DATE:  November 29, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-24860
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
PAUL J. MASON
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Francisco Mendez, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant was born in the U.S. but has lived and worked in Japan since at least 1992. The
resident citizenship in Japan of Applicant’s immediate family members is mitigated. They are not
agents of a foreign power, and it is unlikely Japan would try to apply pressure or coercion on and
through them to Applicant. His one-time failure to register himself with the Selective Service System
(SSS) no longer casts doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment. Clearance is
granted. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
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security clearance for Applicant. On February 2, 2007, under Executive Order 10865 and Department
of Defense Directive 5200.6, dated January 2, 1992, reissued through Change 4, April 20, 1999, with
revised adjudicative guidelines implemented on September 1, 2006, DOHA issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) detailing the reasons for its security concerns raised under the foreign influence
guideline (Guideline B) and the personal conduct guideline (Guideline E) of the Directive. In his
answer, notarized on February 20, 2007, Applicant requested a decision be made on the record in
lieu of a hearing. 
A copy of the Government’s File of Relevant Material (FORM, the Government’s evidence
in support of the SOR) was sent to Applicant on July 24, 2007. Applicant received the FORM on
August 1, 2007. Response was due on August 31, 2007. No response was received. The case was
assigned to me for decision on November 1, 2007.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE
In Section I of the FORM, the Government requested I take official notice of Items 8 through
15, and explained the relevance of the noticed exhibits in Section III. Based on my authority to take
official notice of well-known facts or government reports, I have taken official notice of the
information related to Japan. I have also taken official notice of the Selective Service Act of 1917,
(40 Stat.76), and the online site of the SSS, Office of Public and Intergovernmental Affairs at
http://www.sss.gov, and referred to in Item 6.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the seven foreign influence allegations under paragraph 1. He also
admitted that he did not register with the United States SSS, believing the registration was voluntary.
When he attempted to register, his application was rejected due to his age. 
Applicant, 34 years old, was born in the United States in October 1973. He has lived in Japan
since he was very young. His security clearance form (SCA, Item 4) discloses that he attended
college in Japan for five years between 1992 and 1997. He did not receive a diploma. The SCA also
reflects that Applicant has worked in Japan since at least 1992 (subparagraph 1.g.). 
Applicant's spouse (subparagraph 1.a.) was born in July 1973 in Japan; they were married
in the country in June 1997. She is a sales clerk in a candy store. According to Applicant, she is not
an agent of a foreign power, and not in a position to be exploited by a foreign power. Applicant's
nine-year-old child (subparagraph 1.b.), a resident citizen of Japan, resides with Applicant and his
spouse at the current residence listed in module 4 of Applicant's SCA (Item 4). His son attends
private school. 
Applicant's mother (subparagraph 1.c.) is a resident citizen of Japan, living with Applicant's
father until recently as reported by Applicant in his answer to the SOR on February 20, 2007. She
is 59 years old and is a retired homemaker. When his father retires from his civilian position with
the U.S. Department of Defense, Applicant's mother will retire with him in Hawaii or Guam.
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Applicant indicates she is not an agent of a foreign power. Applicant's father (subparagraph 1.d.),
57 years old, is a citizen of the United States U.S. However, he moved from Japan, and is now a
resident of the U.S., although Applicant does not know whether his new address will be his current
residence. 
Applicant's mother-in-law (subparagraph 1.e.), 47 years old, lives about a block from
Applicant's family; he sees her several times a week. She owns a restaurant. Applicant's brother-in-
law (subparagraph 1.f.), 29 years old, lives with Applicant's mother-in-law, and works as a cook in
the mother-in-law’s restaurant. Applicant sees him about once a week. 
Not alleged in the SOR, but identified as a relative in Applicant’s August 1, 2006 interview
is his grandmother, 87 years old and a retired homemaker. Applicant contacts her by telephone
several times a year. Applicant’s uncle is 57 years old and a business owner. Applicant has not seen
his uncle in about five years. 
The relatives (resident citizens of Japan) not alleged in the SOR on his wife’s side of the
family include his spouse’s sister, 32 years old, employed as a beautician, and married to a sales
representative. Applicant sees her about once a month. His spouse also has an aunt who is a sales
clerk, and a grandmother (retired homemaker) who lives with Applicant's mother-in-law. Applicant
sees his wife's aunt and grandmother every three to six months. 
Applicant has held eight employment positions in Japan (subparagraph 1.g.) since 1992 (Item
4) His employers have been mostly U.S. corporations providing information services to the U.S.
