DATE:  November 19, 2007
In re:
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SSN:  -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-24371
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
PHILIP S. HOWE
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Caroline Jeffreys, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is 28 years old, unmarried, and is a U.S. citizen, as are his family members.  His
father works in the PRC for a Taiwanese auto parts company.  His mother and sister live and work
in the United States.  Applicant came to the United States at the age of five years.  Applicant
mitigated the foreign influence security concern.  Clearance is granted.
Pursuant to Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (Feb. 20, 1960), as amended1
and modified, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program  (Jan. 2, 1992), as amended and modified (Directive).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant.  On March 23, 2007, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons  (SOR)1
detailing the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on  December 29, 2005, and implemented by the
Department of Defense effective September 1, 2006.  Applicant answered the SOR in writing on
May 8, 2007, and elected to have a hearing before an administrative judge.  The case was assigned
to me on June 27, 2007.  On September 21, 2007, I convened a hearing to consider whether it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.
The Government and the Applicant submitted exhibits that were admitted into evidence.  DOHA
received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on October 4, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant's admissions to the SOR allegations are incorporated here as findings of fact.  After
a complete and thorough review of the evidence in the record, and full consideration of that
evidence, I make the following additional findings of fact:
Applicant is 28 years old, a naturalized U.S. citizen, and unmarried.  He works for a defense
contractor in the aerospace business, but currently is on leave to study for his doctorate degree in
aerospace engineering.  He obtained dual bachelor's degrees in aerospace engineering and
atmospheric, oceanic, and space sciences.  Later, he obtained his master's degree in aerospace
engineering.  Applicant came to the United States with his parents when he was five years old.
When he was in fourth grade, his parents and he became U.S. citizens.  His sister was born in the
United States. (Tr. 17, 21, 28, 31, 32; Answer; Exhibits 1, C, G)
Applicant's mother and sister live in the United States.  His sister has a master's degree.  His
mother lives at home and does volunteer work.  His father works overseas in the Peoples Republic
of China (PRC), traveling on his U.S. passport only, and works for a Taiwanese company making
automobile interior parts as the manager of the mainland China plant.  Applicant telephones his
father monthly to speak with him.  His father will retire in a few years and return to live in the family
home he and his wife have owned in the United States for the past 20 years. (Tr. 15, 22, 23, 26-28,
32; Answer; Exhibits 1, B)
Applicant and his family returned to live on Taiwan when Applicant was in the seventh
grade.  His father had a management job with an American company there.  On Taiwan he attended
an American high school.  He returned to the United States to attend college in 1997.  He graduated
from his five-year program in 2002.  His family returned to live in the United States in 2000 when
his sister started college.  Applicant went to Taiwan for a summer internship in 2000 at a prestigious
research institute, then returned to the United States for the college the fall semester.  He exchanges
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one annual email message with his supervisor from that summer institute program. (Tr. 18-21, 24;
Answer)
Applicant went to Taiwan in the summer of 2002 to visit his grandmother and aunt.  His
family traveled with him.  He telephones his grandmother twice a year.  He also traveled to the PRC
to visit his father and make tourist visits in the PRC because he had never been there previously.  He
contacted his employer's security office before going to Taiwan and China to determine what he
should or should not do while traveling there.  He has no contact with his aunt and uncle on Taiwan.
(Tr. 24-27; Answer; Exhibit A)
Applicant submitted six character letters from colleagues and supervisors.  They regard him
as intelligent, conscientious, hard-working, diligent, dependable, honest, discrete, and loyal.
