Required by Executive Order 10865, as amended, and by DoD Directive 5220.6 (Directive), as amended.1
DATE:  October 18, 2007 
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-01050
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MATTHEW E. MALONE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
D. Michael Lyles, Esquire, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns raised by his close ties to family members
who are citizens of and reside in Iran, and by his acquisition and possession of an Iranian passport
after he became a U.S. citizen. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After reviewing the results of Applicant’s background investigation, adjudicators for the
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) were unable to make a preliminary affirmative
finding  that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to give him a security clearance. On1
 Adjudication of this case is controlled by the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, approved by the President on2
December 29, 2005,which were implemented by the Department of Defense on September 1, 2006. Pending official
revision of the Directive, the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines supercede the guidelines listed in Enclosure 2 to the
Directive, and they apply to all adjudications or trustworthiness determinations in which an SOR was issued on or after
September 1, 2006.
 Tr., 13 - 15.3
 Gx. 1.4
 Id., Tr., 19.5
2
May 14, 2007, DOHA issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) alleging facts that raise
security concerns about possible foreign influence (Guideline B) and possible foreign preference
(Guideline C).2
Applicant timely responded to the SOR, admitted all of the allegations therein, and requested
a hearing. The case was assigned to me on July 30, 2007, and I convened a hearing on September
12, 2007, at which the parties appeared as scheduled. I admitted three exhibits proffered by the
government (Gx. 1- 3). A pre-hearing submission by the government, which consists of a six-page
legal memorandum and eight documents attached thereto, is included in the record for purposes of
administrative notice as Judicial Exhibit (Jx.) I.  Applicant testified in his own behalf, but offered3
no exhibits. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on September 27, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant’s admissions in response to the SOR are incorporated herein as facts. After a
thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the following additional findings
of fact.
Applicant is 56 years old and employed as a senior manufacturing associate by a defense
contractor. He was initially hired by his employer in November 1998, and applied for a security
clearance at that time. However, because he was laid off due to lack of work from December 2001
through January 2004, his background investigation was cancelled. A new background investigation
was initiated when he submitted a security clearance application (SF 86)  on or about June 23, 2004.4
Applicant was born and raised in Iran. He came to the U.S. in 1977 to study electrical
engineering at Oklahoma State University, where he received his BSEE in 1981. In July 1986, he
married a native-born U.S. citizen. They had three children, now ages 22, 20, and 7, before the
marriage ended in divorce in 2006. Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen on September 18,
1986. On April 1, 1998, he received a U.S. passport.  5
His mother, three brothers, and one sister are all citizens of and live in Iran. Applicant calls
his mother several times each week to check on her well-being. Because he knows Iranian authorities
may be listening, he is careful to keep his conversation with her benign; that is, he avoids talking
about politics or his work or anything other than routine family matters. He only speaks with his
siblings if they happen to be with their mother. He has not seen his mother or siblings since 1978,
when he last visited Iran because his mother was ill. Applicant wanted to visit Iran in 1994 to see
 Tr., 43 - 47.6
 Tr., 48 - 49.7
 Jx. I, Attachments 1- 3, 5. 8
 Jx. I, Attachments 4, 6, 7.9
3
his again ailing mother, but decided not to because he was concerned he would not be allowed to
leave Iran.6
Applicant had a passport from the pre-revolutionary government of Iran when he became a
U.S. citizen. He allowed it to lapse for about 15 years before he requested and was given a new
passport by the Islamic Republic of Iran on January 14, 2005. As with his U.S. passport, he has not
yet used it. However, he acquired the passport to facilitate travel to Iran to see his mother should she
become sick again. He knows it is difficult to obtain a travel visa to Iran using his U.S. passport. He
is unwilling to relinquish his Iranian passport.
Applicant served in the Iranian military from 1972 until 1974 to satisfy a mandatory service
requirement. Neither he nor his mother and siblings has any current ties to the Iranian government.
His mother is in her 70s and probably did not work outside the home. His sister and her husband are
retired school teachers. One brother owns his own truck for transporting oil. Another works for an
oil refinery, and the third is a retired oil refinery worker.
