DATE:  October 18, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-03653
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
LEROY F. FOREMAN
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Alison O’Connell, Esq., Department Counsel
Richard A. Stevens, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant was born in Taiwan, and his wife was born in the People’s Republic of China
(PRC).  Both came to the U.S. on student visas in the 1990s and both recently became U.S. citizens.
Applicant’s parents and three siblings are citizens and residents of Taiwan.  His mother-in-law and
father-in-law are citizens and residents of the PRC.  Security concerns based on foreign influence
are not mitigated.  Clearance is denied.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 10, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny Applicant a security
clearance. This action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6,
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended and
modified (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) approved by the President on
December 29, 2005, and implemented effective September 1, 2006.  The SOR alleges security
concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on July 30, 2007, admitted all the factual allegations,
offered explanations, and requested a hearing.  The case was assigned to me on August 22, 2007, and
heard as scheduled on September 18, 2007.  DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) on September 26,
2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant’s admissions in his answer to the SOR and at the hearing are incorporated into my
findings of fact.  I make the following findings:
Applicant is a 42-year-old research scientist employed by a defense contractor.  He has never
held a clearance.
Applicant is a native of Taiwan.  He graduated from college in Taiwan in 1987, served two
years of mandatory military service in the Taiwanese Army, and came to the U.S. on a student visa
in 1990 to complete his education (Tr. 35, 42). He obtained a master’s degree in aerospace
engineering and a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering, spent about a year in postdoctoral studies, and
then went to work for his current employer in February 1998 (Tr. 44).  He became a U.S. citizen in
January 2006.
Applicant met his wife while they were both students in the U.S. (Tr. 35-36).  His wife, then
a citizen of the PRC, entered the U.S. on a student visa in August 1991 and recently became a U.S.
citizen (Tr. 47).  They were married in February 1995.  She is employed by a private company as a
software engineer (Tr. 49). Applicant and his wife have two children, ages 11 and 6.  Both are
native-born U.S. citizens.
Applicant’s parents, brother, and three sisters are citizens and residents of Taiwan.
Applicant’s father is about 72 years old and owns a bicycle store.  His mother, about 70 years old,
works in the bicycle store (Tr. 50).  Neither parent has ever worked for the Taiwanese government.
Applicant contacts his parents at least twice a month.  He gives about $2,000 each year to his
siblings to purchase gifts for their parents in accordance with Taiwanese tradition (Tr. 39).  He
The SOR alleged Applicant traveled to Taiwan in June 2006.  At Department Counsel’s request, I amended1
the SOR to conform to the evidence by alleging he traveled in June 2005 (Tr. 20).
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traveled to Taiwan to visit his parents and siblings in June 2005,  July 2006, and November 2003,1
accompanied by his wife and children.  His parents visit him in the U.S. every two or three years,
most recently in June 2007 (Tr. 57-59).
Applicant’s oldest sister is a 50-year-old nun (Tr. 61-62).  He talks to her telephonically about
twice a year, and visits her when he visits his parents (Tr. 63-64).  
Applicant’s next younger sister is about 45 years old, works as a software engineer in
Taiwan, and has applied for immigration to Canada (Tr. 64-65).  She is married and has three
children.  She works for a company that previously was government-owned but now is a private
company (Tr. 66).  He contacts her by telephone about once a year (Tr. 67).
Applicant’s youngest sister is about 43 years old, and she works part-time for a research
institute in Taiwan.  She is disabled and works at home on the internet, performing human resources
duties for the institute.  She does not participate in research (Tr. 68-69).  They speak on the telephone
only once or twice a year but use text messaging and a website camera weekly (Tr. 71).
Applicant’s brother is about 40 years old and works as a software consultant, sometimes for
private companies and sometimes for the Taiwanese government (Tr. 73).  He talks to his brother
telephonically about once a year and contacts him by text message about three times a year (Tr. 74).
Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law are citizens and residents of the PRC.  They are
both in their 70s, and they retired before Applicant and his wife were married (Tr. 77).  His father-in-
law previously worked for an aerospace institute and his mother-in-law was an accounting assistant.
Applicant talks to his in-laws telephonically less than once a year (Tr. 79).  His wife talks to her
parents every one or two months (Tr. 80).  They came to the U.S. for Applicant’s wedding in 1995,
visited for about six months in 2000 when Applicant’s daughter was born, and made a third six-
month visit two or three years ago (Tr. 79-81).  In 2002, Applicant and his family visited his in-laws
in the PRC for about 10 days (Tr. 82).