Department of Defense in Japan. Since August 2003, Applicant's primary employment (as indicated
in his SCA) has been a database administrator with a defense contractor (U.S. company). The
contractor performs work on the same U.S. installation that his father was assigned. Currently, he
is a financial systems analyst. Since March 2001, Applicant has also been employed part-time as an
English language instructor. 
According to the interview with Applicant on August 1, 2006, he does not believe any of his
relatives are connected to any foreign government. None of his relatives have asked questions about
his work, his security clearance or sensitive government information. Applicant does not have any
preference or allegiance for any country outside the U.S., and will follow security procedures by
reporting any suspicious efforts to contact him. 
Applicant has a Japanese bank account that is primarily used to cover his son's education
expenses. He has a checking account that he uses to pay bills. Applicant also has a bank account that
he uses for travel. Applicant's last account is with the credit union. 
The personal conduct allegation (subparagraph 2.a.) arises from Applicant’s negative answer
to question 18 (have you registered with the SSS?) of the SCA he signed on January 20, 2004. In the
remarks section of the question, Applicant stated, “I believed it was voluntary until it was too late
to register. I had a lack of knowledge and misunderstanding of the process. To my knowledge, I have
also not been notified of the non-voluntary aspects of the registration with the Selective Service.”
(Item 4) Applicant added a little detail in his answer to the SOR. He failed to register because he
thought that registration was voluntary permitting him to join the military at any time. Additionally,
he claims he had not received any notice of the obligation to register. When he viewed the SSS
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website and learned that registration was a legal requirement, he was already 26 years old and his
attempt to register was rejected. 
An investigation by the SSS website (www.4.sss.gov/regver/verif_not_found.asp) disclosed
on January 31, 2007 (Item 6) that a registration record could not be found for Applicant. 
An investigation of Applicant was made by the United States Air Force Office of Special
Investigations (AFOSI) that ended on October 14, 2004. The investigation (Item 7), conducted at the
request of DOHA, consisted of record checks and interviews. A review of records of the air base
facility and surrounding area where Applicant was (and still is) employed, “disclosed no derogatory
information regarding subject.” All people interviewed recommended Applicant for a position of
trust. 
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth guidelines containing disqualifying conditions (DC)
and mitigating conditions (MC) that should be given binding consideration in making security
clearance determinations. These conditions must be considered in every case along with the general
factors of the whole person concept. However, the conditions are not automatically determinative
of the decision in any case nor can they supersede the Administrative Judge's reliance on his own
common sense. 
Burden of Proof
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, that conditions exist in the
personal or professional history of the applicant which disqualifies, or may disqualify, the applicant
from being eligible for access to classified information. See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518, 531 (1988) “[T]he Directive presumes there is a nexus or rational connection between
proven conduct under any of the Criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.” ISCR
Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996) (quoting DISCR Case No. 92-1106 (App. Bd. Oct.
7, 1993)). 
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition, the burden shifts to the applicant
to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. “[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err,
if they must, on the side of denials.” See Egan, 481 U.S. at 531; see Directive E2.2.2.
Foreign Influence (FI)
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a person, group, 
organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure by any
foreign interest. 
Personal Conduct (PC)
 Applicant’s father no longer resides in Japan. 1
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Conduct involving questionable judgment, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules
ands regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness. 
CONCLUSIONS
Foreign Influence (FI)
The FI guideline calls for a careful evaluation of whether an applicant may be manipulated
or induced by his foreign contacts and/or financial interests to help a foreign entity in a way that is
harmful to U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Applicant’s
mother, mother-in-law, and brother-in-law are resident citizens of Japan.  FI disqualifying condition1
(DC) 7.a. (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other
person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk
of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) applies based on the
foreign citizenship of Applicant’s family members. FI DC 7d. (sharing living quarters with a person
or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) applies to his spouse and child being resident
citizens of Japan and sharing a residence with Applicant.
Considering the evidence as a whole, FI mitigating condition (MC) 8.a. (the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which the persons are located, or the positions or
activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in
a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or
government and the interests of the U.S.) may be potentially applicable. All of Applicant’s family
members identified in the SOR are resident citizens of Japan except for Applicant’s father. However,
none of Applicant’s family members are agents of any foreign government. His wife is a sales clerk
in a candy store. His nine-year-old child is attending a private school. His mother is a 49-year-old
retired homemaker. His father is 47 years old, a U.S. citizen, employed by the U.S. Department of
Defense, and currently lives in the U.S., not Japan as alleged in the SOR. Applicant’s mother-in-law
is a restaurant owner. Applicant’s brother-in-law is a 29-year-old cook in his mother-in-law’s
restaurant. Applicant’s sister-in-law is 32 years old and employed as a beautician. 