Applicant has no financial interests in Iran. He owns a home in the U.S., and there is no
information showing he maintains any bank accounts outside the U.S., but he has occasionally sent
money to his mother to pay for unplanned events, such as home repairs. The most he has sent at one
time is $1,000.   7
In 1979, the Shah of Iran was overthrown in favor of a theocratic government based on
Islamic law. Despite occasional gains by more moderate Muslim clerics in the government, the
Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) remains under the control of fundamentalists dedicated to a repressive
form of government in furtherance of strict adherence to the Koran. Iran’s regime has amassed a
dismal human rights record. Government entities have been involved in an increased number of
abductions, summary executions, disappearance, torture, and other unacceptable practices designed
to preserve the government’s hold over its citizens. The U.S. State Department has also advised U.S.
citizens not to travel to Iran, and has noted instances whereby dual U.S.-Iranian citizens have been
singled out for special monitoring and detention.8
Iran’s global interests are directly antithetical to those of the U.S.. To further their regional
and global goals, Iran has become an active collector of economic information and has an active
espionage service which targets U.S. interests and information. Iran is also an active sponsor of
terrorism, which targets the interests of the U.S. and its allies. Finally, the development and
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by Iran is seen by the U.S.
as a major threat to regional and possibly global stability.9
 Commonly referred to as the “whole person” concept, these factor are as follows: 1. Nature and seriousness10
of the conduct and surrounding circumstances; 2. Frequency and recency of the conduct; 3. Age of the applicant; 4.
Motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with
knowledge of the consequences involved; 5. Absence or presence of rehabilitation; and 6. Probability that the
circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future.
 See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).11
 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 528, 531.12
 See Egan; Directive E2.2.2.13
4
POLICIES AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Security clearance decisions must reflect consideration of both disqualifying and mitigating
conditions under each adjudicative guideline applicable to the facts and circumstances of each case.
Each decision must also reflect a fair and impartial common sense consideration of the factors listed
in Section 6.3 of the Directive.  The presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition10
is not determinative of a conclusion for or against an applicant. However, specific applicable
guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them as they represent
policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified information. In this case, the
pleadings and the information presented by the parties at hearing require that Revised Adjudicative
Guidelines B (foreign influence) and C (foreign preference) be applied.
A security clearance decision is intended to resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest  for an applicant to either receive or continue to have access to classified11
information. The government bears the initial burden of producing admissible information on which
it based the preliminary decision to deny or revoke a security clearance for an applicant.
Additionally, the government must be able to prove controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If the
government meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the applicant to refute, extenuate or mitigate
the government’s case. Because no one has a “right” to a security clearance, an applicant bears a
heavy burden of persuasion.  A person who has access to classified information enters into a12
fiduciary relationship with the government based on trust and confidence. The government,
therefore, has a compelling interest in ensuring each applicant possesses the requisite judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness of one who will protect the national interests as his or her own. The
“clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt
about an applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.13
CONCLUSIONS
Foreign Preference. The government denied Applicant’s request for clearance, in part
because, after becoming a U.S. citizen in 1986 and obtaining a U.S. passport in 1998, he exercised
his Iranian citizenship by obtaining and possessing, as of April 2007, a valid Iranian passport. (SOR
¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c). The information presented through the Government’s exhibits, Applicant’s
admissions, and his testimony is sufficient to support these allegations. The established facts, in turn,
raise a security concern addressed by Guideline C of the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines.
 Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 9.14
 “exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through15
the foreign citizenship of a family member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign
passport;”
 Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 11(a).16
 Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 11(b).17
 Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 11(e). 18
5
Specifically, the government is concerned that, “[w]hen an individual acts in such a way as to
indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”  In14
2005, he raised a security concern by acquiring an Iranian passport nearly 20 years after becoming
a U.S. citizen. He still holds the passport, which is still valid, and he does not intend to relinquish
it because it will facilitate entry to Iran should he want to see his mother, to whom he is very close.
 The foregoing requires consideration of Guideline C disqualifying condition 10(a).15
Applicant’s passport allows him to travel as an Iranian citizen despite his U.S. citizenship. It also
reflects Applicant’s divided preference between the U.S. and Iran. This facet of the Government’s
concern is heightened by the fact he has been in the U.S. for 30 years and has been a U.S. citizen
since 1986. By contrast, Applicant’s foreign citizenship, if based solely on his parents’ citizenship,16
and if he never exercised post-naturalization his rights as an Iranian citizen, would not be
disqualifying. But an act in furtherance of a right or privilege of foreign citizenship after
naturalization, such as Applicant’s acquisition of his Iranian passport in 2005, makes such mitigation
unavailable. 