Applicant testified he loves his parents, but his family is in the U.S.  He testified he
demonstrated his independence from the influence of his parents by marrying a citizen of the PRC,
regarded by his parents as an enemy of Taiwan, and his wife demonstrated her independence by
marrying a citizen of Taiwan, regarded as an enemy by her parents (Tr. 37).  He believes that
anything that is harmful to the U.S. is harmful to his children (Tr. 38).
Applicant maintains contact with a college friend in Taiwan.  They were close friends in
college, but now their contact is limited to an annual greeting card and occasional telephone call (Tr.
84-85; GX 2 at 14).
At the request of Department Counsel, and without objection from Applicant, I took
administrative notice of relevant facts about the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan (Tr.
29-30).  Department Counsel’s request is included in the record as Hearing Exhibit (HX) I.
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The PRC has an authoritarian government dominated by the Communist Party.  It has large
and increasingly sophisticated military forces.  The U.S. and the PRC have been rivals since the Cold
War, with particular disagreement on the status of Taiwan.  Despite political disagreements, the U.S.
and the PRC have become major economic and trading partners.  The PRC aggressively targets
sensitive and protected U.S. technology and military information, using worldwide intelligence
operations, including those in Taiwan.  It is one of the most aggressive practitioners of industrial
espionage.  There are an estimated 2,000-3,000 PRC-front companies operating in the U.S. to gather
secret or proprietary information.  U.S. citizens of Chinese ancestry are considered prime intelligence
targets.  
The PRC has a poor human rights record.  It suppresses political dissent and engages in
arbitrary arrest and detention, forced confessions, torture, and mistreatment of prisoners.  Travelers
to the PRC can expect to be placed under surveillance, with their hotel rooms, telephones, and fax
machines monitored and personal possessions, including computers, searched without their
knowledge or consent.
Taiwan is a multiparty democracy, established as a separate, independent government by
refugees from mainland China in 1949.  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not recognize
Taiwan’s independence and insists there is only one China.  The U.S. recognized Taiwan as an
independent government until January 1979, when it formally recognized the PRC government as
the sole legal government of China and terminated its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan (HX I,
Enclosure VIII at 9).  Taiwan maintains a large military establishment to protect itself from the PRC
and purchases defensive military equipment from the U.S.  Taiwan is among the most active
collectors of U.S. economic intelligence.
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.”  Id. at
527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended and modified.  Eligibility for a security clearance is
predicated upon the applicant meeting the criteria contained in the Guidelines.  Each clearance
decision must be a fair, impartial, and commonsense decision based on the relevant and material
facts and circumstances, the whole person concept, the disqualifying conditions and mitigating
conditions under each specific guideline, and the factors listed in AG ¶¶ 2(a)(1)-(9).
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special relationship with the
government.  The government must be able to have a high degree of trust and confidence in persons
with access to classified information.  However, the decision to deny an individual a security
clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  See Exec. Or. 10865
§ 7.  It is merely an indication the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the
Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.
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Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal
or professional history of the applicant which disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  “Substantial evidence” is
“more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth.,
36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The Guidelines presume a nexus or rational connection between
proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See
ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the
burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  See Directive ¶
E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”  ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App.
Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; see AG ¶ 2(b). 
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The concern under this guideline is as follows: “Foreign contacts and interests may be a
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that
is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication
under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign
contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether
the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or
is associated with a risk of terrorism.”  AG ¶ 6.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member, business
or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country
if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a). A security concern also may be raised if an applicant is “sharing living
quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a
heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion”  AG ¶ 7(d).  The totality
of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well as each individual family tie must be
considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). 
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United States has
a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person,
organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of whether that person,
organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-
11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United States over
matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security. Finally, we know friendly
nations have engaged in espionage against the United States, especially in the economic, scientific,
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and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317, 2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd.
Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S.,
and its human rights record are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family
members are vulnerable to government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is
associated with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
Applicant’s parents are not connected with the Taiwanese government or the military.  Their
bicycle shop is not a high technology business likely to be a vehicle for industrial espionage.
