completed. While there she stayed in a hotel for two weeks and in Dr. X’s
home for one week. She did not have any contact with any of her distant relatives. She maintained
some contact with Dr. X’s wife in 2006 on a monthly basis, but has not had contact with her this
year. Applicant visited Dr. X’s wife once while she was visiting her relatives in the U.S. They had
dinner at a restaurant. Applicant thought it was the appropriate thing to do because of the hospitality
Tr. 217.25
Tr. 217-218.26
Tr. 162-164.27
AE E; GE 4 contains the postal receipt verifying the ISIR received Applicant’s Iranian passport. Tr.219-221.28
The information in this paragraph is at Tr. 169-170.29
GE 4.30
Tr. 220-221.31
AE X.32
Tr. 52-53.33
Tr. 224.34
Tr. 47-51, 78-85, 109-112.35
Id.36
Id.37
6
she had extended.  She has had no further contact and no plans to see her in the future.  She also25 26
had some contact with Dr. M after her final check up in 2005 as follow-up to her surgery and to
ensure there were no dental or medical issues with her teeth implants. 27
When Applicant renewed her Iranian passport and traveled to Iran she was unaware that her
actions could have future security clearance implications. Apparently, whenever she made a trip to
Iran, the ISIR required a special stamp validating her passport. She has unconditionally renounced
her Iranian citizenship and returned her passport to the ISIR.  She admitted that her renunciation28
was to ease the process to get a security clearance and also that she no longer needs her passport.
She testified that by returning her passport and renouncing her citizenship in Iran she can never
return there. She is certain her name is on a list that would cause her problems if she attempted to
return to Iran. She has permanently severed all ties with Iran.  She provided the postal return receipt29
verifying the ISIR received her passport.  She has not received any acknowledgment from them.30 31
Applicant and her husband have estimated assets in the U.S. of approximately $10 million
dollars.  They own a house in the U.S. valued at $1.25 million.  They have no assets in Iran.  32 33 34
Applicant has a reputation as a very helpful person with a big heart. Her husband would often
ask her to help Iranian foreign students, especially females with personal questions as they were
attempting to adapt culturally to the U.S.  She would not only assist with educational advice, but35
also personal advice. She is viewed as a mentor to these foreign students. She is very giving of her
time and experience.  She was often asked to do the same when she was working at the registrar’s36
office of the university where she worked. She would serve as a translator and a mentor. She was
not paid for her services, but did it voluntarily.  She would sometimes prepare ethnic food for the37
Tr. 176.38
Id.39
HE IV at 1; HE III at 7.40
HE III at 7.41
HE I at 20.42
He III at 7; HE VII.43
HE VII at 2.44
HE IV.45
7
students to make them feel at home and help them not to be home sick.  After the tragedy of38
September 11, 2001, the number of Iranian students diminished and she did not have as much
opportunity to help.  She is considered honest, trustworthy, and a warm individual who truly wants39
to help others. 
Iran is a constitutional Islamic republic with a theocratic system of government in which
Shi’a Muslim clergy dominate the key power structures, and ultimate political authority is vested
in a learned religious scholar.  The U.S. has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since 1980.  The40 41
President’s National Security Strategy has stated that the United States “may face no greater
challenge from a single country than from Iran.”42
The U.S. Government has defined the areas of objectionable Iranian behavior as:
• Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
• Its support for and involvement in international terrorism;
• Its support for violent opposition to the Middle East peace process; 
• Its dismal human rights record; and
• Iran’s intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq.43
The U.S. has designated and characterized Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism.