Applicant is also considered to have high ethical and moral standards.  His integrity is highly
regarded.  On one project mentioned in one character letter, Applicant followed appropriate
protocols to secure his data, and established several more procedures himself to guard his data and
research.  For the past three years, Applicant has had an interim security clearance and no violations
are recorded. (Exhibits A to F)
I take administrative notice of the PRC having a government in which the Chinese
Communist Party is the only political party allowed.  The PRC is a one-party authoritarian
government which has a long record of human rights abuses and espionage. The PRC human rights
record has a history of serious abuses of fundamental human rights occurring, such a denial of free
speech and press, fair and open trials, and other basic rights recognized by the international
community.  The PRC continues to modernize its armed forces and acquire or develop advanced
weapons.  The PRC engages regularly in military, economic, and industrial espionage, including
stealing nuclear weapons technology, missile design information, and commercial technology.  The
PRC also obtains commercial information through the use of front companies, buying dual-use
technologies, and the direct collection of technology by non-intelligence agencies and individuals.
The PRC regards itself as the legitimate government of all of China, including Taiwan.  Since 1979,
the U.S. has recognized the PRC as the legal government of China under the “one China” policy.
The PRC engages in industrial and military espionage designed to collect proprietary and classified
information.  Industrial espionage is intelligence gathering by a foreign country or a foreign company
with its government’s help against a private U.S. company to obtain commercial secrets.  The United
States does billions of dollars of trade with the PRC annually. (Exhibit 2)
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.”  Id. at
527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants
eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent the
national interest to do so.”  Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information with Industry
§ 2 (Feb. 20, 1960).  Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the
security guidelines contained in the Directive.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of
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demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3.
The adjudication process is based on the whole person concept.  All available, reliable
information about the person, past and present, is to be taken into account in reaching a decision as
to whether a person is an acceptable security risk.  Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth personnel
security guidelines, as well as the disqualifying conditions (DC) and mitigating conditions (MC)
under each guideline that must be carefully considered in making the overall common sense
determination required.  
In evaluating the security worthiness of an applicant, the administrative judge must also
assess the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3 of the Directive.  Those assessments include:
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct,
and the extent of knowledgeable participation; (3) how recent and frequent the behavior was; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6)
the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood
of continuation or recurrence (See Directive, Section E2.2.1. of Enclosure 2). Because each security
case presents its own unique facts and circumstances, it should not be assumed that the factors
exhaust the realm of human experience or that the factors apply equally in every case.  Moreover,
although adverse information concerning a single condition may not be sufficient for an unfavorable
determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or
recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or other behavior specified in the
Guidelines.
The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a determination as
to the loyalty of the applicant.  See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.  It is merely an indication that the applicant
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for
issuing a clearance.
Initially, the Government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the personal
or professional history of the applicant that disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being
eligible for access to classified information.  The Directive presumes a nexus or rational connection
between proven conduct under any of the disqualifying conditions listed in the guidelines and an
applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  All that
is required is proof of facts and circumstances that indicate an applicant is at risk for mishandling
classified information, or that an applicant does not demonstrate the high degree of judgment,
reliability, or trustworthiness required of persons handling classified information.  ISCR Case No.
00-0277, 2001 DOHA LEXIS 335 at **6-8 (App. Bd. 2001).  Once the Government has established
a prima facie case by substantial evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain,
extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of
demonstrating that is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance. ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. 2002).  “Any doubt as to whether access to
classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of the
national security.” Directive ¶ E2.2.2.  “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must,
on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.  See Exec. Or. 12968 § 3.1(b).
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Based upon a consideration of the evidence as a whole, I find the following adjudicative
guideline most pertinent to an evaluation of the facts of this case:
Guideline B:  The Concern: Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help
a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.  Adjudication under this Guideline can
and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial
interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country
is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with
a risk of terrorism. ¶6
CONCLUSIONS
The Government established by substantial evidence and Applicant’s admissions each of the
allegations in the SOR.
Foreign Influence:  The condition that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying (DC), which is applicable here, is ¶7.a (contact with a foreign family member who is
a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion).
Applicant has family members on Taiwan, a grandmother whom he telephones twice a year,
and an aunt and uncle with whom he has no contact.  His father works in the PRC for a Taiwanese
company making auto parts.  His father, mother, and sister are U.S. citizens, as is Applicant.