Applicant’s oldest sister is a nun, unconnected to government, the military, or business.  Applicant’s
middle sister works for a government institute, but she works at home and her duties are limited to
personnel administration.  Applicant’s connection with an old college friend appears to have
withered to a casual social connection.  On the other hand, his brother and middle sister are
employed in high technology businesses susceptible to involvement in industrial espionage or being
targeted and used as a conduit for espionage activities.
Taiwan is a close ally, friend, and trading partner of the U.S.  The nature of Taiwan’s
government, its human rights record, and its relationship with the U.S. are clearly not determinative.
Nevertheless, they are all relevant factors in determining whether Taiwan would risk damaging its
relationship with the U.S. by exploiting or threatening its private citizens in order to force a U.S.
citizen to betray the U.S. 
Applicant has little direct contact with his in-laws in the PRC, but his wife has regular
contact.  “[T]here is a rebuttable presumption that a person has ties of affection for, or obligation to,
the immediate family members of the person's spouse.”  ISCR Case No. 01-03120, 2002 DOHA
LEXIS 94 at * 8 (App. Bd. Feb. 20, 2002).  His in-laws attended his wedding and have visited twice
in the U.S., both times for about six months, and Applicant has visited his in-laws in the PRC once.
While there is sparse evidence showing personal affection for his in-laws, he has not rebutted the
presumption that he has ties of obligation to them.
Applicant’s father-in-law was employed in the aerospace business.  The PRC aggressively
targets U.S. technology, focusing on U.S. citizens of Chinese ancestry.  Although it is likely
Applicant and his wife would resist overt attempts to influence them, there is a “heightened risk” that
they could be targeted by more subtle, indirect means.  
Some of Applicant’s family ties to Taiwan, considered individually, do not present the
“heightened risk” in AG ¶ 7(a).  However, the totality of Applicant’s ties to Taiwan and the PRC are
sufficient to raise both AG ¶¶ 7(a) and 7(d).
A disqualifying condition also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group,
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation
to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(b).  Applicant’s ties to two of his siblings
in Taiwan and his in-laws in the PRC raise the “potential conflict of interest” contemplated by this
disqualifying condition.
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Since the government produced substantial evidence to raise AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d), the
burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.
Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant has the burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden
of disproving it never shifts to the government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep.
22, 2005).  
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions
or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed
in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization,
or government and the interests of the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a).  While Applicant’s parents and oldest sister
(the nun) are in situations in Taiwan where a conflict of interest would be unlikely, his middle sister
and brother in Taiwan and his in-laws in the PRC present a likelihood of a conflict of interest.
Considering Applicant’s ties to Taiwan and the PRC in totality, I conclude the mitigating condition
in AG ¶ 8(a) is not established.
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is no conflict
of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group,
government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in
favor of the U.S. interest.”  AG ¶ 8(b).  Applicant’s sense of loyalty or obligation to his college
friend is minimal, but it is strong for his parents, siblings, and in-laws.  Although he and his wife
have lived in the U.S. since the early 1990s, they only recently became U.S. citizens. Applicant has
the burden of establishing a mitigating condition, and he has not met his burden for AG ¶ 8(b).
Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated by showing that “contact or
communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it
could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.”  AG ¶ 8(c).  Applicant has established this
mitigating condition for his college friend, but not for his family members and in-laws.
Whole Person Analysis
In addition to considering the specific disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each
guideline, I have also considered: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the applicant’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure,
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.  AG ¶¶
2(a)(1)-(9).  Some of these factors are discussed above, but some merit additional comment.
Applicant is a mature adult whose family aspirations are in and with the U.S.  He has
mitigated the security concerns based on his ties to his parents, two of his sisters, and a college
friend, but he is vulnerable to subtle exploitation by or through his other siblings. His wife is
vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress exercised directly against her or indirectly through her
parents in the PRC.  Applicant’s ties to Taiwan and the PRC, considered in their totality, make him
vulnerable to direct or indirect coercion or exploitation, notwithstanding his loyalty to the U.S.
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After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B, and evaluating
all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant has not mitigated the
security concerns based on foreign influence.  Accordingly, I conclude he has not carried his burden
of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him a security clearance.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1. Guideline B (Foreign Influence): AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.i: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant Applicant a security clearance. Clearance is denied.
LeRoy F. Foreman
Administrative Judge