Iran provides critical support to non-state terrorist groups.  44
The government of Iran has committed numerous, serious human rights abuses against the
Iranian people. Abuses include political killings and incarceration; summary executions, including
of minors; disappearances; religious persecution; torture; arbitrary arrest and detention, including
prolonged solitary confinement; denial of due process; severe restrictions on civil liberties-speech,
press, assembly, association, movement and privacy; severe restrictions on freedom of religion;
official corruption; violence and legal and societal discrimination against women, ethnic and
religious minorities, and homosexuals; trafficking in persons; and child labor.  45
The State Department continues to warn U.S. citizens to consider carefully the risks of travel
to Iran. The children of Iranian citizens are considered Iranian citizens by Iranian authorities, since
HE VIII.46
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).47
Id. at 527.48
Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960). 49
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).50
Id.51
Id.; Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ E2.2.2.52
Executive Order 10865 § 7.53
See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.54
See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.55
8
Iran does not recognize dual citizenship. As a result, U.S.-Iranian dual citizens have been detained
and harassed by the Iranian government.  46
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  As Commander in Chief, the President has47
“the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national security and to determine
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee48
to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of49
demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations should50
err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should51
be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.  The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a52
determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the applicant has not53
met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a
clearance.54
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal
or professional history of the applicant which disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information.  “Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but55
See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3rd 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).56
See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996)57
See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.58
ISCR Case No. 01-207000 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002)59
Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see Guidelines ¶ 2(b).60
Id. at ¶ 9.61
9
less than a preponderance.”  The Guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between56
proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.57
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the
burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  An applicant “as58
the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue his security clearance.”  “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must,59
on the side of denial.”60
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those
which would mitigate security concerns, pertaining to the adjudicative guidelines are set forth and
discussed in the conclusions below.
CONCLUSIONS
I have carefully considered all the facts in evidence and the legal standards discussed above.
I reach the following conclusions regarding the allegations in the SOR.
Based upon consideration of the evidence, I find the following adjudicative guidelines most
pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case:
Foreign Preference
Foreign Preference is a security concern when an individual acts in such a way as to indicate
a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.61
Based on all of the evidence I have considered Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition
(FP DC) 10(a) (exercise of any right, privilege or obligation, of foreign citizenship after becoming
a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member; This includes but is not limited
to (1) possession of a foreign passport…) and FC DC 10(b) (action to acquire or obtain recognition
of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen). Appellant is recognized as a citizen of Iran because
she was born there. After becoming a U.S. citizen she obtained an Iranian passport and traveled to
Iran three times on it. I find both disqualifying conditions apply.
10
I have considered all the Foreign Preference Mitigating Conditions (FP MC). I especially
considered FP MC 11(a) (dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign
country), FP MC 11(b) (the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship),
FP MC 11(c) (exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before
the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor), and FP MC 11(e) (the
passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise
invalidated). Appellant is considered a citizen by Iran because she was born there. However, she
also acknowledged her citizenship by obtaining and validating her Iranian passport after she became
a U.S. citizen. So her citizenship is not based solely on her birth, but also by her latter actions of
using her Iranian birth to obtain an Iranian passport. I find FP MC 11(a) does not apply. It is
important to note that Applicant renewed and validated her Iranian passport for strictly personal
reasons that were not in any way political. She did so to accommodate her elderly father so he could
return to Iran, although she never used it for that purpose. She used it to assist her mother to attend
a funeral there. Finally, she did so for her own personal reasons for dental treatment that was more
affordable there. By virtue of using her Iranian passport she was afforded entry into the country with
no difficulty, thereby exercising rights and privileges afforded citizens of Iran. Therefore, I find FP
MC 11(c) does not apply.
Applicant was unaware of the issues related to having a foreign passport after becoming a
U.S. citizen and on her security clearance application. She has since unconditionally renounced her
Iranian citizenship and returned her passport to the ISIR. She believes she will never be permitted
to return to Iran again because she will be on a list by the government and it will be unsafe for her
to be there. She has no future intentions to return to Iran. She does not believe she will need to go
back for any family reasons, because all of her family are in the U.S. She returned to Iran for dental
treatment, but at the time had not applied for a security clearance. All of the people of Iranian
descent that she currently has contact with are naturalized U.S. citizens and not an issue regardless
of where the contact occurred. The contact she had with her dentist and Dr. X’s wife has ceased.
Applicant has done all she can to prove she does not have a preference for Iran nor consider herself
a dual citizen. I find FP MC 11(b) and (e) apply.
Foreign Influence
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person,
group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure
or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the
identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including,
but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
I have considered all of the Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) and
especially FI DC 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion), FI DC
7(b) (connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict
of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and
the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information),
FI DC 7(d) (sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that
11
relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion),
and FI DC 7(e) (a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any
foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk
of foreign influence or exploitation). Applicant had contact in 2004 and 2005 with her dentist in Iran.
She also had contact with Dr. X’s wife for a period of time in 2006.She and her husband have had
no contact with his sisters in more than 37 years. Neither have any friends or family with living in
Iran with whom they have contact. I have considered all of the disqualifying conditions and
conclude none apply. However, in an abundance of caution I will address the contacts in a broad
overview. 
