DATE:  October 18, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-03867
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MARY E. HENRY
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Jeff A. Nagel, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant became a U.S. citizen in 2003. He continues to maintain his Swedish citizenship
and hold an active Swedish passport, which he uses for travel to Sweden. He declines to renounce
his Swedish citizenship or destroy, return, or otherwise invalidate his Swedish passport. Applicant
has not mitigated the government’s security concerns under Guideline C. Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Department of State Reports are: 1) Sweden, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2006; and 2)1
Background Note: Sweden, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, August 2007.
Government Exhibit 3 (Applicant’s response to the SOR, dated June 25, 2007) at 1.2
Id.3
Government Exhibit 4 (Applicant’s Security Application (S-86), dated March 31, 2006) at 1-3; Government4
Exhibit 5 (Interrogatories and answers, dated April 24, 2007) at 5.
2
On May 23, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement
of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, pursuant to Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information Within Industry, dated February 20, 1960, as amended and modified, and Department
of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Security Clearance Review Program (Directive),
dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified. The SOR detailed reasons why DOHA could not
make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Specifically, the SOR sets
forth security concerns arising under Guideline C (Foreign Preference) of the revised Adjudicative
Guidelines (AG) issued on December 29, 2005 and implemented by the Department of Defense,
effective September 1, 2006. DOHA recommended the case be referred to an administrative judge
to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or revoked. On June 25,
2007, Applicant submitted a notarized response to the allegations. He elected to have his case
decided on the written record in lieu of a hearing.
Department Counsel prepared a File of Relevant Material (FORM) and provided Applicant
with a complete copy on August 10, 2007. Applicant had 30 days from receipt of the FORM to file
objections and submit material in refutation, extenuation, or mitigation. He did not submit a response
or additional evidence. DOHA assigned this case to me on October 5, 2007.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
In its submission of relevant material, the government has requested that I take administrative
notice of certain facts concerning Sweden based on information contain in two United States
Department of State reports.  I hereby take notice of the information contained therein.1
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the allegations under Guideline C, subparagraph 1.a.-1.d. of the SOR.2
Those admissions are incorporated as findings of fact.  After a complete review of the evidence in3
the record and upon due consideration, I make the following findings of fact.
Applicant is 48 years old. When he completed his security clearance application in March
2006, he listed his job as a field representative for a Department of Defense contractor in the aviation
industry. In his April 2007 response to the interrogatories, he indicated that he was again working
for an American air line carrier, but did not state when he began this employment. 4
Government Exhibit 4, supra note 3, at 1-2, 5-6, 10-11.5
Id. at 3-4.6
Id. at 1, 5; Government Exhibit 5, supra note 3, at 2, 3, 5. The U.S. and European Union have not yet signed7
an agreement on use of air space and airport landing rights.
See footnote 1.8
3
Applicant was born and raised in Sweden. He received a college degree in mechanical
engineering in 1979 from a Swedish university. Upon graduation, he served in the Swedish Army
for less than a year. For the next eight years, he worked for Swedish companies. His parents are
citizens of and residents of Sweden.5
Applicant married a U.S. born citizen in 1993. They own a house in the U.S. For at least the
last 10 years, Applicant has worked for American air line carriers in the U.S. as a pilot, or other
aviation companies as a mechanic or field representative.6
The United States (U.S.) granted Applicant citizenship in 2003. He still retains his Swedish
citizenship. He holds a Swedish passport issued in 2002 with an expiration date of 2012. Applicant
also holds a U.S. passport, issued in April 2003. He traveled to Sweden for pleasure in 2002, 2004
and 2005, using his Swedish passport. He used his U.S. passport to travel to Iraq for business. He
declines to destroy, surrender or invalidate his Swedish passport or renounce his Swedish citizenship.
As his explanation for this decision, he states that he works in the aviation industry, which
traditionally has unstable employment. When the “Open Sky” agreement with Europe becomes
effective, European air carriers will fly into the U.S. at will. Should he again be furloughed from his
current employment with an American airline carrier as a pilot, he wants the option to obtain
employment with European air carriers. With his Swedish passport, he could more readily find work
with a European air carrier, live in the U.S., and commute to work from his U.S. residence.7
I take administrative notice of the following adjudicative facts from the U.S. Department of
State reports submitted by the government. Sweden is a constitutional monarchy with a multiparty,
parliamentary form of government. Legislative authority is vested in the unicameral parliament.
Elections are held every four years, and are free and fair. The king is the largely symbolic head of
state. The prime minister is the head of the government and exercises executive authority. The
government respects the human rights of its citizens. Swedish citizens enjoy many of the same
freedoms as American citizens, including freedom of speech, religion, press, and assembly. Sweden
has an independent judiciary and arrests are made based on warrants issued by duly authorized
officials. Sweden became a member of the European Union in 1995. Sweden and the U.S. have a
close and strong friendship, and work with each other on many issues. Sweden is a member of the
United Nations and the NATO Partnership for Peace. Sweden’s foreign policy is one of staying free
of alliances in peace time so as to remain neutral in war. In 2002, Sweden revised its security
doctrine to allow for cooperation in response to threats against peace and security.8
POLICIES
Directive, revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) ¶ 2(a)(1)-(9).9
ISCR Case No. 96-0277 at 2 (App. Bd., July 11, 1997).10
ISCR Case No. 97-0016 at 3 (App. Bd., Dec. 31, 1997); Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.14.11
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988). 12
ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd., Aug. 10, 1995); Directive, Enclosure 3, ¶ E3.1.15.13
ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Decision and Reversal Order, Jan. 27, 1995); Directive, Enclosure14
3, ¶ E3.1.15.
Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.15
Id.16
Id.; Directive, revised AG ¶ 2(b).17
4
The revised Adjudicative Guidelines set forth disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating
conditions (MC) applicable to each specific guideline. An administrative judge need not view the
revised adjudicative guidelines as inflexible ironclad rules of law. Instead, acknowledging the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines, are intended to assist the administrative judge in
reaching fair and impartial common sense decisions. Although the presence or absence of a particular
condition or factor for or against clearance is not outcome determinative, the revised AG should be
followed whenever a case can be measured against this policy guidance. In addition, each security
clearance decision must be based on the relevant and material facts and circumstances, the whole-
person concept, and the factors listed in the Directive. Specifically, these are: (1) the nature, extent,
and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct; (3) the frequency and
recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other behavioral
changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.9
The sole purpose of a security clearance determination is to decide if it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an applicant.  The government10
has the burden of proving controverted facts.  The burden of proof is something less than a11
preponderance of the evidence.  Once the government has met its burden, the burden shifts to the12
applicant to present evidence of refutation, extenuation, or mitigation to overcome the case against
him.  Additionally, an applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable13
clearance decision.14
No one has a right to a security clearance,  and “the clearly consistent standard indicates that15
security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable16
doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved
in favor of protecting such sensitive information.  Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically17
provides industrial security clearance decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall
in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” The decision to deny an
individual a security clearance is not necessarily a determination as to the allegiance, loyalty, and
Executive Order No. 10865 § 7.18
MC ¶ 11(f) the vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United states Government does not apply19
to this case.
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patriotism of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict18
guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.
CONCLUSIONS
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate
adjudicative factors, I conclude the following with respect to the allegations set forth in the SOR:
Guideline C - Foreign Preference
The Foreign Preference Guideline identifies the following security concern: When an
individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States,
then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the
interests of the United States. (AG ¶ 9)
Applicant admitted the four Guideline C allegations in the SOR. Based on his admissions and
the facts in this case, a potential security concern arises under one Guideline C disqualifying
condition. Applicant retains his Swedish citizenship and holds an active Swedish passport, which
he uses when traveling to and inside Sweden. By using his Swedish passport for travel to Sweden
after becoming a U.S. citizen, he exercised a right and privilege of foreign citizenship. Thus,
Disqualifying Condition (DC) ¶¶ 10(a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign
citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member and
10(a)(1) possession of a current foreign passport, a security concern is raised.
Under the potentially applicable Guideline C Mitigating Conditions (MC) , Applicant could
mitigate security concerns by demonstrating that dual citizenship is based solely on parents’
citizenship or birth in a foreign country (MC ¶ 11(a)), the individual has expressed a willingness to
renounce dual citizenship (MC ¶ 11(b)), exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign
citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor
(MC ¶ 11(c)), use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority, (MC ¶
11(d)), and the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or
otherwise invalidated (MC ¶ 11(e)).19
Applicant grew up in Sweden, his place of birth. After immigrating to the U.S. and becoming
a U.S. citizen, Applicant chose to maintain his citizenship with Sweden and to exercise his rights
of Swedish citizenship, including the right to possess and use of a valid Swedish passport. He
declined to renounce his dual citizenship, destroy his Swedish passport, surrender his Swedish
passport to the cognizant authorities, or otherwise invalidated this passport. Because his employment
with American airline carriers fluctuates, he has decided to retain his Swedish passport and
citizenship because both expand his ability to obtain employment with a European airline carrier,
should his current employer furlough him again. The evidence of record fails to reflect that his use
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of his Swedish passport for personal travel has been approved by a cognizant security authority.
Consequently, Applicant has not mitigated the government’s security concerns.
Whole Person Analysis
Protection of our national security is of paramount concern. Security clearance decisions are
not intended to assign guilt or to impose further punishment for past transgressions. Rather, the
objective of the adjudicative process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment of a person’s
trustworthiness and fitness for access to classified information. Thus, in reaching this decision, I
have considered the whole person concept in evaluating Appellant’s risk and vulnerability in
protecting our national interests. 
Applicant is not involved with drugs nor does he have problems with his finances or
excessive alcohol use. He is married and owns property in the U.S. He lives a normal American life,
with one exception. He retains his Swedish citizenship. When he became a U.S. citizen, Applicant
swore allegiance to the U.S. and no other country. By retaining his Swedish citizenship, his loyalties
became divided between two countries. 
Applicant is unwilling to renounce his Swedish citizen and give up his Swedish passport. His
sole reason for retaining Swedish citizenship and possession of a Swedish passport is economic.
While his reasoning is clearly understandable because his chosen career does not provide job
stability, this decision places Applicant in a precarious situation which could result in pressure,
coercion, duress, or exploitation by other governments seeking information from the United States.
Because he is not willing to abandon his ties to Sweden, he has not mitigated the government’s
security concerns. Accordingly, I find against Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings For or Against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required
by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
SOR ¶ 1-Guideline C : AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs a-d: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
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Mary E. Henry
Administrative Judge