After the Government raised a disqualification, the burden shifted to Applicant to mitigate
or rebut the allegations.  Two mitigating conditions (MC) apply: ¶8.a (the nature of the relationships
with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of
those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position
of having to choose between the interests of the foreign individual and the interests of the U.S.), and
¶8.b (there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to
the foreign person is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and
loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor
of the U.S. interests).  
Applicant has only distant familial relations with his grandmother on Taiwan.  His father is
a U.S. citizen working in the auto parts industry in the PRC.  The auto industry in the PRC is
expanding, and U.S. companies sell cars there and seek strategic alliances with PRC auto
manufacturers.  To coerce or pressure an auto parts production executive like Applicant's father
would injure well-developed business relationships, prove counter-productive for PRC forces, and
be highly unlikely because of the nature and position of Applicant's father in the total auto industry
in the PRC.  Therefore, there is unlikely he will be placed in a position of having to choose between
those persons he knows in the PRC and the interests of the U.S.  Applicant's summer internship in
2000 was part of his academic course of study.  He worked on Taiwan, not the PRC.  His travels to
Taiwan and the PRC in 2002 were disclosed to his employer's security office before travel took
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place.  He undertook the travel only for family visits and tourist activities.  His monthly talks with
his father are normal family activities between two U.S. citizens.
There is no conflict of interest in Applicant’s situation because of his deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties to the United States.  There are many positive attributes to Applicant’s
life as a U.S. citizen that weigh in favor of granting him a security clearance. He has extensive and
long-term contacts with the United States, arriving here 23 years ago as a child of five.  He became
a U.S. citizen when he was in fourth grade at the age of nine years.  He has lived here from 1984 to
1992 when the family returned to Taiwan because his father had a management position there with
a U.S. company.  Applicant obtained a college degree here from 1997 to 2002, and has worked here
continuously since then.  His parents have a home in the United States which they bought 20 years
ago, and his father returns home to the United States every opportunity he has when not working.
His sister was born in the United States.  He is a loyal American committed to his family and job in
the United States, and would resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the United States.  I give his
history in the United States, his compliance with company security requirements, and his successful
work on an interim security clearance for the past three years great weight.  His testimony was
credible and persuasive on his close and dedicated attachments to the United States.
Whole Person Analysis
“The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance.” AG ¶ 2(a). “Each
security clearance decision must be a fair and impartial common sense determination based upon
consideration of all the relevant and material information and the pertinent criteria and adjudication
policy.” Directive ¶ 6.3. “Available, reliable information about the person, past and present,
favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination.” AG ¶ 2(a). In
evaluating Applicant’s case, I have considered the adjudicative process factors listed in the AG ¶
2(a).
I considered all the factors under the "whole person concept."  Only the eighth factor, a
potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress applies.  Applicant's evidence is that he is not
and would not be subject to pressure or coercion.  His connections to the United States are too long
and strong to allow him to be subjected to PRC influence just because his father happens to work
in the PRC now.  Applicant’s history of living and working in the U.S., and his dedication to his
immediate family in the United States and his job are significant factors in his favor.  He is a serious
student who already has three academic degrees from U.S. universities, and is working on his
doctorate at another U.S. university in a professional area he enjoys.  His father's job in the PRC is
not sufficient to influence Applicant to choose between the father, the PRC, and the United States
in any particular situation when all his other connections of family, friends, and colleagues are in the
United States.  All these factors show that there is no potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation,
or duress upon Applicant.  I give great weight to the  character letters from his co-workers and
supervisors about his work ethic, and dedication to his job and security requirements.  I also
conclude Applicant is credible in his explanations of his familial relationships and strong preference
for the United States.
In addition to the above facts, security determinations are predictive judgments and the best
predictor of future performance is past performance.  Based on a review of his history and substantial
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ties to the United States, I conclude Applicant’s potential for exploitation by the PRC, where his
father works presently, appears low and unlikely to occur.  Therefore, I conclude the foreign
influence security concern for Applicant.  I also conclude the “whole person” concept for Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1.  Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.  Clearance is
granted.
Philip S. Howe
Administrative Judge