In determining whether the listed family members create a heightened risk of manipulation
or coercion, the type of government and foreign country must be evaluated. Japan is constitutional
monarchy with a parliamentary government, and a good human rights record. Though territorial
disputes and misunderstandings persist with a few regional neighbors, Japan continues to work with
regional and worldwide organizations like the United Nations to resolve those disputes peacefully.
The country has been a strong ally of the U.S., and has provided significant support to the U.S. in
the world wide war on terror. Even though Japan is considered in the noticed material as an active
collector of economic and proprietary information, its good human rights record indicates that the
country is less likely to manipulate or coerce its citizens in a way that could force Applicant to
choose between the interests of a foreign family member and the interests of the U.S.
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FI MC 8.a. also mitigates Applicant’s employment in Japan since 1992. Most of Applicant’s
employers have been U.S. corporations. He is currently employed as a financial systems analyst by
a U.S. defense contractor whose facility is located on a U.S. military installation in Japan. He
maintains his only preference and allegiance is for the U.S. He also stated he would report any
suspicious contacts to the appropriate authorities. Even though his prediction on how he would act
in the future to a particular set of circumstances does not actually mean he would follow through
with his predicted actions should those circumstances arise, his statements nonetheless, receive some
favorable weight. ISCR Case NO. 02-26826 (November 12, 2003) Subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.g.
are found for Applicant 
Personal Conduct (PC)
The Government argues that Applicant’s foreign contacts and his failure to register with the
Selective Service make PC DC 16.c. (credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which,
when considered as a whole, supports the whole-person assessment of questionable judgment,
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations,
or other characteristics indicating the person may not properly safeguard classified information)
applicable to deny Applicant’s security clearance application. Having weighed and balanced
Applicant’s remarks to question 18 of his SCA (Item 4) with his answer to the SOR, I do not find
Applicant willfully failed to register with the SSS. 
If prosecuted and convicted, a failure to register with the SSS, a blueprint for the U.S. to
devise and administer a draft for males between 18 and 26 years of age, can result in  criminal
penalties of up to $250,000.00 fine and up to five years’ imprisonment. Over the years, registration
with the SSS has become a condition for receiving other types of Federal benefits such as student
aid, training, and Federal employment. This condition was imposed to persuade more eligible men
to register. At the Federal level, a non-registrant may not be excluded from a benefit if he can show
his failure to register was not knowing and wilful. Many states make registration with the SSS a
requirement for receiving a state driver’s license. It appears this requirement was applied to assure
that even greater numbers of draft-eligible men are registered with the SSS.
Having weighed and balanced Applicant’s remarks under question 18 of his SCA with his
answer, I conclude Applicant mistakenly believed that because joining a branch of the service was
optional, registering with the SSS was also optional. After learning that SSS registration was
required by law, Applicant attempted to cure his act of omission by registering, but, having reached
age 26, his registration attempt was rejected. Though not an excuse for not complying with the
registration law, a factor that still must be considered is Applicant was (and still is) residing and
working in Japan between the age of 19 and 26 (seven years of the time period in which an applicant
is required to register), and therefore, not exposed to the extant triggering mechanisms at the state
and Federal levels reminding eligible stateside males to register. 
Though Applicant’s failure to register constitutes a serious lapse of judgment, his act of
omission is mitigated under PC MC 17.c. (the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or
the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment).
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The failure to register is clearly not a minor offense because even a small number of omitted names
from the Selective Service roster defeats the legislative objective of the SSS policy to devise and
implement the fairest and most equitable selection system in case a draft is reinstated. However,
there is no evidence of a pattern of similar behavior since 1999 (when Applicant finally made an
unsuccessful attempt to register). Applicant has no criminal record and the persons interviewed by
AFOSI have all recommended him for a position of trust. 
After weighing and balancing all the disqualifying conditions and evidence against the
mitigating conditions and evidence, in the context of the whole person model, Applicant has
mitigated the security concerns associated with the FI guideline and the PC guideline. Subparagraphs
1.a through 1.g., and subparagraph 2.a. are resolved in Applicant’s favor. 
FORMAL FINDINGS
Paragraph 1 (Foreign Influence, Guideline B): FOR THE APPLICANT
Subparagraph a. For the Applicant.
Subparagraph b. For the Applicant. 
Subparagraph c. For the Applicant.
Subparagraph d. For the Applicant.
Subparagraph e. For the Applicant.
Subparagraph f. For the Applicant.
Subparagraph g. For the Applicant.
Paragraph 2 (Personal Conduct, Guideline E): 
Subparagraph a. For the Applicant.
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is
granted. 
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Paul J. Mason
Administrative Judge