There is no indication that Applicant’s contact with Dr. X’s wife created a heightened risk
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion. There is also no indication
that these connections created a potential conflict of interest. The connection to the dentist was
strictly professional and ended when her treatment ended. Her connection to Dr. X’s wife was
personal, but it was merely a gesture of kindness offered by the wife. The relationship has ended and
there is no further contact. There was no evidence that the connection to the foreign people created
or could create any conflict of interest. Applicant has severed ties and has no contact with any
foreign citizens of Iran. Applicant’s does have contact with immigrants from Iran, but all of them
are U.S. citizens. She and her husband have considerable assets in the U.S. They have no assets in
Iran.
I have considered all of the Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) especially (FI
MC 8(a) (the nature of the relationships with the foreign person, the country in which these persons
are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely
the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.), FI MC (b) (there is no
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign
person, group, government, or country is so minimal or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties to the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest), FI MC 8(c) (contact or communication with
foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk
for foreign influence or exploitation), and FI MC 8(f) (the value or routine nature of the foreign
business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and
could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual).
Applicant’s relationships in Iran have been severed. The contacts she did have were so she
could obtain dental care and to assist her mother to attend her uncle’s funeral. There are no
restriction on contacts with American citizens who were from Iran and became naturalized. It is
undisputed that Iran creates a heightened security concern. However, I find Applicant does not have
any contacts in Iran. She visited Iran prior to applying for a security clearance, has not been there
for more than two years, and has no intentions of returning. There is simply no one there that could
influence her and create a security concern. Whatever relatives she may have there through her
husband are estranged. Her contacts regarding her dental care no longer exist and even if she wanted
to she could not return because she has surrendered her passport and renounced her citizenship. She
and her husband have no financial interests in Iran. Whatever sense of obligation she had to her
family to return to Iran has ceased since her father died. He is buried in the U.S. and her mother is
elderly and her children all live in the U.S. as citizens. There is little likelihood that Applicant has
any conflict of interest, but if she did it is clear due to her longstanding loyalty to the U.S. and the
12
likely minimal nature of the conflict, she would resolve it in favor of the U.S. I find all the above
mentioned mitigating conditions apply.
Whole Person Analysis
In all adjudications, the protection of our national security is the paramount concern. The
objective of the security-clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment of a
person’s life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance.
Indeed, the adjudicative process is a careful weighing of a number of variables in considering the
“whole person” concept. It recognizes that we should view a person by the totality of their acts,
omissions, motivations and other variables. Each case must be adjudged on its own merits, taking
into consideration all relevant circumstances, and applying sound judgment, mature thinking, and
careful analysis.
In addition to considering the specific disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each
guideline, I have also considered the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 2a (1)-(9) of the
Directive to be considered in evaluating a person’s eligibility to hold a security clearance.
Specifically these are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding circumstances;
(2) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (3) the age of the applicant; (4) the motivation of the
applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with
knowledge of the consequences; (5) the absence or presence of rehabilitation; and (6) the probability
that the circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future. Although the presence or
absence of a particular condition or factor for or against clearance is not outcome determinative, the
Guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against this policy guidance.
I considered the whole person in evaluating the case. I considered Applicant’s credibility,
demeanor and responsiveness when testifying. Applicant has lived in the U.S. since 1976 and been
a U.S. citizen since 1985. She did not return to Iran until 2002 and that was to help her mother
travel. She traveled again to Iran in 2004 and 2005 for dental care. She has no family contacts in
Iran. She and her husband are estranged from his two sisters who live there. All of their other
immediate family live in the U.S. and are U.S. citizens. She has no friends she is in contact with
there. She and her husband have substantial assets in the U.S. Applicant returned her passport to
ISIR and has renounced her citizenship, knowing she can never return there and has no wishes to
return. She is a well-regarded professional woman, with a business of her own and a warm and open
heart to many people, but especially those having difficulty transitioning to a new culture. She has
no contact with the Iranian government and knows no one who does.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines C and B, and
evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has mitigated
the security concerns based on Foreign Preference and Foreign Influence. Accordingly, I conclude
she has carried her burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
her a security clearance.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
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Paragraph 1. Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.
Carol G. Ricciardello
Administrative Judge