Mitigation of the foreign preference concerns raised by his active exercise of foreign
citizenship might also be available if Applicant expressed a willingness to renounce his Iranian
citizenship.   (Subsequent acquisition of a new Iranian passport renders this moot and to add it here17
is confusing) The concerns about his possession of the Iranian passport he obtained in 2005 may
have been mitigated if Applicant had relinquished, destroyed, or otherwise rendered it invalid.18
However, Applicant affirmatively stated his desire to maintain his Iranian citizenship so he may, in
turn, retain the passport for ease of travel to Iran to see his mother.  Accordingly, none of the
Guideline C mitigating conditions apply,  and I resolve this guideline against Applicant.
Foreign Preference. The Government also stated as reasons for denying Applicant’s request
for a clearance the fact his mother (SOR ¶ 2.a) and his siblings (SOR ¶ 2.b) are all citizens of and
reside in Iran. Information presented through the Government’s exhibits, Applicant’s admissions,
and his testimony is sufficient to support these allegations. The established facts, in turn, raise a
security concern addressed by Guideline B of the Revised Adjudicative Guidelines. Specifically, the
Government is concerned that “[f]oreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help
a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest
 Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 6.19
 Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7(a). 20
 Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 8(a). 21
 See, Revised Adjudicative Guideline ¶ 8(c).22
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is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known
to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.”  Applicant’s contact with his mother and, to a lesser extent, his siblings, who are citizens19
of and reside in Iran, may be disqualifying “if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  In assessing whether these facts20
present a heightened risk, I have considered the fact that Applicant is very close to and concerned
about his elderly mother. He calls her several times each week to check on her well-being, and he
has obtained an Iranian passport to make it easier to travel to Iran to see her before she dies or if she
becomes ill. His relationship with his siblings appears to be more distant, and he speaks with them
only if they happen to be present when he calls. 
I have also considered the repressive nature of the Iranian government towards its own
people, particularly where dual U.S.-Iranian citizens are concerned. I have also considered Iran’s
sponsorship of international terrorism, aggressive economic espionage and foreign intelligence
activities, all of which are conducted in furtherance of its strategic, political, and economic interests
hostile and opposed to those of the U.S. and its allies. Also probative of whether Applicant’s contact
with his family in Iran creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation is his own concern about
what the Iranian government would do if he, a U.S.-Iranian citizen, were to travel to Iran to see his
mother, and his acknowledgment that he must be careful about what he discusses on the phone with
his mother when he calls her. 
The security concerns raised by the foregoing may be mitigated if it can be shown that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual
will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign  individual, group,
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.”  In light of all of the information about21
Applicant’s close relationship with his mother and the nature of Iran’s government and its adverse
relationship with the U.S., such mitigation is unavailable to the Applicant. However, because it
appears his contact or communication with his siblings is casual and infrequent, I conclude there is
little likelihood his relationship with them could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.22
On balance, however, available information is insufficient to overcome the security concerns about
Applicant’s ties to his family in Iran, and I resolve this guideline against Applicant.
Whole Person. I have evaluated the facts presented in this record and have applied the
appropriate adjudicative factors, pro and con, under Guidelines B and C. I have also reviewed the
record before me in the context of the whole person factors listed in section 2(a) of the Revised
 “ (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to23
include knowledgeable participation; (3) The frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) The individual's age and maturity
at the time of the conduct; (5) The extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) The presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) The motivation for the conduct; (8) The potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; (9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
 Directive, 6.3. 24
 Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 2(b).25
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Adjudicative Guidelines.  Applicant is a mature adult, who has lived most of his adult life in this23
country. He has worked hard to support his wife and family, and, when faced with financial adversity
because of layoffs, he did what he could to make ends meet. While he has significant ties to the U.S.,
the facts herein, particularly those pertaining to Iran, present a significant potential for continued
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress, and Applicant did not present information to show the
potential for duress is likely to abate at any time. Accordingly, a fair and commonsense assessment24
of all available information before me shows that the Applicant has not yet overcome the
government’s reasonable doubts about his suitability for access to classified information. Because
protection of the national interest is of paramount importance, such doubts must be resolved in favor
of the national security.25
8
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings regarding each SOR allegation are as follows:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C (Foreign Preference):         AGAINST THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against the Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B (Foreign Influence):  AGAINST THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against the Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For the Applicant 
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. Clearance is denied.
Matthew E. Malone
Administrative Judge